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The boom of bilateral investment treaties and trade agreements came with an increasing 
number of disputes between investors and states related to actions and omissions of 
states in respect of the protection of investors and their investments. These instruments 
made a significant contribution to the development and implementation of an economic 
and legal framework for the promotion and safeguard of investors and investments. 
They also played an important part in and improved the access of investors to dispute 
resolution mechanisms – and, in particular, to arbitration – for the protection of their 
investments. 
 
In this vast network of treaties and agreements aspiring to offer investors proper 
conditions for a stable and predictable investment environment, the Energy Charter 
Treaty (ECT) stands out as a unique multilateral treaty aimed at facilitating transactions 
and investments in the energy field. The ECT came to life soon after the fall of the 
communist regimes across Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and it was 
motivated by the desire of the Western European states to secure their access to the 
much needed natural resources of the Eastern countries.  
 
This Thesis undertakes the challenging task of clarifying the notion of ‘Investor’ within 
the ECT’s framework and its related treaties and arbitration rules. The notion of 
‘Investor’ is essential for the substantive and procedural protection of Investors and 
their Investments. Although the ECT provides for a definition of Investor, the notion of 
‘Investor’ goes beyond this definition: it is shaped not only by the provisions of the 
ECT, but also by the related treaties and rules under the Investor–Contracting Party 
dispute resolution mechanism. It is also fundamental for the understanding of the 
notion of ‘Investor’ to consider it as it naturally interacts with the concepts of 
‘Contracting Party’ and ‘Investment’. The notion of ‘Investor’ has two essential 
characteristics: it is challenging to assign it with a precise definition – any attempt to 
define this notion will not comprehensively encompass all its features; and it is a 
flexible notion, tailored to suit the treaties and rules interacting with the ECT. The 
intrinsic complexity of the notion of ‘Investor’ is amplified by web of provisions of the 
ECT, not always comprehensible and straightforward. The speed of the ECT’s 
negotiation was the determinant factor that contributed to the entry into force of the 
ECT, but also led to a compromise treaty. In this context, it is mandatory that the 
proper interpretation and analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ be made in the light of the 
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1. INVESTORS AND INVESTMENTS IN THE ENERGY FIELD 
 
Energy resources are the driving force of the economic development, although their 
ownership lies, most often, in the hands of states.1 The world’s confirmed reserves of oil 
and gas have increased since 1980 with an average annual rate of 2.4% and 3.4% 
respectively.2 More than half of the oil reserves are concentrated in the Middle East,3 
while over 70% of the world’s gas reserves are in the fields located in Russia and the 
Middle East.4 Over 80% of the coal deposits are found in six countries, amongst which, 
the United States (28.9%), Russia (19%), and China (13.9%).5 In spite of the increase in 
the reserves of oil and gas, the global production in 2009 registered record drops.6 For 
the European Union (EU), the data of 2008 shows imports exceeding exports, while in 
2006 the import reliance was of 54%.7 However, the European Commission considers 
that “import dependency is not a problem as such but requires appropriate policies.”8 
                                                
1
 Energy is “one of the most important sources of “hard” foreign currency earnings and a major source of 
tax revenue”. See, Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty. A Reader’s Guide, p. 7, 
<http://www.encharter.org/fileadmin/user_upload/document/ECT_Guide_ENG.pdf> (last visited, 16 
February 2011). 
2
 Commission of the European Communities; Second Strategic Energy Review. An EU Energy Security 
and Solidarity Action Plan; Europe's current and future energy position. Demand – resources – 
investments, pp. 33–34, Brussels, 13 November 2008, SEC(2008) 2871, vol. 1. According to the BP 
Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, the proved oil reserves at the end of 2008 increased with more 
than 20% compared with the 1999 figure. See, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010, p. 6, 
<http://www.bp.com/liveassets/bp_internet/globalbp/globalbp_uk_english/reports_and_publications/statis
tical_energy_review_2008/STAGING/local_assets/2010_downloads/statistical_review_of_world_energy
_full_report_2010.pdf> (last visited, 16 February 2011). 
3
 BP Statistical Review; supra at FN 2, p. 6. 
4
 Ibid., p. 22. In 2009, the Middle East countries had a share of 40.6%, while Russia, 23.7%. (id.) 
5
 BP Statistical Review; supra at FN 2, p. 32. The United States, Russia and China are followed by 
Australia (9.2%), India (7.1%) and Ukraine (4.1%). 
6
 Ibid., pp. 3–4. 
7
 Second Strategic Energy Review; supra at FN 2, p. 8. Denmark is the only EU Member State that is 
completely energy independent, while Poland and United Kingdom have low import dependency (approx. 
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The limited nature of energy resources triggers significant trade that transcends national 
borders. By essence, the uneven distribution of oil, gas and coal supplies generates a 
range of worldwide relations that are complex and challenging: from exploration to 
production, distribution and consumption and other related activities without which the 
energy products would not reach their final destination.9 Energy economy is no longer 
limited to the making of profit; environmental issues, for example, became the concern 
of the major players in the field, for energy companies and regulators alike.10 Energy is 
going beyond conventional resources and expanding towards clean and renewable 
sources, such as wind and sunlight.11 
 
Energy investments distinguish themselves from other forms of investment essentially 
by their large size and the lengthy period between the initial commitment and the first 
returns. Energy investments concerning exploration and development must materialize 
where resources are located, be it inland or off–shore. States, usually through their 
national companies, play an important role in energy investments, since they have the 
ownership rights over energy–related resources.12 The sovereignty over natural 
resources places states in a comfortable position as it is the state that decides the energy 
                                                                                                                                          
20%). On the other hand, several EU Member States such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal and Spain are forced 
to import more than 80% of their energy demand, while Malta, Cyprus and Luxembourg are fully reliant 
on energy imports. See, Second Strategic Energy Review; supra at FN 2, p. 9. 
8
 Id. But the EU’s energy production has been declining since 2004. See, Second Strategic Energy 
Review; supra at FN 2, p. 9. 
9
 For a presentation of the energy field, its players and mechanisms, see, Waelde, Thomas W.; 
International Energy Law: Concepts, Context and Players, 1(4) OGEL (2003).  
10
 See, the BP Deepwater Horizon spill in the Gulf of Mexico, which commenced on 20 April 2010 with 
the explosion of the Deepwater Horizon rig and caused the leak of 5.2 million barrels into the Gulf of 
Mexico. The costs were estimated at over USD 6 billion. See, Pfeifer, Sylvia; Costs of BP oil spill 
increase to $6bn; Financial Times, 9 August 2010. Up to 10 February 2011, BP made payments of over 
USD 5 billion to individuals, businesses and government entities in connection with the spill. See, BP; 
Claims and government payments Gulf of Mexico oil spill, Public report – data as of 10 February 2011, 
<http://www.bp.com/sectiongenericarticle.do?categoryId=9034722&contentId=7064398> (last visited, 16 
February 2011). 
11
 Wind power generated in 2008 more than 1.5% of the world’s electricity. See, Sawin, Janet L.; Wind 
Power Increase in 2008 Exceeds 10–Year Average, <http://vitalsigns.worldwatch.org/vs-trend/wind-
power-increase-2008-exceeds-10-year-average> (last visited, 16 February 2011). 
12
 But see the example of the United States, where the private ownership over minerals is significant. 
According to LOWE, the federal government owns 30% of United States mineral rights. See, Lowe, John 
S.; Oil and Gas Law in a Nutshell; 5th edition, St. Paul: Thomson West, 2009, p. 8. 
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policies and the resources that can be shared with foreign investors.13 The risk 
associated with energy investments is significant given the size of the commitments and 
the duration of investments. The life span of energy investments often forces the 
modification of the terms of the agreements between investors and governments.14 
 
Investors in the energy field range from small to large companies. Natural persons 
usually emerge as shareholders in these companies and rarely become visible in energy 
transactions. The energy sector is still dominated by major players,15 multinational or 
international private companies, such as British Petroleum, ExxonMobil, EDF and 
E.ON, and national companies, for example, Petrobras (Brazil), Gazprom (Russia) and 
                                                
13
 See, the UN General Assembly Resolution 626, that 
“[…] recommends all Member States to refrain from acts, direct or indirect, designed to impede the exercise 
of the sovereignty of any State over its natural resources.” (UN General Assembly Resolution 626(VIII) of 21 
December 1952, emphasis original) 
Also, the UN General Assembly Resolution 1803 refers to the “right of peoples and nationals to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources” and to the “exploration, development and 
disposition of such resources” that “should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the 
peoples and nations freely consider”. See, UN General Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII) of 14 December 
1962, paras 1 and 2. The Resolution 1803, para. 4 also provides that “[n]ationalization, expropriation or 
requisitioning shall be based on grounds or reasons of public utility, security or the national interest”. 
See also, Yergin, Daniel; The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power, New York: Free Press, 
2009, p. 212: 
“If oil was power, it was also a symbol of sovereignty. That inevitably meant a collision between the 
objectives of oil companies and the interests of nation–states, a clash that was to become a lasting 
characteristic of international politics.” 
14
 For the types of contracts used in the energy field, see, Cameron, Peter; International Energy 
Investment Law. The Pursuit of Stability; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 36 et seq.; Lowe, 
J.S.; supra at FN 12, pp. 386 et seq.; Hollis Slocum, Sheila; Berresford, John W.; Structuring Legal 
Relationships in Oil and Gas Exploration and Development in ‘Frontier’ Countries, p. 37 et seq., in 
Waelde, Thomas W.; Ndi, George K. (eds.); International Oil and Gas Investment. Moving Eastward?, 
London/Dordrecht/Boston: Graham & Trotman/Martinus Nijhoff, 1994. 
15
 See, Tomain, Joseph P.; Cudahy, Richard D.; Energy Law in a Nutshell; reprinted, St. Paul: Thomson 
West, 2004, p. 153: “In short, the story of oil is a story of multinational corporations and global politics.” 
See also, Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 9, pp. 43–48. But see also, the increasing role of international 
agencies and organizations. The International Energy Agency (IEA), which was initially established to 
co–ordinate the measures to be taken during oil supply emergency situations, is now acting as energy 
policy advisor for its twenty–eight member countries, amongst which, Member States of the EU, the 
United States and Canada. See further information at <http://www.iea.org/> (last visited, 16 February 
2011). The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) was created in 1960 by Iraq, 
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela with the objective to co–ordinate the petroleum policies of the 
member states. The OPEC has currently twelve members that account for more than 79% of the world’s 
oil reserves. See further information at <http://www.opec.org/opec_web/en/data_graphs/330.htm> (last 
visited, 16 February 2011). Also important is the growing presence of the Energy Community founded by 
the Treaty establishing the Energy Community, 1 July 2006, between the European Union, Albania, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, the 
United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo, Moldova and Ukraine. See, 
<http://www.energy-community.org/portal/page/portal/ENC_HOME> (last visited, 16 February 2011). 
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Pemex (Mexico). The last decades of fluctuating prices for barrel of oil triggered some 
surprising mergers and market adjustments, for instance, the BP and Amoco merger of 
1998 and the Exxon and Mobil merger of 1999. 
 
Disputes involving energy companies are numerous and submitted for resolution to 
various venues, from mediation to domestic and international courts and commercial 
and investment arbitration. They are based on various binding instruments, from 
agreements between governments and private companies to bilateral and multilateral 
treaties. In 1950, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) dismissed the case between the 
United Kingdom and Iran concerning the termination of petroleum concessions in Iran 
of the Anglo–Iranian Oil Company for lack of jurisdiction.16 In the Lena Goldfields 
Case of 1930,17 the arbitral tribunal held the Soviet government liable to pay over GBP 
8 million to Lena Goldfields Ltd., a British corporation, which was granted a concession 
with the exclusive right to mine gold and other minerals in the Ural Mountains and parts 
of Siberia. The energy disputes in Aramco and Sapphire Cases were both submitted to 
arbitration and remain notorious for the stabilization clauses contained in the concession 
agreement and in the petroleum agreement, respectively.18 In 1971, the Government of 
Libya enacted a decree that nationalized the interests and properties in Libya of BP 
Exploration Company Ltd., and in 1973 continued applying these measures to other 
international oil companies in Libya. As a result of this policy, three arbitration 
proceedings had been initiated against Libya: by BP Exploration Company (BP Case),19 
                                                
16
 Anglo–Iranian Oil Co. Case, Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 22 July 1952. 
17
 Lena Goldfields Ltd v. USSR, Award of 3 September 1930. See also, Veeder, V.V.; The Lena 
Goldfields Arbitration: The Historical Roots of Three Ideas, 47 ICLQ 747 (1998); Nussbaum, Arthur; 
The Arbitration between the Lena Goldfields, Ltd. and the Soviet Government, 36 Cornell L. Q. 31 
(1950–1951). 
18
 Saudi Arabia v. Arabian American Oil Company, Award of 23 August 1958, and Sapphire 
International Petroleum Co v. National Iranian Oil Company, Award of 15 March 1963. 
19
 British Petroleum Exploration (Libya) Company Ltd. v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, 
Award of 10 October 1973. 
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Texaco Overseas Petroleum and California Asiatic Oil Company (Texaco Case),20 and 
the third arbitration by the Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO Case).21 Also 
important is the Aminoil Case,22 where the dispute concerned a sixty–year concession 
contract between the government of Kuwait and the American Independent Oil 
Company. 
 
With the growing number of investment treaties,23 investors in the energy field began to 
look for alternative venues to national courts and commercial arbitration.24 The 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), created by the 
Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of 
Other States (ICSID Convention),25 received more than 330 disputes based on BITs and 
other treaties offering protection to investors and their investments, or on the domestic 
law of the host state or on contracts between the disputing parties.26 39% of the cases 
submitted to the ICSID concern energy–related disputes,27 while 4% of them are relying 
on the provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty (ECT).28 If the disputes between states 
and energy investors mainly concerned direct expropriation claims, nowadays, the cases 
brought under treaties for the protection and promotion of investments also rely on 
                                                
20
 Texaco Overseas Petroleum Company and California Asiatic Oil Company v. Government of the 
Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 19 January 1977. 
21
 Libyan American Oil Company v. Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Award of 12 April 1977. 
22
 The Government of the State of Kuwait v. American Independent Oil Company, Award of 24 March 
1982. For further comments on the arbitration of petroleum disputes, see, Bishop, Doak R.; International 
Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a Lex Petrolea, in Van den Berg, Albert Jan 
(ed.); XXIII Y.B. Com. Arb 1131 (1998). 
23
 Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) are estimated today to be over 2,600, accompanied by numerous 
Free Trade Agreements (FTAs). See, UNCTAD; World Investment Report 2009: Transnational 
Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development, p. xxii. 
24
 See, Bowman, John P.; Dispute Resolution Planning for the Oil and Gas Industry, 16 ICSID Rev.–FILJ 
332 (2001); Dundas, Hew R.; Dispute Resolution in the Oil & Gas Industry: an Oilman’s Perspective, 
1(3) TDM (2004).  
25
 Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States, 14 
October 1966. The references are made to the version reprinted in 1 ICSID Reports 3 (1993). 
26
 ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2011–1, pp. 7 and 10. The statistics take into 
consideration the cases submitted by 30 December 2010. See also, ICSID, The ICSID Caseload – 
Statistics, Issue 2010–2 and Issue 2010–1. 
27
 The ICSID Caseload – Statistics, Issue 2011–1, supra at FN 26, p. 12. 
28
 Ibid., p. 10. The Energy Charter Treaty was signed on 17 December 1994 and entered into force on 16 
April 1998. The references in this Thesis are made to the version printed in 34 ILM 373 (1995). 
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indirect expropriations through regulatory or administrative policies, such as the setting 
of tariffs or granting of licenses.29 
 
The expansion of international instruments for the protection and promotion of 
investments brought visibility and complexity to investor–state disputes.30 The 
substantive protection of investments, ranging from fair and equitable treatment 
standard to protection against unlawful expropriation, along with the procedural 
protection granted to investors and their investments are intended to strengthen the legal 
framework in which investments are made, and enhance transparency and stability.  
 
2. THE EUROPEAN ENERGY CHARTER AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 
 
Around 500 B.C., Heraclitus stated that “everything flows and nothing stands still”.31 
This statement cannot be more accurate when referring to investments, investors and 
their protection. Evolving from customary law, and in particular from the rules 
concerning expropriation of aliens’ property, to a body of law based on treaties and 
other agreements, investment law is concerned with investors and their investments. 
The notions of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ are developing concepts. If decades ago 
lawyers and economists had in mind only foreign direct investments, currently, 
                                                
29
 See, for example, Enron Creditors Recovery Corporation (formerly Enron Corporation) and 
Ponderosa Assets, L.P. v. Argentine Republic; LG&E Energy Corp., LG&E Capital Corp. and LG&E 
International Inc. v. Argentine Republic etc. 
30
 For the particularities of the disputes between investors and states, see, UNCTAD; Investor–State 
Disputes. Prevention and Alternatives to Arbitration, p. 10 et seq. According to this study, the investor–
state disputes are mainly characterized by the following: they involve a sovereign as respondent; the 
investor challenges acts and measures or omissions of the state; they are governed by international law 
and concern violations of an international instrument; the relationship between the parties involves a 
long–term engagement; the claim of investor is often very high. 
31
 Also, “There is nothing permanent except change”. 
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investments include all kinds of rights and interests.32 Also, the flux of investments is 
no longer restricted to flows from developed countries to developing countries. 
 
Natural resources–related investments have always been a sensitive field with particular 
consequences: from exploitation to intervention measures, to ownership rights and 
exhaustibility, regulation and excessive risks. As explained by scholars, “foreign 
investors in these sectors have been particular targets of nationalistic actions on the part 
of host authorities.”33 The repositioning of the national economies after the fall of the 
communist regimes in Eurasia in 1989–1991 brought significant changes in the 
distribution of natural resources and economic wealth, along with the entrance of new 
players and the opening of investment opportunities. For the Eastern European states 
and the former Soviet countries, the freedom from the communist regime came with 
political and civil unrest and economic decline. Their industries and, in particular, the 
energy sector encountered problems in performance, with outdated technologies and 
products, and capital shortages. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the 
independence of the former Soviet republics increased the investment prospects for 
Western investors. However, this came along with a high investment risk, triggered by 
excessive bureaucracy, uncertainties in policies and procedures, inadequate 
infrastructure, political instability etc.34 At the same time, the Western European states 
were going through unprecedented energy crisis. The security supply was the main 
                                                
32
 Loibl, Gerhard; International Economic Law, p. 709, in Evans D., Malcom (ed.); International Law, 
2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006. 
33
 Moran H., Theodore; Foreign Direct Investment and development: The New Policy Agenda for 
Developing Countries and Economies in Transition, Washington DC: Institute for International 
Economics, 1998, p. 141. 
34
 See, Dorian, James P.; Khartukov, Eugene M.; International Oil and Gas Investment in the CIS States, 
p. 63, in Waelde, Thomas W. (ed.); The Energy Charter Treaty. An East–West Gateway for Investment & 
Trade, London: Kluwer Law International, 1996. 
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concern of the Member States of the EU, with consumption exceeding production with 
over 50% in 1990 and amounting to 12.5% of the world energy consumption.35 
 
In this economic, political and social context, the idea of a multilateral energy treaty 
came to life. The Western European states foresaw the potential of the opening up of the 
former Soviet Union energy market and envisaged their role in securing the necessary 
energy resources and reducing their reliance on the OPEC supplies. The idea of a 
multilateral treaty in the energy field was launched at the meeting of the European 
Council in Dublin of 25–26 June 1990, where the Dutch Prime Minister LUBBERS, 
suggested the establishment of a European Energy Network.36 The first step in 
achieving this objective was the signature of the European Energy Charter (European 
Charter) on 17 December 1991 by a large number of states, including Russia, the United 
States and the European Communities. The European Charter is no more than a political 
declaration, setting the objectives for the negotiation and implementation of a 
multilateral treaty in the energy field. The notion of ‘energy’, as employed by the 
European Charter, and later by the ECT, has a broad meaning, “embracing the whole 
course of handling energy; from geological prospecting to final consumption in 
different sectors of the economy”,37 including the activities linked to the energy 
industry. The European Charter sees the co–operation in the energy field as a crucial 
element in the social and economic development and the security of energy supply and 
                                                
35
 European Communities; Energy Yearly Statistics 1991, Bruxelles: CECA–CEE–CEEA, 1993, pp. 2 and 
4. In the first quarter of 1991, the net imports exceeded the production, and registered constant increase of 
over 2%. See, International Energy Agency; Quarterly Oil Statistics and Energy Balances, Third Quarter 
1991; Paris: OECD/IEA, 1992, pp. 9–10. 
36
 European Council; Presidency Conclusions, Dublin 25 and 26 June 1990, p. 10; Final Act of the 
European Energy Charter Conference, Lisbon, 16–17 December 1994 (Final Act), 34 ILM 373 (1995), p. 
373, para. II. At the Ministerial Conference held in the Hague for the signature of the European Charter, 
CARDOSO E CUNHA, the European Energy Commissioner, stated that the European Charter 
“[…] represents an international undertaking of unprecedented proportions and highlights the importance of 
the energy sector for the development of our economies and societies.” (Speech by Mr Cardoso E Cunha at 
the Ministerial Conference for the signing of the European Energy Charter, The Hague, 16 December 1991) 
37
 Konoplyanik, Andrei A. with von Halem, Friedrich; The Energy Charter Treaty: A Russian 
Perspective, p. 165, in Waelde, T.W (ed.); supra at FN 34. 
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it refers to the promotion of international flow of investments, while signatories will 
“provide for a stable, transparent legal framework for foreign investments”,38 and 
commit to negotiate binding documents for the efficient implementation of the 
European Charter.39 
 
Almost three years after the birth of the European Charter, the ECT was put forward for 
signature and ratification and came into force on 16 April 1998. The close relation 
between the European Charter and the ECT is not limited to the drafting history of the 
ECT. Article 2 of the ECT refers to the purpose of the ECT to “establish a legal 
framework in order to promote long–term cooperation in the energy field, […] in 
accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter”, while Article 41 confines 
the accession to the ECT only to signatories of the European Charter.40 
 
Twenty years after the signature of the European Charter, there are still controversies 
regarding the original purpose and the reasons behind its creation. Almost unanimously, 
the literature considers that the main factor generating the idea of an energy treaty 
connecting East and West was the desire of Western countries to secure energy supply 
from the “beleaguered economies in transition”.41 The real expectations of the 
                                                
38
 European Charter, Title II, point 4(1). 
39
 See also, Note for the attention of Mr Jones and Mr Guibal, Articles on the European Energy Charter 
from RH Greenwood, where GREENWOOD discusses the necessity of legally binding texts for the 
implementation of the European Charter: 
“[…] it can be seen that the Charter is a wide ranging declaration of key importance for establishing a 
renewed energy industry and energy community across Europe and beyond. Nevertheless it was recognised 
from the beginning that these political declarations alone would not be sufficient to promote industrial 
investment and trade and would therefore need to be translated into legally binding texts, that is into 
international treaty.” (Commission of the European Communities; Note for the attention of Mr Jones and Mr 
Guibal, Articles on the European Energy Charter from RH Greenwood, 09.04.92/XVII/04804) 
40
 Art. 41 of the ECT provides that the ECT “shall be open for accession […] by states and Regional 
Economic Integration Organizations which have signed the Charter […].” 
41
 Brazell, Lorna; Draft Energy Charter Treaty: Trade, Competition, Investment and Environment, 12 (3) 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 299 (1994), p. 302. Other authors agree with this: 
“[t]hrough the proposed energy co–operation, West European countries saw the chance to secure access 
to Eastern markets for their energy industries”. See, Doré, Julia; Negotiating the Energy Charter Treaty, 
p. 139, in Waelde, T.W. (ed.); supra at FN 34. 
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signatories of the European Charter in 1991 were highly motivated by political and 
economic reasons. The Russian delegation believed that an Energy Charter would 
encourage investments in the energy sectors, but that there was also the danger that 
opening markets to Western companies would weaken the control of Russia over its 
strategic industries.42 The aim of the Central and Eastern European states was to reduce 
their dependence on the former Soviet Union, as most of them fully relied on the former 
Soviet Union for their oil and gas supplies. The United States allegedly entered into 
negotiations hoping to prevent the Western European countries from monopolizing the 
energy markets and resources of Russia and the former Soviet republics.43 The other 
non–European OECD countries – Australia, Canada and Japan – wanted to ensure their 
participation in the Eurasian energy market and to secure their membership in a 
multilateral trade and investment agreement to which Russia was a party.44 By the time 
the European Charter was concluded, several other purposes had been taken into 
consideration: the economic reconstruction of the former communist states and the 
removal of barriers in the trade and investment relations with these countries,45 the 
improvement of the economic relations between East and West, the efficient use and 
exploitation of natural resources, the protection of the environment, technological 
development and innovation in the energy field etc. The ECT appears to move to more 
balanced provisions than the European Charter, by encouraging the flow of investments 
                                                
42
 See, Doré, Julia; De Bauw, Robert; The Energy Charter Treaty. Origins, Aims and Prospects, London: 
Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1995, p. 23. 
43
 Ibid, p. 25. See also, the U.S. Government Statement, European Energy Charter Meeting, Lisbon, 
Portugal, 15–16 December 1994; 34 ILM 557 (1995). 
44
 Doré, J.; De Bauw, R.; supra at FN 42, p. 25. The authors refer to Japan who, at the time of the of 
negotiation of the European Charter, was unable to enter into bilateral agreements with the Russian 
Federation due to the continuing dispute over the Kurile Islands. 
45
 The main barriers to investment and trade in the former Communist countries “arise from legal and 
administrative complexities and uncertainties, such as absent or confusing legislation and unclear legal 
authority over resources”. See, Doré, J.; De Bauw, R.; supra at FN 42, p. xiv. Besides these legal and 
administrative complexities and uncertainties, the political instability in these countries played an 
important role in preventing the establishment of investments and the development of trade and transit. 
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not only from West to East, but also from East to West,46 and, thus, creating the 
potential for one of the world’s largest energy markets.  
 
The ECT is sometimes referred to as a “free trade agreement”,47 or as a “post–Cold War 
miracle”.48 Negotiated between July 1991 and December 1994, the ECT is the only 
multilateral document for the protection of investments (in the energy field) that 
succeeded in being negotiated, signed and entered into force in such a short period.49 
The fact that the ECT, by creating a multilateral regime for the protection and 
promotion of foreign investments in the energy field, entered into force is, in itself, a 
success.50 The ECT was signed at the Final Plenary Session of the European Energy 
Charter Conference in Lisbon on 16–17 December 1994 and it was open for signature 
from 17 December 1994 to 16 June 1995.51 Up to date, the following states and 
Regional Economic Integration Organizations consented to be bound by the ECT:52 
                                                
46
 The ECT’s symmetry also encourages the East–East and West–West investments. Russian energy 
companies – see for example, Lukoil, Gazprom – have proved successful in investing in the Eastern 
European and former Soviet states. One author referred to this and spotted a “distinct advantage [of the 
Russian companies] over the Western newcomers”. See, Andrews–Speed, Philip; The Energy Charter 
Treaty: Its Importance to Western European Energy Companies, 9 Oil and Gas Law and Taxation 
Review 373 (1996), p. 377. This distinct advantage lies in Russia’s political, economic and cultural 
influence exercised for over fifty years. 
47
 Herman, Lawrence L.; NAFTA and the ECT: Divergent Approaches with a Core of Harmony, 15 
Journal of Energy and Natural Resources Law 129 (1997), p. 130. 
48
 Samuels, David; Power Surge, 2(2) GAR April/May 2007, p. 10. 
49
 It is often seen that the success of the conclusion of the ECT lies in the speed of its negotiation, also 
referred to as “the ethos of negotiation” of the ECT. See, Samuels, D.; supra at FN 48, p. 10. 
50
 For unsuccessful attempts to create a multilateral framework for investments, see, Wendrich, Claudia; 
The World Bank Guidelines as a Foundation for a Global Investment Treaty: A Problem–Oriented 
Approach; 2(5) TDM (2005); Tschofen, Franziska; Multilateral Approaches to Treatment of Foreign 
Investments; 7 ICSID Rev.—FILJ 384 (1992). 
Initially, the ECT was planned to be negotiated in one year, but various factors prevented the completion 
of the negotiations according to the original timetable. See; Doré, J.; supra at FN 41, p. 137. DORÉ gives 
several reasons for the delay in reaching the final draft of the ECT. First, the timetable reflected “strong 
political ambitions”. It was thought that the short negotiation period will result in a speedy agreement and 
will maintain the high level of enthusiasm. However, it turned out that agreeing on legal provisions was 
not that easy as dealing with political statements. Second, the complexity of the issues came to surface 
only after the negotiations begun. Third, the ECT drafters had to implement free trade concepts that were 
completely new to the former Soviet bloc. Needles to say that the negotiations had been challenged by the 
disputes between the Western delegations. For further discussions, see, Doré, J.; supra at FN 41, pp. 137–
138. 
51
 See, Final Act; supra at FN 36. 
52
 The status of Contracting Party to the ECT should not be mistaken for the membership or observership 
standing to the Energy Charter Process. The members of the Energy Charter Process are either signatories 
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a. Contracting Parties to the ECT: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belgium, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, 
Estonia, the European Communities, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Liechtenstein, 
Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Moldova, Mongolia, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, 
Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, the Former, 
Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Kingdom 
and Uzbekistan.53 
b. Signatories of the ECT: Australia, Belarus, Iceland, Norway.54 
 
The scope of the ECT is not to regulate in detail all issues concerning the energy field, 
but to provide a “framework” based on which the Contracting Parties can further 
                                                                                                                                          
or Contracting Parties to the ECT. Observership is considered to be “a “light” form of participation in the 
Charter Process”. See, The Energy Charter Treaty. A Reader’s Guide; supra at FN 1, p. 66. There are two 
categories of observers: (i) observers who have signed the European Charter (Afghanistan, Canada, 
Indonesia, Jordan, Pakistan, Serbia, Syria, United States); and (ii) observers who have not signed the 
European Charter (Algeria, Bahrain, China, Egypt, Iran, Korea, Kuwait, Morocco, Nigeria, Oman, 
Palestinian National Authority, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates, Venezuela, the 
Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Baltic Sea Region Energy Co–Operation 
(BASREC), the Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), the CIS Electric Power Council, the European 
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), the IEA, the OECD, the UN Economic Commission 
for Europe (UN–ECE), the World Bank, the World Trade Organization (WTO)). The status of observer to 
the Energy Charter Process may be a transitional step towards full membership. See, The Energy Charter 
Treaty. A Reader’s Guide; supra at FN 1, p. 67. 
53
 Major producers of energy have not signed or ratified the ECT, while major consumers of energy are 
regarding the ECT in a favourable light. The ECT is sometimes viewed as a club for rich countries, as no 
African, Asian or Latin American states are part of it. This situation is frequently blamed on the 
demanding conditions for the accession to the ECT. See, Doré, J.; De Bauw, R.; supra at FN 42, p. 88. 
54
 Relying on the provisions of Art. 49 of the ECT, on 20 August 2009, the Russian Federation informed 
the Depository, the Government of the Portuguese Republic, that it did not intend to become a 
Contracting Party to the ECT and the Protocol on Energy Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects. 
See further, <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=414&L=0.#c1338> (last visited, 16 February 2011). 
Pursuant to Art. 45(3)(a) of the ECT, this notification results in the termination of the provisional 
application of the ECT upon the expiration of sixty days from the date on which the notification is 
received by the Depository. See also, the plans of the Russian Federation to negotiate a new energy treaty 
(Presidency of Russia; Conceptual Approach to the New Legal Framework for Energy Cooperation 
(Goals and Principles), 21 April 2009; Draft Convention on Ensuring International Energy Security, 
<http://ua-energy.org/upload/files/Convention-engl1.pdf> (last visited, 16 February 2011)) and the 
comments on Russia’s decision to terminate the provisional application in Konoplyanik, Andrei A.; Why 
is Russia Opting Out of the Energy Charter?, 56(2) International Affairs 84 (2010). 
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negotiate various sets of rules applicable in the energy area.55 Article 2 of the ECT 
refers to the purpose of the ECT to establish 
“[…] a legal framework in order to promote long–term co–operation in the 
energy field, based on complementarities and mutual benefits, in accordance 
with the objectives and principles of the Charter.” 
 
The purpose of the ECT is also reaffirmed in its Preamble, which refers to the desire of 
the drafters to “catalyse economic growth by means of measures to liberalize investment 
and trade in energy”.56 Besides the core provisions in the Preamble and the eight Parts, 
totalling fifty articles,57 the ECT includes a number of other instruments that are part of 
the ECT. There are fourteen annexes and five decisions with respect to the ECT,58 
twenty–two understandings,59 seven declarations of the signatories,60 and, according to 
the Energy Charter Secretariat, “few declarations that have been made outside the Final 
Act”.61 The ECT is also supplemented by the Energy Charter Protocol on Energy 
Efficiency and Related Environmental Aspects,62 and amended by the Trade 
Amendment.63 
                                                
55
 Art. 33(1) of the ECT provides for the negotiation of “Energy Charter Protocols or Declarations in 
order to pursue the objectives and principles of the Charter”. 
The early draft Art. 2 of the ECT also referred to the realization of the scope of the ECT through “the 
principles for the development and implementation of an economic and legal framework based on market 
principles and state sovereignty over energy resources”, which would “encourage investment”, “the 
development of trade and security of supply” and the protection of the environment, among others. See, 
Art. 2(2) of the Basic Agreement of 20 January 1992, 4/92 BA 6. 
56
 Preamble of the ECT, para. 5. 
57
 It is relevant to note here the provisions regarding the institutions established by the ECT: the Energy 
Charter Conference, which is the decision–making body of the ECT, formed out of the representatives of 
the Contracting Parties (Art. 34 of the ECT); and the Energy Charter Secretariat, which is assisting the 
Energy Charter Conference in carrying out the functions set forth in the ECT (Art. 35 of the ECT). 
58
 See, Annex 2 to the Final Act; supra at FN 36, p. 443. 
59
 Understandings are binding on the Contracting Parties who consented to them. See, Final Act, para. IV; 
supra at FN 36, p. 374. 
60
 Art. 1(13)(b) of the ECT defines ‘declaration’ as a non–binding instrument authorized and approved by 
the Charter Conference, which is entered into by two or more Contracting Parties to complement or 
supplement the provisions of the ECT. 
61
 The Energy Charter Treaty. A Reader’s Guide; supra at FN 1, p. 62.  
62
 The Protocol entered into force at the same time as the ECT. Art. 1(13)(a) of the ECT identifies the 
‘protocol’ as a treaty entered into by two or more Contracting Parties in order to complement, 
supplement, extend or amplify the provisions of the ECT. 
63
 The Trade Amendment entered into force on 21 January 2010 and replaced the trading regime based on 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) with the one of the WTO. 
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The ECT is limited in application to the energy field and it is structured on three main 
pillars: trade, transit and investment, but also contains important provisions on 
competition, transfer of technology, access to capital, environmental protection, energy 
efficiency and taxation in the energy field. The trade–related provisions of the ECT are 
aimed to assist economies in transition towards membership of the WTO system. The 
transit provisions underline the necessity for each Contracting Party to take the 
appropriate measures to facilitate transit in accordance with the principle of freedom of 
transit and without distinction as to the origin, destination, ownership or pricing, and 
without imposing unreasonable delays, restrictions and charges.64 Probably the most 
important feature of the ECT lies in its provisions on the promotion and protection of 
Investments under Part III. The ECT also provides for the resolution of disputes 
between Investors and Contracting Parties concerning alleged breaches of the 
obligations for the promotion and protection of Investments by the Contracting Parties. 
 
The role of the ECT is to facilitate transactions and investments in the energy field by 
reducing political and regulatory risks, as a natural response to the increasing 
globalization of the economy. It provides for comprehensive provisions for the 
promotion and protection of Investors and their Investments in the energy field. 
Nevertheless, the short negotiation period of the ECT and the conflicting interests of the 
                                                                                                                                          
The negotiations on the ECT Transit Protocol began in 2000 and resulted in a draft Protocol of 31 
October 2003, which is still under discussion. See, <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=37&L=0> 
(last visited, 16 February 2011), and Energy Charter Secretariat; Road Map for the Modernisation of the 
Energy Charter Process, 24 November 2010. 
64
 The transit provisions under the ECT have been extensively debated, but little used, during the gas 
disputes between Ukraine and Russia. There were a number of disputes between Gazprom (the Russian 
state–controlled gas supplier) and Naftogaz Ukrainy (the Ukrainian national oil and gas company) over 
natural gas supplies, prices and debts. A major dispute occurred at the end of December 2008 and 
culminated with the cut off of the delivery of gas to Ukraine on 1 January 2009. The dispute affected 
eighteen European states with significant cut offs of their gas supply from Russia through Ukraine. On 9 
January 2009, ANDRÉ MERNIER, the Secretary General of the Energy Charter Secretariat, stressed the 
importance of the principle of uninterrupted transit, which is one of the core principles of the Energy 
Charter Treaty. See, Energy Charter Secretariat; Statement of the Secretary General on the Recent 
Developments in the Russia–Ukraine Gas Dispute. See also, Konoplyanik, Andrei A.; Breaking with the 
past, 4(4) OGEL (2006); Riley, Alan; The Coming of the Russian Gas Deficit: Consequences and 
Solutions, 5(2) OGEL (2007); Cameron, P.; supra at FN 14, pp. 343–347. 
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negotiating parties required some concessions to be made. The result is a treaty of 
extraordinary profile, interacting in a unique way with other international instruments, 
but which was left with ambiguous provisions. It is argued, however, that “despite its 
shortcomings the ECT offers significant and in some cases groundbreaking legal 
protections for trade and investment.”65 
 
3. THE NOTION OF INVESTOR IN CONTEXT 
 
The ECT, as pointed out by an author, “did not come out of the blue”.66 It forms part of 
a vast network of bilateral and multilateral instruments currently in force and other 
numerous failed draft instruments, aiming at encouraging the flow of foreign 
investments into the contracting parties.67 This objective is accomplished by providing 
investors and their investments a minimum standard of treatment and procedural 
remedies for enforcing this treatment. While these instruments are concluded between 
states and/or other regional or international organizations, the beneficiaries of their 
provisions are the investors of the contracting parties. For acquiring the benefits of these 
investment instruments, the quality of investor alone is not sufficient. As the purpose is 
to protect and promote investments into the contracting parties, investor must have an 
                                                
65
 Bamberger, Craig S.; An Overview of the Energy Charter Treaty, p. 3, in Waelde, T.W. (ed.); supra at 
FN 34. 
66
 Waelde, Thomas W.; International Investment under the 1994 Energy Charter Treaty. Legal, 
Negotiating and Policy Implications for International Investors within Western and Commonwealth of 
Independent States/Eastern European Countries, p. 257, in Waelde, T. W. (ed.); supra at FN 34. 
67
 Referring to the advantage of multilateral treaties over bilateral treaties in the field of investment 
protection, LAUTERPACHT concluded that 
“[…] it enables a potential recipient State to participate in the system of property protection without the 
attendant political complications involved in the conclusion of a bilateral treaty of friendship, commerce and 
navigation; though it should perhaps be recognised that this political advantage may to some extent be offset 
in those cases where the provenance of a multilateral convention is a geographically circumscribed group of 
States”. (Lauterpacht, Eli; The Drafting of Treaties for the Protection of Investment, 3 ICLQ Supplementary 
Publication 18 (1962), p. 24) 
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investment and it is the investment treaty that lays down the requirements for investor 
and investments.68 
 
Although the ECT is not limited to providing safeguards for Investors and their 
Investments, these provisions are probably the most used in practice.69 Arbitration, in 
particular, proved to be an efficient mechanism for enforcing the obligations of the 
Contracting Parties toward Investors. There are currently over twenty–five arbitration 
cases submitted by ECT Investors concerning alleged breaches of the obligations of the 
Contracting Parties to provide protection to Investments of Investors.70 
 
The obligations of the Contracting Parties to promote and protect Investments of 
Investors are found in Part III of the ECT. Under these provisions, Contracting Parties 
shall commit to accord at all times to Investments of Investors of other Contracting 
Parties fair and equitable treatment and most constant protection and security; shall not 
in any way impair by unreasonable measures the management, maintenance, use, 
enjoyment or disposal of such Investments;71 and shall accord to Investments and their 
related activities treatment no less favourable than that which it accords to Investments 
of own Investors or of the Investors of any other Contracting Party or third state, 
whichever is the most favourable. Article 12 of the ECT provides for the compensation 
                                                
68
 There is no standard definition of the notions of ‘investor’ or ‘investment’, although some common 
features emerge from the investment treaties and instruments. 
69
 For simplicity, the term ‘investment treaty’ includes the ECT, although the protection and promotion of 
investments is one of the areas covered by the provisions of the ECT.  
As pointed out by scholars, the ECT has “languished in relative obscurity for several years” until it 
became “a vitally important multilateral instrument for the promotion and protection of foreign 
investment in the energy sector.” See, Gaillard, Emmanuel; McNeill, Mark; The Energy Charter Treaty, 
p. 37, in Yannaca–Small, Katia (ed.); Arbitration under International Investment Agreements: A guide to 
the Key Issues, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010. 
70
 The Energy Charter Secretariat records twenty–seven arbitration cases submitted by 16 February 2011, 
at <http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213&L=1%252F> (last visited, 16 February 2011). Besides 
these twenty–seven cases, other three ECT cases are reported by internet sources: Khan Resources Inc., 
Khan Resources B.V., and Cauc Holding Company Ltd. and the Government of Mongolia and Monatom 
Co. Ltd.; Mohammad Ammar Al–Bahloul v. Republic of Tajikistan; and Türkiye Petrolleri Anonim 
Ortaklığı v. Republic of Kazakhstan. 
71
 Art. 10(1) of the ECT.  
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of Investors for losses caused by war or other armed conflict, state of national 
emergency, civil disturbance or other similar event in the Area of a Contracting Party. 
Pursuant to Article 13 of the ECT, Investments shall not be unlawfully nationalised, 
expropriated or subjected to measures having effect equivalent to nationalisation or 
expropriation. Contracting Parties guarantee the freedom of transfer of funds, without 
delay and in free convertible currency.72 These treaty obligations are enforceable against 
the Contracting Parties under the procedural remedies provided for in Article 26 of the 
ECT.73 
 
The ECT is not a self–contained treaty. The disputes between Investors and Contracting 
Parties concerning alleged breaches of the obligations for the promotion and protection 
of Investments must be submitted to institutions or structures outside the ECT.74 
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 Art. 14 of the ECT. 
73
 Art. 26 of the ECT provides, among others, for the following: 
“(1) Disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party relating to an 
Investment of the latter in the Area of the former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the 
former under Part III shall, if possible, be settled amicably. 
(2) If such disputes can not be settled according to the provisions of paragraph (1) within a period of three 
months from the date on which either party to the dispute requested amicable settlement, the Investor party to 
the dispute may choose to submit it for resolution: 
(a) to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party party to the dispute; 
(b) in accordance with any applicable, previously agreed dispute settlement procedure; or 
(c) in accordance with the following paragraphs of this Article. […] 
(4) In the event that an Investor chooses to submit the dispute for resolution under subparagraph (2)(c), the 
Investor shall further provide its consent in writing for the dispute to be submitted to: 
(a) (i) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established pursuant to the Convention 
on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States opened for signature at 
Washington, 18 March 1965 (hereinafter referred to as the “ICSID Convention”), if the Contracting Party of 
the Investor and the Contracting Party party to the dispute are both parties to the ICSID Convention; or 
(ii) The International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, established pursuant to the Convention 
referred to in subparagraph (a)(i), under the rules governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of 
Proceedings by the Secretariat of the Centre (hereinafter referred to as the “Additional Facility Rules”), if the 
Contracting Party of the Investor or the Contracting Party party to the dispute, but not both, is a party to the 
ICSID Convention; 
(b) a sole arbitrator or ad hoc arbitration tribunal established under the Arbitration Rules of the United 
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (hereinafter referred to as “UNCITRAL”); or 
(c) an arbitral proceeding under the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce.” 
74
 Disputes between Contracting Parties to the ECT concerning the application and interpretation of the 
ECT shall be resolved through ad hoc arbitration in accordance with the provisions of Art. 27 of the ECT. 
In respect to the disputes between Investors and Contracting Parties, the early drafts of the ECT provided 
for conciliation with the Energy Charter Secretariat and international arbitration under the UNCITRAL 
Rules. See, Art. 32 of the Basic Protocol of 11 September 1992, 8/91 BP 2. Following the proposal of the 
United States delegation, supported by Switzerland, the draft ECT included the ICSID option (ICSID 
Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules), mandatory if after a period of nine months there 
was no agreement on the resolution mechanism to be followed: 
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Investors may choose to present their claims against Contracting Parties to courts or 
administrative tribunals, to arbitration or conciliation or to a dispute resolution 
mechanism previously agreed with the respondent Contracting Party.75 Where Investors 
opt for arbitration,76 they have the choice between the ICSID, under the provisions of 
the ICSID Convention or of the Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the 
Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the ICSID (ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules),77 the Arbitration Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce 
(SCC) or arbitration under the Arbitration Rules of the United Nations Commission on 
International Trade Law (UNCITRAL Rules).78  
 
The notion of ‘Investor’ is essential for both substantive and procedural protections 
granted by the ECT. Only Investors within the meaning of the ECT may claim 
protection of their Investments in accordance with Part III of the ECT, and only these 
Investors have access to the remedies offered by the ECT in case of breaches by 
Contracting Parties of their obligations to protect these Investments of Investors. The 
definition of Investor under Article 1(7)(a) of the ECT refers to: 
“[…] (i) a natural person having the citizenship or nationality of or who is 
permanently residing in that Contracting Party in accordance with its 
applicable law; 
(ii) a company or other organization organized in accordance with the law 
applicable in that Contracting Party.” 
 
Thus, the definition of the term ‘Investor’ concerns natural persons and legal entities 
and it essentially connects Investors to the Contracting Parties to the ECT. Nationality is 
                                                                                                                                          
“If after nine month from written notification of the claim there is no agreement to any of the alternative 
procedures described above, the parties to the dispute shall be bound to submit it to the International Centre 
for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (sic!).” (Art. 32(3) of the Basic Agreement of 31 October 1991, 
21/91 BA 4) 
75
 Art. 26(2) of the ECT. 
76
 See, Art. 26(4) of the ECT. 
77
 Rules Governing the Additional Facility for the Administration of Proceedings by the Secretariat of the 
ICSID, as amended on 10 April 2006. 
78
 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, amended and effective as of 15 August 2010. 
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not the only bond between an Investor and a Contracting Party accepted by the ECT. 
Permanent residents can also avail themselves of the protection of the ECT. Similarly, 
not only companies may qualify as Investors under the ECT, but also any other 
organization organized in accordance with the laws of a Contracting Party to the ECT. 
While the provisions of Article 1(7)(a) allow natural persons and legal entities to be 
covered by the ECT, they are not, however, sufficient for granting the protection of Part 
III of the ECT and allowing access to the Investor–Contracting Party dispute resolution 
mechanisms. First, the commitment of the Contracting Parties is to protect and promote 
Investments of Investors, and only in a few cases to protect Investors alone. Article 
10(1) of the ECT refers to “commitment to accord […] Investments of Investors”, that 
“Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection and security”, while the 
Contracting Parties “shall observe any obligations […] with an Investor or an 
Investment of an Investor”. Secondly, Article 26(1) of the ECT, which provides for the 
consent of the Contracting Parties over the disputes with Investors,79 refers to: 
“[d]isputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another 
Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter in the Area of the 
former, which concern an alleged breach of an obligation of the former under 
Part III […].”80 
 
The procedural protection of the ECT is, thus, granted where the dispute between the 
Investor and the Contracting Party is related to an Investment. Consequently, the 
                                                
79
 Art. 26 represents the offer of consent of the Contracting Parties to the ECT on the disputes to be 
submitted to the Investor–Contracting Party dispute resolution mechanism. 
80
 The first draft of this provision limited the disputes to be submitted to Investor–Contracting Party 
dispute resolution mechanism to 
“[…] legal disputes between an investor of one Contracting Party and another Contracting Party in relation to 
an investment of the former concerning: 
(a) the amount or payment of compensation under Articles 22 [current Art. 12, Compensation for Losses] or 
23 [current Art. 13, Expropriation] of this Agreement, or 
(b) any other matter consequential upon an act of expropriation in accordance with Article 23 of this 
Agreement, or 
(c) the consequences of the non–implementation, or of the incorrect implementation, of Article 24 [current 
Art. 14, Transfers Related to Investments] of this Agreement.” (Art. 32(1) of the Basic Protocol of 11 
September 1991, 8/91 BP 2) 
The following drafts referred to 
“[d]isputes between an investor of one Contracting Party and any other Contracting Party concerning an 
obligation of the latter under Part III of this Agreement in relation to an investment of the former […].” (Art. 
32(1) of the Basic Agreement of 31 October 1991, 21/91 BA 4)  
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jurisdiction over a dispute between an Investor and a Contracting Party concerning 
alleged breaches of the obligations of the latter under Part III of the ECT exist only 
when personal jurisdiction (ratione personae), i.e. the existence of an Investor, and the 
material jurisdiction (ratione materiae), i.e. an Investment in the Area of the respondent 
Contracting Party coexist. A strong case of unlawful expropriation, for example, may 
collapse at the jurisdictional stage in the absence of these two key elements. 
 
4. SCOPE OF THE THESIS 
 
This Thesis provides an inclusive analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ within the 
meaning of the ECT, starting from the definition of Investor under Article 1(7) of the 
ECT and the consent expressed in Article 26(1) of the ECT in respect to the types of 
disputes that can be submitted to the Investor–Contracting Party resolution mechanism. 
The research reveals that the notion of ‘Investor’ is influenced by whether the 
discussion is confined to the substantive protection under Part III of the ECT, or it is 
expanded to incorporate the procedural remedies under Article 26. This latter case 
includes the interplay between the ECT and the related treaties and rules. Several key 
issues are raised throughout the Thesis, thus revealing the broad and, sometimes, 
ambiguous wording of the provisions of the ECT in respect of the notion of ‘Investor’. 
These issues are revisited in the ‘Conclusions’ to the Thesis and some solutions are 
suggested. 
 
The analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ commences with the concept of ‘Contracting 
Party’ to the ECT.81 Investor is essentially connected to a Contracting Party, and from 
                                                
81
 The analysis is thus limited to the notion of ‘Contracting Party’ as this is connected with the status of 
Investor under the ECT. Consequently, the Thesis is not discussing the situation where Contracting 
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this point of view, the clarification of the notion of ‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT is 
required. The examination of the notion of ‘Investor’ is not complete without a brief 
look into the concept of ‘Investment’. The notions of ‘Investor’ and ‘Investment’ are 
indissolubly connected. The substantive and procedural protection offered by the ECT 
to Investor cannot be present in the absence of an Investment. As the procedural 
remedies are not accomplished by the ECT alone, but together with related treaties and 
arbitration rules, the notions of ‘Investor’, ‘Contracting Party’ and ‘Investment’ must be 
clarified not only within the meaning of the ECT, but also with a view of the interplay 
between the ECT and these related treaties and rules. For the substantive protection of 
the ECT, the interaction with these treaties and rules presents little relevance; however, 
for the enforcement of Investor’s rights under the provisions for the protection of 
Investments, Investors must observe the limitations imposed by these instruments. At 
the same time, the relationship between the ECT and the related treaties and rules is 
relevant for arbitral tribunals constituted under Article 26 of the ECT. These tribunals 
must have jurisdiction under both the ECT and the relevant treaty or arbitration rules.82 
In the ECT case of Kardassopoulos v. Georgia,83 the arbitral tribunal referred to this in 
the context of its jurisdiction ratione materiae, and concluded that 
“[i]n order for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction ratione materiae over the 
present dispute, it must be found to have jurisdiction under the ICSID 
Convention, and under the ECT […].”84 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Parties are respondents under Art. 26 of the ECT, although some of the issues analysed here apply 
irrespective of the procedural position of the Contracting Parties.  
82
 I.e., jurisdiction ratione materiae, ratione personae, ratione voluntatis and ratione temporis. 
83
 Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, Decision on Jurisdiction of 6 July 2007. The dispute between Mr 
Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Georgia relates to the interests held by the claimant, together with Mr Ron 
Fuchs, an Israeli citizen, in the development of an oil pipeline for the transport of oil from Azerbaijan to 
the Black Sea, through Georgia. See, Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra, para. 13 et seq. As Israel is not a 
signatory of the ECT, Mr Fuchs submitted his claims to the ICSID separately, relying on the provisions of 
the Israel–Georgia BIT. The same tribunal heard both cases and in 2010 issued a joint award for both 
claimants. See, Ioannis Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. Georgia, Award of 3 March 2010. 
84
 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, supra at FN 83, para. 113, emphasis original. 
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The main research objective of this Thesis is the clarification of the meaning of Investor 
by highlighting the problems and suggesting solutions for the proper understanding of 
this notion, while keeping the integrity of the provisions of the ECT as they interact 
with related treaties and arbitration rules. Several secondary questions arise from the 
main research question. 
 
The first one refers to the meaning of the term of ‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT, 
relevant in the context of the notion of ‘Investor’. From this perspective, the consent to 
be bound by the ECT, the entry into force and withdrawal from the ECT, the temporal 
and territorial application of the ECT and the consequences of the participation of the 
European Communities and the EU in the ECT are issues that clarify the notion of 
‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT. The analysis reveals that specific issues are raised by 
the provisional and territorial application of the ECT, with significant consequences for 
the notion of ‘Investor’. As it will be explained, Investors of a signatory may avail 
themselves of the protection of the ECT if the signatory applies the ECT on a 
provisional basis. Further, the question whether a territory of a Contracting Party is 
covered by the ECT may determine the quality of Investor, as well as the competence of 
an arbitral tribunal over a dispute of an Investor that made an Investment in that 
territory of the Contracting Party. However, as it will be discussed in Chapter I, these 
issues are controversial. 
 
The second research question concerns the notion of ‘Investor’ per se and attempts to 
examine the various links between Investor and Contracting Parties that are relevant in 
the context of the ECT. The Thesis examines natural persons and legal entities as 
‘Investors’ under the ECT and identifies the main problems triggered by the broad 
language of the provisions of the ECT. The first issue, although not yet considered by 
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arbitral tribunals, concerns dual nationality of natural persons and brings into attention 
not only the uncertainty of the provisions of the ECT – also highlighted in the 
documents of negotiation of the ECT -, but also the role of diplomatic protection rules 
in the context of investment law and arbitration. The second and probably the most 
unsettled problem in investment law in general refers to the relation between 
shareholders/beneficiaries and companies when the conduct of Contracting Parties 
causes prejudices to these companies and, indirectly, to their shareholders or 
beneficiaries. The analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ identifies issues of parallel 
proceedings – when the conduct of a Contracting Party may be exploited by both 
companies and shareholders or other beneficiaries - and treaty shopping – for example 
when nationals of a third state set up shell companies in Contracting Parties in order to 
get access to the protection of the ECT. Chapter II of the Thesis also discusses whether 
the limitations inserted in the ECT to counteract the abuse of its provisions concerning 
the notion of ‘Investor’ – such as the ‘denial of benefits’ clause – are functional or 
properly interpreted by arbitral tribunals. Other important issues in connection with the 
second research question concern state-owned companies and non-governmental 
organisations and the requirement of legal personality of organizations. 
 
The third subsidiary question arising out of the main research question refers to the 
meaning of the notion of ‘Investment’. As with the concept of ‘Contracting Party’, the 
notion of 'Investor’ is essentially connected to the one of ‘Investment’, and the 
explanation of this latter concept is necessary for a complete examination of the notion 
of ‘Investor’ under the ECT. The definition of ‘Investment’ in Article 1(6) of the ECT 
was seen by arbitral tribunals as broad and encompassing any kind of asset, which lead 
to the conclusion in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan that even ordinary commercial transactions 
can be included in the notion of ‘Investment’, thus broadening the circle of Investors 
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under the ECT. Other issues directly affecting the notion of ‘Investor’, such as the 
origin of Investment or of the invested capital, are also scrutinized. 
 
The issues spotlighted by these research questions are essential for the clarification of 
the notion of ‘Investor’ since they raise the question as to whether they are the result of 
the ambiguous or broad wording of the provisions of the ECT or of the 
misinterpretation of these provisions by arbitral tribunals. They are also crucial for 
Investors in their decision to submit their disputes to one or other dispute resolution 
mechanisms provided for in Article 26 of the ECT. 
 
Although designed as a comprehensive analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ under the 
ECT, this Thesis suffers important limitations, most of them due to the limited size of a 
research of this nature. The research is restricted to the notion of ‘Investor’ under the 
ECT, as it interacts with four main instruments: the ICSID Convention, the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules, the SCC Rules,85 and the UNCITRAL Rules. Even though 
practice shows that there are significant arbitration cases these instruments,86 the lack of 
substantive provisions under the SCC and UNCITRAL Rules limit their relevance for 
the purpose of this research. The ICSID Additional Facility Rules are contingent upon 
the ICSID Convention, and the notions of ‘investment’ and ‘nationality’ employed in 
the Rules are essentially the ones under the ICSID Convention.87 Consequently, the 
                                                
85
 SCC Arbitration Rules, 1 January 2010. 
86
 Out of the thirty known arbitration cases under the ECT, eighteen were submitted to the ICSID, seven 
to the SCC and five under the UNCITRAL Rules. See also, 
<http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=213&L=1%252F> (last visited, 16 February 2011). 
87
 See, Toriello, Pierluigi; The Additional Facility of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, 4 Italian Yearbook of International Law 59 (1978–1979), pp. 72-76. Art. 2 of the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules refers to the following: 
“The Secretariat of the Centre is hereby authorized to administer, subject to and in accordance with these 
Rules, proceedings between a State (or a constituent subdivision or agency of a State) and a national of 
another State, falling within the following categories: 
(a) conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal disputes arising directly out of an 
investment which are not within the jurisdiction of the Centre because either the State party to the dispute or 
the State whose national is a party to the dispute is not a Contracting State; 
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reference to the ICSID Additional Facility Rules is made when the Rules diverge from 
the provisions of the ICSID Convention.88 Thus, the focus will be first, on the notion of 
‘Investor’ under the ECT and second, on the particularization of this notion in the 
context of the ICSID Convention. The Thesis does not address procedural issues related 
to the notion of ‘Investor’, such as the burden of proof; the relevance of time for the 
notion of ‘Investor’, including issues of continuous nationality; the authority of arbitral 
tribunals to assess the fulfilment of the Investor requirement; parallel proceedings etc. 
While the Thesis does not address these procedural issues, few comments are made in 
order to preserve the inclusive analysis when they become relevant for the clarification 
of the notion of ‘Investor’. 
 
The resources on which the Thesis relies are, to a great extent, confined to sources in 
English language, although from time to time, reference is made to resources in French, 
Portuguese, Spanish and Romanian languages. In the context of the notion of ‘Investor’, 
the research is restricted to the resolution by arbitration of disputes between Investors 
and Contracting Parties, mainly because of the public availability of the cases. The 
Thesis is based on material available on or before 16 February 2011. 
 
5. PREVIOUS WRITINGS 
 
More than ten years have passed since the ECT came to life, during which an important 
number of disputes between Investor and Contracting Parties have been submitted to the 
arbitration mechanism under Article 26 of the ECT. In spite of this, the analysis of the 
                                                                                                                                          
(b) conciliation and arbitration proceedings for the settlement of legal disputes which are not within the 
jurisdiction of the Centre because they do not arise directly out of an investment, provided that either the 
State party to the dispute or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is a Contracting State; and 
(c) fact-finding proceedings. 
The administration of proceedings authorized by these Rules is hereinafter referred to as the Additional 
Facility.” 
88
 See for example, with respect to the Contracting parties to the ECT in Chapter I.2.2.1 below. 
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notion of ‘Investor’ in the scholarly writings remains inadequate to the complexity of 
issues raised by the ECT.  
 
There has not been done a comprehensive research on the notion of ‘Investor’ under the 
ECT, although several issues, such as the dual nationality of Investors, the legal 
standing of non–profit organisations or the relevance of the EU citizenship and 
permanent residence, even though not yet tested in practice, raise numerous 
controversies. The main publication concerning the ECT was published in 1996 and 
brought together various papers regarding the history of the ECT, the energy framework 
in which the idea of the ECT developed, and the trade, transit and investment regimes 
under the ECT. This collection of essays, edited by THOMAS WAELDE is a valuable 
resource for understanding the context in which the ECT came to life and the general 
features and provisions of the ECT. It does not offer, however, a thorough analysis of 
the investment provisions, as it essentially provides for an overview of the ECT. 
Notable publications have resulted from two conferences organized by the Energy 
Charter Secretariat in 2005 and 2007: Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter 
Treaty,89 and Investment Protection and the Energy Charter Treaty.90 They gather 
essays on the substantive and procedural protection of Investors and their Investments 
under the ECT and raise challenging debates over various subjects concerning the 
investment protection of the ECT, but they do not, however, offer an in depth analysis, 
as they are essentially collections of conference papers. Besides these publications, 
various other essays discuss the investment provisions of the ECT, some of which are 
                                                
89
 Ribeiro, Clarisse (ed.); Investment Arbitration and the Energy Charter Treaty, New York: JurisNet, 
LLC, 2006. 
90
 Coop, Graham; Ribeiro, Clarisse (eds.), Investment Protection and the Energy Charter Treaty, New 
York: JurisNet, LLC, 2008. 
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focused on the notions of ‘Investor’ and ‘Investment’.91 Although they examine 
interesting issues, these papers do not offer a comprehensive analysis. 
 
Thus, the originality of this Thesis comes not only from the comprehensive manner in 
which the notion of ‘Investor’ is approached, but also from the lack of previous writings 
on the issues analysed here. Nevertheless, the earlier publications dealing with the 
investment regime of the ECT offer a valuable source of debate, and are considered 




The ECT is an international treaty and the analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ has to 
commence with the interpretation of the provisions of the ECT in accordance with the 
rules of treaty interpretation laid down in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
(Vienna Convention).92 The relevant provisions of the Vienna Convention are provided 
for in Articles 31 and 32: 
 
                                                
91
 See for example, D’Allaire, Dominique; The Nationality Rules under the Energy Charter Treaty: 
Practical Considerations, 10(1) Journal of World Investment and Trade 39 (2009); Hobér, Kaj; 
Arbitrating Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty, 7(2) OGEL (2009) etc. 
92
 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties entered into force on 27 January 1980. The references are 
made to the version printed in 1115 UNTS 331. Several Contracting Parties to the ECT are not parties to 
the Vienna Convention, and, thus, the Convention is not directly applicable to them. See, 
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetailsIII.aspx?&src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII~1&chapter=23&Te
mp=mtdsg3&lang=en> (last visited, 16 February 2011). However, the rules of treaty interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention are recognized as codifying the existing customary international law and, therefore, 
applicable to the interpretation of the provisions of the ECT. See, Case Concerning Avena and Other 
Mexican Nationals, Judgment of 31 March 2004, para. 83; Case Concerning the Territorial Dispute 
(Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment of 3 February 1994, para. 41. Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties between States and International Organizations or between International Organizations, 
which restates the rules of treaty interpretation under the Vienna Convention and is relevant in the context 
of the ECT, was opened for signature on 21 March 1986 but has not yet entered into force. See, 
<http://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXIII-
3&chapter=23&lang=en#1> (last visited, 16 February 2011).  
The interpretation of a treaty is “[o]ne of the enduring problems facing courts and tribunals and lawyers.” 




General rule of interpretation 
1.A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light 
of its object and purpose. 
2.The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, 
in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the 
parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with 
the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. 
3.There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation 
of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between 
the parties. 




Supplementary means of interpretation 
Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the 
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in 
order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of article 31, or to 
determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
 
The interpretation of the ECT’s provisions must rely first on their actual text (textual 
interpretation) and precedence must be given to the ordinary meaning of the terms in 
their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the ECT, as expressed in 
Article 2 of the ECT. The interpretation of the ECT must also take into consideration 
any instrument related to its conclusion. This includes, besides the preamble and 
annexes, any instrument related to the conclusion of the ECT, done by all the 
Contracting Parties or by some of them, and accepted by the other Contracting Parties.93 
                                                
93
 WAELDE pointed out that 
“[a]n application of the ECT’s investment disciplines is not complete without consideration of the 
“Decisions”, “Understandings” and “Declarations” included in the “Final Act” of the Conference. Their 
interpretative value is often not clear; in main, one should view them as constituting the legal context – with 
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Consequently, the documents of the Final Act, such as the declarations and 
understandings, are relevant for the proper interpretation of the ECT’s provisions.94 
 
Together with the context, any subsequent practice of the Contracting Parties in the 
application of the ECT and any relevant rules of international law applicable in the 
relations between the parties must be taken into consideration.95 Article 32 of the 
Vienna Convention provides for the possibility to rely on the preparatory works of the 
ECT when there is a need to confirm the interpretation made pursuant to Article 31 of 
the Vienna Convention or when such interpretation leaves ambiguity or leads to 
unreasonable results.96 But unlike the ICSID Convention, for example, there are no 
official preparatory works of the ECT. There are only fragmented documents of the 
negotiation of the ECT held by the Energy Charter Secretariat, the IEA and by the states 
and the European Communities participating in the negotiation of the ECT. The 
documents held by the Energy Charter Secretariat have been considered for this 
research when relevant for clarifying the drafting history of the ECT’s provisions or for 
                                                                                                                                          
varying shades of legal weight – for interpretation.” (Waelde, Thomas W.; Arbitration in the Oil, Gas and 
Energy Field: Emerging Energy Charter Treaty Practice, 1(4) OGEL (2003), p. 7) 
The understanding of the overall structure (formal and substantive) of the ECT is essential for the 
interpretation on the terms of the ECT. Art. 31(1) of the VCLT refers to the meaning of the terms of a 
treaty “in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. Accordingly, the titles, headings and 
chapeaux are also relevant for the interpretation of a treaty. In one of the ECT arbitration cases, the 
tribunal resorted to the interpretation of the ECT relying on the headings of its Parts. See, Plama 
Consortium Limited (Cyprus) v. Republic of Bulgaria, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 February 2005, para. 
147. See also, the Individual Opinion of Jan Paulsson in Hrvatska v. Slovenia, where he refers to “the 
context of the terms of the Treaty, i.e. the internal consistency of the text as one whole”. See, Hrvatska 
Elektroprivreda D.D. v. Republic of Slovenia, Individual Opinion of Jan Paulsson of 8 June 2009, para. 
44, emphasis original. 
94
 AUST sees these agreements and instruments not only as an aid to interpretation, “but also as a valuable 
tool for the treaty maker”. See, Aust, Anthony; Modern Treaty Law and Practice, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, p. 237. 
95
 Article 26(6) of the ECT also expressly provides for the direct application of the rules and principles of 
international law: 
“A tribunal […] shall decide the issues in dispute in accordance with this Treaty and applicable rules and 
principles of international law.” 
96
 As explained by LINDERFALK, the notion of ‘preparatory works’ “is an expression not very easily 
grasped”, mainly because of its “vagueness”. See, Linderfalk, Ulf; On the Interpretation of Treaties. The 
Modern International Law as Expressed in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 
Dordrecht: Springer, 2007, p. 240. As mentioned by LINDERFALK, preparatory works normally include 
“the correspondence (letters, notes, memoranda) between two or more negotiating states”, “preliminary 
drafts or proposals”, “minutes, summary records”, “reports, declarations, statements” etc. (id.) 
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shedding light on the understanding of the negotiating parties on particular issues dealt 
with by the ECT.97 The documents of the negotiation of the ECT have been extensively 
relied on by the parties in the Yukos Cases,98 but the arbitral tribunal saw no need to 
resort to them, leaving unexplained their nature, relevance and legitimacy.99 
CRAWFORD, in his testimony in the Yukos Cases, referred to the weight of the 
preparatory works put forward by the parties and concluded that: 
“[t]ravaux préparatoires include evidence of the conference or other meetings 
where the treaty text was discussed, including proposals communicated, but 
not private statements or recollections. […] the following evidence [is] based 
upon false travaux […].”100  
 
                                                
97
 For this Thesis, the author was granted access by the Energy Charter Secretariat, between 20 and 22 
September 2010, to study the documents of the ECT’s negotiation. The references to these documents are 
based on the notes taken by the author. The Thesis prefers the terms ‘documents of negotiation’, rather 
than the expression ‘preparatory works’, since the legal value of these incomplete documents as 
preparatory works, within the meaning of the Vienna Convention, is rather arguable. 
The documents of the negotiation of the ECT explain that five Working Groups were nominated to 
accomplish the task of delivering a binding multilateral treaty in the energy field. Working Group I was 
entrusted with the negotiation of the European Charter, while the other Working Groups had the mission 
to negotiate the ECT: Working Group II to prepare the core text of the ECT, while Working Groups III, 
IV and V to negotiate the protocols for energy efficiency, hydrocarbons and nuclear energy. The 
European Energy Charter Conference Secretariat was established, with CLIVE JONES as Secretary General 
responsible for the running of the Conference. A Legal Sub–Group was also nominated and chaired by 
CRAIG BAMBERGER. The preliminary drafts of the ECT are divided in three categories: Basic Protocols, 
Basic Agreements, and ECT Drafts. The first ECT Draft was presented on 15 March 1993. See also, 
Commission of the European Communities; Note for the attention of Mr Jones and Mr Guibal, Articles 
on the European Energy Charter from RH Greenwood; supra at FN 39. 
98
 Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation; Hulley Enterprises Ltd. v. Russian Federation; and 
Veteran Petroleum Trust v. Russian Federation, Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 30 
November 2009 (the awards are similar in reasoning, and the references in this Thesis are made to the 
Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility in the Yukos Universal Ltd. v. Russian Federation 
(Yukos Cases)). The tribunals in these three arbitrations have identical compositions and the arbitrations 
are discussed “as a single set of proceedings, except where circumstances distinct to particular Claimants 
necessitate separate treatment”. See, Yukos Cases, supra, para. 2. 
Yukos was created in 1993 and was one of the world's largest private–owned oil companies, producing 
more than 20% of Russian oil. After Yukos was charged with tax evasion for an amount of over USD 7 
billion, in 2004, the Russian Government sold Yukos’ main production unit, Yuganskneftgas, to Rosneft, 
a Russian state–owned oil company. Eventually, in 2007, Yukos went bankrupt. In 2008, the Yukos’ 
shareholders brought their claims against Russia under the ECT (the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules 
option). On 30 November 2009, the arbitral tribunal ruled that it has jurisdiction to hear the claims of 
Yukos’ shareholders. Several other cases have been initiated by Yukos’ shareholders against the Russian 
Federation (see, RosInvestCo UK Ltd. v. Russian Federation; Final Award of 12 September 2010; 
Niebruegge, A.M.; Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty: The Yukos Arbitration and the 
Future Place of Provisional Application in International Law, 8 Chi. J. Int’l L. 355 (2007)), including 
before the European Court of Human Rights (see, Peterson, Luke Eric; European Court of Human Rights 
publishes decision upholding admissibility of some Yukos claims against Russia; shareholders in Yukos 
continue to pursue separate investment treaty claims, 2(5) Investment Arbitration Reporter (2009)). 
99
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 268. 
100
 Witness’ Testimony of James CRAWFORD, Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 227, emphasis original. 
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In the context of the interpretation of the ECT’s provisions, the decisions rendered by 
the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) and the ICJ are relevant for the 
proper understanding and application of the rules of interpretation under the Vienna 
Convention.101 
 
As secondary sources, the Thesis considers the arbitral awards and decisions rendered 
under Article 26 of the ECT and the relevant scholarly writings and other resources. 
Although arbitral tribunals are not bound by the previous decisions of the ECT 
tribunals, since the ECT does not incorporate the stare decisis doctrine in respect to the 
decisions and awards rendered under Article 26 of the ECT, the review of ECT case law 
is relevant for assessing the application of the ECT’s provisions.102 The ‘Conclusions’ 
of the Thesis will further address the relevance of the decisions and awards of arbitral 
tribunals and whether it can be considered that they became de facto precedents. 
 
The scope of this Thesis is to analyse the notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT and its 
related treaties and rules, with particular emphasis on the provisions of the ICSID 
Convention. Consequently, the same research techniques are applicable when 
examining the relevant provisions under these instruments: the text of the treaties and 
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 For the role played by the PCIJ and, later, by the ICJ in the development of the customary international 
law rules of interpretation and their codification in the Vienna Convention, see, Gardiner, Richard; Treaty 
Interpretation, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 13 et seq. 
102
 The tribunal in Saipem v. Bangladesh noted that, although 
“it is not bound by previous decisions […] it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international 
tribunals.” (Saipem S.p.A. v. People's Republic of Bangladesh, Decision on Jurisdiction and Recommendation 
on Provisional Measures of 21 March 2007, para. 67, footnote omitted) 
See also, the statement of the tribunal in Jan de Nul v. Egypt: 
“The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by earlier decisions, but will certainly carefully consider such 
decisions whenever appropriate.” (Jan de Nul N.V. and Dredging International N.V. v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction of 16 June 2006, para. 64, footnote omitted) 
See also, Paulsson, Jan; The Role of Precedent in Investment Arbitration, pp. 699–718, in Yannaca–
Small, K. (ed.); supra at FN 69; Kessedjian, Catherine; To Give or Not to Give Precedential Value to 
Investment Arbitration Awards?, pp. 43–68, in Rogers, Catherine A.; Alford, Roger P. (eds.); The Future 
of Investment Arbitration, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 43 et seq. 
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rules are the primary source, while the decisions and scholarly writings are taken into 
consideration as secondary sources. 
 
The provisions of the ECT are the result of a compromise. The desire to have the ECT 
ready in a short time and the aspiration to have a comprehensive treaty in the energy 
field, signed by a large number of participants, meant that the drafters had to make 
concessions on the content of ECT’s provisions.103 One author, referring to the 
provisions of the ECT, pointed out that “[w]hole sections lack binding clauses, and are 
hedged about with compromises and vague wording”.104 Other authors see the ECT as 
having “unusually generous phrasing”.105 The ECT is not the perfect treaty, but it is the 
best compromise treaty that could be achieved under the circumstances. This is the 
premise on which this Thesis rests. 
 
7. STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
 
The Thesis is divided into three chapters. Chapter One analyses the notion of 
‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT in the context of the notion of ‘Investor’. Thus, the 
research is centred on the requisites laid down in the ECT for Contracting Parties, 
proceeding from the definition of this notion under Article 1(2) of the ECT: 
““Contracting Party” means a state or Regional Economic Integration 
Organization which has consented to be bound by this Treaty and for which 
the Treaty is in force.” 
 
                                                
103
 As DESCARTES pointed out in his Discourse on the Method, 
“[…] things made up of different elements and produced by the hands of several master craftsmen are often 
less perfect than those on which only one person has worked.” (Descartes, René; A Discourse on the Method, 
translated by Ian Maclean, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 12) 
104
 Andrews–Speed, P.; supra at FN 46, p. 374. 
105
 Samuels, D.; supra  at FN 48, p. 10. 
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In this context, the issues pertaining to the consent to be bound by the ECT, the entry 
into force and withdrawal from the ECT, as well as to the application of the ECT to 
territories for which the Contracting Parties are responsible, are relevant. As the analysis 
reveals, the signatories of the ECT, and not only the Contracting Parties, play a 
significant role for the notion of ‘Investor’, when such signatories are bound by the ECT 
on a provisional basis. The participation of the European Communities and the EU in 
the ECT also raises interesting issues that require clarification. Consequently, it is 
necessary to examine who are the proper Contracting Parties to the ECT, and in which 
capacity and with what legal consequences the European Communities and the EU are 
bound by the ECT. The interplay between the ECT and the relevant treaties and 
arbitration rules in respect to the notion of ‘Contracting Party’ is analysed in the last 
part of Chapter One. 
 
Chapter Two examines the core issues raised by the notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT 
and the related treaties and rules. The aim of this Chapter is to analyse the notion of 
‘Investor’ starting with the definition in Article 1(7) of the ECT, under which an 
Investor is a natural person having the citizenship or nationality of or who is 
permanently residing in a Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable law; or a 
company or other organization organized in accordance with the law applicable in a 
Contracting Party. Chapter Two is thus structured in two parts. The first part deals with 
natural persons as Investors under the ECT, and examines the nationality, citizenship 
and permanent residence of natural persons and their relevance in establishing the 
notion of ‘Investor’. Particular emphasis is put on the relevance and legal effects of the 
concept of ‘EU citizenship’ and on the dual nationality lato sensu of Investors. In 
respect to the latter issue, the Thesis attempts to clarify whether the ECT imposes any 
limitations on the coexistence of multiple nationalities or citizenships and permanent 
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residences of an Investor, relevant for the procedural protection offered by the ECT. 
The second part of Chapter Two considers legal entities as Investors under the ECT. 
Since Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT refers to “company or other organization”, the 
approach on legal entities is divided into two sections. The first section examines the 
concept of company and the link with the Contracting Parties for the purpose of the 
notion of ‘Investor’. It also looks into the notion of ‘Societas Europaea’ in the context 
of the ECT, as well as into the issues pertaining to the legal standing of the shareholders 
of a company and of the state–owned or controlled companies. The second section 
discusses the concept of ‘other organization’, with particular emphasis on non–
governmental organizations. The analysis of the legal entities concludes with a brief 
analysis of dual nationality of legal entities, and with an overview of the ‘denial of 
benefits’ clause under Article 17 of the ECT and its effects on the notion of ‘Investor’. 
 
In Chapter Three, the concept of ‘Investment’ and its relevance for the notion of 
‘Investor’ is analysed. The Chapter is framed as an overview of the notion of 
‘Investment’, from the broad definition under Article 1(6) paragraph 1 of the ECT, 
which deals with “any kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an 
Investor”, to the limitation placed on this definition by paragraph 3 of Article 1(6), 
which refers to Investment as “any investment associated with an Economic Activity in 
the Energy Sector”. Thus, not any asset listed in paragraph 1 of Article 1(6) of the ECT 
constitutes an Investment within the meaning of the ECT, but only assets that are 
investments associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector. Other related 
issues, such as the lawfulness, approval and origin of Investment, the requirement for 
Investment to be in the Area of a Contracting Party, the relevance of the Making of 
Investments, as well as the limitations placed by the ICSID Convention on the notion of 
‘Investment’ under the ECT are approached in the last part of Chapter Three. 
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Finally, a conclusion to the research undertaken in this Thesis is drawn. The notion of 
‘Investor’ envisaged by the ECT is not limited to the definition set forth in Article 1(7), 
but it is a complex and interactive notion, which is shaped by other elements of the ECT 
and its related treaties and rules. The key issues identified in the Thesis in respect of the 
notion of ‘Investor’ are revisited and general solutions which concern the manner in 
which the provisions of the ECT are to be interpreted by arbitral tribunals, the need to 
clarify these provisions through the mechanisms of the ECT and the relevance of the 
highlighted issues in the decision of Investors to solve their disputes with the 
Contracting Parties through one or other methods available under Article 26 of the ECT 




CHAPTER I – INVESTOR AND CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE ENERGY 
CHARTER TREATY 
 
The notion of ‘Investor’ is indissolubly connected to that of ‘Contracting Party’: only 
Investors of Contracting Parties can avail themselves of the provisions of the ECT. It is 
only within this framework that an analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ can begin. While 
the European Charter initially started as a European initiative, the ECT emerged as 
multilateral treaty with international participation. Traditionally, contracting parties to 
treaties are states that possess an inherent capacity to conclude these binding 
instruments,106 but entities, other than states, may also participate. In respect to the 
ECT, states and Regional Economic Integration Organizations (REIOs) may be bound 
by the provisions of the ECT. 
 
This Chapter analyses the concept of ‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT as this becomes 
relevant in the context of the notion of ‘Investor’, starting with the definition laid down 
in Article 1(2) of the ECT. For this purpose, the consent to be bound by the ECT, the 
entry into force and withdrawal from the ECT, as well as the relevance of the 
provisional and territorial application of the ECT are examined. The Chapter concludes 
with a look into the participation of the European Communities and the EU in the ECT 
and with an overview of the provisions of the related treaties and rules relevant for the 
notion of ‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT. 
 
                                                
106
 For the capacity of states to be bound by treaties, see, Reuter, Paul; Introduction to the Law of 
Treaties, London and New York: Kegan Paul International, 1995, p. 72 et seq., para. 118 et seq. 
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1. THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND ITS CONTRACTING PARTIES 
 
Under Article 1(2) of the ECT, a Contracting Party is defined as 
“[…] a state or Regional Economic Integration Organization which has 
consented to be bound by this Treaty and for which the Treaty is in force.”107 
 
Thus, an important feature of the ECT is that not only states may become Contracting 
Parties to the ECT, but also REIOs. The definition of ‘Contracting Party’ under Article 
1(2) of the ECT provides for two cumulative conditions: the consent to be bound by and 
the entry into force of the ECT. From the Investor’s perspective, these two conditions 
are of vital importance, as together they define the status of Contracting Party on which 
the Investor relies in claiming the protection of the ECT. In addition to the typical case 
under Article 1(2), the ECT provides for an exceptional situation when the ECT applies 
to signatories, without the entry into force.108 
 
The ECT does not contain a definition of ‘state’,109 but Article 1(3) of the ECT defines 
REIO as: 
“[…] an organization constituted by states to which they have transferred 
competence over certain matters a number of which are governed by this 




                                                
107
 The first drafts of the ECT defined the notion of ‘Contracting Party’ as “a party to this Agreement”. 
See for example, Art. 1(b) of the Basic Protocol of 11 September 1991, 8/91 BP 2 and Art. 1(2) of the 
Basic Agreement of 31 October 1991, 21/91 BA 4. The reference to states and REIOs was introduced 
following the Meeting of the Legal Sub–Group of 7–11 September 1992 and the suggested definition 
provided for 
“[…] a State or a Regional Economic Integration Organization which has consented to be bound by the 
Agreement and for which the Agreement is in force.” (Note for C. Bamberger, Legal Sub–Group, 7–11 
September 1992 meetings) 
108
 Art. 45 of the ECT. 
109
 See, infra FN 324. 
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1.1. Consent to be Bound by the Energy Charter Treaty  
 
The consent to be bound by a treaty is fundamental. As one author explains, 
“[t]reaties are in this sense contracts between states and if they do not receive 
the consent of the various states, their provisions will not be binding upon 
them.”110 
 
Article 11 of the Vienna Convention provides that the consent to be bound by a treaty 
may be expressed in various forms: “by signature, exchange of instruments constituting 
a treaty, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, or by any other means if so 
agreed.”111 Treaties usually refer to signature followed by the deposit of instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval.112 The options laid down for the parties are justified 
by the specific provisions provided for by municipal laws or, in case of international 
and regional organizations, by their constitutive instruments. Consequently, it is not 
upon the provisions of a treaty to determine how the treaty shall be implemented in the 
municipal law or in the legal order of an international organization, but it is upon the 
parties to a treaty to ensure that such treaty is effectively implemented. 
 
Under the ECT, the consent to be bound may take the form of (i) signature with 
ratification, acceptance or approval of the ECT, under Articles 38 and 39; 113 or of (ii) 
accession to the ECT, under Article 41. 114 
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 Shaw, M.N.; supra at FN 92, p. 817. 
111
 Art. 2(1)(b) of the Vienna Convention provides for the following definition of ratification, acceptance, 
approval and accession: 
“[…] “ratification”, “acceptance”, “approval” and “accession” mean in each case the international act so 
named whereby a State establishes on the international plane its consent to be bound by a treaty”. 
There is no substantive difference between ratification, acceptance or approval. See, Aust, A.; supra at 
FN 94, p. 109. 
112
 Art. 39 of the ECT reads as follows: 
“This Treaty shall be subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatories. Instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Depository.” 
113
 Art. 38 of the ECT provides for the following: 
“This Treaty shall be open for signature at Lisbon from 17 December 1994 to 16 June 1995 by the states and 
Regional Economic Integration Organizations which have signed the Charter.” 
SHAW observes that 
 45 
The consent to be bound by the ECT through signature with ratification, acceptance or 
approval was reserved to states and REIOs while the ECT was open for signature 
between 17 December 1994 and 16 June 1995.115 The signature of the ECT, not 
followed by ratification, acceptance or approval, has particular importance in the 
context of the provisional application of the ECT under Article 45.116 Starting with 16 
June 1995, the date on which the ECT was closed for signature, the consent to be bound 
by the ECT can only take the form of accession through the deposit of instruments of 
accession with the Depository.117 Article 41 of the ECT provides as a precondition for 
accession the prior signature of the European Charter. 
 
1.2 Entry into Force and Withdrawal from the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
The second condition set forth under Article 1(2) of the ECT refers to the entry into 
force of the ECT for the states and REIOs. 
 
The ECT entered into force on 16 April 1998 for the states and REIOs that became 
signatories of the ECT and have deposited instruments of ratification, acceptance or 
                                                                                                                                          
“[…] where the convention is subject to acceptance, approval or ratification, signature will in principle be a 
formality and will mean no more than that state representatives have agreed upon an acceptable text, which 
will be forwarded to their particular governments for the necessary decision as to acceptance or rejection.” 
(Shaw, M.N.; supra at FN 92, p. 818, footnote omitted) 
114
 Art. 41; supra at FN 40. 
115
 See, Art. 38 of the ECT; supra at FN 113. 
116
 The signature is essential for the application of ECT, as signatories have the obligation not to defeat 
the object and purpose of the ECT prior to its entry into force, in accordance with Art. 18 of the Vienna 
Convention: 
“A State is obliged to refrain from acts which would defeat the object and purpose of a treaty when: 
(a) it has signed the treaty or has exchanged instruments constituting the treaty subject to ratification, 
acceptance or approval, until it shall have made its intention clear not to become a party to the treaty; or 
(b) it has expressed its consent to be bound by the treaty, pending the entry into force of the treaty and 
provided that such entry into force is not unduly delayed.” 
See also, Klabbers, Jan; How to Defeat a Treaty’s Object and Purpose Pending Entry into Force: Toward 
Manifest Intent, 34 Vand. J. Transnat’l L. 283 (2001). 
117
 See, Art. 41 of the ECT; supra at FN 40. According to SHAW, accession 
[…] is the normal method by which a state becomes a party to a treaty it has not signed either because the 
treaty provides that signature is limited to certain states, and it is not such a state, or because a particular 
deadline for signature has passed.” (Shaw, M.N.; supra at FN 92, p. 820) 
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approval before this date. For states and REIOs acceding to, ratifying, accepting or 
approving the ECT after 16 April 1998, the ECT enters into force on the ninetieth day 
after the date of deposit of the instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or 
accession.118 
 
The status of Contracting Party to the ECT ceases to exist with the withdrawal from the 
ECT.119 Under Article 47 of the ECT, any Contracting Party may request the 
withdrawal from the ECT. The withdrawal takes effect upon the expiry of one year after 
the date of the receipt of the notification of withdrawal or after a later period specified 
in the notification.120 Article 47(3) of the ECT contains an important provision for 
Investors as it expressly refers to the application of the ECT for a period of twenty years 
to Investments made by Investors of the denouncing Contracting Party in the Areas of 
other Contracting Parties and to Investments made by Investors of other Contracting 
Parties in the Area of the denouncing Contracting Party.121 This means that the ECT 
continues to apply, but only to the Investments made before the withdrawal takes effect, 
i.e. one year after the date of notification or a later period, if specified in the 
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 Art. 44(2) of the ECT reads as follows: 
“For each state or Regional Economic Integration Organization which ratifies, accepts or approves this 
Treaty or accedes thereto after the deposit of the thirtieth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval, it 
shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date of deposit by such state or Regional Economic 
Integration Organization of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” 
119
 The ECT was concluded for an indefinite time. The status of Contracting Party to the ECT may as well 
end with the termination of the ECT, under the provisions of Section 3 of the Vienna Convention. 
120
 Art. 47(1) provides that such withdrawal may only be requested after five years from the date on 
which the ECT has entered into force, i.e. after April 2003. No such requests have been registered until 
now. 
121
 Art. 47(3) of the ECT reads as follows: 
“The provisions of this Treaty shall continue to apply to Investments made in the Area of a Contracting Party 
by Investors of other Contracting Parties or in the Area of other Contracting Parties by Investors of that 
Contracting Party as of the date when that Contracting Party’s withdrawal from the Treaty takes effect for a 
period of 20 years from such date.” 
Art. 47 of the ECT refers to the application of “this Treaty” and not to specific parts of the ECT. A 
similar provision can be found under the termination of the provisional application of the ECT. 
Art. 70(2) of the Vienna Convention provides that unless the treaty provides otherwise, from the date 
when the withdrawal takes effect, the withdrawal releases the party from any further obligation to 
perform the treaty, and does not affect any right, obligation or legal situation of the parties created 
through the execution of the treaty prior to the withdrawal. Art. 47 of the ECT provides otherwise, i.e. the 
ECT shall apply to Investments made by the Contracting parties for a period of twenty years after the 
withdrawal becomes effective. 
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notification.122 In the latter situation, Investors may avail themselves of the provisions 
of the ECT for a period of twenty years. 
 
1.3 Signatories and the Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
Article 45 of the ECT contains a provision of unique and significant practical 
consequences which refers to the provisional application of the ECT to signatories.123 
Under the provisional application rule, the ECT also applies to signatories, transforming 
the obligations under the ECT into binding obligations before its entry into force. The 
provisional application grants Investors of states and REIOs that are not yet Contracting 
Parties to the ECT access to the protection of the ECT. 
 
Article 45 of the ECT contains complex and interrelated provisions, some of which 
have already been tested in practice in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan,124 and in the cases brought against the Russian Federation by the Yukos’ 
shareholders. 
 
The analysis of the provisional application of the ECT first deals with the nature of the 
provisional application rule in the light of the provisions of the Vienna Convention and 
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 Art. 47(2) of the ECT. Art. 47 of the ECT stands out against the provisions of Articles 71 and 72 of the 
ICSID Convention. For a commentary of Articles 71 and 72 regarding the denunciation of the ICSID 
Convention, see, Castro de Figueiredo, Roberto; Euro Telecom v. Bolivia: The Denunciation of the ICSID 
Convention and ICSID Arbitration under BITs, 6(1) TDM (2009); Garibaldi, Oscar M.; On the 
Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, Consent to ICSID Jurisdiction, and the Limits of the Contract 
Analogy; pp. 251–277, in Binder, Christina; Kriebaum, Ursula; Reinisch, August; Wittich, Stephan (eds.); 
International Investment Law for the 21st Century. Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2009 etc. 
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 There was a proposal to define the notion of ‘signatory’ as “a state or Regional Economic Integration 
Organisation which has signed this Agreement and for which the Agreement has not yet entered into 
force”, but it was not included in any of the ECT’s drafts. See, Note from the Legal Sub–Group 
Chairman, Subject: Agenda for the Legal Sub–Group Meeting of 1–5 March 1993, 18/93 LEG–8, 24 
February 1993. 
124
 Petrobart Ltd. v. Kyrgyz Republic, Arbitral Award of 29 March 2005. 
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continues with the conditions laid down in Article 45, highlighting the controversial 
issues in relation to these requirements. The analysis concludes with the termination and 
the effects of the provisional application, and their relevance for the notion of 
‘Investor’. 
 
1.3.1 Provisional Application of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties  
 
Article 45 contains an innovative provision allowing for the provisional application of 
the ECT to signatories: 
“(1) Each signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally pending its entry 
into force for such signatory in accordance with Article 44, to the extent that 
such provisional application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or 
regulations. 
(2) (a) Notwithstanding paragraph (1) any signatory may, when signing, 
deliver to the Depository a declaration that it is not able to accept provisional 
application. The obligation contained in paragraph (1) shall not apply to a 
signatory making such declaration. Any such signatory may at any time 
withdraw that declaration by written notification to the Depository. 
      (b) Neither a signatory which makes a declaration in accordance with 
subparagraph (a) not Investors of that signatory may claim the benefits of 
provisional application under paragraph (1). 
      (c) Notwithstanding subparagraph (a), any signatory making a declaration 
referred to in subparagraph (a) shall apply Part VII provisionally pending the 
entry into force of the Treaty for such signatory in accordance with Article 44, 
to the extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with its laws 
or regulations. 
(3) (a) Any signatory may terminate its provisional application of this Treaty 
by written notification to the Depository of its intention not to become a 
Contracting Party to the Treaty. Termination of provisional application for any 
signatory shall take effect upon the expiration of 60 days from the date on 
which such signatory’s written notification is received by the Depository. 
      (b) In the event that a signatory terminates provisional application under 
subparagraph (a), the obligation of the signatory under paragraph (1) to apply 
Parts III and V with respect to any Investments made in its Area during such 
provisional application by Investors of other signatories shall nevertheless 
remain in effect with respect to those Investments for twenty years following 
the effective date of termination, except as provided in subparagraph (c). 
      (c) Subparagraph (b) shall not apply to any signatory listed in Annex PA.1 
A signatory shall be removed from the list in Annex PA effective upon 
delivery to the Depository of its request therefor. […] 
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(7) A state or a Regional Economic Integration Organization which, prior to 
this Treaty’s entry into force, accedes to the Treaty in accordance with Article 
41 shall, pending the Treaty’s entry into force, have the rights and assume the 
obligations of a signatory under this Article.”125 
 
For the original signatories, the ECT applied provisionally between the signing date, 17 
December 1994, and the date it entered into force, 16 April 1998, save for those 
signatories that excluded the provisional application. After the ECT entered into force, 
the ECT continued to apply provisionally to signatories that signed the ECT, but did not 
ratify it, except where the signatories opted out of the provisional application. 
According to the Energy Charter Secretariat, only Belarus applies the ECT on a 
provisional basis under Article 45, while Australia, Iceland and Norway opted out of 
the provisional application.126 The Russian Federation applied the ECT provisionally 
until to 18 October 2009, inclusive.127  
 
The provisional application is the exception to the rule that treaties do not create rights 
and do not impose obligation upon parties prior to their entry into force. Article 26 of 
the Vienna Convention recognizes the rule that only treaties in force are binding upon 
parties, by providing that “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.” 
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 The initial provision referring to the provisional application of the ECT provided that 
“[s]ubject to Article 2 above the Contracting Parties agrees to apply this Agreement provisionally pending its 
entry into force in accordance with Article 40 above.” (Note from the Chairman of Working Group II, 
Subject: Basic Protocol, 8/91 BP2, 12 September 1991) 
The Basic Agreement of 31 October 1991 referred to the following: 
“The Signatories agree to apply this Agreement provisionally following signature, to the extent that such 
provisional application is not inconsistent with their national laws pending its entry into force in accordance 
with Article 40 above.” (Art. 41 of the Basic Agreement of 31 October 1991, 21/91 BA 4) 
126
 Energy Charter Treaty Members of the Energy Charter Conference, 
<http://www.encharter.org/index.php?id=61&L=0> (last visited, 16 February 2011). Signatories may 
exclude the provisional application under Art. 45(2)(a) of the ECT. See, Chapter I.1.3.2 below. 
127
 On 20 August 2009, the Russian Federation informed that it did not intend to become a Contracting 
Party to the ECT. See, supra at FN 54. Nevertheless, in accordance with Art. 45(3)(b) of the ECT, for the 
investments made up to 18 October 2009 inclusive, the Russian Federation is still bound by the 
obligations under Parts III and V (Investment Promotion and Protection, and Dispute Settlement) for a 
period of twenty years as of the termination of the provisional application. See also, the tribunal’s 
reasoning in the Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98. 
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Article 25 of the Vienna Convention generically allows for the provisional application 
of treaties: 
“1. A treaty or a part of a treaty is applied provisionally pending its entry into 
force if: 
 (a) the treaty itself so provides; or 
 (b) the negotiating States have in some other manner so agreed. 
2. Unless the treaty otherwise provides or the negotiating States have 
otherwise agreed, the provisional application of a treaty or a part of a treaty 
with respect to a State shall be terminated if that State notifies the other States 
between which the treaty is being applied provisionally of its intention not to 
become a party to that treaty.” 
 
Article 25(1)(a) of the Vienna Convention refers to the provisional application of a 
treaty, pending its entry into force, if such application is provided for by the treaty itself. 
The ECT is a case falling under this rule. Article 45 of the ECT expressly provides for 
the provisional application to signatories of the ECT. The Vienna Convention and the 
ECT do not offer a definition of ‘provisional application’; however, the wordings of 
Article 25 of the Vienna Convention and of Article 45 of the ECT indicate that the 
provisional application does not trigger the entry into force of a treaty.128  
 
There are various reasons that motivate signatories to a treaty to exercise the provisional 
application rule. Usually, there is 
“[…] a pressing need for the immediate application of the provisions of a 
signed but unratified treaty […]. For instance, there may be an immediate 
need to settle the location of a particular maritime boundary, or to put into 
effect the provisions of an international commodity or trade agreement, or to 
commence the preparatory work for a new international organization, or to 
create uniformity in newly–developed substantive rules of international 
law.”129 
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 According to AUST,  
“[t]he subject of Article 25 is sometimes described loosely as provisional entry into force. This may be 
because the draft article prepared by the International Law Commission so describe it, but, as Article 25 
makes clear, it is concerned only with the application of a treaty on a provisional basis.” (Aust, A.; supra at 
FN 94, p. 172, emphasis original) 
129
 See, Rogoff, Martin A.,Gauditz, Barbara E.; The Provisional Application of International Agreements, 
39 Me. L. Rev. 29 (1987), pp. 35–36, footnotes omitted. One of the most cited cases is the provisional 
application of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, 1 January 1948, through the Protocol of 
Provisional Application. Other examples of provisional application include the Open Skies Treaty, 1 
January 2002; United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 16 November 1994, (UNCLOS); and 
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Some authors refer to the provisional application as “responding to some form of 
international crisis”.130 This includes cases of “treaties for which rapid, broad–based 
participation and implementation is essential to ensure the effectiveness of the treaty 
regime”.131 In the Note from the Chairman of the Working Group II for the drafting of 
the ECT, it is mentioned that the provisional application provision 
“[…] would enable the institutional framework to be put into place and import 
a momentum to the Charter System to proceed with work on the production of 
Core and Supplementary Protocols and other information exchanges.”132 
 
As revealed by the documents of the ECT’s negotiation,133 the rapid implementation 
was the reason that determined the drafters to insert the provisional application rule in 
the final draft of the ECT. 
 
1.3.2 Conditions for the Provisional Application 
 
Under Article 45, the ECT applies on a provisional basis subject to two cumulative 
conditions. First, the provisional application should not be inconsistent with the 
constitution, laws and regulations of the signatory. Article 45(1) of the ECT provides 
that signatories agree to apply the ECT provisionally “to the extent that such provisional 
                                                                                                                                          
the Antarctic Treaty Environmental Protocol, 14 January 1998. For further commentary on these 
conventions, see, Aust, A.; supra at FN 94, p. 172–175. 
130
 Niebruegge, A. M.; supra at FN 98, p. 358. 
131
 Niebruegge, A.M.; supra at FN 98, p. 358. According to NIEBRUEGGE, 
“[p]articularly within the context of international trade and investment treaties, the rapid, uniform, and 
broad–based implementation of treaty protections and obligations is crucial to the efficacy of the treaty 
regime”. (Niebruegge, A.M.; supra, p. 359) 
132
 Note from the Chairman of Working Group II; supra at FN 125. See also, the Speech by Ambassador 
Charles Rutten: 
“It is clear, and generally accepted, that the full realisation of the economic and political objectives of the 
Charter require a rapid implementation of the general principles and the specific obligations that will be 
agreed upon in the Basic Agreement. The continuing deterioration of the economic and political climate, 
particularly in the CIS, has only further increased the urgency of reaching agreement and producing practical 
and tangible effects as soon as possible.” (Speech by Ambassador Charles Rutten, Chairman of the 
Preparatory Conference on the European Energy Charter, 4th International Energy Forum, Hamburg, 19–20 
November 1992, p. 8) 
133
 See, the testimony of FREMANTLE in the Yukos Cases: 
“[…] there was a sense of urgency in finalizing the ECT, in the belief that it would help overcome the 
Russian energy crisis. Urgency was also the motivation behind splitting the treaty into the present ECT, 
dealing with investments, and a later document (never completed) covering the pre–investment stage.” 
(Witness’ Testimony of Sydney FREMANTLE, Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 98) 
 52 
application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations.” Second, the 
signatory should not have submitted a declaration with the Depository excluding the 
provisional application. Article 45(2)(a) of the ECT allows signatories to opt out of the 
provisional application by making a declaration, upon signature, that they are not able to 
accept the provisional application of the ECT. 
 
Before discussing these two conditions, a few comments must be made on the 
correlation between Article 45(1) and Article 45(2)(a) of the ECT. The debate in the 
practice of the ECT concerned two questions: first, whether the declaration made under 
Article 45(2)(a) is limited to the reasons stated under Article 45(1); and second, whether 
the situation envisaged by Article 45(1) automatically triggers the inapplicability of the 
provisional application rule or there is a need for a declaration to be submitted by the 
signatory in this respect. 
 
In Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, Georgia objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal, 
claiming, among other grounds, that the dispute occurred prior to the entry into force of 
the ECT. When examining whether the ECT applied provisionally to Georgia and 
Greece, the tribunal held that there is “no necessary link between paragraphs (1) and (2) 
of Article 45”.134 Turning to the question as to whether a signatory must submit the 
declaration under Article 45(2)(a) should there be an inconsistency between the 
provisional application of the ECT and the constitution, laws and regulations of the 
signatory, as provided for by Article 45(1), the tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia 
stated that the signatory “is entitled to rely on the proviso to paragraph (1) without the 
need to make, in addition, a declaration under paragraph (2).”135 
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The wording of Article 45(2)(a) distinguishes between the case where the provisional 
application is not possible due to inconsistency with the laws of the signatory under 
Article 45(1) and the case when the signatory decides to avoid provisional application 
by making the declaration to the Depositary. The insertion of the word 
“notwithstanding” at the beginning of the provision of Article 45(2)(a) suggests the 
distinct situations under Articles 45(1) and 45(2)(a).136 Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention requires for treaties to be interpreted in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning of the terms in their context. Where the terms of a treaty “make sense in their 
natural and ordinary meaning”, then there is no need to resort to other methods of 
interpretation.137 The tribunal in the Yukos Cases stated that 
“[…] the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of Articles 45(1) and 
45(2), when read together, demonstrates […] that the declaration which is 
referred to in Article 45(2) is a declaration which is not necessarily linked to 
the Limitation Clause of Article 45(1).”138  
 
                                                
136
 According to The New Oxford American Dictionary, ‘notwithstanding’ means ‘in spite of’. See, The 
New Oxford American Dictionary, 2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005, p. 1165. 
Consequently, Art. 45(2)(a) may be read as follows: ‘In spite of (regardless of) paragraph 1 any signatory 
may, when signing, deliver to the Depository a declaration that it is not able to accept provisional 
application. […]’. See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in the Yukos Cases: 
“[…] the use of the word “[n]otwithstanding” to introduce Article 45(2) plainly suggests that the declaration 
in Article 45(2)(a) can be made whether or not there in fact exists any inconsistency between “such 
provisional application” of the ECT and a signatory’s constitution, laws or regulations.” (Yukos Cases; supra 
at FN 98, para. 262) 
137
 Advisory Opinion regarding the Competence of the General Assembly for the Admission of a State to 
the United Nations of 3 March 1950 (Second Admissions), p. 8. See also, the statement of the PCIJ in the 
Polish Postal Service in Danzig: 
“It is a cardinal principle of interpretation that words must be interpreted in the sense which they would 
normally have in their context, unless such interpretation would lead to something unreasonable or absurd.” 
(Advisory Opinion in the Polish Postal Service in Danzig of 16 May 1925, p. 39) 
138
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 264, emphasis original. The tribunal added that support for this 
conclusion is found in the practice of the ECT’s signatories: 
“[…] while twelve States did make a formal declaration under Article 45(2) opting out of provisional 
application, six States (Austria, Luxembourg, Italy, Romania, Portugal and Turkey) relied on the Limitation 
Clause in Article 45(1), or the ability to opt out of provisional application for inconsistency with the domestic 
regime, without delivering a formal declaration to the Depository under Article 45(2). While the Tribunal 
accepts Claimant’s point that four of these countries made some form of declaration prior to signing the 
Treaty (Austria, Italy, Romania and Portugal), both Luxembourg and Turkey relied on Article 45(1) when 
they signed the ECT without submitting any kind of declaration.” (Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 265, 
emphasis original) 
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Likewise, the tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia referred to the declaration under 
Article 45(2)(a) and concluded that this declaration 
“[…] may be, but does not have to be, motivated by an inconsistency between 
provisional application and something in the State’s domestic law; there may 
be other reasons which prompt a State to make such a declaration.”139  
 
The wording of Article 45(2)(a) indicates that a signatory may opt out of the provisional 
application if it is “not able” to apply the ECT on a provisional basis. Such ability is not 
restricted to the inconsistency of its laws with the provisional application of the ECT. 
But contrary to the statements of the arbitral tribunals in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia 
and the Yukos Cases, some authors argue that the words “not able to accept provisional 
application” indicate an inability to apply the ECT provisionally that comes from the 
inconsistency between the provisional application regime and the laws of the 
signatory.140 This argument, however, makes Article 45(2)(a) of the ECT superfluous, 
given that the situation is already covered by Article 45(1).141 While it is true that 
Article 45(2)(a) refers to “not be able to”, there is no limitation placed on the reasons 
preventing a signatory from being able to apply the ECT on a provisional basis.142 
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 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, para. 228.  
140
 See for example, Reisman, Michael W.; Part III – The Provisional application of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, pp. 47–61, in Coop, G.; Ribeiro, C. (eds.); supra at FN 90. The author emphasizes that 
“Article 45(2) does not say “that it [the signatory State] does not wish to accept provisional application”. Nor 
does it say “that it [the signatory State] finds it politically inconvenient to accept provisional application”. 
Nor does the provision use any other verb indicating or implying a facultative power.” (Reisman, M.W.; 
supra, p. 56, emphasis original) 
REISMAN also argues that a signatory 
“[…] which had not exercised the option of making a declaration at the critical date, which is the moment of 
signing [cannot] subsequently […] invoke “its constitution, laws or regulations,” on the ground that it is not 
able to comply, as a justification for and defense of dishonoring all or some part of its commitment to apply 
the Treaty provisionally.” (Reisman, M.W.; supra, p. 54, emphasis original)  
141
 The rule of non–surplus in treaty interpretation suggests that the terms of a treaty must have a 
meaning. In the case concerning the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee, the ICJ rejected the 
interpretation of the Convention for the Establishment of the Inter–Governmental Maritime Consultative 
Organization in a manner in which some terms “would be left without significance”. See, Case 
concerning the Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter–Governmental Maritime 
Consultative Organization, Advisory Opinion of 8 June 1960, p. 166. 
142
 But see, in the drafting documents of the ECT, the suggestion that there is no option for the signatories 
to escape the provisional application without making the declaration under Art. 45(2)(a): 
“In relation to Article 50, provisional Application, it has been argued that the Article might be interpreted to 
allow: 
[…] 3) CP’s [Contracting Parties] who will not apply the Treaty provisionally but will not submit a 
declaration to that effect. 
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A. Provisional Application not Excluded by the Signatory’s Declaration 
The ECT applies provisionally as long as signatories did not submit the declaration 
under Article 45(2)(a) stating that they are not able to accept the provisional 
application.143 The declaration excluding the provisional application of the ECT 
prevents a signatory and Investors of the signatory making this declaration from taking 
advantage of the rights conferred upon them by the ECT.144 
 
Should a signatory make the declaration avoiding the provisional application, Article 
45(2)(c) provides that the provisions of Part VII of the ECT regarding the structure and 
institutions of the ECT, including the contribution to the budget of the Energy Charter 
Secretariat and the Energy Charter Conference, shall apply.145 Article 45(2)(a) also 
provides that where a signatory opted out of the provisional application of the ECT by 
submitting the declaration mentioned above, the signatory may, at any time, withdraw 
this declaration, thus commencing the provisional application of the ECT. 
 
B. Provisional Application not Inconsistent with the Constitution, Laws or 
Regulations of the Signatory 
Article 45(1) of the ECT states that the provisional application of the ECT is valid as 
long as “such provisional application is not inconsistent with [signatory’s] constitution, 
                                                                                                                                          
I personally don’t see any room for the third interpretation which might stem from the use of the word “may” 
in paragraph 2(a).” (Facsimile from Lise Weis, Energy Charter Secretariat, to Ted Borek, 25 August 1994) 
The European Communities suggested replacing the first sentence of Article 45(2)(a) with the following 
provision: 
“Those signatories whose laws, regulations and constitutional requirements do not so permit shall, on 
signature, make a declaration that they are not able to accept provisional application.” (ECT Draft of 17 
March 1994, seventh version, 17/94 CONF 96) 
Nevertheless, below the comment of the European Communities it is mentioned that “several delegations 
entered reserves on this EC proposal”. 
143
 In Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal held that since Bulgaria made no declaration under Art. 45(2)(a) of 
the ECT, the ECT applied provisionally from the date of signature. See, Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 
93, para. 140.  
144
 Art. 45(2)(b) of the ECT. 
145
 Art. 45(2)(c) of the ECT allows for the provisional application of Part VII only if such application is 
not inconsistent with the laws and regulations of the signatory which submitted the declaration. 
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laws or regulations”. This provision suggests that the power to assess whether there is 
such inconsistency belongs to the signatory applying the ECT on a provisional basis. 
Where the provisional application of the ECT is inconsistent with the laws of the 
signatory, arguably, the ECT does not require the signatory to submit the declaration 
provided for by Article 45(2)(a).146 
 
Article 45(1) does not provide for an explanation of the terms ‘inconsistent with’. In the 
ordinary meaning, the terms ‘inconsistent with’ refer to an incompatibility with 
something.147 It follows that Article 45(1) becomes effective only if there is an 
incompatibility between the provisional application of the ECT and the laws of the 
signatory relying on this provision. The moment when the inconsistency of the 
provisional application with the laws of the signatory should be assessed is the date of 
signature of the ECT. The principles of public international law prevent signatories 
from adopting legislation, at a later stage, which would defeat the provisions and the 
object and purpose of the ECT. This was also the approach taken by the tribunals in 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia and in the Yukos Cases.148 In Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, 
the tribunal took into consideration the laws applicable at the time of signature of the 
ECT and excluded the laws dealing with this aspect enacted after that date.149 
 
The debate on Article 45(1) of the ECT is focused on the meaning of the expression “to 
the extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws 
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 See also, Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, paras 270–285. 
147
 As explained by the New Oxford American Dictionary, they mean “not compatible” with something. 
See, The New Oxford American Dictionary; supra at FN 136, p. 855.  
148
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, paras 343-344:  
“The Tribunal is of the view that the determination as to whether or not the principle of provisional 
application is consistent with the constitution, the laws or the regulations of the host State in which the 
Investment is made must be made in the light of the constitution, laws and regulations at the time of signature 
of the ECT. 
Any other interpretation would allow a State to modify its laws after having signed the ECT in order to evade 
an obligation that it has assumed by agreeing to provisional application of the Treaty. The Tribunal cannot 
accept such an interpretation.” 
149
 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, paras 229–246. 
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or regulations [of the signatory]”. It was suggested that this phrase may be read in two 
distinct ways: (i) Article 45 applies as long as the provisional application per se is not 
inconsistent with the constitution, laws and regulations of the signatory;150 or (ii) Article 
45 applies only if the ECT as a whole and each of its provisions are not inconsistent 
with the law of the signatory.151 Some scholars consider the above expression should be 
understood as referring to both: the compatibility of the provisional application per se 
and of the ECT with the laws of the signatory.152 
 
a. Article 45 applies as long as the provisional application per se is not 
inconsistent with the constitution, laws and regulations of the signatory 
For the first interpretation of the expression “to the extent that such provisional 
application is not inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations [of the 
signatory]”, several arguments may be put forward.  
 
The documents included in the negotiation of Article 45 of the ECT suggest that the 
provision referring to the inconsistency of the provisional application with the 
constitution, laws and regulations of the signatory was inserted following concerns of 
the participating states in respect of the prohibition of the provisional application by 
their laws. The Comments of the United States on the Basic Protocol Draft of 11 
September 1991 show this concern: 
                                                
150
 This was the interpretation held by the tribunal in the Yukos Cases. See, Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, 
para. 329. For example, in Romanian legislation, Art. 26(1) of the Law on Treaties no. 590 of 2003 
provides for the provisional application of only certain categories of treaties (for example, treaties signed 
by governments of states, treaties providing for financial assistance from the EU, etc.; the ECT is 
excluded from this category). 
151
 For more on this opinion, see, Hafner, Gerhard; The ‘Provisional Application’ of the Energy Charter 
Treaty, pp. 593–607, in Binder, C.; Kriebaum, U.; Reinisch, A.; Wittich, S. (eds.); supra at FN 122. 
152
 For example, HOBÉR is of the opinion that both interpretations of this second condition are valid. See, 
Hobér, Kaj; Arbitrating Disputes under the Energy Charter Treaty, 7(2) OGEL (2009, pp. 17–18; Hobér, 
Kaj; The Role of the Energy Charter Treaty in the Context of the European Union and Russia, p. 279, in 
Coop, G.; Ribeiro, C. (eds.); supra at FN 90. 
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“Article 41 (Provisional Application): “Provisional” application of the 
Protocol is not possible in the U.S., where a treaty or legislation is required 
before such a document can come into force. 
This can be fixed with: “to the extent that their laws allow” or some similar 
language.”153 
 
The language of the ECT suggests that the inconsistency refers to the per se provisional 
application of the ECT and not to the inconsistency of some or all the provisions of the 
ECT with the laws of the signatory. The word “such” inserted in the expression “such 
provisional application is not inconsistent” makes reference to the first part of the 
paragraph 1, “[e]ach signatory agrees to apply this Treaty provisionally”.154 Where the 
terms of a treaty are clear within their ordinary meaning, there is no need to resort to 
other methods of interpretation.155 In the Iranian Oil Case, the ICJ reaffirmed the 
principle of textuality in Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention and concluded that the 
“[d]eclaration must be interpreted as it stands, having regard to the words actually 
used.”156 Moreover, terms are to be given their natural meaning, unless there is evidence 
                                                
153
 Comments of the United States on the Basic Protocol Draft of 11 September 1991, 8/91 BP 2. See also, 
the comments of the Austrian representatives: 
“In Austria the provisional application of international agreements is possible only in specific cases provided 
for expressly under Constitutional law or in cases where the contents of the relevant agreement is already 
embodied in pre–existent national legislation. Since neither of this applies here, an obligation on provisional 
application would be acceptable for Austria only “subject to Constitutional law” or “subject to a reservation 
upon signature”.” (Telefax from H. Steinhäusl, Austrian Mission to the E.C., Brussels, to European Energy 
Charter Conference Secretariat, 7 January 1994) 
But see, the comments of the Japanese delegation, who understood that Japan will weigh each provision 
of the ECT against its laws and regulations: 
“[…] When we consider provisional application, it is our legal practice to scrutinise the extent to which each 
provision is applicable according to our domestic legislation.” (Japanese Comments on Provisional 
Application, 20 January 1994) 
154
 The tribunal in the Yukos Cases held this to be the solution for the correct interpretation of Art. 45(1) 
of the ECT: 
“For the Tribunal, the key to the interpretation of the Limitation Clause rests in the use of the adjective 
“such” in the phrase “such provisional application.” “Such,” according to Black’s Law Dictionary (Seventh 
Edition), means “that or those; having just been mentioned.” The Merriam–Webster Collegiate Dictionary 
(Tenth Edition) defines “such” as “of the character, quality, or extent previously indicated or implied.” The 
phrase “such provisional application,” as used in Article 45(1), therefore refers to the provisional application 
previously mentioned in that Article, namely the provisional application of “this Treaty.”” (Yukos Cases; 
supra at FN 98, para. 304, emphasis original) 
155
 See, Vattel, Emmerich; The Law of Nations or Principles of the Law of the Law of Nature, Applied to 
the Conduct and Affairs of Nations and Sovereigns, London: G.G. and J. Robinson, Paternoster–Row, 
1797, p. 244: “The first general maxim of interpretation is, that It is not allowable to interpret what has 
no need of interpretation.” (emphasis original) See, Advisory Opinions in Polish Postal Service in Danzig 
and Second Admissions; supra at FN 137, p. 39. 
156
 Anglo–Iranian Oil Co. Case, Preliminary Objection, Judgment of 22 July 1952, p. 105. Art. 31(1) of 
the Vienna Convention retains two principles of interpretation, referred to by FITZMAURICE as the 
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that they are to be understood in another sense or where the natural meaning leads to an 
absurd result:157 
“That will was expressed in the words used, and in order to determine it, the 
first principle must be applied. It is necessary to give effect to the words used 
in their natural and ordinary meaning in the context in which they occur. The 
second principle is equally important. It is my duty to interpret the Declaration 
and not to revise it. In other words, I cannot, in seeking to find the meaning of 
these words, disregard the words as actually used, give to them a meaning 
different from their ordinary and natural meaning, or add words or ideas which 
were not used in the making of the Declaration.”158 
 
The terms must be interpreted in accordance with their ordinary meaning in their 
context.159 Furthermore, the context in which the terms of a treaty must be interpreted 
includes the immediate context, which refers to the “grammatical construction of the 
provision or phrase within which a word in issue is located.”160 The term ‘such’ used in 
Article 45(1) of the ECT particularizes the inconsistency to the provisional application 
of the ECT. 
                                                                                                                                          
‘principle of actuality or textuality’ and the ‘principle of natural and ordinary meaning’. See, Fitzmaurice, 
Gerald; The Law and Procedure of the International Court of Justice 1951–4: Treaty Interpretation and 
Other Treaty Points, 33 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 203 (1957), p. 211. Accordingly, Art. 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention refers to the textual approach in the interpretation of treaties pursuant to which, treaties 
should be interpreted based on their actual text, in accordance with the natural and ordinary meaning of 
its terms. See, Iranian Oil Case; supra; Ambatielos Case, Merits: Obligation to Arbitrate, Dissenting 
Opinion by Sir Arnold McNair, President, and Judges Basdevant, Klaestad and Read to the Judgment of 
15 May 1953, p. 30: “These words should be construed in their natural and ordinary meaning, as has been 
said over and over again […]”. 
157
 Fitzmaurice, G.; supra at FN 156, p. 211. See also, Vattel, E.; supra at FN 155, p. 248: “In the 
interpretation of treaties […] we ought not to deviate from the common use of the language, unless we 
have very strong reasons for it.” (emphasis original) 
158
 Dissenting Opinion of Judge Read in the Iran Oil Case; supra at FN 156, p. 145. Art. 32 of the Vienna 
Convention provides that 
“[r]ecourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory work of the 
treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning resulting from the application 
of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: 
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or 
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.” 
159
 Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. As stated in the Iranian Oil Case, the interpretation of the terms 
according to their ordinary meaning cannot 
“[…] base itself on purely grammatical interpretation of the text. It must seek the interpretation which is in 
harmony with the natural and reasonable way of reading the text […].” (Iranian Oil Case; supra at FN 156, 
p. 104) 
160
 Gardiner, R.; supra at FN 101, p. 178. As pointed out by GARDINER, “syntax [is] very much allied to 
construing phrases and thus fixing the ordinary meaning of terms in their context”. (ibid., p. 180) See 
also, the Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier Dispute, where the ICJ referred to the 
fact that “the word must be read in its context” and that the conclusion of the ICJ is also “confirmed if the 
phrase is considered in the wider context”. See, Case Concerning the Land, Island and Maritime Frontier 
Dispute, Judgement of 11 September 1992, p. 583. 
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If the drafters intended to allow signatories to escape the provisional application 
without making the declaration under Article 45(2)(a), by granting them the freedom to 
test the provisions of the ECT against any of their laws or regulations, then, such 
intention must have been clear and construed as a valid exception to the principles of 
public international law. The principle of good faith, as stated in Article 26 of the 
Vienna Convention, prevents a signatory from entering into a treaty knowing that it will 
not be able to comply with the obligations assumed under that treaty.161 It also prevents 
a signatory party to take any action or measure that would breach the purpose and the 
obligations provided for by the respective treaty. Referring to the formation of treaties 
and the principle of good faith, REUTERS points out that 
“[t]he negotiating States or international organizations owe each other a duty 
of loyalty in their conduct with respect to the proposed treaty. They should not 
embark on a treaty commitment and at the same time defeat its purpose”162 
 
In the Megalidis Case, the Greco–Turkish Arbitral Tribunal expressly stated that, 
already with the signature of the treaty, there exists an obligation having the value of a 
principle of law, to do nothing which may harm the treaty.163 This was seen by the 
Greco–Turkish Arbitral Tribunal as the expression of the principle of good faith 
applicable to all treaties.164 Based on the principle of good faith, parties are expected to 
carry out the substance of the treaty “honestly and loyally”.165 Between the signature 
and the entry into force of a treaty, parties have a duty to refrain from acts that would 
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 Art. 26 of the Vienna Convention refers to “[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and 
must be performed by them in good faith.” The Greco–Turkish Arbitral Tribunal in the Megalidis Case 
considered that the principle of good faith is the foundation of all law and all conventions (“la base de 
toute loi et de toute convention”). See, Aristoteles A. Megalidis v. Turkey, Award of 1928, p. 395. 
162
 Reuter, P.; supra at FN 106, p. 67, para. 110. 
163
 Megalidis Case; supra at FN 161, p. 395: 
“[q]u´il est de principe que déjà avec la signature d´un Traité et avant sa mise en vigueur, il existe pour les 
parties contractantes une obligation de ne rien faire qui puisse nuire au Traité en diminuant la portée de ses 
clauses.” 
164
 Megalidis Case; supra at FN 161, p. 395. 
165
 Cheng, B.; supra at FN 161, p. 115. 
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breach the object and purpose of that treaty, unless it made clear its intention not to 
become a party to the treaty.166 The provisional application of the ECT means more 
than refraining from acts that would defeat the ECT; it means that the ECT applies to 
the signatories as it would be in force. 
 
When a signatory assumes treaty obligations through the entry into force or the 
provisional application, the rights that are in conflict with these treaty obligations are 
“restricted or renounced”.167 Article 27 of the Vienna Convention codifies the principle 
of supremacy of international law over internal law: 
“A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal law as justification for 
its failure to perform a treaty. […]”168 
 
Usually referred to in justifying the state responsibility for internationally wrongful 
acts,169 the principle of supremacy of international law over internal law provides that a 
state may not rely on the provisions or deficiencies of its own law to justify a breach or 
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 See, Art. 18 of the Vienna Convention; supra at FN 116. 
167
 Cheng, B.; supra at FN 161, p. 123. See also, the North Atlantic Coast Fisheries Case (Great Britain 
v. U.S.), Award of 7 September 1910, p.15, para. (c): 
“[…] the line in question is drawn according to the principle of international law that treaty obligations are to 
be executed in perfect good faith, therefore excluding the right to legislate at will concerning the subject-
matter of the Treaty, and limiting the exercise of sovereignty of the States bound by a treaty with respect to 
that subject-matter to such acts as are consistent with the treaty.” (emphasis original) 
168
 Art. 27 adds that “[t]his rule is without prejudice to article 46”, where Art. 46 of the Vienna 
Convention reads as follows: 
“1. A State may not invoke the fact that its consent to be bound by a treaty has been expressed in violation of 
a provision of its internal law regarding competence to conclude treaties as invalidating its consent unless that 
violation was manifest and concerned a rule of its internal law of fundamental importance. 
2. A violation is manifest if it would be objectively evident to any State conducting itself in the matter in 
accordance with normal practice and in good faith.” 
The Vienna Convention provides for limited grounds for the invalidity, termination and suspension of 
treaties. The singular case when the internal law affects the validity of a treaty is laid down in Art. 46 of 
the Vienna Convention. In any other cases, when there is a conflict between the treaty and the internal 
law, the treaty shall prevail, in accordance with Art. 27 of the Vienna Convention. 
169
 See, Art. 3 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts: 
“The characterization of an act of a State as internationally wrongful is governed by international law. Such 
characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act as lawful by internal law.” 
(International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II) 
Art. 3 of the Draft Articles on Responsibility of States provides therefore that states cannot use their 
internal law as a means of escaping international responsibility. For a comprehensive explanation of Art. 
3, see, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries; 
supra, p. 7 et seq. 
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a failure to perform its duties under international law.170 In the Greco–Bulgarian 
“Communities” Case, the PCIJ referred to the 
“[…] generally accepted principle of international law that in the relations 
between Powers who are contracting Parties to a treaty, the provisions of 
municipal law cannot prevail over those of the treaty.”171 
 
Writing about the principle of supremacy of international law, SHAW underlines that 
“[…] the presence or absence of a particular provision within the internal legal 
structure of a state, including its constitution if there is one, cannot be applied 
to evade an international obligation. Any other solution would render the 
operations of international law rather precarious”.172 
 
In the Yukos Cases, the tribunal considered this principle and concluded that 
“[u]nder the pacta sunt servanda rule and Article 27 of the VCLT, a State is 
prohibited from invoking its internal legislation as a justification for failure to 
perform a treaty. In the Tribunal’s opinion, this cardinal principle of 
international law [supremacy of international law over municipal law] strongly 
militates against an interpretation of Article 45(1) that would open the door to 
a signatory, whose domestic regime recognizes the concept of provisional 
application, to avoid the provisional application of a treaty (to which it has 
agreed) on the basis that one or more provisions of the treaty is contrary to its 
internal law. Such an interpretation would undermine the fundamental reason 
why States agree to apply a treaty provisionally.”173 
 
The parties to a treaty must unequivocally and mutually agree an exception to this 
principle;174 otherwise, the parties to a treaty would be allowed to defeat the object and 
purpose of the treaty.  
 
Article 45(1) provides that each signatory agree to apply “this Treaty” provisionally, 
meaning as a whole, in its entirety. The wording of Article 45 of the ECT reveals the 
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236–238.  
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provisional application as a “singular concept, a take–it–or–leave–it approach”,175 that 
speaks against the idea that Contracting Parties are allowed to test the provisions of the 
ECT against their constitution, laws and regulations. In Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, the 
tribunal considered that: 
“[i]t is “this Treaty” which is to be provisionally applied, i.e. the Treaty as a 
whole and in its entirety and not just a part of it […]“.”176 
 
In the Yukos Cases, the tribunal agreed with the position taken by the tribunal in 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia: 
“The Tribunal finds that, in context, the former interpretation accords better 
with the ordinary meaning that should be given to the terms, as required by 
Article 31(1) of the VCLT. Indeed, without any further qualification, it is to be 
presumed that a reference to “this Treaty” is meant to refer to the Treaty as a 
whole, and not only part of the Treaty.177 
 
A treaty is to be considered a whole and any application of parts of a treaty must be 
expressly provided for, allowed and agreed to by the parties. This principle of unity is 
recognized by the Vienna Convention, in particular under Article 44(1), which refers to 
the separability of treaty provisions: 
“A right of a party [...] to denounce, withdraw from or suspend the operation 
of the treaty may be exercised only with respect to the whole treaty unless the 
treaty otherwise provides or the parties otherwise agree.” 
 
Where the drafters of the ECT allowed for the applicability of only some parts of the 
ECT, this is clearly provided for in the ECT.178 For example, Article 45(2)(c) allows for 
the provisional application of Part VII independently of the declaration submitted by a 
signatory under Article 45()2(a), and Article 45(3)(b) provides for the applicability of 
Parts III and V even after the termination of the provisional application of the ECT. 
While Article 25 of the Vienna Convention on provisional application recognizes the 
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possibility to apply provisionally the whole or a part of a treaty, this concession must be 
read in consideration of the principle of unity. The permission to apply provisionally 
only some parts of a treaty should be expressly and unambiguously provided for in the 
treaty. 
 
b. Article 45 applies only if the ECT as a whole and each of its provisions are not 
inconsistent with the law of the signatory 
Scholars and the tribunal in the Yukos Cases have considered and discussed the second 
interpretation of the expression “to the extent that such provisional application is not 
inconsistent with its constitution, laws or regulations [of the signatory]”, which allows 
for signatories to weigh the provisions of the ECT against their laws and regulations.179 
Although the analysis above showed that the provision of Article 45(1) of the ECT 
refers to the provisional application per se not inconsistent with the laws of the 
signatory, it is pertinent to highlight here the main arguments put forward for the 
interpretation of Article 45(1) as allowing signatories to evaluate the ECT and its 
provisions against their laws and regulations. 
 
It is undisputed that such power granted to signatories must be, in any case, referred to 
the time of the signature of the ECT. Any laws or regulations adopted after the 
signature of the ECT will not affect the provision of Article 45(1). Based on the 
principle of good faith, parties are expected to carry out the obligations under the treaty 
and may not escape them by enforcing internal laws defeating the object and purpose of 
such treaty.180 
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 As pointed out by the tribunal in the Yukos Cases, 
“[a]llowing a State to modulate (or, as the case may be, eliminate) the obligation of provisional application, 
depending on the content of its internal law in relation to the specific provisions found in the Treaty, would 
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One argument used for justifying the second interpretation of Article 45(1) of the ECT 
refers to the wording of the expression “to the extent that such provisional application is 
not inconsistent”. It was suggested that the terms ‘to the extent that’ may trigger “a 
partial provisional application of the ECT, namely to the extent the provisions of the 
ECT are not inconsistent with the signatory’s constitution, laws or regulations.”181 The 
tribunal in the Yukos Cases considered this argument, but rejected it and instead gave 
weight to the phrase “such provisional application”: 
“[…] the Tribunal agrees that the phrase “to the extent that” is often the 
language used when drafters of a clause in a treaty or a statute wish to make 
clear that a provision is to be applied only insofar as what then follows is the 
case. Far from being determinative of the meaning of the Limitation Clause, 
however, the use of the introductory words “to the extent that” requires the 
Tribunal to examine carefully the words that follow, namely “that such 
provisional application is not inconsistent with [each signatory’s] constitution, 
laws or regulations.”182 
 
In upholding the second interpretation of Article 45(1) of the ECT, some authors rely on 
a statement made by the European Communities on the provisional application rule 
under Article 45 of the ECT.183 This joint Statement by the Council, the Commission, 
and the Member States on Article 45 of the European Energy Charter Treaty refers to 
                                                                                                                                          
undermine the principle that provisional application of a treaty creates binding obligations.” (Yukos Cases; 
supra at FN 98, para. 314) 
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Treaty would be provisionally applied in whole or not at all, Article 45(1) would have instead provided for 
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Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 294. 
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Article 45(1) and provides that this provision “(a) […] does not create any commitment 
beyond what is compatible with the existing internal order of the Signatories”.184  
The documents of the ECT’s negotiation suggest that the European Communities 
expressed the opposite point of view to the one advocated by the scholars relying on 
Statement by the Council to justify the article–by–article application of the ECT. In the 
Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Communities it is stated that  
“[t]here is no provision in the EC Treaty which might rule out provisional 
application by the Community. Moreover, the Community has in the past 
provisionally applied Treaties on several occasions.”185 
 
The concern of the Communities, which determined the Statement by the Council to 
refer to no “commitment beyond what is compatible with the existing internal order of 
the Signatories”, rather derived from the provisional application of the ECT by some 
and not all of the EU Member States and the European Communities. This concern is 
discussed in the Opinion of the Legal Service of the European Communities: 
“The Legal Service is of the opinion that […] the provisional application by 
the Community alone or accompanied by some Member States would not be 
possible. […] 
It could also be argued that, in the absence of a clear statement on the division 
of competences, notified to the other Contracting Parties, the Community 
could be held responsible for infringements caused by Member States which 
have not accepted provisional application. 
The same problem would arise if only some Member Sates signed the ECT 
without declaring that they are not accepting provisional application, because 
they will not be able to apply the ECT’s provisions on trade, as the 
Community is exclusively competent for them.”186 
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The tribunal in the Yukos Cases acknowledged this situation: 
“The 1994 EU Joint Statement does not say, and cannot be read as meaning, 
that certain elements of the ECT will not be provisionally applied by the 
European Community because they are inconsistent with the Community’s 
internal legal order. The 1994 EU Joint Statement, rather, says that Article 
45(1) “does not create any commitment beyond what is compatible with the 
existing internal legal order of the Signatories.” On this basis, the 1994 EU 
Joint Statement concludes that the European Community can safely sign the 
ECT, and accept the obligation of provisional application, without taking on 
any obligation to do anything that is beyond its competence.”187 
 
Nevertheless, the value of the Statement by the Council in the light of the rules of treaty 
interpretation of the Vienna Convention is at least debatable. If seen as an interpretative 
declaration, such statement may be used in interpreting Article 45(1) of the ECT only 
“if made in connection with the conclusion of a treaty, and accepted as such by other 
parties”.188 Apparently, the absence of this declaration from the Final Act suggests that 
such declaration was not agreed to by all signatories of the ECT. However, if seen as a 
reservation made to the ECT, it would contradict Article 46 of the ECT, which 
expressly prohibits any reservation. In the Yukos Cases, the tribunal considered that this 
Statement by the Council cannot be construed as meaning that a signatory may apply 
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provisionally only some parts of the ECT,189 and, moreover, that it has no legal or 
binding value.190 
 
The analysis of the arguments for supporting the second interpretation of the condition 
laid down in Article 45(1) of the ECT reveals that there cannot be a valid understanding 
of the terms “to the extent that such provisional application is not inconsistent with its 
constitution, laws or regulations [of the signatory]”, as allowing signatories to weigh 
each provision of the ECT and the ECT as a whole against their laws and regulations. 
 
1.3.3 Effects of the Provisional Application 
 
The provisional application of a treaty does not trigger its entry into force. Article 25(1) 
of the Vienna Convention provides that a treaty is applied provisionally pending its 
entry into force. Similarly, Article 45(1) of the ECT refers to the provisional application 
of the ECT pending its entry into force. The tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia 
reached the same conclusion: 
“Applying the ECT provisionally is used in contradistinction to its entry into 
force […]. Provisional application is therefore not the same as entry into 
force.”191 
 
Nevertheless, during the provisional application, a signatory is bound by and must 
comply with the obligations under the ECT. In other words, although not entered into 
force, the provisional application of the ECT bears similar effects. It follows that 
Investors of signatories applying the ECT on a provisional basis may take advantage of 
the ECT’s provisions as any other Investor of a Contracting Party to the ECT. As 
explained by the tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, 
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 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, para. 209, emphasis original. 
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“[…] the ECT’s provisional application is a course to which each signatory 
“agrees” in Article 45(1): it is (subject to other provisions of the paragraph) 
thus a matter of legal obligation.192 
[…] It follows that the language used in Article 45(1) is to be interpreted as 
meaning that each signatory State is obliged, even before the ECT has 
formally entered into force, to apply the whole ECT as if it had already done 
so.”193 
 
In relation to the effect of the provisional application, a difficulty may arise in practice 
as some provisions of the ECT refer to the date of the entry into force of the ECT and 
not to the date when the ECT starts to apply provisionally. The provisions of a treaty 
must be interpreted in their context and in the light of the object and purpose of the 
treaty or, as FITZMAURICE suggested, “as a whole, and with reference to their declared 
or apparent objects, purposes, and principles”.194 Additionally, the principle of 
effectiveness calls for the interpretation of particular provisions “so as to give them the 
fullest weight and effect consistent with the normal meaning of the words and with 
other parts of the text”.195 It follows that the provisions of the ECT that refer to the entry 
into force of the ECT must not be restricted to their literal meaning, but they must also 
be considered in the light of the provisions of Article 45. As the tribunal in 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia suggested,  
“[s]o long as the intention of the negotiating States clearly shows that they 
intended the treaty to be provisionally applied, it cannot be accepted that that 
clear intention could be undermined by an insistence on applying the terms of 
the treaty in their strictly literal form.”196 
 
In other words, when the drafters of the ECT linked the obligations of the Contracting 
Parties to the date of the entry into force of the ECT, such provisions must be 
understood as also referring to signatories, for which the ECT is applied provisionally. 
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More specifically, and relevant in the context of the notion of ‘Investor’, Article 1(6) of 
the ECT referring to the notion of ‘Investment’, which “includes all investments, 
whether existing at or made after the later of the date of entry into force”, must be read 
as also implicitly referring to the date of the beginning of the provisional application.197 
This was also the conclusion of the tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia: 
“[…] the language used in Article 45(1) is to be interpreted as meaning that 
each signatory State is obliged, even before the ECT has formally entered into 
force, to apply the whole ECT as if it had already done so, and that the 
language used in Article 1(6), particularly its use of the term “entry into 
force”, is to be interpreted as meaning the date on which the ECT became 
provisionally applicable […].”198 
 
1.3.4 Termination of the Provisional Application 
 
Article 45 provides for two cases when the provisional application of the ECT 
terminates. The provisional application may terminate (a) with the entry into force of 
the ECT for the signatory applying the ECT provisionally under Article 45(1), or (b) 
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with notification from the signatory that it does not intend to become a Contracting 
Party to the ECT under Article 45(3)(a).199  
 
a. Termination of the provisional application with the entry into force of the ECT 
In the first situation, Article 45(1) provides that the ECT applies provisionally pending 
its entry into force.200 As a result, the rule is that on the date of the entry into force, the 
ECT ceases to apply provisionally.  
 
Although this situation does not apparently create problems in practice, it did raise some 
controversial issues in the case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan. Kyrgyzstan objected to the 
jurisdiction of the ECT tribunal contending that the claimant is not an Investor of a 
Contracting Party, as the ECT did not apply to Gibraltar, Petrobart’s place of 
registration. According to Kyrgyzstan, upon the signature of the ECT on 17 December 
1994, the United Kingdom stated that it intended to apply the ECT provisionally to the 
Great Britain and Northern Ireland and to the Overseas Territory of Gibraltar.201 On 13 
December 1996, the United Kingdom ratified the ECT in respect of the Great Britain 
and Northern Ireland, and the Crown Dependencies of the Bailiwick of Jersey and the 
Isle of Man.202 The tribunal considered that the ECT still applies provisionally to 
Gibraltar, since the United Kingdom did not include Gibraltar in the ratifying document 
of the ECT.203 In the Tribunal’s view, the United Kingdom, if it wished to terminate the 
                                                
199
 The second case of termination was suggested by the Canadian delegation. See, Canadian suggestion 
on draft Article 40 – Provisional Application, Room Document 11, Working Group II, 2 February 1993. 
200
 In the case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan, the tribunal regarded Article 45(1) as envisaging 
“[…] the simple case where a signatory first accepts provisional application and subsequently ratifies the 
Treaty in respect of the same territory with the effect that upon its entry into force the provisional application 
ceases and is succeeded and replaced by the direct application resulting from the ratification”. (Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 62) 
The language of the ECT appears to suggest that the provisional application applies without limitation in 
time. See, Hobér, K.; supra at FN 152, p. 283. 
201




 Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 63. 
 72 
provisional application of the ECT for Gibraltar, was required to submit a notification 
pursuant to Article 45(3)(a) excluding Gibraltar from the application of the ECT. In 
justifying its decision, the tribunal considered that 
“[i]t could indeed be expected that the United Kingdom, if it wished the 
provisional application of the Treaty to Gibraltar to be terminated as a result 
of a ratification not including Gibraltar, should have made this clear by 
making a notification in line with Article 45(3)(a) or a declaration in some 
other form in connection with the ratification. In the Arbitral Tribunal’s 
opinion, the fact that the ratification, for political or other reasons, did not 
include Gibraltar does not justify the conclusion that the United Kingdom 
intended to revoke the application of the Treaty to Gibraltar on a provisional 
basis. It may be observed that what is at issue here is not only the rights of 
investors from Gibraltar in other states but also the protection of foreign 
investors in Gibraltar.”204 
 
The decision of the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan remains controversial. Gibraltar 
is an Overseas Territory of the United Kingdom with no power to enter into a treaty in 
its own name.205 The power to sign treaties on behalf of Gibraltar or to extend the 
application of a treaty to Gibraltar belongs to the United Kingdom. Because of this 
particularity, Article 45 must be read in its context, and in particular, in the light of the 
provisions of Article 40 dealing with the application of the ECT to territories for which 
the Contracting Parties are responsible.206 Article 40 of the ECT restates the principle of 
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territorial unity provided for by Article 29 of the Vienna Convention. This provision 
refers to the application of a treaty to the entire territory of a party, “[u]nless a different 
intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise established”.207 Similarly, Article 40(1) 
of the ECT allows signatories or Contracting Parties to exclude one or more territories 
for which they are responsible and this declaration, made upon signature, ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession, takes effect at the time of the entry into force of the 
ECT. In the light of the rules of provisional application of the ECT, a declaration made 
upon signature enters into force with the provisional application of the ECT for that 
signatory.208 Consequently, in accordance with Article 40(1), the declaration made by 
the United Kingdom in respect of Gibraltar had effects upon the commencement of the 
provisional application of the ECT and resulted in the provisional application of the 
ECT to Gibraltar, as well as to the United Kingdom. This issue was not disputed by the 
parties in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; the controversy referred to whether the provisional 
application to Gibraltar ended with the entry into force of the ECT for the United 
Kingdom, or continued to have effects after this date. 
 
Article 40(3) of the ECT provides that any declaration made by a signatory or 
Contracting Party in respect of a territory must be withdrawn by a notification made to 
the Depository, and such notification becomes effective upon the expiry of one year. 
When the United Kingdom ratified the ECT and included only the Crown Dependencies 
of the Bailiwick of Jersey and the Isle of Man, it excluded the other territories, including 
Gibraltar, from the territorial scope of the ECT.209 Article 40(3) of the ECT sets no 
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requirements as to the manner in which a Contracting Party must deliver the notification 
to the Depository. Moreover, the United Kingdom used similar notification when 
including as well as when excluding Gibraltar from the ECT. The declaration made by 
the United Kingdom on 13 December 1996, upon the ratification of the ECT, was an 
effective notification for the exclusion of Gibraltar from the ECT’s coverage under 
Article 40(3).210 Therefore, the proper issue to be considered by the Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan tribunal concerned the effects of the termination of the provisional 
application of the ECT for Gibraltar and its jurisdiction in this case submitted seven 
years after the declaration of ratification.211 
 
Where the provisional application terminates without the entry into force of the ECT, 
the former signatory is still bound for a period of twenty years by the provisions on the 
protection and promotion of Investments with respect to Investments made by Investors 
of other Contracting Parties in its Area.212 In the case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan, 
Petrobart was a company incorporated in Gibraltar that claimed an Investment made in 
Kyrgyzstan. This situation is not the one envisaged by Article 45(3)(b) of the ECT and, 
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into force of the ECT. The Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan tribunal also erroneously ignored the provisions of 
Art. 40 when it concluded that the ECT has no rule for the “unusual situation where the territory accepted 
for provisional application and for application upon ratification does not coincide”. See, Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 62. 
211
 Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 15. 
212
 See, Art. 45(3) of the ECT. 
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thus, it was outside the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal.213 The award in Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan reflects the strong interconnection between the provisions of the ECT and 
highlights the need of proper interpretation of the terms of the ECT in their context, in 
accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation.214 
 
b. Termination of the provisional application without the entry into force of the 
ECT 
The provisional application of the ECT may also terminate by notification from the 
signatory, without the entry into force of the ECT for that signatory. Article 45(3) 
allows a signatory to end the provisional application by a written notification made to 
the Depository stating it does not want to become a Contracting Party to the ECT. The 
termination takes effect upon the expiration of sixty days from the date on which the 
Depository receives the notification. An example of this termination of the provisional 
application of the ECT is the case of the Russian Federation. The Russian Federation 
applied the ECT provisionally up to 18 October 2009, inclusive,, when the sixty–day 
period after the notification of the Depository has lapsed.215 
 
Even if a signatory terminates the provisional application by submitting the notification 
under Article 45(3), the ECT provides that after the expiry of the sixty–day period, the 
obligation under Parts III (Investment Promotion and Protection) and V (Dispute 
                                                
213
 Where a Contracting Party excludes a territory for the international relations of which it is responsible 
by later withdrawing the notification made under Art. 40(1), Art. 40(3) of the ECT sends to the provisions 
of Art. 47(3), “subject to the applicability” of this provision. See also, Chapter I.1.2 above. On the other 
hand, Art. 45(3)(b) refers to the effects of the termination of the provisional application for signatories. 
While in both cases the ECT continues to apply for a period of twenty years, the effects of the termination 
of the provisional application are restricted to Investments in the Area of the signatory. Only when a 
Contracting Party withdraws from the ECT, the protection is extended to cover Investments of Investors 
of the withdrawing Contracting Party. Nevertheless, the provisions of Art. 47(3) – as highlighted by Art. 
40(3) – must be applicable; however, in the case of the termination of the provisional application, the 
ECT contains specific provisions. 
214
 As acknowledged by the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan, “a problem of interpretation therefore 
arises”. See, Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 62. 
215
 See, supra FN 127. 
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Settlement) of the ECT remain in effect for a period of twenty years for Investments 
made until the expiry of the sixty–day period.216 Different from the provisions of Article 
47(3) of the ECT regarding the withdrawal from the ECT of the Contracting Parties, 
Article 45(3) maintains the protection of the ECT only for Investors of other 
Contracting Parties or signatories that made Investments in the Area of the signatory 
notifying the termination of the provisional application. Investors of the signatory that 
terminated the application of the ECT are not covered by this twenty–year period. 
 
Through the provisional application rule under Article 45, Investors of signatories that 
apply the ECT on a provisional basis gain access to the ECT. Therefore, not only 
Investors of Contracting Parties are protected by the ECT’s provisions, but also 
Investors of signatories for which the provisional application is in force. 
 
1.4 Contracting Parties and the Application of the Energy Charter Treaty to 
Territories 
 
As an expression of their sovereignty, states may exclude one or more territories for 
which they are internationally responsible from the applicability of a treaty. This sets 
further hurdles for Investors,217 as the case may be that, for example, the territory in 
which an Investor is incorporated is not covered by the ECT. Investors must be aware of 
this additional limitation imposed on the concept of Contracting Party or signatory of 
the ECT.  
                                                
216
 This is valid except for the signatories listed in Annex PA to the ECT: the Czech Republic, Germany, 
Hungary, Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia. However, these signatories are now Contracting Parties to the 
ECT and, therefore, Annex PA is no longer effective. 
The application of certain provisions of the ECT for a period of twenty years was the proposal of the 
Canadian delegation. See, Canadian suggestion on draft Article 40 – Provisional Application; supra at 
FN 199. 
217
 This is rather a situation of concern for Investors legal persons who are organized in a territory of a 
Contracting Party that might be excluded from the ECT’s application. 
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Article 29 of the Vienna Convention provides for the possibility to restrict the territorial 
application of a treaty: 
“Unless a different intention appears from the treaty or is otherwise 
established, a treaty is binding upon each party in respect of its entire 
territory.”218 
 
Article 29 of the Vienna Convention establishes the rule of territorial unity, but also 
acknowledges the right of the contracting parties to provide exceptions to this rule. 
Article 40(1) of the ECT contains the same principle referred to in Article 29 of the 
Vienna Convention. As a rule, the ECT applies to all territories for which Contracting 
Parties or signatories are internationally responsible, but allows the exclusion of one or 
more territories from the application of the ECT. According to Article 40(1) of the ECT: 
“Any state or Regional Economic Integration Organisation may at the time of 
signature, ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, by a declaration 
deposited with the Depository, declare that the Treaty shall be binding upon it 
with respect to all territories for the international relations of which it is 
responsible, or to one or more of them. Such declaration shall take effect at the 
time the Treaty enters into force for that Contracting Party.”219 
 
The Contracting Parties may submit a declaration at a later stage extending the 
applicability of the ECT to other territories or may withdraw the initial declaration in 
respect to the territories to which the ECT was applicable.220 The application to 
                                                
218
 According to the International Law Commission, the “Commission preferred this term [“the entire 
territory of each party”] to the term “all the territory or territories for which the parties are internationally 
responsible””, in order “to avoid the association of the latter term with the so–called “colonial clause””. 
See, International Law Commission; Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties with commentaries, 1966, p. 
213, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 1966, vol. II. On the drafting history of Art. 29 of 
the Vienna Convention, see, Sinclair, Ian; The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 2nd edition, 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984, pp. 87–92; for further comments on overseas territories, 
see, Aust, A.; supra at FN 94, p. 71. 
219
 The chapeau of the first draft of Art. 40 referred to the “Application to Overseas Territories”. See, Art. 
35 of the Basic Agreement of 20 January 1992, 4/92 BA 6. 
220
 Art. 40(2) and (3) of the ECT. See, supra FN 206. 
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territories under Article 40 of the ECT must be read in conjunction with Article 1(10), 
which defines the notion of ‘Area’.221 Article 40(4) of the ECT expressly provides that 
“[t]he definition of “Area” in Article 1(10) shall be construed having regard to 
any declaration deposited under this Article.” 
 
It follows that only territories that are not excluded by a Contracting Party from the 
application of the ECT are included in the Area of that Contracting Party. The definition 
of ‘Area’ is relevant in the context of the definition of ‘Investment’ under Articles 1(6) 
and 26 of the ECT. Pursuant to Article 26 of the ECT, only disputes concerning 
Investments in the Area of another Contracting Party may be covered by the dispute 
resolution mechanism of the ECT. Consequently, an Investor may resort to the 
resolution mechanism under Article 26, and, thus, benefit from the procedural 
protection of the ECT, only if the Investment is in the Area of the respondent 
Contracting Party.222 
 
When pursuing arbitration against another Contracting Party or signatory to the ECT, 
the fact the territory on which an Investor relies for the application of the ECT is not 
covered by the ECT may affect the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.223 This situation has 
practical consequences, as shown by the case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan.224 
 
                                                
221
 According to Art. 1(10) of the ECT, 
“”Area” means with respect to a state that is a Contracting Party: 
(a) the territory under its sovereignty, it being understood that territory includes land, internal waters and the 
territorial sea; and 
(b) subject to and in accordance with the international law of the sea: the sea, sea-bed and its subsoil with 
regard to which that Contracting Party exercises sovereign rights and jurisdiction. 
With respect to a Regional Economic Integration Organisation which is a Contracting Party, Area means the 
Areas of the member states of such Organisation, under the provisions contained in the agreement 
establishing that Organisation.” 
222
 This limitation is further discussed in Chapter III.3 below. 
223
 See, Art. 26 of the ECT. The Energy Charter Secretariat does not keep a public list of the territories 
that are excluded for the application of the ECT. This is an additional obstacle for Investors relying on the 
fact that the ECT applies to certain territories. 
224
 See, Chapter I.1.3.4 above. 
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1.5 Regional Economic Integration Organizations as Contracting Parties to the 
Energy Charter Treaty 
  
The concept of Contracting Party under the ECT includes not only states, but also 
REIOs. From this perspective, the ECT is a treaty with a unique profile. Article 1(3) of 
the ECT defines a REIO as 
“[…] an organization constituted by states to which they transferred 
competence over certain matters a number of which are governed by this 
Treaty, including the authority to take decisions binding on them in respect to 
those matters.” 225 
 
1.5.1 The European Communities, the European Union and the Energy Charter 
Treaty 
 
When the European Charter was concluded in 1991 there were three European 
Communities: the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), the European Atomic 
Energy Community (EURATOM) and the European Economic Community (EEC). The 
ECSC was created by the Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community 
(ECSC Treaty),226 which provided that the ECSC shall have legal personality to enter 
                                                
225
 According to the documents of the negotiation of the ECT, the idea of including international 
organizations in the ECT process was advanced by the EBRD in 1991: 
“[…] the definition of investor does not appear to us to be sufficiently broad to capture the full range of 
actors to be involved in Central and Eastern Europe. We recommend that the definition in the Protocol to be 
amended to recognise the de facto role of the Bank as an investor in Central and Eastern Europe. […] 
We recommend the draft in 1(f) to be amended to include: 
1(f) “(iii) international organisations such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development.”” 
(Comments of the EBRD on the Basic Protocol Draft, 14/91 BP3 Annex II, 7–8 October 1991) 
The definition of REIO was suggested by the European Communities and it initially referred to 
“[…] an organisation constituted by Sovereign States to which its member States have transferred 
competences over a range of matters governed by this Agreement and Protocols, including the authority to 
take decisions binding on its Member States in respect to those matters.” (EC proposal on the definition of 
Regional Economic Integration Organization, Room Document 20, Working Group II, 1–6 February 1993) 
See for example, a similar definition of REIOs in Art. 27 of the Convention on the Transboundary Effects 
of Industrial Accidents, 19 April 2000: 
“This Convention shall be open for signature […] by States […] and by regional economic integration 
organizations constituted by sovereign States members of the Economic Commission for Europe to which 
their member States have transferred competence in respect of matters governed by this Convention, 
including the competence to enter into treaties in respect of these matters.” 
226
 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community, 23 July 1952. 
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into international relations.227 After the establishment of the ECSC, the Treaty 
establishing the European Economic Community (EEC Treaty) set up the EEC in view 
of a common economic market.228 The EEC Treaty provided that the EEC shall have 
legal personality,229 while the competence to negotiate and enter into international 
agreements on behalf of the EEC belonged to the Commission.230 At the same time, the 
six founding states of the ECSC and the EEC entered into the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM Treaty).231 The EURATOM Treaty 
provided that the EURATOM shall have legal personality,232 and may enter into 
international agreements with other states or international organizations.233  
 
Between the conclusion of the European Charter in 1991 and the signature of the ECT 
in 1994, the Member States of the European Communities created the EU. The Treaty 
on European Union (TEU) established the EU, a new form of cooperation between the 
Member States of the European Communities.234 The TEU provided that 
“[t]he [European] Union shall be founded on the European Communities, 
supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this 
Treaty. Its task shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency 
                                                
227
 Art. 6 of the ECSC Treaty provides that 
“[i]n international relations, the Community shall enjoy the legal capacity it requires to perform its functions 
and attain its objectives.” 
228
 Treaty establishing the European Economic Community, 1 January 1958. 
229
 Art. 210 of the EEC Treaty. 
230
 Art. 228 of the EEC Treaty provides, among others, the following: 
“Where this Treaty provides for the conclusion of agreements between the Community and one or more 
states or an international organisation, such agreements shall be negotiated by the Commission. […] 
Agreements concluded under these conditions shall be binding on the institutions of the Community and on 
Member States.” 
231
 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, 1 January 1958. 
232
 Art. 184 of the EURATOM Treaty. 
233
 See, Art. 101 of the EURATOM Treaty that reads as follows: 
“The Community may, within the limits of its powers and jurisdiction, enter into obligations by concluding 
agreements or contracts with a third State, an international organisation or a national of a third State.” 
As provided for by Art. 2 of the EURATOM Treaty, the main function of EURATOM is to promote 
research and regulations in the atomic energy field. Initially, the purpose of the EURATOM was “to 
develop nuclear energy, distribute it within the Community and sell the surplus to the outside world”. 
See, Fairhurst, John; Law of the European Union, 8th edition, Gosport: Pearson Eduation Limited, 2010, 
p. 8. 
234
 Treaty on European Union, 1 November 1993. 
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and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their 
peoples.”235 
 
With the establishment of the EU, the TEU changed the name of the EEC to the 
European Community (EC). The TEU also established the concept of citizenship of the 
EU for persons holding the nationality of the Member States. The TEU amended the 
provisions of the European Community Treaty (EC Treaty) and provided for the 
exclusive competence of the EC in certain areas.236 
 
In 1994, the ECT was signed by the European Communities: the ECSC, the 
EURATOM and the EC. Given their institutional identity, the three communities acted 
jointly and were referred to as the European Communities. At the time of the signature 
of the ECT, the European Communities had the following Member States: Belgium, 
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, and the United Kingdom.237 The twelve Member States of the 
European Communities also signed the ECT in their own name. 
 
This situation has only changed on 23 July 2002, when the ECSC Treaty expired, 
leaving two out of the three European Communities: EC and EURATOM.238 
Consequently, in 2002, the Contracting Party to the ECT was the EC and EURATOM. 
With the entry into force of the Treaty on the Functioning of the EU in December 2009 
                                                
235
 Art. A(3) of the TEU. According to the same provision, the EC is competent to act in areas that are not 
in its exclusive competence 
“[…] only if and in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the 
Member States and can therefore, […], be better achieved by the Community.” 
236
 Art. 3b of the TEU. 
237
 Information available at <http://europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm> (last visited, 16 February 2011). 
238
 The TEU and the Treaties establishing the European Communities were subsequently amended by the 
Treaty of Amsterdam, 1 May 1999, and the Treaty of Nice, 1 February 2003. A first attempt to implement 
a Constitution of the European Union was made by the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe, 
signed on 29 October 2004, not in force. 
For the purpose of this Thesis, the reference to the Community Law and, subsequently, to the EU Law, is 
understood to include the Treaties establishing the European Communities and the EU, and the legislation 
implemented based on these Treaties. 
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(TFEU), EU replaced and succeeded the EC.239 Out of the three Communities that 
signed the ECT in 1994, only the EURATOM is still active. Therefore, as of 1 
December 2009, the REIO Contracting Party to the ECT is the EU and EURATOM.240 
The EU has currently twenty–seven Member States: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, 
Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, 
Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom. 
All twenty–seven Member States are Contracting Parties to the ECT. 
 
1.5.2 The European Union and its Member States as Contracting Parties to the 
Energy Charter Treaty 
 
At the time of the signature of the ECT, the European Communities – ECSC, EEC and 
EURATOM – had legal personality and capacity to enter into international agreements 
with other states or international organizations in areas expressly provided for under 
Community Law,241 or where such competence was implied.242 In addition, in some 
                                                
239
 Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, 1 December 2009. See also, Art. 1(3) of the TEU, 
as amended by the TFEU: “[…] The Union shall replace and succeed the European Community.” The 
TFEU also provides that the EU may conclude agreements with one or more States or international 
organisations (Art. 37 of the TEU). Before, the legal personality of the EU was under debate, and the EU 
was relying on the provisions of Art. 24 of the TEU as the legal basis to conclude treaties, although there 
was no provision in the TEU expressly providing for the legal personality of the EU. For the legal 
standing of the EU before the TFEU, see, Klabbers, Jan; Presumptive Personality: The European Union 
in International Law, pp. 231–253, in Koskenniemi, Martti (ed.), International Law Aspects of the 
European Union, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998. 
240
 As explained by FAIRHURST, with the entry into force of the TFEU, the references to ‘European 
Communities’ and the ‘Community Law’ are no longer used. See, Fairhurst, J.; supra at FN 233, p. 87. 
As the powers of the EURATOM are restricted to research activities in the nuclear energy field, for the 
purpose of this Thesis, the analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ in the light of the participation of the EU 
and EURATOM in the ECT is restricted to the EU, unless the context requires otherwise. 
Currently there are no disputes under the ECT in which the EU is involved as respondent or Contracting 
Party of an Investor. On the other hand, the European Commission submitted petitions for amicus curiae 
participation in ECT disputes under Art. 32(2) of the ICSID Rules of Procedure for Arbitration 
Proceedings, as amended on 10 April 2006. See for example, the participation of the European 
Commission in AES v. Hungary. See, AES Summit Generation Limited and AES–Tisza Erömü Kft. v. 
Republic of Hungary, Award of 23 September 2010, para. 3.22. 
241
 See, Verwey, Delano; The European Community, the European Union and the International Law of 
Treaties, The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2004, p. 20–21. See also, Articles 2-6 of the TFEU. 
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subject areas, such as customs union, monetary policy and common commercial policy, 
the Member States had transferred to the European Communities the exclusive 
competence to enter into international agreements.243 However, in most areas, there was 
a shared competence with the Member States: internal market, environment, energy, 
transport etc.244 The shared competence between the Member States and the European 
Communities resulted in the conclusion of so–called “mixed agreements”. Mixed 
agreements are defined as agreements to which the Member States and the Communities 
are parties, along with other states and/or international organizations,245 and are binding 
on both the Member States and the European Communities.246 The ECT is such a mixed 
                                                                                                                                          
242
 See for example, Art. 101 of the EURATOM Treaty; supra at FN 233. See also, Art. 216(1) of the 
TFEU which provides that 
“[t]he Union may conclude an agreement with one or more third countries or international organisations 
where the Treaties so provide or where the conclusion of an agreement is necessary in order to achieve, 
within the framework of the Union’s policies, one of the objectives referred to in the treaties, or is provided 
for in a legally binding Union act or is likely to affect common rules or alter their scope.” 
Under the EC Treaty, there was no similar provision, but based on the AETR Doctrine developed by the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) in the AETR Case, the EC had an implied authority to enter into 
international agreements: 
“16. […] ARISES NOT ONLY FROM AN EXPRESS CONFERMENT BY THE TREATY - AS IS THE CASE WITH ARTICLES 113 
AND 114 FOR TARIFF AND TRADE AGREEMENTS AND WITH ARTICLE 238 FOR ASSOCIATION AGREEMENTS - BUT 
MAY EQUALLY FLOW FROM OTHER PROVISIONS OF THE TREATY AND FROM MEASURES ADOPTED, WITHIN THE 
FRAMEWORK OF THOSE PROVISIONS, BY THE COMMUNITY INSTITUTIONS.” (Judgment of the Court of 31 March 
1971, Case 22-70, Commission of the European Communities v Council of the European Communities, 
regarding the European Agreement on Road Transport, European Court Reports 1971, p. 00263) 
243
 See, Art. 3 of the TFEU. This means that the Member States can no longer enter into international 
agreements in areas reserved to the exclusive competence of the EU. See, Craig, Paul; De Búrca, Gráinne; 
EU Law. Text, Cases, and Materials, 4th edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 176. 
244
 Art. 4 of the TFEU. See also, Craig, P.; De Búrca, G.; supra at FN 243, p. 181. There is also the 
supplementary competence of the EU in the fields of industry, culture, tourism etc., as provided for by 
Art. 6 of the TFEU, according to which, the EU shall have competence to carry out actions to supplement 
the actions of the Member States. 
245
 Verwey, D.; supra at FN 241, p. 38. 
246
 Craig, P.; De Búrca, G.; supra at FN 243, p. 198. The creation of this category of agreements is the 
result of the jurisprudence of the ECJ, which stated, although not expressly using the terms ‘mixed 
agreements’, that in certain cases it is possible that Members States enter into an agreement alongside the 
European Community. See, Opinion of the Court 1/78 of 4 October 1979, Opinion given pursuant to the 
second subparagraph of Article 228(1) of the EEC Treaty, International Agreement on Natural Rubber, 
European Court Reports 1979, p. 02871. 
When entering into mixed agreements, the Member States and the European Communities are under the 
obligation to cooperate closely in the negotiation, conclusion and implementation of these agreements. 
Under the EC Treaty, this obligation derived from the provisions of Art. 10 of the EC Treaty, which 
provided that 
“Member States shall take all appropriate measures, whether general or particular, to ensure fulfilment of the 
obligations arising out of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the institutions of the Community. 
They shall facilitate the achievement of the Community’s tasks. 
They shall abstain from any measure which would jeopardise the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.” 
See also, Ruling 1/78 of the ECJ of 14 November 1978, Ruling delivered pursuant to the third paragraph 
of Article 103 of the EAEC Treaty regarding the Draft Convention of the International Atomic Energy 
Agency on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials, Facilities and Transports, European Court 
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agreement.247 The mixed nature of the ECT was also recognized by the European 
Communities in the Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, EURATOM, where the final 
paragraph of the Preamble states that 
“[…] where the decisions to be taken by the Energy Charter Conference 
concern areas of mixed competence, the European Communities and the 
Member States are to cooperate with a view to achieving a common position, 
in accordance with the jurisprudence of the Court of Justice of the European 
Communities”.248 
 
The European Communities – now the EU and EURATOM – and the Member States 
retain their competences in the fields covered by the ECT.249 The Member States signed 
the ECT in their capacity as subjects of international law, but the presence of the 
European Communities was essential, given their exclusive competence in certain areas 
of the ECT, such as trade. As stated in one of the documents of the ECT’s negotiation, 
“[t]he ECT deals with a variety of matters for which competences are shared 
between the Community and its Member States. It will therefore be signed 
and ratified by the Community and the Member States.”250 
 
                                                                                                                                          
Reports 1978, p. 02151; Opinion 1/94 of the ECJ of 15 November 1994, Competence of the Community 
to conclude international agreements concerning services and the protection of intellectual property, 
Article 228 (6) of the EC Treaty, European Court Reports 1994, p. I–05267. 
Under the TFEU, the principle of cooperation between the EU and its Member States transpires in several 
provisions. See for example, Articles 4 and 5 of the TEU. See also, Art. 2 of the Council and Commission 
Decision 98/181/EC, ECSC, EURATOM of 23 September 1997 on the conclusion, by the European 
Communities, of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Energy Charter Protocol on energy efficiency and 
related environmental aspects. 
247
 See also, Coop, Graham; European Energy Charter and the European Union: Is Conflict Inevitable?, 
27(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 404 (2009), p. 406. 
248
 Council and Commission Decision 98/181 /EC, ECSC, EURATOM of 23 September; supra at FN 246, 
p. 2. 
249
 In reality, the ECT is a unique blend of competencies, which has slightly changed with the TFEU. For 
example, in the investment area, Art. 57(2) of the EC Treaty provided for the express competence of the 
EC with regard to the admission of investments from third–states. With regard to the protection of 
investments, it was understood that the competence was on the Member States. See, Tietje, Christian; The 
Applicability of the Energy Charter Treaty in ICSID Arbitration of EU Nationals vs. EU Member States, 
6(1) TDM (2009), p. 14; Burgstaller, Markus; European Law and Investment Treaties, 26(2) Journal of 
International Law 181 (2009); Söderlund, Christer; Intra–EU BIT Investment Protection and the EC 
Treaty, 24(5) J. Int’l Arb. 455 (2007). Currently, under Art. 207 of the TFEU, the EU has exclusive 
competence in respect to the conclusion of agreements concerning foreign direct investments. In the 
energy field, the competence is also shared between the EU and the Member States (Articles 4 and 194 of 
the TFEU), but in the trade area, the EU has exclusive competence (Art. 4 of the TFEU). 
250
 Opinion of the Legal Service; supra at FN 185, footnote omitted. 
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Nevertheless, in respect to the Contracting Parties to the ECT, the Member States, on 
one hand, and the EU and EURATOM, on the other, have separate legal standing.251  
 
2. CONTRACTING PARTIES TO THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY AND THE 
RELATED TREATIES AND ARBITRATION RULES 
 
Investors may submit disputes with Contracting Parties to the ECT to arbitration under 
one of the following options: the ICSID, under the provisions of the ICSID Convention 
or the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; the UNCITRAL Rules; or the SCC.252 The fact 
that the ECT provides Investors with various options and fora, for which they have the 
right to select, does not necessarily mean that this will put them in an advantageous 
position.253 To the contrary, Article 26(4) of the ECT “means that there are a number of 
threshold and procedural issues which an Investor will need to consider when choosing 
where a dispute should be submitted”.254 Relevant here are the provisions of the treaties 
and arbitration rules restricting access of Investors to the fora under Article 26(4) of the 
ECT because of the limitations on the notion of ‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT. 
 
                                                
251
 See also, European Communities; Statement submitted by the European Communities to the 
Secretariat of the Energy Charter pursuant to Article 26(3)(b)(ii) of the Energy Charter Treaty. 
252
 Art. 26(4) of the ECT. 
253
 The first drafts of the ECT provided for “[d]isputes [to] be submitted to international arbitration if 
either Party to the dispute so wishes” (Art. 32(1) of the Basic Agreement of 31 October, 21/91 BA 4), and 
“the Investor […] may agree to refer the dispute” (Art. 32(3) of the Basic Agreement of 31 October, 21/91 
BA 4). The right of Investor to choose the dispute resolution mechanism was inserted, following the 
proposal of the Dutch delegation, in the Basic Agreement of 20 January 1992, 4/92 BA 6. Art. 23(3) of 
the Basic Agreement of 9 April 1992, 22/92 BA 12, also provided that Investors are barred from 
submitting a dispute to international arbitration or conciliation if they previously resorted to an agreed 
dispute resolution mechanism or to the courts or administrative tribunals of the Contracting Party party to 
the dispute.  
254
 Blanch, Juliet; Moody, Andy; Lawn, Nicholas; Investment Dispute Resolution and the Energy Charter 
Treaty, p. 8, in Coop, G.; Ribeiro, C. (eds.); supra at FN 90. 
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2.1 Contracting Parties and the Requirements of the ICSID Convention and 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention provides for the following requirements in respect 
to investors and Contracting States of the ICSID Convention: 
“(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any constituent 
subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that 
State) and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the 
dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre. […] 
(2) "National of another Contracting State" means: 
(a) any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other 
than the State party to the dispute […]; and 
(b) any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State […]” 
 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention refers to investors that are nationals of Contracting 
States of the ICSID Convention. In accordance with Article 67 of the ICSID 
Convention, the ICSID Convention is opened for signature to state members of the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) or, by invitation, to 
states that are not members of the IBRD, but are parties to the Statute of the ICJ. 255 The 
ICSID Convention is open to states only and not to international organizations.256 
Additionally, in the ICSID Convention system, the accession to the Convention is not 
                                                
255
 Art. 93(1) of the Charter of the United Nations (UN Charter) provides that 
“[a]ll Members of the United Nations are ipso facto parties to the Statute of the International Court of 
Justice.” (Charter of the United Nations, 24 October 1945, emphasis original) 
A state that is not member of the UN may become a party to the Statue of the ICJ in accordance with Art. 
93(2) of the UN Charter. 
256
 See, as well, Statement submitted by the European Communities to the Secretariat of the Energy 
Charter; supra at FN 251: 
“As far as international arbitration is concerned, it should be stated that the provisions of the ICSID 
Convention do not allow the European Communities to become parties to it. The provisions of the ICSID 
Additional Facility also do not allow the Communities to make use of them.” 
Also, the EU and EURATOM cannot appear as respondent in front of ICSID tribunals. In addition, the 
ICSID Convention recognizes the concept of nationality only. In respect to Investors of REIOs, it is 
controversial if in practice there can be a situation where Investors may rely on their link with such 
organizations. For the implications of the EU citizenship, see, Chapter II.1.3 below; for Societas 
Europaea, see, Chapter II.2.1.2 below.  
 87 
possible without prior signature.257 The date to assess the status of a state as Contracting 
State of the ICSID Convention is the date of the institution of the proceedings in front 
of the ICSID.258 Currently, there are 157 signatory states, out of which 147 states have 
ratified the ICSID Convention. 259 
 
An Investor of a Contracting Party to the ECT that chooses to submit to ICSID his 
dispute against another Contracting Party must observe a two–fold test: the Contracting 
Party of the Investor as well as the respondent Contracting Party must be Contracting 
States of the ICSID Convention.260 It may be the case, when multiple nationalities or 
permanent residences overlap, that Investor satisfies the requirement of being both an 
Investor of a Contracting Party to the ECT and of a Contracting State of the ICSID 
Convention with reference to two different states.261 Out of the forty–seven Contracting 
Parties and the signatory deemed to apply the ECT provisionally, four are not 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention: Kyrgyzstan,262 Lichtenstein, Poland and 
Tajikistan.263  
 
The second option under Article 26(4) of the ECT refers to the resolution of disputes 
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. The ICSID Additional Facility Rules, 
adopted by the Administrative Council of the ICSID, authorize the ICSID Secretariat to 
                                                
257
 Art. 68(1) of the ICSID Convention. See also, Schreuer, Christoph H.; The ICSID Convention: A 
Commentary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, p. 1270, para. 7. 
258
 Schreuer, C. H.; supra at FN 257, p. 163, para. 177; Dolzer, Rudolf; Schreuer, Christoph; Principles of 
International Investment Law, New York: Oxford University Press, 2008, p. 42. 
259
 For an up–to–date list of the signatories and Contracting States of the ICSID Convention, see 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDDocRH&actionVal=ShowDocument
&language=English > (last visited, 16 February 2011). 
260
 For the territorial application of the ICSID Convention, see Art. 70 of the ICSID Convention and 
Schreuer, C. H.; supra at FN 257, pp. 1281–1283, paras 1–10. 
261
 See, infra Chapter II.1.5. 
262
 Kyrgyzstan signed the ICSID Convention on 9 June 1995, but has not yet ratified it. 
263
 Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Poland and Tajikistan are members of the IBRD; while Lichtenstein is party to 
the Statute of the ICJ only and may become a signatory of the ICSID Convention upon invitation. The 
Russian Federation is not a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention. 
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administer disputes that do not fall under the scope of the ICSID Convention.264 Article 
2(1) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules provides for three circumstances in which 
the Rules are applicable. First, when a legal dispute arising directly out of an investment 
is not within the jurisdiction of the ICSID because “either the State party to the dispute 
or the State whose national is a party to the dispute is not a Contracting State”.265 The 
case envisaged by Article 2(1)(a) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules provides that 
at least one of the Contracting States – the Contracting State of the investor or the 
respondent Contracting State – must not be a Contracting State of the ICSID 
Convention; a dispute where both Contracting States are Contracting States of the 
ICSID Convention cannot be settled under Article 2(1)(a) of the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules. The second case of application of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules 
concerns legal disputes that are not within the ICSID’s jurisdiction because they do not 
arise out directly of an investment, “provided that either the State party to the dispute or 
the State whose national is a party to the dispute is a Contracting State.” In other words, 
Article 2(1)(b) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules covers disputes where either the 
state of the investor or the respondent state, or both states are Contracting States of the 
ICSID Convention, but the investment requirement of the ICSID Convention is not 
met.266 The third case of application of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules refers to 
fact–finding proceedings. Article 1(1) of the Fact–Finding Additional Facility Rules 
allows any “State or national of a State” to resort to the fact–finding proceedings.267 
 
                                                
264
 See, Art. 2 of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra at FN 87. Art. 3 of the ICSID Additional 
Facility Rules provides that “[s]ince the proceedings envisaged by Article 2 are outside the jurisdiction of 
the Centre, none of the provisions of the Convention shall be applicable to them or to recommendations, 
awards, or reports which may be rendered therein.” 
265
 Art. 1(4) of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules provides that ““Contracting State” means a State for 
which the Convention has entered into force.” 
266
 See also, Toriello, P; supra at FN 87, p. 76. 
267
 Fact–Finding (Additional Facility) Rules, Schedule A of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, supra at 
FN 77. The existence of a dispute is not a condition for resorting to the fact–finding proceedings. 
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Article 26(4)(a)(ii) of the ECT provides for the consent of the Contracting Parties with 
respect to disputes submitted under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, where at least 
one Contracting Party – the Contracting Party of the Investor or the respondent 
Contracting Party –, but not both, are Contracting States of the ICSID Convention. For 
example, a dispute based on the ECT, between an Investor of Poland and Kyrgyzstan – 
not Contracting States of the ICSID Convention – cannot be submitted for resolution 
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules; likewise, a dispute between an Investor of 
Romania and Sweden – both Contracting States of the ICSID Convention – cannot be 
brought under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. Consequently, when a dispute is not 
arising directly out of an investment, an ECT Investor may resort to Article 2(1)(b) of 
the ICSID Additional Facility Rules only when one of the Contracting Parties, but not 
both, is a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention. 
 
2.2 Contracting Parties and the SCC and UNCITRAL Rules 
 
The concepts of signatories or contracting parties are unknown for the UNCITRAL 
Rules and the SCC Rules. These two instruments are procedural rules applied in ad hoc 
and institutional arbitrations, respectively, and, therefore, states or international 
organizations are not parties to these instruments. Investors that wish to submit their 
claims against Contracting Parties to the ECT with the SCC or under the UNCITRAL 
Rules will have to make sure that they fulfil only the requirements of the ECT. No 
additional hurdles are imposed under these arbitration options, which make SCC and 
UNCITRAL safe alternatives to the rigorous conditions of the ICSID Convention and 





The aim of this Chapter was to clarify the notion of ‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT, in 
the light of the notion of ‘Investor’, focusing on the possible limitations or extensions of 
the concept under the provisions of the ECT and its related treaties and rules. The 
proper interpretation of the notion of ‘Investor’ gives efficiency to the provisions of the 
ECT and ensures that its scope and purpose are accomplished. The protection of the 
ECT is afforded to Investors of Contracting Parties or, as revealed in this Chapter, of 
signatories that apply the ECT on a provisional basis. 
 
The analysis of the notion of ‘Contracting Party’ to the ECT commenced with the 
definition laid down in Article 1(2) of the ECT, which refers to states or REIOs bound 
by and for which the ECT is in force. From the outset of the Chapter, two conclusions 
were drawn: (a) the ECT is open to states and REIO (b) that become Contracting Parties 
to the ECT upon the fulfilment of two cumulative conditions: consent to be bound by 
and the entry into force of the ECT for that respective state or REIO. To this general 
rule, Article 45 of the ECT provides for an exception. The ECT also covers signatories 
that apply the ECT on a provisional basis. Consequently, the coverage of the ECT 
extends not only to Investors of Contracting Parties, but also to Investors of signatories 
that apply provisionally the ECT. The provisional application of the ECT has proved to 
be a controversial issue in ECT case law. The ECT applies provisionally if, according to 
Article 45 of the ECT, the provisional application was not excluded by a notification of 
the signatory, upon the signature of the ECT, and if the provisional application is not 
inconsistent with the constitution, laws and regulations of the signatory. The ordinary 
meaning of the terms of Article 45, in their context and in accordance with the object 
and purpose of the ECT, suggests that the second condition refers to the compatibility 
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between the provisional application per se and the constitutions and laws of the 
signatory. This view has been recently confirmed by the tribunal in the Yukos Cases. 
Regarding the application of the ECT to territories of the Contracting Parties, practice 
confirmed its significance for the notion of ‘Investor’. The ECT allows Contracting 
Parties to exclude from the coverage of the ECT one or more territories for which they 
are internationally responsible. For legal entities, this might affect their access to the 
protection of the ECT, as the territory in which they are incorporated might be excluded 
from the ECT’s application. The territorial application of the ECT also becomes 
relevant in the context of the notion of ‘Investment’ and the access of Investors to the 
dispute resolution mechanism under Article 26 of the ECT. 
 
In respect to the participation of REIOs in the ECT, the research revealed that the 
Contracting Party to the ECT is the EU and EURATOM. The analysis also showed that 
all Member States of the EU are Contracting Parties to the ECT, but that they have 
separate legal standing, due to the mixed nature of the ECT and the competences shared 
between the Member States and the EU in the matters covered by the ECT. 
 
The final part of the Chapter discussed the interplay between the ECT and the ICSID 
Convention, the ICSID Additional Facility Rules and the SCC and UNCITRAL Rules, 
with respect to the notion of ‘Contracting Party’. There are no practical difficulties 
when Investors of Contracting Parties to the ECT bring their disputes against other 
Contracting Parties to arbitration under the SCC or UNCITRAL Rules. However, there 
are issues raised by the interaction between the ECT and the ICSID Convention and the 
ICSID Additional Facility Rules. Some of the Contracting Parties to the ECT are not 
Contracting States of the ICSID Convention, while regional and international 
organizations are excluded from the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Additional 
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Facility Rules. The consent of the Contracting Parties with respect to the ICSID 
Additional Facility Rules is given only for disputes where at least one Contracting Party 
– the Contracting Party of the Investor or the respondent Contracting Party –, but not 




CHAPTER II – NATURAL PERSONS AND LEGAL ENTITIES AS INVESTORS 
UNDER THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 
 
The notion of ‘Investor’ determines the coverage of the substantive protection afforded 
by the ECT and the jurisdiction of ECT arbitral tribunals.268 Nationality, citizenship, 
permanent residence,269 incorporation or organization in accordance with the laws of a 
Contracting Party to the ECT are key elements that establish the link between a 
Contracting Party and a natural person or a legal entity claiming the status of Investor. 
 
The analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT begins with the provisions of 
Article 1(7)(a) of the ECT. For natural persons, Article 1(7)(a)(i) provides that they 
must have the citizenship or nationality of or reside permanently in a Contracting Party 
in accordance with its applicable law.270 For legal entities, Article 1(7)(a)(ii) briefly 
refers to “a company or other organization organized in accordance with the law 
applicable in that Contracting Party”. This Chapter follows the elements of Article 
1(7)(a).271 
 
The first part of this Chapter discusses natural persons as Investors under the ECT and 
focuses on the concepts of ‘nationality’, ‘citizenship’, and ‘permanent residence’, as 
                                                
268
 Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C.; supra at FN 258, p. 47. 
269
 This Thesis uses the term ‘nationality lato sensu’ to jointly refer to the links of nationality, citizenship 
and permanent residence. 
270
 Stateless persons are excluded from the protection of the ECT, as well as from the ICSID Convention 
and the ICSID Additional facility Rules. 
271
 As explained by VANDEVELDE,  
“[t]he term “investor” raises two broad issues. The first is the type of person who may be considered an 
investor. The second is the method by which the nationality of the investor is to be determined.” 
(Vandevelde, Kenneth J.; Bilateral Investment Treaties: History, Policy and Interpretation, New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2010, p. 157) 
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well as on potential controversial issues, such as the EU citizenship and dual nationality 
lato sensu of Investors. This latter analysis considers not only traditional cases of 
Investors having at the same time the nationality of a Contracting Party and the 
nationality of the respondent Contracting Party to the ECT, but also cases where, for 
example, Investors are nationals of a Contracting Party and permanent residents of the 
respondent Contracting Party. Throughout the first part of this Chapter, the provisions 
of the ECT with respect to natural persons are weighted against the provisions of the 
ICSID Convention. The second part examines the Investor legal entity and discusses the 
concepts of ‘company’ and ‘other organization’ organized in accordance with the law 
applicable in that Contracting Party, as well as other important elements contributing to 
the notion of ‘Investor’, such as the denial of benefits clause under Article 17 of the 
ECT.  
 
1. NATURAL PERSONS AND THE NOTION OF INVESTOR 
 
Only two of the disputes submitted to arbitration under Article 26 of the ECT were 
initiated by natural persons.272 In arbitrations submitted to the ICSID, around twenty out 
of the one hundred and twenty–two pending disputes have been brought by natural 
persons, alone or with judicial persons.273 Undoubtedly, the majority of investments are 
channelled through legal entities, and corporations mostly appear as claimant in 
investment arbitration cases.274 Nevertheless, the existence and importance of natural 
                                                
272
 Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia and Al–Bahloul v. Tajikistan. 
273
 The number of ICSID pending cases on 16 February 2011. See, 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=GenCaseDtlsRH&actionVal=ListPending> 
(last visited, 16 February 2011). The numbers include Ioannis Kardassopoulos v. Georgia. 
274
 As SCHREUER points out, 
“[i]n the vast majority of cases investors are companies. Although we often speak of the protection of the 
individual in international law, in international investment cases the relevant actors usually appear in the form 
of juridical persons. Corporations are owned by shareholders who may themselves be companies. A 
shareholder may own the company entirely, may own a majority of its shares or may just own a minority of 
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persons in investment law cannot be diminished by statistics. Leaving aside the fact that 
they are the ultimate beneficiaries of investments, they often resort, in their own name, 
to the protection afforded by investment treaties. When individuals emerge as claimants 
in investment arbitration cases, the issues raised by their nationality often appear to be 
highly controversial.275 
 
One essential prerequisite for investors to gain access to the protection of investment 
treaties and, ultimately, to resort to arbitration in the event of a dispute with the host 
state of the investment, is to hold the nationality of a foreign state or, in some cases, to 
permanently reside in that foreign state. The challenges of the globalized society, the 
complexity of the corporate structures through which investments are channelled and 
the reality that one person possesses more than one nationality or permanently lives in a 
state other than his state of nationality,276 brings novel hurdles in assessing the 
nationality, and consequently, in establishing the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.277 
 
Although extensively relied on by international and investment law and representing 
one of the fundamental rights of a person,278 nationality remains one of the debatable 
                                                                                                                                          
shares.” (Schreuer, Christoph; Shareholder Protection in International Investment Law, 2(3) TDM (2005), p. 
1) 
275
 Example of notorious arbitrations involving natural persons include Waguih Elie George Siag and 
Clorinda Vecci v. Arab Republic of Egypt; The Loewen Group, Inc. and Raymond L. Loewen v. United 
States of America; Ioan Micula, Viorel Micula and others v. Romania etc. 
276
 See also, Wisner, Robert; Gallus, Nick; Nationality Requirements in Investor–State Arbitration, 5(6) 
Journal of World Investment & Trade 937 (2004), p. 927. 
277
 As SLOANE resumes it,  
“[…] the foreign investor tends to be cosmopolitan: he carries more than one passport; has business interests 
in several states; often has cultural ties and associations in the host state; travels frequently; and may reside in 
different states at different times.” (Sloane, Robert D.; Breaking the Genuine Link: The Contemporary 
International Legal Regulation of Nationality, 50 Harv. Int'l L.J. 1 (2009), p. 54) 
278
 It is undisputed that nowadays individuals are subjects of international law. See, Jennings, Robert; 
Watts, Arthur (eds.), Oppenheim’s International Law, vol. I Peace, 9th edition, Harlow: Longman, 1992, 
pp. 505 and 846–847 (also, ‘Oppenheim’s International Law’). As early as 1895, LAWRENCE recognized 
the status of individuals as distinct subjects of international law: 
“Sometimes, however, one state is empowered to deal directly with citizens of another in their individual 
capacity; and when this occurs they are, for the time and as far as the question extends, subjects of 
International Law.” (Lawrence, T.J.; The Principles of International Law, London: Macmillan & Co, 1895, p. 
83) 
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concepts of law that has no universally agreed definition.279 The Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights recognizes that it is the right of any person to possess a nationality and 
that any person has the fundamental right not to be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality 
nor denied the right to change his nationality.280 In the context of diplomatic protection, 
scholars and tribunals attempted to find a definition of nationality. Oppenheim’s 
International Law defines nationality of an individual as “his quality of being subject of 
a certain state”,281 while Article 1(a) of the Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality 
sees nationality as “the status of a natural person who is attached to a state by the tie of 
allegiance”.282 In the Robert Lynch Case, nationality was considered to be  
“[…] a continuing legal relationship between the sovereign State on the one 
hand and the citizen on the other. The fundamental basis of a man’s 
nationality is his membership of an independent political community. This 
legal relationship involves rights and corresponding duties upon both–on the 
part of the citizen no less than on the part of the State.”283  
 
These definitions suggest that nationality is the expression of a link between a state and 
an individual and that no additional requirements are placed on the nature of this bond. 
However, in the Nottebohm Case, the ICJ emphasised that this link between a state and 
an individual must be genuine. As the ICJ stressed, nationality is 
                                                
279
 It is not the adherence of a person to a nation or a race that presents interest to international law, but 
the bond between a person and a state. Article 2(a) of the European Convention on Nationality, referring 
to nationality, specifies that the term “does not indicate the person’s ethnic origin”. See, European 
Convention on Nationality, 1 March 2000.  
280
 Art. 15 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 10 December 1948. 
281
 Jennings, R.; Watts, A.; supra at FN 278, p. 851. WEIS, one of the prolific scholars on nationality, saw 
nationality as  
“[…] a specific relationship between individual and State conferring mutual rights and duties as distinct from 
the relationship of the alien to the State of sojourn.” (Weis, P.; Nationality and Statelessness in International 
Law; 2nd edition, Alphen aan den Rijn: Sijthoff & Noordhoff International Publishers B.V., 1979, p. 29, 
footnote omitted) 
282
 Harvard Law School, Research in International Law. I. Nationality, 23 Special Number Am. J. Int’l L. 
13 (1929). The Harvard Draft Convention on Nationality was the main source of inspiration for the 
Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws (see, infra FN 286). The commentary of Art. 1(a) clarifies 
that no attempt is made to define the term ‘allegiance’, but this term is “in general use to denote the sum 
of the obligations of a natural person to the state to which he belongs”. See, Harvard Law School; supra, 
p. 23.  
283
 Robert John Lynch (Great Britain) v. United Mexican States, Decision of 8 November 1929, p. 18. 
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“[…] a legal bond having as its basis a social fact of attachment, a genuine 
connection of existence, interests and sentiments, together with the existence 
of reciprocal rights and duties.”284  
 
The power of a state to decide who its nationals are, as well as to determine their rights 
and duties, is an element of state sovereignty that is uncontested in international law. 
This principle was accepted in the Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco 
Case, where the PCIJ concluded that 
“[t]he question whether a certain matter is or is not solely within the 
jurisdiction of a State is an essentially relative question; it depends upon the 
development of international relations. Thus, in the present state of 
international law, questions of nationality are, in the opinion of the Court, in 
principle within this reserved domain.”285 
 
However, when nationality becomes a question of jurisdiction for international 
tribunals, the reference to domestic law suffers two significant limitations: the 
principles of international law and the power of arbitrators or judges to assess 
nationality. In the same case of the Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco, the PCIJ 
inserted a caveat to the general rule that nationality is within the exclusive jurisdiction 
of a state and reasoned that “jurisdiction which, in principle, belongs solely to the State, 
is limited by rules of international law.”286 Besides the rules of international law, 
international tribunals have the power to examine whether the nationality requirement is 
                                                
284
 Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v. Guatemala), second phase, Judgment of 6 April 1955, p. 23.  
285
 The Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco Case, Advisory Opinion no. 4 of 7 February 
1923, p. 24. 
286
 The Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco Case; supra at FN 285, p. 24. The PCIJ 
concluded as follows: 
“The question whether the exclusive jurisdiction possessed by a protecting State in regard to nationality 
questions in regard to nationality questions […] depends upon an examination of the whole situation as it 
appears from the standpoint of international law. The question therefore is no longer solely one of domestic 
jurisdiction […].” (The Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco Case; supra, p. 28)  
See also, Art. 1 of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, which provides that 
“[i]t is for each State to determine under its own law who are its nationals. This law shall be recognised by 
other States in so far it is consistent with international conventions, international custom, and the principles of 
law generally recognised with regard to nationality.” (Convention on Certain Questions Relating to the 
Conflict of Nationality Laws, 1 July 1937) 
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met.287 Referring to this principle, the tribunal in Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates 
concluded that 
“[…] when, in international arbitral or judicial proceedings, the nationality of 
a person is challenged, the international tribunal is competent to pass upon 
that challenge. It will accord great weight to the nationality law of the State in 
question and to the interpretation and application of that law by its authorities. 
But it will in the end decide for itself whether, on the facts and law before it, 
the person whose nationality is at issue was or was not a national of the State 
in question and when, and what follows from that finding. Where, as in the 
instant case, the jurisdiction of an international tribunal turns on an issue of 
nationality, the international tribunal is empowered, indeed bound, to decide 
that issue.”288 
 
In investment law, the investor’s nationality, or in some cases, his residence in a state, is 
one of the elements ensuring the access to the protection granted by investment treaties 
and it also determines the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals.289 Where an investor is 
seeking protection from investment instruments, he must comply with the nationality or 
other requirements set forth therein. However, these treaties do not provide for a 
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 See, Dugan, C.; Wallace jr., D.; Rubins, N. D.; Sabahi, B.; supra at FN 198, p. 298. In the Salem Case 
the tribunal stated that 
“[…] is not impeded by the principle of international law that every sovereign State is […] sovereign in 
deciding the question as to which persons he will regard as his subjects […]. In fact, as soon as the question 
of nationality is in dispute between two sovereign powers, it cannot be exclusively decided in accordance 
with the national law of one of these powers.” (Salem Case (Egypt v. U.S.), Award of 8 June 1932, p. 1184) 
As noted by AGHAHOSSEINI,  
“[t]he nationality of a person may come up for examination by an international tribunal for three different 
purposes: (i) for the purpose of determining its status at the domestic level; (ii) for the purpose of determining 
its status at the international level; and (iii) in the case of a dual national, for the purpose of determining its 
status vis–à–vis the national’s second nationality.” (Aghahosseini, Mohsen; Claims of Dual Nationals and the 
Development of Customary International Law. Issues Before the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, Leiden: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007, p. 70, emphasis original) 
288
 Hussein Nouman Soufraki v. the United Arab Emirates, Decision on Jurisdiction of 7 July 2004, para. 
55. See also, Siag v. Egypt; supra at FN 275, Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 April 2007, para. 145, citing 
Schreuer, C.H.; supra at FN 257, p. 267. See, AGHAHOSSEINI, who concludes that 
“[…] it is equally well–settled that, although there is strong presumption in favour of the regularity of a 
confirmed nationality, an international tribunal is not only entitled but duty bound to determine, when so 
requested, the legal status of a nationality both at the domestic and at the international levels.” (Aghahosseini, 
M.; supra at FN 287, p. 72, footnotes omitted) 
289
 LEGUM refers to the definitions of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ as “the key to making the most of 
international investment agreements”. See, Legum, Barton; Defining Investment and Investor: Who is 
Entitled to Claim?, 22(4) Arb. Int’l 521 (2006), p. 521. The author adds that these definitions “are 
essential at the stage where the investor delineates who has standing to bring a claim against the state 
under the treaty.” (ibid., p. 525)  
 99 
definition of nationality, but they offer guidance in assessing the nationality of 
investors, usually by reference to the laws of the contracting parties.290 
 
The practice on nationality in investment law was shaped by the rules of diplomatic 
protection developed in the practice of international courts and tribunals.291 This is more 
visible where investors possess more than one nationality or when they renounce their 
nationality or acquire a new nationality. However, scholars and tribunals raised the 
question as to whether the rules of diplomatic protection can be simply imported into 
investment law. Some scholars consider that the rules of diplomatic protection 
regarding nationality cannot be automatically applied in cases involving the protection 
of investors under international investment treaties. The main argument for supporting 
this opinion appears to be based on a teleological interpretation of investment treaties. It 
is therefore argued that there is a striking difference between diplomatic protection and 
investment law that lies in the fact that, under the protection regime offered by 
investment law, investors no longer need their state of nationality to espouse their 
claims.292 Others are of the opinion that, to the extent that there are no specific rules in 
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 For example, Article 1(2)(a) of the Sweden–Romania BIT defines the notion of ‘investor’ with respect 
to natural persons as “any natural person who is a citizen of a Contracting Party in accordance with its 
laws”. See, Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden and the Government of 
Romania on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 1 April 2003. Other treaties do not 
contain a reference to the laws of the contracting parties in determining the nationality of investors. For 
example, Art. 1(2)(a) of the Agreement between the Republic of Austria and the Republic of Croatia for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 1 November 1999, refers to investors as “nationals of a 
Contracting Party who make an investment in the other Contracting Party’s territory”.  
291
 The right to diplomatic protection was first stated by VATTEL in 1758: 
“Whoever uses a citizen ill, indirectly offends the state, which is bound to protect this citizen; and the 
sovereign of the latter should avenge his wrongs, punish the aggressor, and, if possible, oblige him to make 
full reparation […].” (Vattel, E.; supra at FN 155, p. 162) 
292
 KRIEBAUM sees investment law as the 
“[…] first area of international law that allows for direct complaints by individuals […]. Diplomatic 
protection cases and human rights complaints can only to a limited extent serve as precedent.” (Kriebaum, 
Ursula; Local Remedies and the Standards for the Protection of Foreign Investment, p. 420, in Binder, C.; 
Kriebaum, U.; Reinisch, A.; Wittich, S.(eds.); supra at FN 122) 
In Olguín v. Paraguay the tribunal stated that 
“[..] internal rules of this nature, pertaining to the grant of diplomatic protection to individuals, and therefore, 
to something that under international law is a prerogative of the mother country, could not, by analogy, be 
applied to the case of access to the ICSID forum, one of whose most important and unique objectives is to 
effectively give the individual the right of action, excluding the mother country’s endorsement of his claim or 
any other initiatives from the mother country, the only requirement being that it be a party to the 1965 
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investment treaties, there is nothing that prevents the reliance on the “established 
principles developed in the context of diplomatic protection”.293 The proliferation of the 
BITs and of the right of individuals to bring claims against states, without relying on the 
willingness of their state of nationality, diminished the importance of the rules 
developed in diplomatic protection. While their direct application in investment disputes 
is still controversial, in the light of the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention,294 these rules may emerge as relevant. 
 
In order to gain access to the protection of the ECT and to be able to bring a dispute 
against the Contracting Party hosting their Investments, natural persons must meet 
certain prerequisites. Article 1(7) of the ECT provides that natural persons may qualify 
as Investors if they have “the citizenship or nationality of or [are] permanently residing 
in that Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable law”.295 Article 1(7) of the 
ECT employs three notions for designating the link between natural persons and 
Contracting Parties for the purpose of the notion of ‘Investor’: nationality, citizenship 
                                                                                                                                          
Convention and the relevant BIT.” (Eudoro Armando Olguín v. Paraguay, Award of 26 July 2001, para. 62, 
unofficial translation) 
DOUGLAS considers that there is no reason to apply by default the rules of diplomatic protection where an 
investment treaty is silent on issues of nationality. See, Douglas, Zachary; The International Law of 
Investment Claims, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 321–322, para. 600. For further 
comments, see also, Sinclair, Anthony C.; ICSID’s Nationality Requirements, 23(1) ICSID Rev.–FILJ 55 
(2008), pp. 61–62. 
293
 Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C.; supra at FN 258, p. 47. See also, Schreuer, Christoph H.; with Malintoppi, 
Loretta; Reinisch, August and Sinclair, Anthony; The ICSID Convention. A Commentary, 2nd edition, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 267, para. 646. The authors conclude that 
“[u]ntil international practice develops new criteria [...], the rules as developed in the context of diplomatic 
protection remain the only reliable guidance.” (Schreuer, C. with Malintoppi, L., Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, 
A.; supra, p. 267, para. 647) 
PERKAMS considers that 
“[t]he modern international law of foreign investment can be described as a ‘spin-off’ of international law of 
aliens and the rules governing diplomatic protection, both of which form a part of customary international 
law. Accordingly, even if today’s investment law might deviate from these sources, it cannot be fully 
understood without recourse to its roots.” (Perkams, Markus; Piercing the Corporate Veil in International 
Investment Agreements, p. 96, emphasis original, in Reinisch, August; Knahr, Christina (eds.); International 
Investment Law in Context, Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 2008) 
294
 See, Art. 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention. 
295
 The original provision referred to “natural persons having the citizenship or nationality of that 
Contracting Party in accordance with its laws”. See, Art. 1(f)(i) of the Basic Protocol of 11 September 
1991, 8/91 BP 2. 
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and permanent residence. The ECT, however, does not provide for a definition of these 
notions. 
 
1.1 Nationality of Investor Natural Person 
 
While Article 1(7) of the ECT is essential in determining the natural persons who may 
qualify for the protection offered by the ECT, the provisions of Article 26(1) of the 
ECT, which refer to the consent of the Contracting Parties on the disputes that may be 
submitted for resolution under the ECT’s provisions, must also be observed. An arbitral 
tribunal has jurisdiction over a dispute if such dispute is between a Contracting Party 
and an Investor of another Contracting Party relating to an Investment of the latter, 
which concerns an alleged breach of an obligation of the respondent Contracting Party 
under Part III of the ECT.296 Thus, only disputes between a Contracting Party to the 
ECT and an Investor of another Contracting Party may qualify for resolution under 
Article 26 of the ECT; disputes between Contracting Parties and their nationals can be 
settled under the municipal law.297 
 
Article 1(7) of the ECT provides that Investors are the natural persons who have the 
nationality of a Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable laws. As mentioned 
before, the power of states to determine the nationality of individuals is not unlimited. 
While a Contracting Party has the right to regulate the access to its nationality, such 
prerogative is restricted by the rules of international law and the power of tribunals to 
assess the nationality of a natural person as a jurisdictional requirement, as it is 
indicated by the consent of the Contracting Parties under Article 26 of the ECT. 
                                                
296
 Art. 26(1) of the ECT. 
297
 See, for the ICSID Convention, Amerasinghe, C.F.; Jurisdiction Ratione Personae Under The 
Convention On The Settlement Of Investment Disputes Between States and Nationals Of Other States, 47 
Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 227 (1974–1975), p. 229. 
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Where investment treaties only provide for investors to be nationals of a state in 
accordance with the law,298 tribunals have been reluctant to apply other requisites in 
addition to the plain language of the treaties, such as the rule of ‘genuine link’ adopted 
in the Nottebohm Case.299 This view is supported by scholars,300 and retained by arbitral 
tribunals. In Micula v. Romania, the tribunal rejected the genuine link test based on the 
language of the Romania–Sweden BIT and the requirements of the Swedish law for 
acquiring Swedish nationality. As summarized by the tribunal, 
“[t]he Contracting Parties to the BIT are free to agree whether any additional 
standards must be applied to the determination of nationality. Sweden and 
Romania agreed in the BIT that the Swedish nationality of an individual 
would be determined under Swedish law and included no additional 
requirements for the determination of Swedish nationality. The Tribunal 
concurs with the Siag tribunal that the clear definition and the specific regime 
established by the terms of the BIT should prevail and that to hold otherwise 
would result in an illegitimate revision of the BIT”301 
 
In Saba Fakes v. Turkey, the tribunal denied the existence of a ‘genuine link’ 
requirement and explained that the clear language of the Netherlands–Turkey BIT 
cannot be disregarded: 
                                                
298
 There are few BITs that provide for other requirements than nationality. Art. 1(3) of the Germany–
Israel BIT provides for Israeli investors the supplementary condition of permanent residence: 
“The term 'nationals' shall mean  
(a) in respect of the Federal Republic of Germany: Germany within the meaning of the Basic Law for the 
Federal Republic of Germany;  
(b) in respect of the State of Israel: Israeli nationals being permanent residents of the State of Israel.” (Treaty 
between the Federal Republic of Germany and the State of Israel concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investments, signed on 24 June 1976, not in force) 
299
 For the distinction between valid, effective and dominant nationality, see, infra FN 349. In the 
Nottebohm Case, the ICJ discussed the issue of effectiveness of the single nationality of Mr Nottebohm, 
and retained the condition of genuine link between the national and the granting state for such nationality 
to be effective. The genuine link, thus, was held to be applicable only when nationality is acquired, and 
not when nationality is by virtue of birth. 
300
 See, KRISHAN who concludes that 
“[i]f the particular treaty rule says ‘national of a contracting State in accordance with laws’–full stop–that is 
all that is required. There is no need for further proof that nationality was effective […]. All the individual 
has to prove is that he or she holds the fact of that nationality.” (Krishan, Devashish; Nationality of Physical 
Persons, p. 65, emphasis original, in Ortino, Federico; Liberti, Laura; Sheppard, Audley; Warner, Hugo 
(eds.); Investment Treaty Law. Current Issues II. Nationality and Investment Treaty Claims. Fair and 
Equitable Treatment in Investment Treaty Law, London: British Institute of International and Comparative 
Law, 2007) 
301
 Micula v. Romania; supra at FN 275, Decision on Jurisdiction and Admissibility of 24 September 
2008, para. 101, emphasis original, footnote omitted. The tribunal added that 
“[…] Nottebohm cannot be read to allow or require that a State disregard an individual’s single nationality on 
the basis of the fact that this individual has not resided in the country of his nationality for a period of time.” 
(Micula v. Romania; supra, para. 103, emphasis original) 
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“Had the Contracting Parties intended to set additional limitations as regards 
jurisdiction ratione personae, no doubt they would have expressly stated such 
limitation in the text of the BIT.”302 
 
The language of the ECT is unambiguous as to the assessment of natural persons’ 
nationality. Article 1(7) of the ECT requires only for nationality of individuals to be in 
accordance with the laws of the Contracting Parties. Reading other implied 
requirements would be inconsistent with the rules of treaty interpretation that call for 
treaties to be interpreted as they are, on the basis of their actual text.303 As explained by 
the ICJ in the Morocco Case, “[t]he Court can not, by way of interpretation, derive from 
the Act a general rule […] which it does not contain”.304 Since the sole requirement 
under Article 1(7) is for nationality to be in accordance with the laws of the Contracting 
Party, a ‘genuine link’ requirement, for example, can only be upheld when provided as a 
condition under the municipal laws of the Contracting Parties regulating nationality. 
 
1.2 Citizenship and the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
The review of various investment treaties reveals that nationality and citizenship are 
seen in some cases as different notions and are employed separately or together in the 
                                                
302
 Saba Fakes v. Republic of Turkey, Award of 14 July 2010, para. 70, emphasis original. Art. 1(a)(i) of 
the Netherlands–Turkey BIT provides that “‘investor’ means: (i) a natural person who is a national of a 
Contracting Party under its applicable law”. See, Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra, para. 64. 
303
 Fitzmaurice, G.G.; supra at FN 194, p. 9. See also, the similar discussion in the context of legal 
entities, in Chapter II.2.4 below. 
304
 Case Concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, Judgment of 27 
August 1952, p. 199. See also, Saba Fakes v. Turkey, where the tribunal concluded the following:  
“The language of Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention is clear and does not require any further 
clarification. Pursuant to the generally accepted rules of treaty interpretation, as codified in Article 31 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, the Tribunal is precluded from elaborating any interpretation that 
would run counter to this clear language, in particular any interpretation that would result in establishing 
additional limitations to the Centre-s jurisdiction where no such limitations were provided by the Contracting 
Parties.” (Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 76) 
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definition of the notion of ‘investor’.305 The question whether nationality is a synonym 
for citizenship is not new in international law.  
 
Determining whether citizenship is a substitute for nationality is difficult in the absence 
of generally accepted definitions of these two concepts and, consequently, one must 
resort to municipal laws for taking a grip of this problem.306 Some states refer to either 
nationality or citizenship to designate their legal relationship with an individual, while 
some states use both terms. An important difference is the fact that, while the term 
‘nationality’ is used for natural persons and legal entities, the term ‘citizenship’ refers to 
natural persons only. The Spanish Constitution refers to ‘nationality’,307 while the 
Romanian Constitution refers to ‘citizenship’.308 No differences seem to appear in the 
meaning of the two notions. However, unlike the Spanish and Romanian laws, there are 
states where the notions of ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ do not converge and are used 
to designate different bonds between states and individuals. The Mexican legislation 
provides support for this argument, as ‘nationality’ retains a broader meaning than the 
notion of ‘citizenship’. The Mexican Constitution uses both ‘nationality’ and 
‘citizenship’, where citizenship is bestowed to Mexican nationals that are over eighteen 
                                                
305
 See for example, Article I(g) of the Canada–Thailand BIT, which refers to citizenship and permanent 
residence for Canadian investors, and to nationality and permanent residence for investors of Thailand: 
“[…] ”investor” means 
in case of Canada: 
(i) any natural person possessing the citizenship of or permanently residing in Canada in accordance with its 
laws; or […] 
in the case of the Kingdom of Thailand: 
(i) any natural person possessing the nationality of or permanently residing in the Kingdom of Thailand in 
accordance with its laws; […]” (Agreement between the Government of Canada and the Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 24 September 1998) 
306
 Even ARISTOTLE, referring to citizenship, wrote in his Politics that “there is no unanimity, no 
agreement as to what constitutes a citizen”. See, Aristotle, The Politics, translated by T.A. Sinclair, 
Penguin, 1981, p. 168. 
307
 Art. 11 of the Constitution of Spain of 1978. See also, Chapter III “Da Nacionalidade” (“On 
Nationality”) of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil of 1988.  
308
 Article 5 of the Constitution of Romania of 1991, amended by Law no. 429 of 23 October 2003. Under 
Romanian law, the term ‘nationality’ is used with respect to the ethnicity of a person, as a Romanian 
citizen may be of Hungarian nationality.  
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years of age and have honest means of livelihood.309 Only Mexican citizens enjoy the 
political rights conferred by the Constitution and municipal laws.310 The Harvard Draft 
Convention on Nationality sees nationality and citizenship as different notions, since 
“nationality has a broader meaning than “citizenship”, for which it is frequently used as 
a synonym”.311 This meaning is the result of the fact that nationality “does not 
necessarily involve the right or privilege of exercising civil or political functions”.312 
 
It is generally agreed that nationality and citizenship are or must be viewed as 
synonyms,313 where public international law uses the term ‘nationality’ and municipal 
law the one of ‘citizenship’ and/or ‘nationality’: 
“Conceptually and linguistically, the terms “nationality” and “citizenship” 
emphasize two different aspects of the same notion: State membership. 
“Nationality” stresses the international, “citizenship” the national, municipal 
aspect.”314 
                                                
309
 See, Art. 34 of the Constitution of United Mexican States of 1917 (the Mexican Constitution), with 
subsequent amendments. Art. 30 of the Mexican Constitution defines the notion of ‘nationals’, while Art. 
35 provides for the rights of Mexican citizens.   
310
 See also, s. 325 of the U.S. Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952. The United States, in an 
explanatory note to the United States–Georgia BIT clarifies that 
“[t]he Treaty [BIT] defines “national” as a natural person who is a national of a Party under its own laws. 
Under U.S. law, the term “national” is broader than the term “citizen”. For example, a native of American 
Samoa is a national of the United States, but not a citizen.” (The Treaty between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Georgia concerning the Encouragement and 
Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 17 August 1997, and Letter of Submittal of 22 June 1995) 
The British Nationality Act of 1981 (the British Nationality Act) refers to British citizens, British 
Overseas citizens, British subjects and British protected persons. British citizens are defined under Part I, 
while British subject under Part IV of the British Nationality Act. A British citizen is considered to be a 
citizen of the United Kingdom, while the term ‘British subject’ encompasses both citizens of the United 
Kingdom and its former colonies (today, the Commonwealth). See also, the British Nationality Act of 
1948, referred to by the British Nationality Act.  
311
 For similar opinion, see, Nelson, Timothy G.; Passport, s’il Vous Plaît?: Investment Treaty Protection 
and the Individual Investor’s Citizenship, 32 Suffolk Transnat'l L. Rev. 451 (2008–2009), p. 463. 
312
 Harvard Law School; supra at FN 282, p. 23. For the same opinion, see, McGarvey–Rosendahl, 
Patricia; A New Approach to Dual Nationality; 8 Houston Journal of International Law 305 (1985–1986), 
p. 305 
313
 See, Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287, p. 15, note 1. 
314
 Weis, P.; supra at FN 281, pp. 4–5. Similarly, GUILD concludes that “the national is the citizen viewed 
from outside the state”. See, Guild, Elspeth; The Legal Elements of European Identity. EU Citizenship 
and Migration Law, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 20–21, footnote omitted. 
HALL concludes that citizenship, 
“[…] as opposed to nationality, is a concept ordinarily associated with the possession of civil and political 
rights and obligations by natural persons”. (Hall, Stephen; Nationality, Migration Rights and Citizenship of 
the Union, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 14) 
The tribunal in Feldman Karpa v. Mexico used the terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’ interchangeably, 
relying on the fact that 
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Where both terms are used, one must confirm the term which has the meaning 
employed to the notion of ‘nationality’ under international law.315 Where a person is 
vested with full political and personal rights attesting the legal relationship with a 
specific state, the fact that the municipal law employs the term ‘nationality’ or 
‘citizenship’ does not change the effect of the legal bond between state and its nationals 
in international law. In this context, perhaps the ECT drafters preferred to use both 
terms in Article 1(7) in order to reconcile the different approaches taken by the laws of 
the Contracting Parties. 
 
1.3 EU Citizenship and the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
One of the peculiarities of the ECT refers to the capacity of REIOs to become 
Contracting Parties to the ECT. Currently, the EU and EURATOM are the only REIO 
Contracting Party to the ECT. The existence of the citizenship of the EU (EU 
citizenship) raises questions as to its effectiveness for the purpose of international law 
and of the ECT.316 
 
                                                                                                                                          
“[…] citizenship may pertain more to domestic aspects, and nationality rather to international aspects of the 
legal bond between a state and an individual […].” (Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. United Mexican States, 
Interim Decision on Preliminary Jurisdictional Issues of 6 December 2000, para 31) 
315
 See also, Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra at FN 297, p. 246. 
316
 The EU citizenship also becomes relevant in the context of dual nationality of Investors. See, infra 
Chapter II.1.5. 
Before the entry into force of the TFEU, the citizenship was of the EU; however, the EU was not formally 
a Contracting Party to the ECT. See further, Ortino, Federico; L’Importance de la Nationalité des 
Personnes et des Entreprises dans le Droit de L’Investissement, p. 65, in Kessedjian, Catherine; Leben, 
Charles (eds.); Le Droit Européen et L’Investissement, Paris: Ėditions Panthéon–Assas, 2009. 
Until the adoption of the TFEU, the EU citizenship was actually a de facto citizenship of the European 
Communities. The provisions dealing with the EU citizenship were included in the EC Treaty, while EU 
citizens had the rights and duties provided for by the EC Treaty. Moreover, until the ratification of the 
TFEU, the concepts of EU and EC were not coincident. This determined some scholars to conclude that 
“the qualification “of the Union” is either inaccurate or reflects an aspiration not borne by positive law.” 
See, Condinanzi, Massimo; Lang, Allessandra; Nascimbene, Bruno; Citizenship of the Union and Free 
Movement of Persons, Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008, p. 3. 
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The concept of EU citizenship was introduced with the adoption of the TEU.317 The 
original provision of the TEU provided that the citizenship of the EU is established for 
every natural person holding the nationality of a Member State.318 In 1992, the 
European Council adopted a decision that sought to clarify the notion of ‘EU 
citizenship’ and its position in relation to the nationality of a Member State. The 
European Council stressed that 
“[t]he provisions […] relating to citizenship of the Union give nationals of the 
Member States additional rights and protection […]. They do not in any way 
take the place of national citizenship. The question whether an individual 
possesses the nationality of the Member State will be settled solely by 
reference to the national law of the Member State concerned.”319 
 
The current provisions on the EU citizenship are contained in Article 20 of the TFEU, 
which states the following: 
“Citizenship of the Union is hereby established. Every person holding the 
nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union. Citizenship of 
the Union shall be additional to and not replace national citizenship.” 
 
The opinions of scholars on the issue of EU citizenship and the ECT are divided. Some 
authors consider that nationals of Member States of the EU also have a lawful 
citizenship of the EU and consequently they are dual nationals.320 The question, 
therefore, is whether the EU citizenship can be recognized as such in international law 
or, put it differently, whether EU citizenship values nationality of a state.321  
 
                                                
317
 See, supra at FN 234. 
318
 Art. G(9) of the TEU.  
319
 Conclusions of the Presidency: Edinburgh 12 December 1992, Annex I: Decision of the Heads of State 
and Government, Meeting within the European Council, Concerning Certain Problems Raised by 
Denmark on the Treaty on European Union, Section A.  
320
 For example, see, Burgstaller, M.; supra at FN 249, pp. 207–208; Pinsolle, Philippe; The Dispute 
Resolution provisions of the Energy Charter Treaty, 10(3) Int. A.L.R. 82 (2007), p. 87–88; Pinsolle, 
Philippe; Selected Nationality Issues in ECT Arbitration, p. 970, in Fernández–Ballesteros, M.Á.; Arias, 
David (eds.); Liber Amicorum Bernardo Cremades, Las Rozas (Madrid): La Ley, 2010. 
321
 Any discussion on the EU citizenship and its relation with the ECT must consider the evolution of the 
European Communities and the EU. Initially, the Contracting Party to the ECT was the ECSC, the 
EURATOM and the EEC. Also, before the TFEU came into force, the EU had no legal personality.  
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The EU citizenship is often seen as expressing “the idea of belonging to a 
community”322 or as a “de jure category of Union citizenship which is created by 
Community law”.323 At least two arguments rejecting the idea of an EU citizenship, in 
the sense of nationality under international law, can be put forward. If nationality 
expresses the link between an individual and a state, then the element ‘state’ of this 
definition is missing in the case of the EU citizenship. Although having the appearance 
of a state, the EU is not a state within the meaning of international law.324 Secondly, the 
EU citizenship is not a stand–alone citizenship, as the EU citizenship can exist only 
where an individual has the nationality of a Member State. Also, the rights and 
obligations bestowed in the EU citizens are not exclusive, as some of them are extended 
to non–national residents in the Member States.325 With a view of these particularities, it 
is debatable whether the EU citizenship can produce effects at international level.326 
 
                                                
322
 Condinanzi, M.; Lang, A.; Nascimbene, B.; supra at FN 316, p. 10. Other authors argue that the EU 
citizenship was introduced “as part of an effort to move from a mainly economic community to a political 
union.” See, Craig, P.; De Búrca, G.; supra at FN 243, p. 847. 
323
 Hall, S.; supra at FN 314, p. 9, emphasis original. The author also refers to the EU citizenship as “an 
essentially political concept”. (ibid., p. 10) 
324
 Art. 1 of the Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of States provides for that  
“[t]he state as a person of international law should possess the following qualifications: 
a. a permanent population; 
b. a defined territory; 
c. government; and 
d. capacity to enter into relations with the other states.” (Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties of 
States, 26 December 1934) 
See also, Hirsch, Moshe; The Arbitration Mechanism of the International Centre for the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes, Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1993, p. 62; Crawford, James; The 
Creation of States in International Law, 2nd edition, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006, p. 28 et 
seq. 
The EU possesses the capacity to enter into relations with other states (as of 1 December 2009, with the 
entry into force of the TFEU); and has governing bodies (the EU Parliament, the Commission etc.). 
However, the territory and the population of the EU are of the Member States who retain their 
sovereignty over these elements. Similarly, the Member States retain their governments. BROWNLIE sees 
the EU as an association of states “which has a certain federal element, albeit on a treaty basis.” See, 
Brownlie, I.; supra at FN 170, p. 75. Such associations of states do not constitute states, but they have “a 
certain effect upon international law”. See, Shaw, M.N.; supra at FN 92, p. 214. SHAW shares the opinion 
of BROWNLIE, considering the EU to be an association of states (pp. 216–217). For other examples of 
associations of states, see, the Commonwealth of Nations (the British Commonwealth) and the 
Commonwealth of Independent States (of the former USSR republics), in Shaw, M. N; supra at FN 92, 
pp. 214–217. 
325
 See for example, Art. 48(1)(b) of the TFEU. 
326
 In the absence of the legal effects of the EU citizenship under the rules of international law, it is 
debatable whether in practice there can be envisaged a dispute brought by Investors of the EU against the 
ECT Contracting Parties. For the case of Societas Europaea, see, Chapter II. 2.1.1 below. 
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1.4 Permanent Residence and the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
The ECT covers not only nationals and citizens of Contracting Parties, but also natural 
persons who are permanently residing in a Contracting Party, in accordance with its 
applicable law.  
 
It is not unusual for a treaty to extend its protection to permanent residents. The 
NAFTA,327 encompasses under the definition of ‘national’, citizens or permanent 
residents of a NAFTA Party.328 Similarly, BITs extend their treatment to permanent 
residents. The Germany–Russia BIT, for instance, protects only permanent residents: 
“The term “investor” means an individual having a permanent place of 
residence in the area covered by this Agreement […].”329 
 
In order to be covered by the provisions of Article 1(7) of the ECT, individuals must be 
permanent residents in accordance with the law of a Contracting Party to the ECT.330 
Again, as with nationality, the freedom of a Contracting Party in deciding who its 
permanent residents are, is limited by the principles of international law and the 
competence of tribunals to assess the jurisdictional requirements set forth under the 
ECT. The rules of permanent residence differ from legislation to legislation and may 
impose on individuals onerous or more permissible conditions. The requisites for 
                                                
327
 North American Free Trade Agreement, 1 January 1994. The references to NAFTA refer to the version 
published in 32 ILM 296/612 (1993). 
For the similarities between the NAFTA and the ECT, see, Omalu, Mirian Kene; NAFTA and the Energy 
Charter Treaty. Compliance with, Implementation and Effectiveness of International Investment 
Agreements, The Hague/London/Boston: Kluwer Law International, 1999. 
328
 Art. 201 of the NAFTA: 
“[…] national means a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident of a Party and any other natural 
person referred to in Annex 201.1” 
329
 Art. 1(1)(c) of the Agreement between the federal Republic of Germany and the Union of Soviet 
Socialist Republics concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 5 August 1991. 
This definition was discussed in the case of Franz Sedelmayer v. the Russian Federation, Award of 7 July 
1998. 
330
 The proposal to include permanent residents in the definition of Investor was advanced by the 
representatives of Australia. See, Note from the Chairman of the Working Group II, 14/91 BP 3, 11 
October 1991. There are no permanent residents of the EU, but permanent residents of EU Member 
States. 
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acquiring the status of permanent resident depend upon various circumstances: whether 
the person is married to a national of the host state, has children who are nationals of 
the host state, or is residing in the host state as refugee;331 or it requires a minimum 
period during which the individual resides in the territory of the host state etc.332 What 
is relevant, however, is that permanent residence only, and not any residence, has legal 
effect under the ECT. 
 
In investment law, few cases deal with permanent residents as investors. In Sedelmayer 
v. Russia, the tribunal had to decide whether the claimant, Mr Franz Sedelmayer, was a 
permanent resident in Germany in accordance with the provisions of the Germany–
Russia BIT.333 The Germany–Russia BIT adopts the rule of permanent residence rather 
than nationality for covered investors. In Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, a case brought 
under the NAFTA, the claimant, a United States citizen by birth, moved to Mexico and 
obtained the status of permanent resident.334 The tribunal here gave preference to the 
nationality of the claimant and rejected the allegations of a dual nationality lato sensu 
because of the permanent resident status.335 
 
1.5 Dual Nationality Lato Sensu and the Energy Charter Treaty  
 
The fact that a person may have one or more nationalities is recognized in international 
law, although several attempts have been made to restrict the right of a person to hold 
                                                
331
 See for example, the Normative Resolution no. 36/99 of the Brazilian National Council for 
Immigration, which provides that the spouse of a Brazilian national acquires permanent residence in 
Brazil. 
332
 See for example, Art. 71 of the Emergency Government Ordinance no.194/2002 on the Regime of 
foreigners in Romania, with subsequent amendments, which provides, inter alia, that a foreigner will be 
granted the right to permanently reside in Romania if he resided in the territory of Romania for a period 
of at least 5 years. Art. 71 adds the condition for the foreigner to have basic knowledge of Romanian 
language. 
333
 Sedelmayer v. Russia, supra at FN 329, section 2.1.5, p. 56 et seq. 
334
 Feldman Karpa v. Mexico; supra at FN 314, paras 27–28. 
335
 Ibid., para. 36. The case is further discussed below, in Chapter II.1.5. 
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more than one nationality.336 Today, however, the focus is not anymore on eliminating 
the cases of dual or multiple nationalities, but on accommodating and regulating this 
particular situation,337 in order to offer dual or multiple nationals the protection granted 
to any national.338 The issue of dual nationality is not new to international law and far 
from being settled. 
 
Article 1(7) of the ECT is silent on whether natural persons having dual or multiple 
nationalities may qualify as Investors. Article 26(1) of the ECT refers, nonetheless, to 
claims brought against a Contracting Party by Investors of ‘another’ Contracting Party. 
The central point of this analysis revolves around the provision of Article 26(1).339 The 
following situations are discussed below: (a) where a national of a Contracting Party is 
also a national of the respondent Contracting Party; (b) where a national of a 
Contracting Party is also a national of the respondent Contracting Party and the dispute 
is submitted under the provisions of the ICSID Convention; (c) where a national of a 
Contracting Party is also a national of another Contracting Party, other than the 
respondent Contracting Party, or of a third state; (d) where a national of a Contracting 
Party is also a permanent resident of the respondent Contracting Party or of another 
Contracting Party or third state, and the vice versa. It is important to point out from the 
outset of this analysis that Article 26 (1) of the ECT refers to ‘Investor of another 
Contracting Party’, which means that the language of the provision is not restricted to 
                                                
336
 These attempts were unsuccessful for various reasons, but one in particular appears to be decisive. One 
cannot eliminate dual or multiple nationalities without the risk of rendering a person stateless. See, 
McGarvey–Rosendahl, P.; supra at FN 312, p. 312.  
337
 As explained by AGHAHOSSEINI,  
“[t]his general distaste for dual nationality has slowly but distinctly changed, not because of any doctrinal 
conversion on the part of its opponents, but because of the practicalities of human life. […] [T]he appropriate 
policy towards the phenomenon should be, not to regard it as an evil to be avoided or eliminated, but as a fact 
of life the impact of which must be regulated.” (Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287, p. 255) 
338
 For example, the bilateral taxation treaties resolving the conflicts between different taxation regimes. 
339
 While the discussion can be extended to cases of multiple nationalities, the limited space compels to 
the analysis of cases of dual nationality only.  
 112
nationals or citizens of another Contracting Party, but it also encompasses permanent 
residents. 
 
a. Where a National of a Contracting Party is also a National of the Respondent 
Contracting Party 
The first situation refers to individuals who are nationals or citizens of a Contracting 
Party, but who, at the same time, hold the nationality or citizenship of the respondent 
Contracting Party. It was suggested that the ECT does not expressly exclude these dual 
nationals from its coverage, but it is simply silent on this matter.340 Article 1(7)(a)(i) 
briefly refers to natural persons possessing the nationality or citizenship of a 
Contracting Party in accordance with its applicable law.341 On the other hand, Article 
26(1) of the ECT refers to disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of 
another Contracting Party. The wording of this provision, which employs the term 
‘another’, is suggested to have two interpretations in the context of dual nationality. On 
one hand, the ECT may only allow for disputes between an Investor of a Contracting 
Party that is not an Investor of the respondent Contracting Party, since the term 
‘another’ may suggest the exclusion of such dual nationals.342 In contrast, the wording 
of Article 26(1) can be construed as requiring an Investor to be a national, citizen or 
permanent resident of another Contracting Party, but does not exclude Investors that are 
                                                
340
 See, D’Allaire, Dominique; The Nationality Rules under the Energy Charter Treaty: Practical 
Considerations, 10(1) Journal of World Investment and Trade 39 (2009), p. 41. PINSOLLE concludes that 
the ECT does not exclude dual nationals from the definition of ‘Investor’. See, Pinsolle, P., in Fernández–
Ballesteros, M.Á.; Arias, D. (eds.); supra at FN 320, p. 969. 
341
 See, the reasoning of the tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Turkey: 
“Pursuant to Article 1(a)(i) of the Netherlands–Turkey BIT, for the purposes of this BIT, “‘investor’ means: 
(i) a natural person who is a national of a Contracting Party under its applicable law.” […] 
The Netherlands–Turkey BIT therefore does not exclude dual nationals from the protection extended by the 
BIT, to the effect that Mr. Fakes may file a claim against the Republic of Turkey as a Dutch national 
regardless of the fact that he also holds Jordanian nationality.” (Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, paras 
64 and 65, emphasis original, footnote omitted) 
342
 The adjective “another” has the meaning of ‘different’, ‘something or somebody different than the 
person or object already mentioned’. See, The New Oxford American Dictionary; supra  at FN 136, p. 64. 
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also nationals, citizens or permanent residents of other Contracting Parties, including 
the respondent Party.343 
 
The interpretation of Article 26(1) of the ECT must be made within the rules ascribed 
in the Vienna Convention.344 In accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention, which sets forth the general rule of treaty interpretation, “[a] treaty shall be 
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the 
terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. The 
Vienna Convention, accordingly, gives precedence to the ordinary meaning of the 
terms of the treaty, which, however, must be understood within the context where they 
are employed. The provisions of Article 1(7) and 26(1) of the ECT do not expressly 
exclude dual nationals from the protection of the ECT, when one of the states of 
nationality is the respondent in the dispute.345 Such situation was not envisaged, nor 
considered during the negotiation of the ECT or elsewhere in the final text of the 
ECT.346 Moreover, ECT tribunals constantly rejected to read in the ECT something 
                                                
343
 Support may also be found in the early drafts of the ECT. Art. 32(1) of the Basic Agreement of 31 
October 1991, 21/91 BA 4 provided for “[d]isputes between an investor of one Contracting Party and any 
other Contracting Party” (emphasis added). Similar phrasing is employed by Art. 10(1) of the ECT, which 
provides that each Contracting Party shall “encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and 
transparent conditions for investors of other Contracting Parties”, and by Art. 13(1) of the ECT, which 
refers to “Investments of Investors of a Contracting Party in the Area of any other Contracting Party”. 
344
 There is no doubt that treaties are lex specialis and their clauses must be strictly followed. However, 
“to produce such a result, the treaty rules need to be clearly formulated”. See, Gazzini, Tarcisio; The Role 
of Customary International Law in the Field of Foreign Investment, 8(5) Journal of World Investment & 
Trade 691 (2007), p. 706.  
345
 The drafters of the ECT made use of at least three wordings: ‘other’, ‘any other’ and ‘another’ 
Contracting Party/Parties throughout the ECT’s provisions. See, supra at FN 343. 
346
 The issue of dual nationality was of no concern and it was easily dismissed during the drafting of the 
ECT. As results from the available documents, the Canadian delegation asked whether “Investors with 
dual nationality of two Contracting Parties be able to choose international arbitration to challenge 
measures of one or the other of those Contracting Parties.” See, Comments of the Canadian delegation 
regarding the Basic Agreement of 19 June 1992, 31/92 BA 13. The only available reply to this question 
came from the representative of Australia who considered that, unless the dispute is submitted under the 
ICSID option, there is nothing in the ECT against dual nationals bringing a dispute against one of the 
state of nationality: 
“As to the ICSID Convention procedures – generally the answer is no. Dual nationals who are natural persons 
would be unable to take action against either of the States […]. 
[…] where the other means of dispute settlement are relied on, there [sic!] currently no such limitation on a 
dual national taking action against a state of its nationality,” (Letter from Michael Lennard, Principal 
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which is not expressly provided, in particular in respect to the prerequisites imposed on 
Investors and Investment.347 In the light of the textual interpretation principle, this 
argument should be sufficient for establishing the jurisdiction of an ECT arbitral 
tribunal dealing with this issue. However, if it is accepted that the terms of Article 
26(1) of the ECT within their ordinary meaning are ambiguous, then further 
consideration must be paid to other methods of treaty interpretation. Article 31(3)(c) of 
the Vienna Convention provides that there shall be taken into account “any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” where the 
ordinary meaning of the terms still leaves ambiguity.348 
 
In resolving issues of dual nationality, international tribunals resorted to the application 
of two rules: the rule of non–responsibility and the rule of effective or dominant 
nationality.349 The rule of non–responsibility, as developed under the rules of diplomatic 
protection, prevents a state from espousing the claims of a national, when the individual 
also holds the nationality of the respondent state. This rule, which was adopted by some 
                                                                                                                                          
Lawyer, International Trade Law, Attorney General’s Department Australia, to Mr Leif Ervik, European 
Energy Charter Conference Secretariat, 1 December 1992) 
The proposal of the representative of Australia either to explain that dual nationals submitting claims 
against their state of nationality are not covered when the dispute is brought under the ICSID Convention, 
either to explicitly exclude such dual nationals from the dispute settlement provisions, except where the 
respondent Contracting Party agreed to treat the Investor as a national of another Contracting Party, 
generated no debate. See, Letter from Michael Lennard to Mr Leif Ervik; supra. 
347
 See for example, Chapter II. 2.4 below. 
348
 See, Lotus Case, where the PCIJ stated that the terms of a treaty must be interpreted within their 
ordinary meaning, unless there is an express stipulation to the contrary. See, The Case of the SS “Lotus”, 
Judgment no. 9 of 7 September 1927, pp. 16–17. 
Article 26(6) of the ECT also provides for the direct application of the rules and principles of 
international law by the ECT tribunals. 
349
 From the outset of this analysis it is useful to clarify the terminology used here. While scholars and 
tribunals refer to the ‘effective nationality’ rule, it is submitted that using the wording ‘dominant 
nationality’ satisfies better the purpose of this rule. The use of the terms ‘dominant nationality’ indicates 
the existence of at least two nationalities that are both valid and effective at international level. The term 
‘effective’, on the other hand, may suggest that out of two nationalities one is ineffective. Such latter 
approach would be inaccurate, while the first would correctly describe the concept of prevalence on 
which the dominant nationality rule relies. The effective nationality answers the question whether a 
nationality granted at national level can have international effects. The Nottebohm Case retained as a 
condition for the effectiveness of nationality the existence of a genuine link between the national and the 
state of nationality which he acquired. For the distinction between valid, effective and dominant 
nationality, see, Aghahosseini, M; supra at FN 287, pp. 72–80. 
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modern investment instruments, prevents an individual to bring a claim against one of 
his states of nationality. For example, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention confines the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID to claims submitted by individuals who are nationals of a 
Contracting State, but are not nationals of the respondent Contracting State.350 The rule 
of dominant nationality allows states to take up claims of an individual who also 
possesses the nationality of the respondent state, as long as the dominant nationality is 
not the one of the respondent state.351 
 
The Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws retains the principle of non–
responsibility by providing that a state is prevented to afford diplomatic protection to 
one of its nationals against a state whose nationality such person also possesses.352 The 
prohibition is absolute and irrespective of whether the dominant nationality is that of the 
claimant state, and it is based on the principle of sovereign equality of states. The 
                                                
350
 Art. 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention refers to national of another Contracting State as “any natural 
person who had the nationality of a Contracting State […], but does not include any person who […] had 
the nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute”. 
351
 The nature of these two rules is not yet settled in international law. While there appears to be strong 
support for the rule of non–responsibly as customary international law, there is still debate on whether the 
dominant nationality rule can be considered as such. See also, Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287. 
AGHAHOSSEINI considers both rules to be part of customary international law (p. 1). Oppenheim’s 
International Law refers to the provisions of Articles 4 and 5 of the Hague Convention as rules “which are 
probably to be regarded as rules of customary international law” (Jennings, R.; Watts, A.; supra at FN 
278, p. 516.). In the Reparation for Injuries Case, the ICJ saw as “ordinary” the “practice whereby a State 
does not exercise protection on behalf of one of its nationals against a State which regards him as its own 
national”. See, Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations, Advisory Opinion of 
11 April 1949, p. 186. ORREGO VICUÑA argues that, “[a]lthough it has been suggested that these rules 
probably reflect customary international law, the situation does not appear today to be quite 
consolidated.” See, Orrego Vicuña, Francisco; Changing Approaches to the Nationality of Claims in the 
Context of Diplomatic Protection and International Dispute Settlement, <http://www.arbitration-
icca.org/media/0/12224294674510/changing_approaches_to_the_nationality_of_claims_in_the_context_
of_diplomatic_protection_and_international_dispute_settlement.pdf> (last visited, 16 February 2011), p. 
16, footnote omitted. VANDEVELDE is of the opinion that the rule of dominant or effective nationality 
constitutes customary international law: 
“The rule under customary international law is that such a person shall be treated as a national of the country 
of his or her “dominant or effective” nationality.” (Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at FN 271, p. 158, footnote 
omitted) 
The analysis here is not intended to be an analysis of the two rules and whether or not they would 
constitute customary international law rules, but whether, at least in the light of the recent developments 
of investment law, dual nationals would have access to the dispute settlement mechanism of the ECT. 
352
 Art. 4 of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra at FN 286, reads as follows: 
“A State may not afford diplomatic protection to one of its nationals against a State whose nationality such 
person also possesses.” 
See also, Peake, Jessica; Diplomatic Protection for Dual Nationals: Effective Nationality or Non–
Responsibility?, 10 Trinity College Law Review 98 (2007), p. 102. 
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Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws retains the dominant nationality test only 
for cases where a third state is concerned, namely that such state will recognize the 
effective nationality of an individual possessing more than one nationality.353 
 
The Institute of International Law, at its 1965 session held in Warsaw, adopted a 
Resolution that confirmed the rule of non–responsibility. Article 4(a) of the Warsaw 
Resolution provided that 
“[a]n international claim presented by a State for injury suffered by an 
individual who possesses at the same time the nationalities of both claimant 
and respondent States may be rejected by the latter and is inadmissible before 
the court (jurisdiction) seised of the claim.”354 
 
However, similar to the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, the Warsaw 
Resolution recognises the rule of dominant nationality when the nationality of a third 
state, and not of the respondent state, is involved.355 
                                                
353
 Art. 5 of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra at FN 286, notes that 
“[w]ithin a third State, a person having more than one nationality shall be treated as if he had only one. 
Without prejudice to the application of its law in matters of personal status and of any conventions in force, a 
third State shall, of the nationalities which any such person possesses, recognise exclusively in its territory 
either the nationality of the country in which he is habitually and principally resident, or the nationality of the 
country with which in the circumstances he appears to be in fact most closely connected.” 
The drafting history of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws reveals a lack of consensus on the 
rules of non–responsibility in case of dual nationality. The Draft Conventions prepared for the 1930 
Hague Conference on the Codification of International Law, show that the states rather disagreed with the 
rule under Article 4 of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws. The Bases of Discussion drawn 
up for the Conference by the Preparatory Committee reveals that 
“[w]hile some replies claim to exclude any exercise of diplomatic protection in the case in question […]; 
other replies, on the contrary, admit the right of protection.” (Official Documents. Conference for the 
Codification of International Law, The Hague, March 13, 1930; Bases of Discussion drawn up for the 
Conference by the Preparatory Committee, I. Nationality; 24 Am. J. Int’l L. 1 (1930), p. 11) 
The conclusion was based upon the replies received from the governments of South Africa, Germany, 
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Egypt, Estonia, United States, Finland, France, Great 
Britain, Hungary, India, Italy, Japan, Latvia, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, 
Siam, Sweden, Switzerland and Czechoslovakia (id.). 
354
 The Warsaw Resolution was adopted on the basis of the Report of Herbert W. Briggs. See, Institute of 
International Law, The National Character of an International Claim Presented by a State for Injury 
Suffered by an Individual, Warsaw, 1965. 
355
 Art. 4(b) of the Warsaw Resolution provides that 
“[a]n international claim presented by a State for injury suffered by an individual who, in addition to 
possessing the nationality of the claimant State, also possesses the nationality of a State other than the 
respondent State may be rejected by the latter and is inadmissible before the court (jurisdiction) seised of the 
claim unless it can be established that the interested person possesses a closer (prépondérant) link of 
attachment with the claimant State.” 
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The practice before 1930 and after this date shows that the rule of dominant nationality 
has been extensively used in case of dual nationals, thus disregarding the rule of non–
responsibility advocated by the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws.356 A dual 
national has full nationality of two states. As pointed out by an author, “a dual national 
is not a half–national of each of his two countries of nationality”,357 and, consequently, 
each of these countries has the right to treat him as national.358 The dominant 
nationality test considers the strength of two links between the national and the two 
states concerned and gives preference to the nationality that shows stronger ties.359 The 
ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection restate the principle of non–responsibility 
under Article 4 of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, but maintain the 
exception of the dominant nationality rule: the state may exercise diplomatic protection 
in respect of a national, against a state of which that person is also a national, if the 
nationality of the former state is predominant.360 The ILC Report on Multiple 
Nationalities considered the dominant nationality rule as follows: 
                                                                                                                                          
The drafting history of the Warsaw Resolution indicates that the dominant nationality rule was suggested 
by BRIGGS as an exception to the rule of non–responsibility under Art. 4(a). See, Aghahosseini, M.; supra 
at FN 287, p. 47, at note 48. 
356
 See, Canevaro Claim (Italy v. Peru), Award of 3 May 1912; Alexander Tellech (United States v. 
Austria and Hungary), Award of 25 May 1928. 
357
 Aghahosseini, M; supra at FN 287, p. 23. 
358
 See, Art. 3 of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws, supra at FN 286, that provides for the 
following: 
“Subject to the provisions of the present Convention, a person having two or more nationalities may be 
regarded as its national by each of the States whose nationality he possesses.” 
359
 One author refers to the “relative strength of two sets of links”. See, Kerley, Ernest L.; Nationality of 
Claims – A Vista; 63 American Society of International Law Proceedings 35 (1969), p. 39, emphasis 
original. 
360
 Art. 7 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection refers to the following: 
“A State of nationality may not exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person against a State of which 
that person is also a national unless the nationality of the former State is predominant, both at the date of 
injury and at the date of the official presentation of the claim.” (International Law Commission, Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2006, 
vol. II, p. 43) 
The ILC Report on Multiple Nationality suggested several connecting factors for determining the 
dominant nationality of a person: 
“(a) Residence in the territory of one of the States of which the individual concerned is a national; 
(b) In case of residence in the territory of a State of which he is not a national, whether or not this State is a 
party, the previous and habitual residence in the territory of one of the States of which he is a national; 
(c) If the criteria mentioned in the above sub-paragraphs do not apply, any other circumstances showing a 
closer link de facto to one of the States of which he is a national, such as: 
(i) Military service; 
(ii) Exercise of civil and political rights or of political office; 
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“If, by application of the nationality laws of the Parties, a person has two or 
more nationalities, such person shall be deprived of all but the effective 
nationality that he possesses […].”361 
 
Support for the dominant nationality rule can also be found in the practice of tribunals 
dealing with diplomatic protection. In the Mergé Claim the Italian–United States 
Conciliation Commission stated that 
“[t]he principle, based on the sovereign equality of States, which excludes 
diplomatic protection in the case of dual nationality, must yield before the 
principle of effective nationality whenever such nationality is that of the 
claiming State.”362 
 
The dominant nationality rule was also held by the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal. 
In the Esphahnian v. Bank Tejerat, Chamber Two of the Iran–United States Claims 
Tribunal stated that  
                                                                                                                                          
(iii) Language; 
(iv) His previous request of diplomatic protection from such State; 
(v) Ownership of immovable property.” (International Law Commission, Nationality Including Statelessness 
– Report on Multiple Nationality by Mr Roberto Cordova Special Raporteur, Yearbook of the International 
Law Commission, 1954, vol. II, p. 50) 
Residence is an important factor as it mirrors not only the choice of the individual for one state, but also 
because it triggers other relevant factors, such as social life, education, employment etc. However, as 
suggested by an author, whether or not an individual is more attached to a state “is as much a personal 
and emotional phenomenon as it is a physical one.” See, Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287, p. 258. 
For the relevance of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection in the context of investment law, 
Art. 17 provides that 
“[t]he present draft articles do not apply to the extent that they are inconsistent with special rules of 
international law, such as treaty provisions for the protection of investments.” (ILC Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection; supra, p. 89) 
Treaties dealing with the protection of foreign investment contain special rules 
“[…] which exclude or depart substantially from the rules governing diplomatic protection. Such treaties 
abandon or relax the conditions relating to the exercise of diplomatic protection, particularly the rules relating 
to the nationality of claims and the exhaustion of local remedies.” (ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection; supra, p. 89) 
Art. 17 provides that the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection do not apply to the alternative 
special regime for the protection of foreign investors. However, Art. 17 states that the ILC Draft Articles 
on Diplomatic Protection do not apply to the extent that they are inconsistent with the provisions of a 
treaty for the protection of investments. Consequently, “[t]o the extent that the draft articles remain 
consistent with the BIT in question, they continue to apply.” See, ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection; supra, p. 90. Leaving aside the non–binding character of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection, their relevance for the purpose of this analysis is retained. For the nature of the ILC Draft 
Articles on Diplomatic Protection, see, Perkams, M; supra at FN 293, p. 100. 
361
 ILC Report on Multiple Nationality; supra at FN 360, p. 49. 
362
 Mergé Claim, Decision of 10 June 1955, p. 455. The commentary to the ILC Draft Articles on 
Diplomatic Protection suggests that following the Mergé Claim, the Italian–United States Conciliation 
Commission applied the effective nationality test in over fifty subsequent cases. See, ILC Draft Articles 
on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 45. 
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“[i]n applying international law, the Tribunal finds itself in a position similar 
to that of a court of a third State faced with the claim of a dual national against 
one of the States of his nationality. […] Thus, by construing Articles 4 and 5 
of the Hague Convention together the Tribunal is led to adopt the notion of 
effective or dominant nationality.” 363 
 
In the A/18 Case, the Full Tribunal of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal restated 
the decision of Chamber Two in Esphahnian v. Bank Tejerat  and upheld the dominant 
nationality rule.364 As concluded by the majority in the A/18 Case,  
“[t]here is a considerable body of law and legal literature […], which leads the 
Tribunal to the conclusion that the applicable rule of international law is that 
of dominant and effective nationality”365 
 
The drafting history of the ICSID Convention reveals that the Preliminary Draft allowed 
dual nationals within the jurisdiction of the ICSID, without imposing the condition of 
dominant nationality. Article X.2 of the Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention of 
15 October 1963 provided that 
““National of another Contracting State” means any national of a Contracting 
State other than the State party to the dispute, notwithstanding that such 
                                                
363
 Nasser Esphahanian v. Bank Tejarat, Award No. 31–157–2 of 29 March 1983. The tribunal also 
concluded that Article 4 of the Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws 
“[…] must be interpreted very cautiously. Not only is it more than 50 years old, but great changes have 
occurred since then in the concept of diplomatic protection, which has been expanded. […]This concept 
continues to be in a process of transformation, and it is necessary to distinguish between different types of 
protection, whether consular or claims-related.” 
364
 The Full Tribunal considered that another reason for rejecting the rule under Article 4 of the 
Convention on Conflict of Nationality Laws rested on the fact that this provision 
“[…] applies by its own terms solely to "diplomatic protection" by a State. While this Tribunal is clearly an 
international tribunal established by treaty and while some of its cases involve disputes between the two 
Governments and involve the interpretation and application of public international law, most disputes 
(including all of those brought by dual nationals) involve a private party on one side and a Government or 
Government-controlled entity on the other, and many involve primarily issues of municipal law and general 
principles of law. In such cases it is the rights of the claimant, not of his nation, that are to be determined by 
the Tribunal.” (A/18 Case (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States (Case A/18)(Dual Nationality), Decision 
No. DEC 32-A18-FT) 
365
 A/18 Case; supra at FN 364, p. 265. See also, Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287, p. 85. See also, the 
Drummond Case, which appears to support both non–responsibility and dominant nationality rule, cited 
in Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287, pp. 89–91. In the A/18 Case the decision of the majority was 
largely influenced by the desire to support the rights of individuals vis–à–vis states. As stated in the 
decision, 
“[t]his trend toward modification of the Hague Convention rule of non-responsibility by search for the 
dominant and effective nationality is scarcely surprising as it is consistent with the contemporaneous 
development of international law to accord legal protections to individuals, even against the State of which 
they are nationals.” (A/18 Case; supra at FN 364, p. 261) 
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person may possess concurrently the nationality of a State not party to this 
Convention or of the State party to the dispute.”366 
 
While the practice of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal and the view adopted by 
the drafters of the ICSID Convention in the Preliminary Draft are to be considered 
cautiously, given the lex specialis nature of the instruments on which they are based,367 
the codification retained by the ILC is significant. The Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection adopts the general rule of non–responsibility of states for dual nationals, but 
allow, as an exception, the dominant nationality rule.368 
 
If the dominant nationality rule is to be considered under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna 
Convention, and consequently, directly applicable to investment law, where an investor 
is at the same time a dual national of a contracting state and of the respondent 
contracting state, then a tribunal has jurisdiction ratione personae as long as the 
dominant nationality is not of the respondent state.369 It cannot be denied that the rule of 
                                                
366
 International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes; History of the ICSID Convention, 
Documents Concerning the Origin and the Formulation of the Convention on the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes Between States and Nationals of Other States, Analysis of Documents, Washington D.C.: 
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 1970, vol. II–1, p. 230. 
Art. 1 of the 2004 United States Model BIT adopted the dominant nationality rule in cases of dual 
nationality: 
“[…] “investor of a Party” means a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of a Party, 
that attempts to make, is making, or has made an investment in the territory of the other Party; provided, 
however, that a natural person who is a dual national shall be deemed to be exclusively a national of the State 
of his or her dominant and effective nationality.” (2004 United States Model BIT, in Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C.; 
supra at FN 258, pp. 385–419) 
But see also, Article 1(2)(a) of the Sri Lanka–Iran BIT, which provides that 
“[…] natural persons who, according to the laws of one Contracting Party, having its nationality and are not 
nationals of the other Contracting Party” (Agreement on Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments 
between the Government of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka and the Government of the 
Islamic Republic of Iran, signed on 25 July 2000, not in force) 
367
 In Saba Fakes v. Turkey, the tribunal rejected the dominant nationality test in the A/18 Case, which 
was brought up by the respondent in order to restrict the jurisdiction of the ICSID tribunal. The tribunal 
observed that the clear language of the Netherlands–Turkey BIT cannot be superseded by the decision of 
the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal. See, Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 70. The 
tribunal held the specific nature of the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal, established on the basis of the 
Algiers Declarations. (ibid., para. 71) 
368
 See, Art. 7 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 43. 
369
 DOUGLAS is of the opinion that 
“[w]here the investment treaty is silent on the question of the standing of dual nationals, there is no reason to 
imply the default rule of diplomatic protection to the effect that dual nationals must be excluded from the 
tribunal’s jurisdiction ratione personae. To the contrary, such an inflexible rule would hardly serve the 
treaty’s purpose of encouraging foreign investment because an entire class of potential investors would be 
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dominant nationality has gained large support after the decision in the A/18 Case. 
However, the matter is not settled in international and investment law,370 and, in 
practice, parties can successfully argue the applicability of both rules of non–
responsibility and dominant nationality in the context of the ECT.371 As pointed out by 
a scholar, it is possible to assume 
“[…] that those States that are unwilling to face their nationals before 
international tribunals will in future make sure that their unwillingness is 
reflected in the dispute settlement agreements to which they adhere, and that 
where this is not done, the rule of dominant nationality will likely be 
upheld.”372 
 
The ECT is not expressly excluding dual or multiple nationals from the ECT’s 
protection. This interpretation may be confirmed by the definition of Investor, which 
includes nationals, citizens and permanent residents. Article 26(1) of the ECT, which 
refers to ‘Investor of another Contracting Party’, and not to ‘national of another 
Contracting Party’, seems to suggest that there is no restriction imposed on individuals 
with dual or multiple nationalities or who are nationals and permanent residents at the 
                                                                                                                                          
denied the opportunity to rely upon the investment protection of the treaty. […] So long as the nationality of 
the adopted country is the dominant of the two in the sense that the individual maintains stronger personal 
links to that country rather than to the country of birth, then there is no overriding consideration of principle 
that should prevent such an individual from investing in the country of birth with reliance upon a relevant 
investment treaty.” (Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, pp. 321–322, para. 600, emphasis original, footnote 
omitted) 
KRISHAN agrees with this point of view: 
“[…] the effective link, or the effective nationality theory […] should only apply in multiple nationality 
cases where the effective link is with the defendant State.” (Krishan, D.; supra at FN 300, p. 66) 
370
 It can be argued that, at least in investment arbitration, tribunals did not have a chance to properly 
discuss the applicability of the dominant nationality rule, as under the ICSID Convention, dual nationality 
is an absolute bar to jurisdiction. This will be explained below. 
371
 See, the discussion at the first annual Juris Conference on Investment Treaty Arbitration and 
International Law in Grierson Weiler, Todd J. (ed.); Investment Treaty Arbitration and International Law, 
New York: JurisNet, LLC, 2008, pp. 130–131. 
372
 Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287, p. 265, emphasis original. Further, with reference to the Decision 
in the A/18 Case, AGHAHOSSEINI explains that 
“[…] the Tribunal’s support for the rule of dominant nationality was both a legitimate exercise of judicial 
function and, prompted primarily by a desire to accord the individual greater access to international justice, a 
theoretically laudable choice. It was also in line with the modern trend of promoting the international 
interests of the individual vis-à-vis the State.” (Aghahosseini, M.; supra, p. 257, emphasis original) 
See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Champion Trading v. Egypt: 
“The Tribunal notes that the above cited A/18 decision contained an important reservation that the real and 
effective nationality was indeed relevant “unless an exception is clearly stated”. The Tribunal is faced here 
with such a clear exception.[Art. 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention]” (Champion Trading Company, 
Ameritrade International, Inc., James T. Wahba, John B. Wahba, Timothy T. Wahba v. Arab Republic of 
Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 March 2003, p. 297, emphasis original) 
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same time. Admitting, however, that Article 26(1) of the ECT is ambiguous in dealing 
with dual nationals, further attention must be given to further methods of treaty 
interpretation. If considering the status of dual nationals in international law and 
whether they are eligible to bring their claims against one of the states of nationality, 
the solutions adopted by tribunals appear to be divided between the rule of non–
responsibility and the dominant nationality rule. While the rule of non-responsibility 
has lost its relevance, there is a tendency nowadays to allow dual nationals to bring a 
dispute against one of the states of nationality when the dominant nationality is not that 
of the respondent Contracting Party.373 Even though the rule of dominant nationality 
has received generous support, especially from the new model BITs, it is still debatable 
whether it can be construed as customary international law or subsequent practice under 
Article 31(3)(b) of the Vienna Convention. However, this does not exclude it from 
being taken into consideration by the ECT tribunals.374 
 
b. Where a National of a Contracting Party is also a National of the Respondent 
Contracting Party and the Dispute is submitted under the ICSID Convention 
When an ECT dispute is submitted for resolution under the ICSID Convention, the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal must satisfy a double threshold.375 The tribunal must 
                                                
373
 And the investor did not rely on the nationality of the respondent Contracting Party to make the 
investment. For similar opinion, see, Pinsolle, P.; supra at FN 320, pp. 82–91. For the exclusion of dual 
nationals from the dispute resolution provision of the ECT, see, Burgstaller, M.; supra at FN 249, pp. 
207–208. But see, the opinion of the tribunal in Víctor Pey Casado v. Chile: 
“Un double-national n’est pas exclu du champ d’application de l’API [BIT], même si sa nationalité «effective 
et dominante» est celle de l’Etat de l’investissement […]. La considération du but même de l’API et sa 
rédaction excluent au contraire l’idée d’une condition de nationalité effective et dominante. [...] De l’avis du 
Tribunal arbitral, il ne se justifierait pas d’ajouter (sur la base de ce qui a été prétendu être des règles de droit 
coutumier international) une condition d’application qui ne résulte ni de sa lettre ni de son esprit.” (Víctor 
Pey Casado and President Allende Foundation v. Republic of Chile, Award of 8 May 2008, para. 415, 
emphasis original, footnote omitted) 
374
 As suggested by MCLACHLAN, 
“[w]here the investment treaty poses new questions not previously answered by custom […], reference to 
general international law may still illuminate the rule to the extent that it reveals general principles which 
guide the application of the rule.” (McLachlan, Campbell; Investment Treaties and General International 
Law, 57(2) ICLQ 361 (2008), p. 400) 
375
 See, Parra, Antonio; Investments and Investors Covered by the ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties. Introduction, p. 51, in Ribeiro, C. (ed.); supra at FN 89. When an ECT dispute is submitted 
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have jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the ECT and with the 
requirements of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention provides that the jurisdiction of the ICSID exists for  
“[…] any legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a 
Contracting State […] and a national of another Contracting State, which the 
parties to the dispute consent in writing to submit to the Centre.” 
 
Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention defines ‘national of another Contracting 
States’ as 
“[…] any natural person who had the nationality of a Contracting State other 
than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties consented 
to submit such dispute to […] arbitration as well as on the date on which the 
request was registered pursuant to paragraph (3) of Article 28 or paragraph (3) 
of Article 36, but does not include any person who on either date also had the 
nationality of the Contracting State party to the dispute”376  
 
Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention contains an absolute prohibition for an 
individual who possesses, at the same time, the nationality of a Contracting State of the 
ICSID Convention and of the respondent Contracting State to bring a claim under the 
ICSID Convention. No exception to this rule was allowed by the ICSID tribunals.377 
The tribunals confronted with the situation envisaged by Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID 
Convention found dual nationality to be an unconditional bar to the jurisdiction of the 
ICSID. In Champion Trading v. Egypt, the tribunal rejected the application of the 
dominant nationality rule in case of individuals with the nationality of the respondent 
Contracting State, as the rule under Article 25 of the ICSID Convention contains an 
absolute prohibition and any other interpretation would go contrary to the rules of treaty 
                                                                                                                                          
under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the notion of ‘national’ employed in Art. 2(1) has the meaning 
under Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. 
376
 Under the ICSID Convention only nationality, and not permanent residence, has legal effects. See also, 
Schlemmer, Engela C.; Investment, Investor, Nationality and Shareholders, p. 70, in Muchlinski, Peter; 
Ortino, Federico; Schreuer, Christoph (eds.); The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2008. An investor in this situation should rather choose to arbitrate 
under the other options provided for by Article 26(4) of the ECT. 
377
 If such investor relies on a BIT or other investment treaty, then he can take advantage of the provisions 
of the treaty, but cannot bring a claim under the ICSID Convention. See, Schreuer, C. with Malintoppi, L., 
Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 272, para. 668.  
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interpretation.378 In Siag v. Egypt, the tribunal concurred with the decision in Champion 
Trading v. Egypt and held that the interdiction under Article 25 is unconditional and 
does not leave room for the dominant nationality test.379 
 
Although it may be accepted that an individual who has the nationalities of a 
Contracting Party and of the respondent Contracting Party may benefit from the dispute 
resolution provisions of the ECT, given that his dominant nationality is not of the 
respondent Contracting Party, this situation would fall under the interdiction provided 
for by Article 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention. Such dual nationality would be an 
absolute bar for a dispute to be submitted under the ICSID Convention and the investors 
should opt for arbitration under the UNCITRAL or the SCC.380 
 
c. Where a National of a Contracting Party is also a National of another 
Contracting Party, not Party to the Dispute, or of a Third State 
The nationality of another Contracting Party not party to the dispute and of a third state, 
in addition to the nationality of a Contracting Party, would apparently not create hurdles 
for the jurisdiction of ECT tribunals. In the context of the ICSID Convention, scholars 
are of the opinion that 
                                                
378
 Champion Trading v. Egypt; supra at FN 372, pp. 287–288. The tribunal rejected the jurisdiction over 
the three Wahba claimants, but upheld the jurisdiction over the two corporations. 
379
 Siag v. Egypt; supra at FN 288, para. 198. If the dominant nationality is the rule, allowing for an 
individual to submit a claim against a state, which is not the state of its dominant nationality, then Art. 
25(2)(a) is the exception to this rule. In Soufraki v. United Arab Emirates, although Mr Soufraki was 
found not to be a dual national, the tribunal surprisingly noted that 
“[…] had Mr. Soufraki contracted with the United Arab Emirates through a corporate vehicle incorporated in 
Italy, rather than contracting in his personal capacity, no problem of jurisdiction would now arise.” (Soufraki 
v. United Arab Emirates; supra at FN 288, para. 83) 
See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Víctor Pey Casado v. Chile: 
“Il suffirait pour la défenderesse de montrer que la partie demanderesse possédait la nationalité de l’Etat 
d’accueil aux moments critiques, que cette nationalité soit effective ou non pour exclure, la compétence du 
Centre.194 En d’autres termes, pour que les conditions de la compétence requises par l'article 25 de la 
Convention CIRDI soient remplies, il ne suffirait pas que la nationalité dominante du demandeur soit celle 
d'un autre Etat que l'Etat défendeur mais il faudrait encore qu'il ne possède pas la nationalité de cet Etat 
défendeur.” (Víctor Pey Casado v. Chile; supra at FN 373, para. 241) 
380
 Natural persons who qualify as dual nationals under Art. 25(2)(a) of the ICSID Convention are also 
barred from taking advantage of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, since the notion of ‘nationality’ 
used in these Rules has the meaning ascribed by Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention. 
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“[n]o particular problem arises if an investor has the nationality of more than 
one Contracting State. The possession of the nationality of a non–Contracting 
State in addition to that of a Contracting State would not be a bar to becoming 
a party to ICSID proceedings.”381 
 
The Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention expressly allowed for nationals of a 
Contracting State also possessing the nationality of a non–Contracting State to be 
covered by the provisions of the ICSID Convention.382 In Olguín v. Paraguay, Mr 
Olguín was a national of Peru and of the United States and both nationalities were 
effective.383 The ICSID tribunal held that the United States nationality was not an 
impediment for Mr Olguín, since the BIT’s sole requirement was for the claimant to 
have an effective Peruvian nationality: 
“What is important in this case in order to determine whether the Claimant has 
access to the arbitral jurisdiction based on the BIT, is only whether he has 
Peruvian nationality and if that nationality is effective. There is no doubt on 
this point. There was no dispute regarding the fact that Mr. Olguín has dual 
nationality, and that both are effective. […] To this Tribunal, the effectiveness 
of his Peruvian nationality is enough to determine that he cannot be excluded 
from the provisions for protection under the BIT.”384 
 
In Saba Fakes v. Turkey, the tribunal held that  
“[…] the Contracting Parties to the ICSID Convention did not exclude claims 
of dual nationals per se, in circumstances when such dual nationals (i) hold the 
nationality of at least one Contracting State and (ii) do not hold the nationality 
of the host State.”385 
 
                                                
381
 Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 270, para. 661, 
footnote omitted. 
382
 Preliminary Draft of 15 October 1963, History of the ICSID Convention; supra at FN 366, vol. II–1, p. 
230. As pointed out by SCHREUER, although the provision was not retained in the later drafts of the ICSID 
Convention, “no concern was expressed about situations of this kind.” See, Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, 
L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 270, para. 662, footnote omitted. 
383
 Olguín v. Paraguay; supra at FN 292, para. 61. 
384
 Id. See, Agreement between the Republic of Peru and the Republic of Paraguay regarding the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection on Investments, 18 December 1994. 
385
 Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 62, emphasis original. 
The tribunal in Víctor Pey Casado v. Chile also held that 
“[...] il suffit pour la partie demanderesse de démontrer qu’elle possède la nationalité de l’autre Etat 
contractant. Contrairement à ce qui a été soutenu par la défenderesse, le fait que la demanderesse ait une 
double nationalité, comprenant la nationalité de la défenderesse, ne l’exclut pas du champ de protection de 
l’API [BIT].” (Víctor Pey Casado v. Chile; supra at FN 373, para. 415) 
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However, where the claimant has the nationality of a Contracting State of the ICSID 
Convention and of a non–Contracting State, and the dominant nationality is of the non–
Contracting State, scholars are of the opinion that the respondent Contracting State 
might be successful in challenging claimant’s standing. In this case only, and not when 
the claimant also possesses the nationality of another Contracting State, other than the 
respondent, the dominant nationality rule may become applicable.386 
 
In Saba Fakes v. Turkey, the claimant held both Jordanian and Dutch nationalities.387 
Respondent did not dispute claimant’s dual nationality, but objected to the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID tribunal arguing that the Dutch nationality was not sufficient, but that such 
nationality “must be effective”.388 The tribunal rejected respondent’s contentions by 
concluding that  
“[…] as regards dual nationals who do not hold the nationality of the host 
State (for example, a dual national who holds the nationality of two 
Contracting States other than the host State, or the nationality of a Contracting 
State other than the host State and a non–Contracting State), the ICSID 
drafters did not subject their access to ICSID jurisdiction to the effective 
nationality test.”389 
 
In the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal jurisprudence, the issue of the application of 
the dominant nationality rule where claimant also had the nationality of a third state was 
not debated. The matter was raised in several cases, but it was not decided by the 
                                                
386
 See, Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 270, para. 
662. See also, Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra at FN 297, p. 251. Also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Saba 
Fakes v. Turkey referring to the fact that the ‘dominant nationality’ rule might become applicable where 
the investor also holds the nationality of a third state, only when there is a case of “a nationality of 
convenience, acquired “in exceptional circumstances of speed and accommodation”, for the purpose of 
bringing a claim” or when “a person [is] deemed to have a nationality merely because such nationality has 
passed over several generations”. See, Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 78, emphasis 
original. 
387
 Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, paras 3 and 54. 
388
 Ibid., para. 54. 
389
 Ibid., para. 63, footnote omitted. 
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tribunals as they reached the conclusion that the third state nationality was renounced,390 
or implicitly lost.391 However, scholars discussing the notion of ‘nationality’ in the 
Iran–United States Claims Tribunal practice are of the view that 
“[t]he weight of evidence in international case law seems to be against the 
application of the rule of dominant nationality in such instances, suggesting 
instead that the mere proof of the nationality of the claimant State would 
suffice.”392 
 
The ordinary meaning of terms of the ECT’s provisions appears to uphold the opinion 
that the nationality of a third state in addition to that of a Contracting Party would not be 
an obstacle to the tribunals’ jurisdiction. Nevertheless, whether the dominant nationality 
rule applies where the Investor possesses the nationality of a Contracting Party and of a 
third state is an issue not settled yet in the literature and, even less, in the ECT’s 
practice. 
 
d. Where a National of a Contracting Party is also a Permanent Resident of the 
Respondent Contracting Party or of another Contracting Party or of a Third State and 
vice versa 
Article 26(1) of the ECT records the consent of the Contracting Parties in respect of 
disputes which may be submitted for resolution under the mechanisms provided in 
Article 26(2) of the ECT. Pursuant to this provision, only disputes between a 
Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party relating to an 
Investment and that concerns alleged breaches by the Contracting Party of the 
obligations for the promotion and protection of investments under Part III of the ECT 
                                                
390
 See, Ali Asghar, claim presented by the United States of America v. Islamic Republic of Iran, Award 
No. 475–11491–1 of 1990. 
391
 See, Uiterwyk Corporation, Jan C. Uiterwyk, Maria Uiterwyk, Robert Uiterwyk, Hendrik Uiterwyk, 
Jan D. Uiterwyk v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Ministry of Roads and Transportation, 
Ports and Shipping Organization, Iran Express Lines, Sea–Man–Pak, Partial Award No. 375–381–1 of 6 
July 1988. 
392
 Aghahosseini, M.; supra at FN 287, p. 169. 
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may be solved under Article 26 of the ECT. The term ‘Investor’, as defined by Article 
1(7)(a)(i) of the ECT encompasses nationals, citizens and permanent residents of a 
Contracting Party. In practice, situations may occur where a national of a Contracting 
Party, who, at the same time, is a permanent resident of another Contracting Party – 
party to the dispute or not – or of a third state, submits a dispute to resolution under 
Article 26 of the ECT. For example, a French national commences arbitration under 
Article 26 of the ECT against Italy, the state of its permanent residence. It can also be a 
case where an Investor has the permanent residence in a Contracting Party and the 
nationality of another Contracting Party to the ECT or of a third state, and, for the 
purpose of Article 26 of the ECT, he relies on his permanent residence against the 
Contracting Party or the third state of nationality. For example, an Investor, permanent 
resident of Germany, submits his claims under the ECT against Ukraine, the state of his 
nationality. These situations, although theoretical in this context, may occur in practice, 
given the growing relocation of individuals between states, and in particular within the 
EU.393 
 
In investment law practice, the issue of concurrent nationality and permanent residence 
has been discussed in the context of the NAFTA, under the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules. The case of Feldman Karpa v. Mexico raised the question whether a United 
States citizen, also a permanent resident of Mexico, could submit a claim against 
Mexico based on the NAFTA.394 Mr Feldman Karpa was a United States citizen by 
birth who lived in the United States for 33 years,395 and later acquired the permanent 
residence in Mexico and continuously resided there for 27 years.396 In reaching its 
                                                
393
 Some authors even consider that the protection of permanent residents can sometimes create “potential 
anomalies”. See, Nelson, T.G.; supra at FN 311, p. 462. 
394
 Feldman Karpa v. Mexico; supra at FN 314, para. 24 et seq. 
395
 Ibid., para. 27. 
396
 Ibid., paras 27 and 28. 
 129
decision, the tribunal also recalled that the United States Embassy had intervened with 
Mexican officials on behalf of claimant on several occasions in respect to the dispute.397 
The tribunal dismissed Mexico’s objections regarding the lack of standing of the 
claimant concluding that claimant, a United States citizen, “should not be barred from 
the protection provided by Chapter Eleven just because he is also a permanent resident 
of Mexico”.398 In deciding so, the tribunal first considered the distinction between 
nationality and permanent residence and the fact that residence “only fulfils a subsidiary 
function” and “does not amount to, or compete with, citizenship”.399 In this context, the 
tribunal asserted that the dominant nationality rule cannot be applied mutatis mutandis 
where permanent residence and nationality meet, as this rule requires “the existence of a 
double citizenship, connecting the same individual to two states with the legal bond of 
citizenship”.400 Clarifying these aspects, the tribunal then turned to the definitions of 
‘investor’ and ‘national’ under the NAFTA. Article 201 of the NAFTA defines 
‘national’ as a citizen or permanent resident of a Party,401 while Article 1139 refers to 
‘investor of a Party’, which means, among other persons, a national of a Party that seeks 
to make, is making or has made an investment.402 Reading these provisions together, 
the tribunal came to the conclusion that the inclusion of permanent residents in the 
definition of ‘national’ was meant to expand the circle of investors covered by the 
NAFTA, and not to limit the jurisdiction of tribunals. As explained by the tribunal,  
“[…] an investor of a Party, entitled to seek arbitration under Chapter Eleven 
can be not only a U.S. citizen but a French citizen as well, provided he is a 
permanent resident of the United States.”403 
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 Ibid., para. 29. 
398
 Ibid., para. 36. 
399
 Ibid., para. 30. 
400
 Ibid., para. 31. 
401
 Art. 201 of the NAFTA; supra at FN 328. 
402
 Art. 1139 of the NAFTA reads as follows: 
“[…] investor of a Party means a Party or state enterprise thereof, or a national or an enterprise of such 
Party, that seeks to make, is making or has made an investment”. 
403
 Feldman Karpa v. Mexico; supra at FN 314, para. 35. The tribunal explained the extensive 
interpretation of the NAFTA’s provisions as follows: 
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The tribunal found this extensive interpretation consistent with the purpose of NAFTA 
to “increase substantially investment opportunities in the territories of the Parties” and 
to “create effective procedures for the implementation and application of this 
Agreement”.404 As concluded by the tribunal, “enlarging the circle of investors to be 
protected” can only lead to the increase of both investment opportunities and the 
effective protection of investments.405  
 
The conclusion of the tribunal in Feldman Karpa v. Mexico appears to give more 
weight to nationality, rather than to permanent residence of investors, based on the 
theory that the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals must be extended and not restricted, in 
accordance with the object and purpose of investment treaties to promote and protect 
investors and their investments.406 Such interpretation cannot be upheld neither in the 
context of the NAFTA, nor in the context of Article 1(7) of the ECT. The definition of 
the notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT gives the same weight to nationality, citizenship 
and permanent residence for Investors of a Contracting Party. Nor is it substantiated the 
preference for nationality simply because this link is considered to deliver “the relevant 
connection” in international adjudication.407 The conclusions of tribunals must always 
rely on the text of the treaties and the interpretation of their terms in accordance with 
the rules of treaty interpretation of the Vienna Convention. 
                                                                                                                                          
“[…] the definition of “national” as “a natural person who is a citizen or permanent resident of a Party” is 
needed in this context to complement the definition in Article 1139 of the “investor of a Party” which, in the 
scope of application of Article 1117(1), refers to an investor of a Party other than the one in which the 
investment is made. Such contextual interpretation of an equal treatment of nationals and permanent residents 
leads to the result that permanent residents are treated like nationals in a given State Party only if that State is 
different from the State where the investment is made.” (Feldman Karpa v. Mexico; supra at FN 314, para. 
34) 
404




 For this theory, see, for example, Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra at FN 297, p. 229. The theory is based on 
a teleological interpretation of treaties, which relies on the object and purpose of a treaty. This 
interpretation was not retained by the Vienna Convention, which adopted the textual interpretation 
approach. For the teleological interpretation of treaties, see, Fitzmaurice, G.G.; supra at FN 156, pp. 204–
209. 
407
 Feldman Karpa v. Mexico; supra at FN 314, para. 30. 
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While Article 1(7) of the ECT gives equal rights to nationals, citizens and permanent 
residents of Contracting Parties to benefit from the provisions of the ECT, Article 26(1) 
of the ECT, as discussed above, does not – at least explicitly – exclude concurrent 
nationality and permanent residence, not even when one of these connections is with the 
responding Contracting Party. In theory, the consent of the Contracting Parties to the 
ECT on the types of disputes to be submitted to resolution under Article 26 would 
extend to situations when, for example, a national of a Contracting Party relies on the 
ECT in his claims against the Contracting Party of his permanent residence, or when a 
permanent resident of a Contracting Party to the ECT submits a claim under Article 26 
against the Contracting Party of his nationality.408 However, if ECT tribunals decide to 
follow the interpretation given to nationality and permanent residence of the tribunal in 
Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, a permanent resident having the nationality of the 
respondent Contracting Party and relying on his residence, will be absolutely barred 
from arbitrating under Article 26 of the ECT, because the bond of nationality is the 
“relevant” one for the jurisdiction ratione personae of the tribunals.409 
 
In the context of the ECT disputes submitted for resolution under the ICSID 
Convention, an Investor relying on his permanent residence must consider this option 
with caution. While Article 1(7) allows permanent residents to benefit from the 
protection of the ECT, Article 25 of the ICSID Convention foresees ICSID’s 
                                                
408
 The argument is even stronger when an Investor, permanent resident of a Contracting Party, is also a 
national or a permanent resident of a non–disputing Contracting Party or of a third state, or when an 
Investor, national of a Contracting Party, is also a permanent resident of a non–disputing Contracting 
Party or of a third state. Nevertheless, as indicated by the tribunal in Feldman Karpa v. Mexico, Investors 
should not have used their permanent residence, when relying on nationality, or the nationality, when 
relying on the permanent residence, in making the Investment. See, Feldman Karpa v. Mexico; supra at 
FN 314, para. 29. 
409
 See also, D’ALLAIRE who considers that, under the ECT, permanent residents may enforce their rights 
in relation to Investments made in any state, except for the state of nationality. See, D’Allaire, D.; supra 
at FN 340, p. 41. 
 132
jurisdiction with respect to nationals of a Contracting State only. Consequently, the 
jurisdiction of the ICSID cannot be extended to ECT Investors that are relying solely on 
their permanent residence.410 The situation is different when, for example, an Investor 
has the permanent residence of France, a Contracting Party to the ECT, and the 
citizenship of the United States, non–Contracting Party to the ECT, and makes an 
investment in Germany relying on the provisions of the ECT, as a French resident, and 
submits a claim to the ICSID, relying on his United States citizenship. For the purpose 
of the ECT, this Investor fulfils the requirements of Articles 1(7)(a)(i) and 26(1) of the 
ECT, as a French permanent resident, and, for the purposes of the ICSID Convention, 
the conditions set forth under Article 25, under his United States nationality. 
 
e. ECT Investors and the EU Citizenship: Compulsory Dual Nationality? 
The question whether nationals of the EU Member States have dual EU–Member States 
citizenship becomes relevant when these individuals bring a dispute against the EU, as a 
Contracting Party to the ECT.411 
 
As discussed before, however, the nature of the EU citizenship cannot be construed in 
order to produce effects in international law. Individuals who are nationals of the EU 
                                                
410
 See also, Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 270, 
para. 659. 
411
 A dispute against the EU cannot be submitted to the ICSID under provisions of the ICSID Convention, 
as international or regional organizations are not and may not be Contracting States of the ICSID 
Convention. 
With the entry into force of the TFEU, the possibility of an Investor of an EU Member State bringing a 
dispute against another EU Member State based on intra–EU BITs is questioned. However, the ECT 
differs from such intra–EU BITs, given the direct participation of the EU and its Member States. For 
further comments, see, Coop, G.; supra at FN 247, p. 415 et seq. See also, R. & V. Haegeman v Belgian 
State, Case 181–73; Judgment of the Court of 30 April 1974, according to which, the agreements entered 
into by the institutions of the EU are binding and form an integral part of the EU Law. 
On the competence of EU member States to enter into BITs with third states, see, European Commission; 
Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing transitional 
arrangements for bilateral investment agreements between Member States and third countries, Brussels, 
7.7.2010, COM(2010)344 final; Council of the European Union; Conclusions on a comprehensive 
European international investment policy, 3041st FOREIGN AFFAIRS Council meeting, Luxembourg, 
25 October 2010. See also, supra at FN 249. 
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Member States and are automatically bestowed with EU citizenship cannot be 
considered dual nationals for the purpose of international law.412 Within the ECT 
framework, the EU citizenship may not be regarded as imposing a compulsory dual 
nationality on the nationals of the EU Member States. 
 
2. LEGAL ENTITIES AND THE NOTION OF INVESTOR 
 
Investment treaties generally include legal entities as investors in various forms, such as 
companies, enterprises, corporations, firms, business associations, partnerships and 
other organizations.413 Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT refers to companies and other 
organizations, thus generously comprising any entity organized in accordance with the 
laws of a Contracting Party to the ECT.414 The wording of this provision ensures that 
new forms of organizations are protected irrespective of the form they take. The rules 
governing the establishment, organization and functioning of these legal entities, as well 
as their link with the Contracting Parties to the ECT are found in the municipal laws of 
the respective Contracting Parties.415 
                                                
412
 See, Chapter II.1.3 above. 
413
 But see, Art. 10 of the Accord relatif à l'encouragement et la protection des investissements entre le 
Royaume des Pays–Bas et la République du Sénégal, 5 May 1981, which refers to the disputes between 
natural persons (ressortissants) and a Contracting State, thus excluding companies (sociétés), although the 
substantive protection covers both categories of investors. This provision has been discussed by the 
tribunal in the Millicom v. Senegal. See, Millicom International Operations B.V. and Sentel GSM SA v. 
Republic of Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction of the Arbitral Tribunal of 16 July 2010. The tribunal did 
not accept that the provisions of Art. 10 are clear and proceeded to interpret them in accordance with the 
rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention. (Millicom v. Senegal, para. 70) Reading the terms of 
Art. 10 in their context, the tribunal concluded that the substantive protection offered by the Accord is 
granted equally to both natural persons and companies and the exclusion of companies from the 
procedural remedies is not justified. See, Millicom v. Senegal, supra, paras 71(b) and 71(c). 
414
 The wording of Art. 1(7)(a)(ii) suffered numerous amendments during the negotiation of the ECT. The 
first draft referred to: 
“[…] any corporations, companies, firms, enterprises, organisations and associations incorporated or 
constituted under the law in force in the Territory of that Contracting Party” (Art. 1(f)(ii) of the Basic 
Protocol of 11 September 1991, 8/91 BP 2) 
There were also requests from the participating delegations to find “a more precise definition of 
“investors” in Article 1(f), in order to include traders or international investors.” See, Note from the 
Chairman of Working Group II, 14/91 BP 3, 11 October 1991, and the Comments of the EBRD on the 
Basic Protocol Draft, 7–8 October 1991. 
415
 As explained by the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection,  
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The analysis of Investor legal entity under the ECT begins with the notion of ‘company’ 
and discusses the relevance of the Societas Europaea in the context of the ECT, the 
protection of entities incorporated in the respondent Contracting Party, the legal 
standing and the protection of the shareholders of a company, and the particular case of 
state–owned or controlled companies. The focus is then shifted to the notion of 
‘organization’ and the forms in which it emerges, with emphasis on the non–
governmental organizations as potential Investors under the ECT. The analysis 
concludes with a discussion of the dual nationality of legal entities in the light of the 
provisions of Article 26(1) of the ECT. 
 
2.1 ‘Company’ as Investor under the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
The company has proved to be the most powerful and revolutionary organization, 
influencing behaviours, changing cultures, or rather building their own, breaking 
language barriers, shaping economies, politics and legal systems.416 In spite of these 
achievements, the company remains a fiction of the law, remarkable by all means.  
 
Attempts to define the concept of company are few, given the diversity of the forms in 
which they may appear.417 However, a relatively simple definition would regard the 
                                                                                                                                          
“[a]lthough international law has no rules of its own for the creation, management and dissolution of a 
corporation or for the rights of shareholders and their relationship with the corporation, and must 
consequently turn to municipal law for guidance on this subject, it is for international law to determine the 
circumstances in which a State may exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of a corporation or its 
shareholders.” (ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 53) 
416
 Some authors metaphorically refer to companies as being more powerful than individuals: “they are 
not condemned to die of old age and they can create progeny pretty much at will.” See, Micklethwait, 
John; Wooldridge, Adrian; The Company. A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, reprinted, London: 
Phoenix, 2005, p. 4. 
417
 As suggested by VANDEVELDE, “[a] broad definition of companies also complements the broad 
definition of investment […].” See, Vandevelde, K. J.; supra at FN 271, p. 159. 
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company as “an organization engaged in business”.418 Some investment treaties provide 
for illustrative forms of legal entities considered to be encompassed by the notion of 
‘company’. Article 1(d) of the Australia–Peru BIT provides that ““company” means 
any corporation, association, partnership, trust or other legally recognized entity”.419 
The notion of ‘company’ is not explained by the ECT, but the language of Article 1(7) 
suggests that the Contracting Parties have broad discretion in deciding on the forms a 
company may take.420 
 
Investment treaties usually retain three links between companies and states: the place of 
incorporation or establishment of the company,421 the place of the company’s seat 
                                                
418
 Micklethwait, J.; Wooldridge, A.; supra at FN 416, p. 4. The authors also refer to a second, more 
specific definition of the company: 
“[…] the limited-liability joint-stock company is a distinct legal entity […], endowed by government with 
certain collective rights and responsibilities.” (Micklethwait, J.; Wooldridge, A.; supra, p. 4) 
Similarly, The New Oxford American Dictionary defines the company as “a commercial business”. See, 
The New Oxford American Dictionary; supra at FN 136, p. 345. The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic 
Protection employ the term ‘corporations’, rather than companies, as “profit–making enterprises with 
limited liability whose capital is generally represented by shares”. See, Art. 9 and its commentaries; ILC 
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 52. 
419
 Art. 1(d) of the Agreement between Australia and the Government of the Republic of Peru on the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, 2 February 1997. Likewise, Art. 1(2) of the Agreement between 
the Government of Hong Kong and the Belgo–Luxemburg Economic Union for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, 18 June 2001, provides that  
““companies” means: 
(a) in respect of Hong Kong: corporations, partnerships and associations incorporated or constituted under the 
law in force in its area […]”. 
420
 The approach taken by the drafters of the ECT is in agreement with the principles of international law, 
as confirmed by the ICJ in the Barcelona Traction Case: 
“[…] international law has had to recognize the corporate entity as an institution created by States in a 
domain essentially within their domestic jurisdiction. This in turn requires that, whenever legal issues arise 
concerning the rights of States with regard to the treatment of companies and shareholders, as to which rights 
international law has not established its own rules, it has to refer to the relevant rules of municipal law.” 
(Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited, Judgment of 5 February 1970 (second phase), 
para. 38) 
On this issue, see also, Gaillard, Emmanuel; Investments and Investors Covered by the Energy Charter 
Treaty, p. 67–68, in Ribeiro, C. (ed.); supra at FN 89: 
“[…] legal entities are defined by reference to the domestic laws of each Contracting State, as regards the 
organization of legal entities.” 
421
 See, Art. 1(d) of the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and 
Northern Ireland and the Government of Jamaica for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 14 
May 1987: “corporations, firms or associations incorporated or constituted under the law in force […].” 
The Convention concerning the Recognition of the Legal Personality refers to the recognition of a 
company, association or institution that acquired legal personality in accordance with the law of the state 
where the formalities of registration or publicity have been met and where the registered office is located. 
See, Art. 1 of the Hague Convention concerning the Recognition of the Legal Personality of Foreign 
Companies, Associations and Institutions, signed on 1 June 1956, not in force. 
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(siège social) or management,422 and the nationality of the controlling shareholders.423 
These connecting factors determine the nationality of the company.424 Some 
instruments take a mixed approach, by requiring both the place of incorporation and the 
place of the central administration or the place of incorporation and the nationality of 
the controlling shareholders to establish the nationality of a company.425 Under the rules 
of customary international law, the ICJ, in the landmark case of Barcelona Traction, 
recognized the test of incorporation together with the seat theory: 
“In allocating corporate entities to States for purposes of diplomatic 
protection, international law is based, but only to a limited extent, on an 
analogy with the rules governing the nationality of individuals. The traditional 
rule attributes the right of diplomatic protection of a corporate entity to the 
State under the laws of which it is incorporated and in whose territory it has its 
registered office. These two criteria have been confirmed by long practice and 
by numerous international instruments.”426 
                                                
422
 See for example, Art. 1(3)(b) of the Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of Sweden 
and the Government of the Republic of Venezuela on the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, 5 January 1998: “legal person having its seat in the territory of either Contracting Party”. 
423
 See, Art. 1(b)(iii) of the Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments 
between Georgia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 1 April 1999: “legal persons […] controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by natural persons […] or by legal persons […].” 
424
 Authors discuss the advantages and disadvantages of these criteria for determining the nationality of a 
company. See, Dolzer, Rudolf; Stevens, Margrete; Bilateral Investment Treaties, The Hague: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, 1995, p. 36. VANDEVELDE refers to the incorporation test as being “the most easily 
administered because rarely will there be doubt about the place where a company is organized.” See, 
Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at FN 271, p. 159. 
It is also considered that the necessity to establish the nationality of a company was triggered by the 
obstacles occurred when solving conflict of laws problems. See, Kronstein, Heinrich; The Nationality of 
International Enterprises, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 983 (1952). 
425
 Art. 1.3(b) of the Switzerland–Kuwait BIT, provides, in respect of Switzerland, that juridical persons 
must be organized in accordance with the Swiss law and have their place of management located in 
Switzerland, and, moreover, perform their genuine economic activities in Switzerland: 
“les entités juridiques, y compris les sociétés, les sociétés enregistrées, les sociétés de personnes et autres 
organisations, qui sont constituées ou organisées de toute autre manière conformément à la législation suisse 
et qui ont leur siège, en même temps que des activités économiques réelles, sur le territoire de la Suisse” 
(Accord entre la Confédération Suisse et l’Etat du Koweït concernant la promotion et la protection 
réciproque des investissements, 17 December 2000) 
426
 Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN 420, para. 70. The ICJ further rejected the application of the 
genuine link test, as held in the Nottebohm Case: 
“However, in the particular field of the diplomatic protection of corporate entities, no absolute test of the 
"genuine connection" has found general acceptance. Such tests as have been applied are of a relative nature, 
and sometimes links with one State have had to be weighed against those with another. In this connection 
reference has been made to the Nottebohm case. […] However, given both the legal and factual aspects of 
protection in the present case the Court is of the opinion that there can be no analogy with the issues raised or 
the decision given in that case.” (Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN 420, para. 70, emphasis original) 
The early drafts of the ECT also provided for the control test. Following a proposal from the Swiss 
delegation, the drafters inserted in the definition of Investor legal entity the following wording: 
“[…] any corporations, companies, firms, enterprises, organisations and associations controlled by nationals 
of that Contracting Party or by corporations, companies, firms, enterprises, organisations and associations 
incorporated or constituted under the law in force in the Territory of that Contracting Party.” (Proposal of the 
Delegation of Switzerland of 12 March 1992, and Art. 1(6)(c) of the Basic Agreement of 19 March 1992, 
17/92 BA 10)  
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Article 1(7) of the ECT retains the test of incorporation for determining the nationality 
of a company,427 and, consequently, its access to the protection of the ECT. The test of 
incorporation indicates that the company is viewed as possessing the nationality of the 
state of incorporation and the laws of this state are governing the company.428 The law 
of the place of incorporation does not only determine the nationality of the company, 
but it also regulates issues related to the legal personality of the company, its 
management, the relations between shareholders, between shareholders and the 
company etc. 
 
For the purpose of Article 26 of the ECT, Investors will have to satisfy the requirements 
of Article 1(7) and also the requisites of the ICSID Convention when the dispute is 
submitted to the ICSID. The ICSID Convention does not expressly provide for the 
criteria by which to identify the nationality of juridical persons. By reference to the 
provisions of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, it is accepted that the tests of 
incorporation or seat must be considered for juridical persons.429 However, ICSID 
                                                                                                                                          
The European Communities submitted a proposal to give effect to the seat of business. See, the 
comments of the European Communities to the Basic Agreement of 19 March 1992, 17/92 BA 10, which 
suggested adding the following wording to the incorporation requirement under the definition of 
Investor: “and having their principal place of business within the Territory of that Contracting Party.” 
The Basic Agreement of 12 August 1992 retained this proposal and provided that Investors are 
“[…] companies or firms constituted under […]in the territory of that Contracting Party in accordance with 
its laws and having its registered office, central administration or principal place of business within the 
territory of a Contracting Party” (Art. 1(5)(b) of the Basic Agreement of 12 August 1992,37/92 BA 15 ) 
427
 See also, Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 22, note 96; Castro de Figueiredo, Roberto; ICSID and 
Non–Foreign Investment Disputes, 4(5) TDM (2007). 
428
 See, Hirsch, M.; supra at FN 324, p. 82. 
429
 Delaume, D.R.; ICSID Arbitration and the Courts, 77 Am. J. Int’l L. 784 (1983), pp. 793–794; 
Stanimir, A.; supra at FN, p. 399; Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra 
at FN 293, pp. 280–281, paras 698–699. See also, Société Ouest Africaine des Bétons Industriels v. 
Senegal, Decision on Jurisdiction of 1 August 1984, para. 29; Lanco International, Inc. v. Argentine 
Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 December 1998, para. 46, citing the SOABI v. Senegal tribunal. 
BROCHES is of the opinion that the text of Art. 25 of the ICSID Convention “implicitly assumes that 
incorporation is a criterion of nationality.” See, Broches, Aron; The Convention on the Settlement of 
Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of other States, 136 Recueil des Cours 331 (1972–II), 
Hague Academy of International Law, p. 360. 
The Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention of 15 October 1963 held both control and incorporation 
tests: 
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tribunals also understood the absence of the reference to a nationality test as allowing 
the consent of the parties to prevail. In Mobil v. Venezuela, the tribunal concluded that 
“[…] Article 25 (b) (i) does not impose any particular criteria of nationality 
(whether place of incorporation, siège social or control) in the case of juridical 
persons not having the nationality of the Host State. Thus the parties to the 
Dutch–Venezuela BIT were free to consider as nationals both the legal 
persons constituted under the law of one of the Parties and those constituted 
under another law, but controlled by such legal persons.”430 
  
ECT Investors must carefully consider the uncertainty generated by the absence of 
specific provisions under the ICSID Convention in respect to the nationality of juridical 
persons. 
 
2.1.1 Societas Europaea and the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
A separate comment must be made to the rather atypical company Societas Europaea 
(SE). Starting from 8 October 2004, it is possible to set up an SE under the provisions of 
the Regulation No. 2157/2001 on the Statute for a European company (Regulation on 
SE).431 The main characteristic of the SE is the ability to transfer its registered office 
from one EU Member State to another without the creation of a new juridical person 
and without the winding up of the SE.432 Apart from this, the SE acts as any other public 
limited–liability company, with certain requirements imposed by its chameleonic 
nature: the registered office and the head office of the SE must be located in the same 
EU Member State and the SE may not be formed through the traditional injection of 
                                                                                                                                          
“”National of a Contracting State” […] includes (a) any company which under domestic law of that State is 
its national, and (b) any company in which the nationals of that State have a controlling interest.” (History of 
the ICSID Convention; supra at FN 366, vol. II–1, p. 230) 
430
 Mobil Corporation and others v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction of 10 
June 2010, para. 157, emphasis original. 
431
 European Commission Regulation No. 2157/2001 of 8 October 2001.  
432
 Art. 8(1) of the Regulation on SE. On the results of the Regulation on SE, see, Storm, Paul; The SE in 
its Sixth Year: Some Early Impressions, pp. 3–14, in Van Gerven, Dirk; Storm, Paul (eds.); The European 
Company; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008. 
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capital resulting in a limited company.433 A SE does not exist in the abstract universe of 
the EU, but it must be registered in the Member State in which it has its registered 
office.434 Furthermore, the Regulation on SE unambiguously states that a SE shall be 
treated as a public limited–liability company formed in accordance with the law of the 
EU Member State in which it has its registered office.435 For the purpose of Article 1(7) 
of the ECT, a SE shall be treated as a company organized in accordance with the law of 
the EU Member State where it is registered, thus following the test of incorporation.436 
 
2.1.2 Investors of a Contracting Party controlled by Investors of another 
Contracting Party 
 
Investors are frequently required to carry out their investments through locally 
incorporated companies. This can be a condition imposed by the host state,437 or a 
convenient option for structuring the investment.438 Where the nationality of the 
company is determined by the place of incorporation, the locally incorporated company 
will be considered a national of the host state, unless adopting the control test for 
                                                
433
 The SE may only be formed as follows: by merger of companies from different EU Member States 
(Title II, Section 2 of the Regulation on SE); by allowing companies from different Member States to 
form a holding or a joint subsidiary (Title II, Sections 3 and 4 of the Regulation on SE); and by allowing 
existing public limited companies whose registered seat and head office are within the EU to be 
restructured as an SE (Title II, Section 5 of the Regulation on SE). See also, on the formation of the SE, 
Werlauff, Erik; The SE Company – A New Common European Company from 8 October 2004; 14(1) 
European Business Law Review 85 (2003); Hodt Dickens, Christine; Establishment of the SE Company: 
An Overview over the Provisions Governing the Formation of the European Company; 18(6) European 
Business Law Review 1423 (2007); Werlauff, Erik; SE – The Law of the European Company, 
Copenhagen: DJØF Publishing, 2003. 
434
 Art. 12(1) of the Regulation on SE. 
435
 Art. 10 of the Regulation on SE. 
436
 As the SE has the nationality of the Member State of incorporation, and in the absence of the legal 
effects of the EU citizenship, it is debatable whether there can exist disputes of Investors of the EU 
against the ECT Contracting Parties. Some authors are of the opinion that SE holds the EU citizenship 
and it must be considered to be organized in accordance with the EU law. See for example, Happ, 
Richard; The Legal Status of the Investor Vis–a–Vis the European Communities: Some Salient Thoughts, 
10(3) Int. A.L.R. 74 (2007), p. 5; Pinsolle, P.; supra at FN 320, p. 89. For the nationality of SE under 
other investment treaties, see, Ortino, F.; supra at FN 316, pp. 66–68. 
437
 SCHREUER observes that, “[i]n fact, many States require the establishment of a local company as a 
precondition for foreign investment.” See, Schreuer, C.; supra at FN 274, p. 4. 
438
 PERKAMS suggests that investors prefer to act through locally incorporated companies for tax saving 
reasons. See, Perkams, M.; supra at FN 293, p. 96. 
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determining the actual nationality.439 This would be the case under the ECT, as the 
jurisdiction of the ECT tribunals extends only to disputes between a Contracting Party 
and Investors of another Contracting Party.440 Such treatment, nevertheless, would be 
inequitable, in particular for Investors forced to channel their investments through local 
companies, and would deny access to the investment protection of the ECT to a large 
number of Investors. 
 
Under the ICSID Convention, this situation is covered by Article 25(2)(b), which 
provides that 
“[…] any juridical person which had the nationality of a Contracting State 
other than the State party to the dispute on the date on which the parties 
consented to submit such dispute to conciliation or arbitration and any 
juridical person which had the nationality of the Contracting State party to the 
dispute on that date and which, because of foreign control, the parties have 
agreed should be treated as a national of another Contracting State for the 
purposes of this Convention.”441 
 
Pursuant to this provision, a juridical person is treated as a national of another 
Contracting State because of the foreign control.442 Nevertheless, Article 25(2)(b) 
stresses that the parties must have agreed to treat the juridical person as a national of 
                                                
439
 See, Sornarajah, M., The International Law on Foreign Investment, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2004, pp. 230–231; Castro de Figueiredo, R.; supra at FN 427, pp. 7–9. 
440
 Art. 26(1) of the ECT. 
441
 As HIRSCH explains, 
“[t]he [ICSID] Convention lays down a sophisticated, flexible mechanism, combining a number of criteria for 
identifying the nationality of a corporation. The innovation contained in the provisions of the Convention 
gave rise to a great number of debates as to the significance and exact interpretation of these provisions.” 
(Hirsch, M.; supra at FN 324, p. 80) 
442
 The First Draft of the ICSID Convention simply provided for “any juridical person which the parties 
have agreed shall be treated as a “national of another Contracting State””. There was no reference to the 
requirement of foreign control. See, Article 30 of the First Draft of the ICSID Convention, History of the 
ICSID Convention; supra at FN 366, vol. I, p. 124. As one author explains, 
“[…] Article 25(2)(b) is the single provision of the ICSID Convention which tries to establish a link between 
the nationality of the investor and the effective origin of the investment.” (Castro de Figueiredo, R.; supra at 
FN 427, p. 12) 
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another Contracting State.443 As one author observes, in interpreting this provision, 
ICSID tribunals showed “some flexibility”.444  
 
The possibility to consider a local company as a national of another Contracting State, 
as articulated by Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, was extensively discussed 
by the ICSID tribunals. In Aucoven v. Venezuela, the claimant, Autopista Concesionada 
de Venezuela, C.A. (Aucoven), was a company incorporated in Venezuela, with 99% of 
its shares held by ICA, a Mexican engineering and construction firm and 1% of shares 
held by Baninsa, a Venezuelan investment bank. ICA, in turn, was a subsidiary of 
Empresas ICA Sociedad Controladora, S.A. de C.V., the parent company of a Mexican 
conglomerate of over 140 corporations.445 75% of Aucoven’s shares were later 
transferred to Icateh Corporation, a company organized under the laws of the state of 
Florida, United States.446 As Venezuela claimed that, despite the transfer of the majority 
of Aucoven’s shares to an American company, “the true control over Aucoven has 
always been exerted by ICA Holding”, the Mexican corporation,447 the tribunal 
proceeded to verify whether the requirements set forth by Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention are met. The tribunal upheld the unequivocal and express provisions of the 
concession agreement between the parties to treat Aucoven as a national of another 
                                                
443
 The ICSID Convention fails to develop on the particularities of such agreement. As SCHREUER 
explains, 
“[t]he Convention does not require any specific form for an agreement to treat a juridical person that has the 
host State’s nationality as a national of another Contracting State because of foreign control. An agreement is 
essential, however. Without it, the Centre will not have jurisdiction.” (Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; 
Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 299, para. 768) 
On the other hand, the ICSID Convention does not require this agreement to be in writing. Or, as 
SCHREUER points out, “the standard of formality is somewhat lower” than for consent to the ICSID’s 
jurisdiction. See, Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 
301, para. 776. 
444
 Schreuer, C.; supra at FN 274, p. 5. 
445
 Autopista Concesionada de Venezuela, C.A. v. Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 27 September 2001, paras 8–10. Mexico is not a Contracting State of the ICSID 
Convention and accepting the Mexican nationality as the ‘real’ nationality of Aucoven would have 
obliged the tribunal to deny jurisdiction. 
446
 Ibid., paras 18–26. 
447
 Ibid., para. 41. 
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Contracting State,448 and saw no justification for departing from the agreement of the 
parties.449 
 
The tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia found that Article 25 does not provide for a formal 
requirement to be fulfilled by the agreement of the parties and the full knowledge of the 
host Contracting State is sufficient to acknowledge that parties agreed to treat the local 
company as a foreign juridical person.450 In LETCO v. Liberia, the tribunal considered 
the existence of an ICSID arbitration clause as an indicator that the parties agreed on 
bringing into effect Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.451 
 
In Alex Genin v. Estonia, the agreement of the parties to treat a local corporation as a 
national of another Contracting State because of foreign control was contained in the 
United States–Estonia BIT, on which claimants relied.452 The tribunal found no 
                                                
448
 Clause 64 of the Concession Agreement between Aucoven and the Venezuelan Ministry of 
Infrastructure provided that 
“[b]oth The Republic of Venezuela, acting by means of THE MINISTRY, and THE CONCESSIONAIRE, 
agree to attribute to THE CONCESSIONAIRE, a legal person of Venezuela subject to foreign control for the 
date when this clause enters into force, the character of “National of another Contracting state” for the 
purpose of applying this Clause and the provisions of the Convention.” (Aucoven v. Venezuela; supra at FN 
445, para. 79) 
449Aucoven v. Venezuela; supra at FN 445, para. 87. 
450
 Amco Asia Corp. and others v. Republic of Indonesia, Award on Jurisdiction of 25 September, 1983, 
para. 14(ii): 
“Nothing in the Convention, and in particular in article 25, provides for a formal requisit of an express clause 
stating that the parties have decided to treat a company having legally the nationality of the Contracting State, 
which is a party to the dispute, as a foreign company of another contracting State, because of the control to 
which it is submitted. 
What is needed, for the final provision of article 25-2(b) to be applicable, is 10 that the juridical person, party 
to the dispute be legally a national of the Contracting State which is the other party and 20 that this juridical 
person being under foreign control, to the knowledge of the contracting state, the parties agree to treat it as a 
foreign juridical person.” 
In Cable TV v. St. Kitts and Nevis, the tribunal considered that the recognition of a local company as a 
foreign investor may be found in the privileges granted by the host State, which are normally retained by 
foreign investors. See Cable Television of Nevis Ltd. and Cable Television of Nevis Holdings, Ltd. v. the 
Federation of St. Christopher (St. Kitts) and Nevis, Award of 13 January 1997, para. 5.18. 
451Liberian Eastern Timber Corporation v. Republic of Liberia, Award of 31 March 1986 and 
Rectification of 17 June 1986, p. 8: 
“Though it is not necessary to go so far in the case at hand, it could be argued that the mere fact that Liberia 
and LETCO included an ICSID arbitration clause in the Concession Agreement constitutes an agreement to 
treat LETCO as a ‘national of another Contracting State’. To conclude otherwise would be tantamount to 
stating that Liberia never intended to honour this part of the Concession Agreement; that Liberia, by agreeing 
to the ICSID clause, acted in bad faith and contrary to the tenor and purpose of the ICSID Convention.” 
452
 Alex Genin, Eastern Credit Limited, Inc. and A.S. Baltoil v. Republic of Estonia, Award of 25 June 
2001, para. 328. Art. VI(8) of the United States–Estonia BIT provides that 
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difficulty in considering the claimant, Eastern Credit, a company having the nationality 
of the United States, wholly owned by Mr Genin, a United States national.453 The 
tribunal had to deal with the case of the agreement to treat a local company as foreign 
investor expressed in a treaty.454 The agreement required by Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention can be found in many BITs. One such example is the above mentioned 
United States–Estonia BIT. Similarly, Article 7(4) of the Chile–United Kingdom BIT 
provides that 
“[…] any legal person which is constituted in accordance with the legislation 
of one Contracting Party, and in which, before a dispute arises, the majority of 
shares are owned by investors of the other Contracting Party, shall be treated, 
in accordance with Article 25(2)(b) of said Washington Convention, as a legal 
person of the other Contracting Party.”455 
 
Article 26(7) of the ECT contains the agreement of the Contracting Parties to treat a 
legal entity, “which has the nationality of a Contracting Party party to the dispute on the 
date of the consent in writing […] and which, before a dispute between it and that 
Contracting Party arises, is controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party”, as a 
national of another Contracting State, for the purpose of Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention.456 This provision allows the control test to be applied in determining the 
                                                                                                                                          
“[f]or purposes of an arbitration held under paragraph 3 of this Article, any company legally constituted 
under the applicable laws and regulations of a Party or a political subdivision thereof but that, immediately 
before the occurrence of the event or events giving rise to the dispute, was an investment of nationals or 
companies of the other Party, shall be treated as a national or company of such other Party in accordance with 
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.” (Art. VI(8) of the Treaty between the Government of the United 
States of America and the Government of the Republic of Estonia for the Encouragement and Reciprocal 
Protection of Investment, 16 February 1997) 
453
 Alex Genin v. Estonia; supra at FN 452, para. 328. 
454
 See also, MTD Equity Sdn. Bhd. and MTD Chile S.A. v. Republic of Chile, Award of 25 May 2004, 
para. 94; Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v. Republic of Peru, Award of 7 February 
2005, para. 15. 
455
 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the Republic of Chile for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 21 April 1997. 
Nevertheless, other BITs do not provide for such agreement. See, Agreement between the Government of 
the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of 
Argentina for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 19 February 1993. 
456
 Art. 26(7) of the ECT reads as follows: 
“An Investor other than a natural person which has the nationality of a Contracting Party party to the dispute 
on the date of the consent in writing referred to in paragraph (4) and which, before a dispute between it and 
that Contracting Party arises, is controlled by Investors of another Contracting Party, shall for the purpose of 
article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention be treated as a “national of another Contracting State” and shall for 
the purpose of article 1(6) of the Additional Facility Rules be treated as a “national of another State”.” 
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nationality of a legal entity in the context of an arbitration submitted under the ICSID 
Convention, in addition to the incorporation test in Article 1(7) of the ECT. 
Consequently, legal entities that would normally be treated as nationals of the host 
Contracting Party and, thus, barred from bringing a dispute against this Contracting 
Party under Article 26 of the ECT, are allowed to do so if they are controlled by 
Investors of another Contracting Party. 
 
Article 26(7) of the ECT does not provide for an explanation of ‘foreign control’. The 
provisions of the Understanding no. 3 of the Final Act clarify the notion of ‘control’ in 
the context of the definition of ‘Investment’ in Article 1(6) of the ECT.457 The 
explanation of ‘control’ in Understanding no. 3 suggests that the notion of ‘control’ has 
an objective meaning.458 The test for determining the existence of control may be 
quantitative, where investors own a certain percentage of the shares, or qualitative, 
underlined by the ability of investors to decisively influence the management of 
investments. The ECT does not explicitly adopt one of these tests, and this rather 
suggests that any kind of control qualifies for the purpose of Article 26(7). 
 
Referring to Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, SCHREUER explains that “control 
is an objective requirement that cannot be replaced by an agreement.”459 Other 
commentators of the ICSID Convention also agree that control is a factual element, 
which can be objectively examined by arbitral tribunals.460 AMERASINGHE explains that 
                                                                                                                                          
Art. 26(7) is also relevant in the context of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. See, supra at FN 380. 
457
 See infra, FN 524. There are scholars who consider Understanding no. 3 to be applicable throughout 
the provisions of the ECT. See, for example, Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 274. 
458
 See infra, FN 524. 
459
 Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 312, para. 813. 
See also, the argument of the Argentine Republic in TSA Spectrum de Argentina, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, Award of 19 December 2008, para. 114: “The “control” required is an objective requirement 
that shall not be replaced by an agreement.” 
460
 See, for example, Hirsch, M.; supra at FN 324, p. 102: 
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“[…] there is no reason to suppose that in deciding the question whether a 
reasonable criterion forms the basis for an agreement on foreign control, a 
tribunal or commission will necessary be bound by a single definition based 
on a majority shareholding or any other particular test. […] On the contrary, a 
tribunal or commission may regard any criterion based on management, voting 
rights, shareholding or any other reasonable theory as being reasonable for the 
purpose.”461 
 
In Vacuum Salt v. Ghana, the tribunal found that the control of the claimant was in fact 
in the hands of Ghanaian nationals.462 20% of claimant’s shares were under Greek 
control, while the remaining 80% were held by Ghanaian nationals.463 While the 
tribunal attached some weight to the shareholding of the claimant, it looked further into 
the circumstances of the case and held in this respect that  
“[…] “foreign control” within the meaning of the second clause of Article 
25(2)(b) does not require, or imply, any particular percentage of share 
ownership. Each case arising under that clause must be viewed in its own 
particular context, on the basis of all of the facts and circumstances. There is 
no "formula." It stands to reason, of course, that 100 percent foreign 
ownership almost certainly would result in foreign control, by whatever 
standard, and that a total absence of foreign shareholding would virtually 
preclude the existence of such control. How much is "enough," however, 
cannot be determined abstractly.”464 
 
However, the tribunal found that there was no material evidence that the Greek 
shareholder “either acted or was materially influential in a truly managerial rather than 
technical or supervisory vein”.465 These findings led the tribunal in Vacuum Salt v. 
                                                                                                                                          
“The very term ‘control’ indicates that the tribunal must look into all the factual and juridical circumstances, 
in order to determine who really controls a corporation.” 
See also, Masood, Arshad; Jurisdiction of International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, 14 
Journal of the Indian Law Institute 119 (1972), p. 139: 
“Control is a question of fact and may differ from case to case. Any attempt to find a single formula to cover 
every manifestation of control might, therefore, have proved unsuccessful.” 
461
 Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra at FN 297, p. 264. Although referring to the notion of ‘control’ in the 
definition of investment, Understanding no. 3 provide a useful list of elements to be considered when 
assessing foreign control over a local company: 
“(a) financial interest, including equity interest, in the Investment; 
(b) ability to exercise substantial influence over the management and operation of the Investment; and 
(c) ability to exercise substantial influence over the selection of members of the board of directors or any 
other managing body.” (infra at FN 525) 
462
 Vacuum Salt Products Ltd. v. Republic of Ghana, Award of 16 February 1994, paras 41–42 and 54. 
463
 Ibid., paras 41–42. 
464
 Ibid., para. 43. 
465
 Ibid., para. 53. 
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Ghana to the conclusion that the claimant was not under foreign control, as required by 
Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention.466  
 
In Thunderbird v. Mexico, the tribunal explained that in the context of NAFTA,467 there 
is no express requirement that control must be of legal nature and a de facto control, 
“established beyond any reasonable doubt”, would be sufficient.468 The Thunderbird v. 
Mexico tribunal held that 
“[c]ontrol can also be achieved by the power to effectively decide and 
implement the key decisions of the business activity of an enterprise and, 
under certain circumstances, control can be achieved by the existence of one 
or more factors such as technology, access to supplies, access to markets, 
access to capital, know how, and authoritative reputation.”469 
 
Article 26(7) of the ECT does not restrict the foreign control to a single controller. It 
can be the case where the arbitral tribunal’s inquiry reveals that the foreign control is 
equally exercised by two or more foreign nationals. As long as the nationals are of 
Contracting Parties to the ECT, there is nothing to prevent arbitral tribunal to uphold the 
applicability of Article 26(7) of the ECT. 
 
Under the ICSID Convention, the tribunal in Amco v. Indonesia was confronted with a 
similar situation. The debate whether the true controller was an American company or a 
Dutch national that controlled the American company through a Hong Kong company 
                                                
466
 Ibid., para. 54. 
467
 Art. 1117(1) of the NAFTA, which provides for the following: 
“An investor of a Party, on behalf of an enterprise of another Party that is a juridical person that the investor 
owns or controls directly or indirectly, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that the other 
Party has breached an obligation […].” 
468
 International Thunderbird Gaming Corporation v. the United Mexican States, Award of 26 January 
2006, para. 106. 
469
 Ibid., para. 108. See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Aguas del Tunari, S.A. v. Republic of 
Bolivia, Decision on Respondent’s Objections to Jurisdiction of 21 October 2005, para. 264. The tribunal 
here observed that the Netherlands–Bolivia BIT, on which Claimant relied, did not require “actual day–
to–day” control. See, Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia; supra, para. 264. 
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did not affect the reasoning of the tribunal, as the foreign control belonged to nationals 
of Contracting States of the ICSID Convention.470 
 
The existence of foreign control leads to the piercing of the corporate veil in order to 
find the actual controllers of the company. Article 26(7) of the ECT does not offer 
guidance as to how tribunals should proceed in discovering the ‘foreign control’ of the 
locally incorporated company.471 
 
Under the similar provision in Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, some tribunals 
limited their inquiries to the first layer of controllers,472 while other tribunals continued 
their investigation until they found the real source of control.473 As to the nationality of 
the controllers, the expression ‘foreign control’ is self–explanatory and excludes 
nationals of the host state. In TSA v. Argentina, the claimant, Thales Spectrum de 
Argentina S.A., was a company incorporated in Argentina and wholly owned by TSI 
Spectrum International N.V, a company registered in the Netherlands.474 Looking at the 
first layer of claimant’s control, the tribunal in TSA v. Argentina could have been 
satisfied that the foreign control required by Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention 
exists. However, the tribunal decided to investigate further in order to reach the real 
source of control of TSA.475 Based on the evidence submitted in the case, the tribunal 
                                                
470
 Amco v. Indonesia, supra at FN 450, para. 14(iii). See also, Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; 
Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 318, para. 833. 
471
 The tribunal in AES v. Hungary briefly concluded that 
“AES Summit owns 99% of, and exercises ownership and control over, AES Tisza. Therefore, pursuant to 
Article 26(7) of the ECT, AES Tisza shall be treated as a national of “another contracting state” for purposes 
of Article 25(2)(b) of the Convention.” (AES v. Hungary; supra at FN 240, para. 6.1.6, footnote omitted) 
472
 See, for example, Amco v. Indonesia; supra at FN 450; Aucoven v. Venezuela; supra at FN 445; etc. 
473
 See, African Holding Company of America and Société Africaine de Construction au Congo S.A.R.L. 
v. Republic of Congo, Award of 29 July 2008; Noble Energy, Inc. and Machalapower Cia. Ltda. v. 
Republic of Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, Decision on Jurisdiction of 5 March 2008. 
474
 TSA v. Argentina; supra at FN 459, para. 1. 
475
 See also, SOABI v. Senegal, supra at FN 429, where the tribunal looked at the effective controller, 
rather than at the direct one. 
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found that that the ultimate owner of the claimant was an Argentinean citizen,476 and, 
therefore, claimant could not be treated, for the purpose of Article 25(2)(b), as a 
juridical person under foreign control.477 
 
On the other hand, the foreign control can only be exercised by nationals of a 
Contracting Party to the ECT. Under the ICSID Convention, the tribunal in SOABI v. 
Senegal stressed that the foreign interests, which could serve as a basis for the foreign 
status of a locally incorporated company, should belong to nationals of Contracting 
States: 
“Le Tribunal est d'avis qu'il résulte de la structure et de l'objet de la 
Convention, que les intérêts étrangers qui pourraient servir de base pour 
donner "extranéité" à une société de droit local, doivent être ceux de 
ressortissants d'Etats contractants.”478 
 
As to the relevance of Article 26(7) of the ECT when Investors opt for arbitration under 
the SCC or UNCITRAL Rules, this provision appears to be inapplicable.479 In this case, 
the owners or shareholders of a locally incorporated company might consider 
submitting the dispute in their own name, relying instead on the provisions of Article 
1(6) of the ECT on the definition of ‘Investment’.  
 
                                                
476




 SOABI v. Senegal, supra at FN 429, para. 33. In SOABI v. Senegal, the tribunal upheld jurisdiction 
although the immediate controller of the locally incorporate company was a Panamanian company, while 
Panama is not a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention (SOABI v. Senegal; supra, para. 32). The 
tribunal was not satisfied to look at the first layer of control and found that the Panamanian company was 
in turn controlled by a Belgian national, while Belgium is a Contracting State of the ICSID Convention 
(SOABI v. Senegal; supra, para. 39). This case, as well as TSA v. Argentina, raises the question whether a 
tribunal must look into the layers of control of a local company until it finds that it has jurisdiction. As 
SCHREUER points out, the real questions are the following: 
“Could this search for the true controller go on indefinitely beyond the first controller? Or was it the 
Tribunal’s intention to search until it could find a foreign control that had the nationality of a Contracting 
State? Put differently, how would a tribunal decide if the situation in SOABI were to be reversed? If the 
immediate controller is a national of a Contracting State which is, in turn, controlled by nationals of non-
Contracting States or even by nationals of the host State?” (Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. 
and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 321, para. 844, emphasis original) 
479
 Some authors consider that there might be some room for SCC or UNCITRAL tribunals to apply the 
provision under Art. 26(7) of the ECT. See, Perkams, M.; supra at FN 293, p. 106. 
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2.1.3 Shareholders of a Company and the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
Most often, investments are made through acquisition of shares or other forms of 
participation in a company. As numerous disputes under investment law are brought by 
shareholders of companies, tribunals have to decide whether these shareholders meet the 
requirements ascribed by a treaty. Shareholders frequently argue that the interest they 
hold in a company gives them legal standing to ask damages not only related to their 
direct rights, such as the right to vote or to attend meetings of the general assembly, but 
also for their indirect rights, such as those in connection with the devaluation of their 
shares as a result of the actions of the state.480 
 
In the context of the ECT, several questions relate to the legal standing of 
shareholders.481 The first one debates whether shareholders, independently from the 
company, have legal standing in relying on the provisions of the ECT, when a 
Contracting Party’s actions caused injury to the company. Related to this, it is discussed 
                                                
480
 The Annulment Committee in Azurix Corp. v. Argentina concluded that investors may bring an action 
for indirect damages: 
“[…] where a foreign investor is not the actual legal owner of the assets constituting an investment, or not an 
actual party to the contract giving rise to the contractual rights constituting an investment, that foreign 
investor may nonetheless have a financial or other commercial interest in that investment. This is so, 
irrespective of whether the actual legal owner of the assets or contractual rights constituting the investment is 
a wholly or partly owned subsidiary of the investor, or whether the actual legal owner is an unrelated third 
party. The Committee sees no reason in principle why an investment protection treaty cannot protect such an 
interest of a foreign investor, and enable the foreign investor to bring arbitration proceedings in respect of 
alleged violations of the treaty with respect to that interest.” (Azurix Corp. v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Application for Annulment of 1 November 2009, para. 108) 
For the right of shareholders to claim indirect damages, see further, Bentolila, Dolores; Shareholders’ 
Action to Claim for Indirect Damages in ICSID Arbitration, 2(1) Trade L. & Dev. 87 (2010). 
During the ECT’s negotiations, Canada suggested, though in the context of Investments carried out 
through locally incorporated companies, that the scope of the Investor–Contracting Party dispute 
resolution mechanism should expressly cover the situation where indirect damages are claimed by the 
Investor: 
“Where an Investor of one Contracting Party has established a company […] and a breach of an obligation 
under Part IV [currently, Part III] by that other Contracting Party affects the company, the investor’s injury 
will be measured by the effect that the breach has upon the value of the investor’s shares in the company. 
This effect will not always be readily ascertainable or an accurate measure of the injury suffered by the 
investor.” (Canadian comments to the Basic Agreement of 19 January 1993, 3/93 BA 32) 
481
 The term ‘shareholder’ does not appear as such in the ECT. Nevertheless, the indirect reference can be 
traced in Art. 1(6) of the ECT, which refers to shares as possible Investments, and Art. 26(7) of the ECT, 
which refers to legal entities controlled by Investors. This conclusion is also valid in the context of the 
ICSID Convention. 
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whether an ECT tribunal would reach different conclusion when faced with minority or 
majority shareholding, or with direct or indirect shareholding. The practical significance 
of these issues has been highlighted by tribunals and scholars: 
“[t]he extent to which shareholders can present a claim against the host State 
of the investment therefore is a critical question in the area of international 
investment law.”482 
 
In the seminal case of Barcelona Traction, decided under the rules of customary 
international law, the ICJ found that Belgium, the state of nationality of the majority 
shareholders, had no legal standing in the dispute against Spain, for damages caused to 
the company. Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company Limited was incorporated 
in Canada, but the majority of its shareholders were Belgian nationals. The ICJ ruled 
that, unless the injured company ceased to exist or the state of nationality of the 
company is prevented from protecting it, the state or states of nationality of 
shareholders may not bring an action at international level for damages suffered by the 
company.483 While emphasising the legal distinction between the corporation and its 
shareholders, the Court stressed that  
“[…] a wrong done to the company frequently causes prejudice to its 
shareholders. But the mere fact that damage is sustained by both company and 
shareholder does not imply that both are entitled to claim compensation. […] 
In such cases, no doubt, the interests of the aggrieved are affected, but not 
their rights. Thus whenever a shareholder's interests are harmed by an act done 
to the company, it is to the latter that he must look to institute appropriate 
                                                
482
 Cohen Smutny, Abby; Claims of Shareholders in International Investment Law, p. 363, in Binder, C.; 
Kriebaum, U.; Reinisch, A.; Wittich, S. (eds.); supra at FN 122. 
483
 The Court concluded that 
“[…] where it is a question of an unlawful act committed against a company representing foreign capital, the 
general rule of international law authorizes the national State of the company alone to make a claim.” 
(Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN 420, para. 88) 
The Court also recognized the distinction between situations when the prejudice is cause to the company 
and those when the harm is caused to the shareholders: 
“The situation is different if the act complained of is aimed at the direct rights of the shareholder as such. It is 
well known that there are rights which municipal law confers upon the latter distinct from those of the 
company, including the right to any declared dividend, the right to attend and vote at general meetings, the 
right to share in the residual assets of the company in liquidation. Whenever one of his direct rights is 
infringed, the shareholder has an independent right of action.” (Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN 420, 
para. 47) 
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action; for although two separate entities may have suffered from the same 
wrong, it is only one entity whose rights have been infringed.”484 
 
Acknowledging the increased importance of treaty–based claims in international law, 
the Court concluded that 
“[…] the protection of shareholders requires that recourse be had to treaty 
stipulations or special agreements directly concluded between the private 
investor and the State in which the investment is placed. States ever more 
frequently provide for such protection, in both bilateral and multilateral 
relations, either by means of special instruments or within the framework of 
wider economic arrangements.”485 
 
In the ELSI Case, the ICJ apparently departed from the dictum of the Barcelona 
Traction Case and allowed a claim by the United States on behalf of the two American 
shareholders of Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. However, the conclusion of the ICJ in the 
ELSI Case was not based on the rules of customary international law, but on the 
provisions of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United 
States and Italy.486 Most recently, in the Diallo Case, the ICJ had the opportunity to 
review whether the customary international law rules for the protection of shareholders 
have evolved since the Barcelona Traction Case. Noting that the role of diplomatic 
protection has somehow faded with the development of bilateral and multilateral 
agreements for the protection of foreign investments,487 the ICJ held that there is no 
sufficient evidence to show that there has been a change in the customary international 
                                                
484
 Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN 420, para. 44. The ICJ stressed the distinction between the 
rights and the interests of shareholders: 
“Not a mere interest affected, but solely a right infringed involves responsibility, so that an act directed 
against and infringing only the company's rights does not involve responsibility towards the shareholders, 
even if their interests are affected.” (Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN , para. 46) 
485
 Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN 420, para. 90. The ICJ admitted that 
“[c]onsidering the important developments of the last half-century, the growth of foreign investments and the 
expansion of the international activities of corporations, in particular of holding companies, which are often 
multinational, and considering the way in which the economic interests of States have proliferated, it may at 
first sight appear surprising that the evolution of law has not gone further and that no generally accepted rules 
in the matter have crystallized on the international plane.” (Barcelona Traction Case; supra, para. 89) 
486
 Elettronica Sicula S.P.A. (ELSI), Judgment of 20 July 1989, paras 68–69. See further, Murphy, Sean 
D.; The ELSI Case: An Investment Dispute at the International Court of Justice, 16 Yale J. Int’l L. 391 
(1991). 
487
 Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), 
Judgment of 24 May 2007, para. 88. 
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law regarding the protection of shareholders.488 It follows that, still, under customary 
international law, shareholders cannot justify a claim for damages caused to the 
company, while their state of nationality has a restricted standing to espouse 
shareholders’ claims in such circumstances. 
 
The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection maintain the rule stated in the 
Barcelona Traction Case and provide in Article 9 that, when a company suffers harm, 
the state of incorporation is the one entitled to exercise diplomatic protection on that 
company’s behalf.489 The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection accept two 
exceptions from this rule: first, when the company ceased to exist for a reason unrelated 
to the harm, and, second, when the company has the nationality of the state alleged to be 
responsible for causing the harm, and incorporation in that state was required by it as a 
precondition for doing business there.490 These exceptional circumstances allow the 
state of nationality of shareholders to exercise diplomatic protection on behalf of the 
company.491 The ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection also recognize the right of 
                                                
488
 The ICJ stated that  
“[t]he fact invoked by Guinea that various international agreements, such as agreements for the promotion 
and protection of foreign investments and the Washington Convention, have established special legal régimes 
governing investment protection, or that provisions in this regard are commonly included in contracts entered 
into directly between States and foreign investors, is not sufficient to show that there has been a change in the 
customary rules of diplomatic protection; it could equally show the contrary.” (Diallo Case; supra at FN 487, 
para. 90) 
489
 Art. 9 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 52: 
“For the purposes of the diplomatic protection of a corporation, the State of nationality means the State under 
whose law the corporation was incorporated. However, when the corporation is controlled by nationals of 
another State or States and has no substantial business activities in the State of incorporation, and the seat of 
management and the financial control of the corporation are both located in another State, that State shall be 
regarded as the State of nationality.” 
However, Art. 9 provides that if the circumstances show that a company has a closer connection with 
another state, in which the seat of management and financial control are located, that state shall be the 
state of nationality of the company, having the right to exercise diplomatic protection. 
490
 Art. 11 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 58: 
“The State of nationality of shareholders in a corporation shall not be entitled to exercise diplomatic 
protection in respect of such shareholders in the case of an injury to the corporation unless:  
(a) The corporation has ceased to exist according to the law of the State of incorporation for a reason 
unrelated to the injury; or  
(b) The corporation had, at the date of injury, the nationality of the State alleged to be responsible for causing 
the injury, and incorporation in that State was required by it as a precondition for doing business there.” 
491
 Id.  
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a state to provide diplomatic protection to shareholders of a company, when a state 
causes direct injury to the rights of shareholders.492 
 
In the practice of investment law, however, arbitral tribunals have consistently 
recognized the standing of shareholders to claim compensation for damages incurred by 
the company.493 Such decisions rely on investment treaties that either directly refer to 
this right of shareholders or, based on the definition of covered investments, allow 
shareholders to claim compensation for injuries caused to the company. An example of 
the first situation is Article 1117(1) of the NAFTA, which provides that 
“[…] an investor of a Party, on behalf of an enterprise of another Party that is 
a juridical person that the investor owns or controls directly or indirectly, may 
submit to arbitration under this Section a claim that the other Party has 
breached an obligation.”494 
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 Art. 12 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 66: 
“To the extent that an internationally wrongful act of a State causes direct injury to the rights of shareholders 
as such, as distinct from those of the corporation itself, the State of nationality of any such shareholders is 
entitled to exercise diplomatic protection in respect of its nationals.” 
493
 See, American Manufacturing & Trading, Inc. v. Zaire, Award of 21 February 1997; Lanco. v. 
Argentina; supra at FN 429; CMS Gas Transmission Company v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 17 July 2003; Azurix Corp. v. Argentina; supra at 480, Decision on Jurisdiction of 8 
December 2003; Enron v. Argentina; supra at FN 29, Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 January 2004; 
LG&E v. Argentina; supra at FN 29, Decision on Jurisdiction of 30 April 2004; Siemens A.G. v. 
Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction of 3 August 2004; Impreglio S.p.A. v. Pakistan, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005; Pan American Energy LLC and BP Argentina Exploration Company v. 
Argentina and BP America Production Company and others v. Argentine Republic, Decision on 
Preliminary Objections of 27 July 2006 etc. See also, Alexandrov, Stanimir; The "Baby Boom" of Treaty–
Based Arbitrations and the Jurisdiction of ICSID Tribunals–Shareholders as "Investors" under 
Investment Treaties, 6 J. of World Investment & Trade 387 (2005); Schreuer, Christoph; Shareholder 
Protection in International Investment Law, 2(3) TDM (2005); Cohen Smutny, A.; supra at FN 482. 
494
 Similar provision is contained in Art. 24(1)(b) of the 2004 United States Model BIT: 
“1. In the event that a disputing party considers that an investment dispute cannot be settled by consultation 
and negotiation: […] 
(b) the claimant, on behalf of an enterprise of the respondent that is a juridical person that the claimant owns 
or controls directly or indirectly, may submit to arbitration under this Section a claim  
(i) that the respondent has breached 
(A) an obligation under Articles 3 through 10,  
(B) an investment authorization, or  
(C) an investment agreement;  
and  
(ii) that the enterprise has incurred loss or damage by reason of, or arising out of, that breach,  
provided that a claimant may submit pursuant to subparagraph (a)(i)(C) or (b)(i)(C) a claim for breach of an 
investment agreement only if the subject matter of the claim and the claimed damages directly relate to the 
covered investment that was established or acquired, or sought to be established or acquired, in reliance on 
the relevant investment agreement.” 
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This provision of the NAFTA confers legal standing on direct and indirect shareholders 
that own or control the company to claim on behalf of the company. Article 1117(3) of 
the NAFTA sets forth the possibility of non–controlling shareholders to submit to 
arbitration a claim, “arising out of the same events that gave rise to the claim under this 
Article.”495  
 
Claims by shareholders are most often relying on the broad definition of ‘investment’ 
contained in investment instruments. For example, Article 1139(e) of the NAFTA 
includes in the definition of ‘investment’ “an interest in an enterprise that entitles the 
owner to share in income or profits of the enterprise”. Similarly, Article I(1)(a)(ii) of the 
Argentina–United States BIT provides that 
“[…] ‘investment’ means every kind of investment in the territory of one 
Party owned or controlled directly or indirectly by nationals or companies of 
the other Party, such as equity, debt, and service and investment contracts; and 
includes without limitation […] a company or shares of stock or other interests 
in a company or interests in the assets thereof.”496 
 
In Lanco v. Argentina, which was based on the Argentina–United States BIT, the 
Tribunal concluded that 
“[…] the definition of this term [investment] in the ARGENTINA–U.S. 
Treaty is very broad and allows for many meanings. For example, as regards 
shareholder equity, the ARGENTINA–U.S. Treaty says nothing indicating 
that the investor in the capital stock has to have control over the administration 
of the company, or a majority share; thus the fact that LANCO holds an equity 
                                                
495
 Art. 1117(3) of the NAFTA provides that 
“[w]here an investor makes a claim under this Article and the investor or a non-controlling investor in the 
enterprise makes a claim under Article 1116 arising out of the same events that gave rise to the claim under 
this Article, and two or more of the claims are submitted to arbitration under Article 1120, the claims should 
be heard together by a Tribunal established under Article 1126, unless the Tribunal finds that the interests of 
a disputing party would be prejudiced thereby.” 
496
 Treaty between the Argentine Republic and the United States of America Concerning the Reciprocal 
Encouragement and Protection of Investment, 20 October 1994. Similar provision is found in numerous 
other BITs. For example, Art. 1(1) of the Romania–Australia BIT provides for the following definition of 
investment: 
““investment” means every kind of asset, owned or controlled by investors of one Contracting Party and 
admitted by the other Contracting Party subject to its laws and investment policies and includes: […] 
(ii) shares, stocks, bonds and debentures and any other form of participation in a company”. (Agreement 
between the Government of Australia and the Government of Romania on the Reciprocal Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, 22 April 1994) 
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share of 18.3% in the capital stock of the Grantee allows one to conclude that 
it is an investor in the meaning of Article I of the ARGENTINA–U.S. 
Treaty.”497 
 
The tribunal in Lanco v. Argentina saw no impediment in allowing minority 
shareholders to benefit from the protection of the BIT, since the definition of 
‘investment’ places no requirements on the number of shares to be owned by an 
investor in order to have a covered investment. 
 
The approach adopted in Lanco v. Argentina was followed by subsequent tribunals. In 
CMS v. Argentina, also based on the Argentina–United States BIT, the claimant was a 
minority shareholder in an Argentinean incorporated company, Transportadora de Gas 
del Norte. Argentina objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal on the ground that CMS 
is a minority shareholder of the locally incorporated company and the alleged damages 
caused by the respondent are only indirectly affecting CMS.498 The tribunal considered 
the objections raised by Argentina, including those based on the principles laid down in 
the Barcelona Traction Case, and concluded that there is 
“[…] no bar in current international law to the concept of allowing claims by 
shareholders independently from those of the corporation concerned, not even 
if those shareholders are minority or non–controlling shareholders.”499 
 
The CMS tribunal admitted, however, that such conclusion rests on the provisions of the 
BIT, as a lex specialis.500 The decision in CMS v. Argentina also confirms the 
possibility for a covered investor–shareholder to claim damages not only in respect to 
                                                
497
 Lanco v. Argentina; supra at FN 429, para. 10. 
498
 CMS v. Argentina; supra at FN 493, para. 36. 
499
 Ibid., para. 48. 
500
 Ibid., para. 48. The tribunal went further and contended that “lex specialis in this respect is so 
prevalent that it can now be considered the general rule”. See, CMS v. Argentina; supra at FN 493, para. 
48 emphasis original. 
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the shares of a company, but also for the indirectly owned investments, such as the 
assets of the company.501 In Enron v. Argentina, the Tribunal concluded that 
“[…]under the provisions of the [Argentina–U.S.] Bilateral Investment Treaty, 
broad as they are, claims made by investors that are not in the majority or in 
the control of the affected corporation when claiming for violations of their 
rights under such treaty are admissible.”502  
 
In Siemens v. Argentina, the claimant owned shares in a local Argentinean company 
through an affiliated company.503 The claims were based on the provisions of the 
Germany–Argentina BIT, which did not include a reference to investments owned or 
controlled directly or indirectly by the investor.504 Even so, the tribunal reasoned as 
follows: 
“The definition of “investment” is very broad. An investment is any kind of 
asset considered to be such under the law of the Contracting Party where the 
investment has been made. The specific categories of investment included in 
the definition are included as examples rather than with the purpose of 
excluding those not listed. The drafters were careful to use the words “not 
exclusively” before listing the categories of “particularly” included 
investments. One of the categories consists of “shares, rights of participation 
in companies and other types of participation in companies”. The plain 
meaning of this provision is that shares held by a German shareholder are 
protected under the Treaty. The Treaty does not require that there be no 
interposed companies between the investment and the ultimate owner of the 
company. Therefore, a literal reading of the Treaty does not support the 
allegation that the definition of investment excludes indirect investments.”505 
 
Unless expressly excluded by the relevant investment instruments, tribunals often held 
that a covered investor may indirectly own shares in a company incorporated in the host 
                                                
501
 CMS v. Argentina; supra at FN 493, para. 65. See also, the opinion expressed by the Annulment 
Committee in CMS v. Argentina: 
“One must add that whether the locally incorporated company may itself claim for the violation of its rights 
under contracts, licenses or other instruments, in particular under Article 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, 
does not affect the right of action of foreign shareholders under the BIT in order to protect their own interests 
in a qualifying investment, as recognized again in many ICSID awards.” (CMS Gas Transmission Company 
v. Argentine Republic, Decision of the Ad Hoc Committee on the Application for Annulment of the Argentine 
Republic of 25 September 2007, para. 74) 
502
 Enron v. Argentina, supra at FN 493, para. 49. 
503
 Siemens v. Argentina, supra at FN 493, para. 23: 
“The bidding terms required that a local company be established by bidders in order to participate in the 
bidding process. The Claimant established, through its wholly-owned affiliate Siemens Nixdorf 
Informationssysteme AG (“SNI”), a local corporation, Siemens IT Services S.A. (“SITS”).”  
504
 Siemens v. Argentina, supra at FN 493, para. 137.  
505
 Id., footnote omitted. 
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state.506 However, allowing indirect and direct shareholders to pursue claims on behalf 
of a company may lead to a duplication of claims and, sometimes, to conflicting awards. 
For instance, a company, on one hand, and its shareholders, on the other, may submit 
their claims arising out of the same conduct of a state to different arbitral tribunals, 
within the same treaty or using the protection of different treaties.507 In CME v. Czech 
Republic, the claimant held 99% equity interest in CNTS, a company registered in the 
Czech Republic.508 The case was based on the Netherlands–Czech Republic BIT and 
concerned the alleged failure of the Czech authorities to protect CNTS.509 The tribunal 
held that the claimant is an investor based on the provisions of the BIT, which comprise 
in the definition of ‘investment’ shares and other kind of interests in a company.510 
Lauder v. Czech Republic dealt with the same facts as CME v. Czech Republic. The 
claimant was a United States national who controlled CME and brought the dispute 
under the United States–Czech Republic BIT.511 Although initially disputed, respondent 
agreed that, for the purpose of jurisdiction, claimant controlled the investment.512 The 
parties could not agree on the consolidation or coordination of the two proceedings, 
                                                
506
 In Enron v. Argentina, the claimant’s shareholding involved several layers of companies and 
ownership. Nevertheless, the tribunal, by considering the facts of the case, accepted the legal standing of 
the claimant: 
“The conclusion that follows is that in the present case the participation of the Claimants was specifically 
sought and that they are thus included within the consent to arbitration given by the Argentine Republic. The 
Claimants cannot be considered to be only remotely connected to the legal arrangements governing the 
privatization, they are beyond any doubt the owners of the investment made and their rights are protected 
under the Treaty as clearly established treaty–rights and not merely contractual rights related to some 
intermediary. The fact that the investment was made through CIESA and related companies does not in any 
way alter this conclusion.” (Enron v. Argentina; supra at FN 493, para. 56) 
In  Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia, the tribunal, discussing the meaning of the terms ‘controlled directly or 
indirectly’, reached the following conclusion: 
“[…] the phrase “controlled directly or indirectly” means that one entity may be said to control another entity 
(either directly, that is without an intermediary entity, or indirectly) if that entity possesses the legal capacity 
to control the other entity.” (Aguas del Tunari v. Bolivia; supra at FN 469, para. 264) 
507
 It must be mentioned here the multiplication of claims based on contracts and treaties, usually referred 
to as contract claims and treaty claims. 
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 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 13 September 2001, para. 4. 
509
 Ibid., para. 3. 
510
 Ibid., para. 375. 
511
 Ronald S. Lauder v. Czech Republic, Final Award of 3 September 2001, paras 77 and 154. 
512
 Ibid., paras 153–155. 
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although they run in parallel.513 The tribunal in Lauder v. Czech Republic held that the 
principle of lis pendens is not applicable to the case, as the case of CME v. Czech 
Republic was not between the same parties and it relied on a different investment 
treaty.514 The tribunal also rejected Czech Republic’s contentions of abuse of process in 
the multiplicity of proceedings initiated by Mr Lauder and concluded that the “present 
proceedings are the only place where the Parties’ rights under the Treaty can be 
protected”.515 The CME tribunal also rejected the “abuse of process” claim noting that 
jurisdiction is not affected when “[…] two different Treaties grant remedies to the 
respective claimants deriving from the same facts and circumstances […]”,516 and 
rejected respondent’s contentions that the Lauder award constitutes res judicata, since 
the claimants in the two cases were different, as well as the treaties on which the claims 
were based.517 
 
Investment instruments recognize the possibility for indirect and direct shareholders to 
claim damages on behalf of a company and this certainly added further complexity to 
the disputes between investors and states. This is an important issue, as the right granted 
to shareholders to pursue the reparation of damages resulting from actions directed to 
the company should not result in double recovery of damages or generate irreconcilable 
awards518 It is suggested that this problem can be easily resolved by consolidating the 
                                                
513
 CME v. Czech Republic; supra at FN 508, paras. 40-41; Lauder v. Czech Republic; supra at FN 511, 
para. 16. The Lauder tribunal even concludes that it was the respondent who did not agree on the de facto 
consolidation of claims and insisted on a different tribunal to hear the CME claim. See, Lauder v. Czech 
Republic; supra, para. 173. 
514
 Ibid., paras 162 and 165: 
“The parallel UNCITRAL arbitration proceeding (hereinafter: “the Stockholm Proceedings”) is between 
CME and the Czech Republic, and is based on the bilateral investment treaty between the Netherlands and 
the Czech Republic.” (Lauder v. Czech Republic, supra at FN 511, para. 165) 
515
 Lauder v. Czech Republic; supra at FN 511, para. 174. 
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 CME v. Czech Republic; supra at FN 508, para. 412. 
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 CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, Final Award of 14 March 2003, para.432. The tribunal 
added that it “[…] cannot judge whether the facts submitted to the two tribunals for decision are identical 
[…]”. (id.) 
518
 Double recovery is not allowed in international law. In Chorzów Factory, the PCIJ referred to 
compensation that will "wipe out all the consequences of the illegal act and re-establish the situation 
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cases519 or by applying the principles of lis pendens and res judicata,520 or, where 
possible, as in the Yukos cases, at least addressed by the same tribunal.521 
 
The investment arbitration practice confirms that shareholders, including minority 
shareholders, have legal standing in arbitration, within the limits of the relevant 
investment treaty. Such shares or other form of participation in a company, even only 
indirectly owned by the investor, are most often seen as a covered investment. Thus, 
shareholders of a company are allowed to claim compensation for damages resulting 
from measures adopted by the host State against the company, although such measures 
affect indirectly the shareholders through the devaluation of profits and of the price of 
the shares.522 
 
The definition of ‘Investment’ under the ECT is broad and covers “every kind of asset, 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an Investor and includes […] a company 
                                                                                                                                          
which would, in all probability, have existed if that act had not been committed", thus excluding any 
possibility for a party to receive undue compensation. See, Case Concerning the Factory at Chorzów, 
Judgment of 13 September 1928, 47. See also, Arts 34-39 of the ILC Draft Articles on Responsibility of 
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 95-110. 
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 Although, only pending cases may be consolidated. See, Art. 1117(3) of the NAFTA: 
Where an investor makes a claim under this Article and the investor or a non-controlling investor in the 
enterprise makes a claim under Article 1116 arising out of the same events that gave rise to the claim under 
this Article, and two or more of the claims are submitted to arbitration under Article 1120, the claims should 
be heard together by a Tribunal established under Article 1126, unless the Tribunal finds that the interests of 
a disputing party would be prejudiced thereby. 
520
 See, Schreuer, C; supra at FN 274, p. 14. See also, the Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, and Ioannis 
Kardassopoulos and Ron Fuchs v. Georgia, Award.; supra at FN 83. 
In the ICSID system, the principles of lis pendens and res judicata were recognized and deemed to be 
applicable to ICSID tribunals. For res judicata, see, Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
Decision on Mexico's Preliminary Objection Concerning the Previous Proceedings of 26 June 2002, 
paras. 38 et seq. For lis pendens, see, S.A.R.L. Benvenuti & Bonfant v. People's Republic of the Congo, 
Award of 8 August 1980. para. 1.14. 
For further comments on res judicata and lis pendens doctrines, see, International Law Association; 
Interim Report: “Res Judicata” and Arbitration, 2004 and Final Report on Lis Pendens and Arbitration, 
2006. 
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 For other solutions, see, August Reinisch, ‘The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible 
Solutions’, in The Backlash against Investment Arbitration, eds Michael Waibel, Asha Kaushal, Kyo-
Hwa Chung & Claire Balchin (Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2010), 118-126. 
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 LEGUM points out that irrespective of whether investment treaties cover indirectly controlled 
investments through the definition of ‘investor’ or through the definition of ‘investment’, 
“[…] the effect is clear: investment treaty protection is not lost when multinationals use the common 
corporate devices of intermediate holding companies and special investment holding companies organized 
under the laws of a third country.” (Legum, B.; supra at FN 289, p. 524) 
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or business enterprise, or shares, stock or other forms of equity participation in a 
company or business enterprise”.523 Understanding no. 3 of the Final Act explains that 
the notion of ‘control’ under Article 1(6) of the ECT refers to “control in fact, 
determined after an examination of the actual circumstances in each situation”.524 The 
ECT, therefore, not only recognizes as an Investment the ownership or control of a 
company or enterprise, but also the ownership or control of shares, stock or other forms 
                                                
523
 The requirement for Investments to be owned or controlled by Investors of a Contracting Party was 
suggested by the Australian delegation. See, Basic Agreement of 31 October 1991, 21/91 BA 4. In April 
1992, the representatives of the United States, Australia and Switzerland requested inserting the following 
wording: “owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by investors of one Contracting Party in the 
territory of another Contracting Party.” See, Basic Agreement of 9 April 1992, 22/92 BA 12. Canada 
suggested, in June 1992, to introduce an explanation of the notion of ‘indirect ownership and control’, as 
follows: 
“For the purpose of paragraph (1), an investor owns or controls an investment indirectly when he has a 
determining influence on the management of such investment.” (Basic Agreement of 19 June 1992, 31/92 BA 
13) 
Scholars are of the opinion that even where investment treaties do not explicitly provide for indirect 
ownership or control, “the principle that investment may be owned or controlled indirectly is usually 
presumed to be implicit.” See, Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at FN 271, p. 160. 
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where foreign shareholders in Russian corporations are deprived of their rights in the corporation, but it is not 
intended to break through the corporate veil and identify the rights in the company embodied by shares with 
the rights of the company affected by government action.” (Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 275, footnote 
omitted) 
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 Understanding no. 3 of the Final Act provides for the following: 
“For greater clarity as to whether an Investment made in the Area of one Contracting Party is controlled, 
directly or indirectly, by an Investor of any other Contracting Party, control of an Investment means control 
in fact, determined after an examination of the actual circumstances in each situation. In any such 
examination, all relevant factors should be considered, including the Investor’s  
(a) financial interest, including equity interest, in the Investment; 
(b) ability to exercise substantial influence over the management and operation of the Investment; and 
(c) ability to exercise substantial influence over the selection of members of the board of directors or any 
other managing body. 
Where there is doubt as to whether an Investor controls, directly or indirectly, an Investment, an Investor 
claiming such control has the burden of proof that such control exists.” (Final Act; supra at FN 36, p. 375) 
The notion of ‘control’ posed significant difficulties to the drafters of the ECT. In a letter from Tobias 
Müller–Dekn, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, the challenges raised by the search of a proper definition of 
the notion of ‘control’ are explained: 
“From the material available it is clear that no uniform definition of control exists and the frequency of the 
expression “inter alia” suggests that there is a certain reluctance to draft a closed, exhaustive definition. […] 
Therefore, the chances of agreeing on a closed definition within the framework of the Charter negotiations 
are very small indeed.” (Letter from Tobias Müller–Dekn, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, 16 June 1993) 
From the representative of Sweden, it was stated that 
“[…] it would probably be quite impossible to produce a generally acceptable list of criteria, especially an 
exhaustive one […].” (Letter from Hans Olawaeus, Ministry of Foreign Affairs Sweden, 1993) 
The Japanese delegation understood that 
“[…] the Sub–Group could not establish a general definition of “controlled”, and, therefore, interpretation of 
the meaning of “controlled” will be left to the discretion of each Contracting Party in which the investment is 
made and each Contracting Party will be able to decide the meaning of “controlled” in accordance with its 
national legislation.” (ECT Draft of 17 March 1994, seventh version, 17/94 CONF 96) 
The solution adopted in the end was in a form of an understanding that would serve as “guidance for 
international arbitration in the case of a dispute arising over the question of control.” See, Message No. 
163, 13 June 1993. 
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of equity participation in a company or enterprise. Ownership and control can be either 
direct or indirect.525 
 
The ECT places no restriction on the number of shares to be owned or controlled by an 
Investor.526 This allows minority shareholding to qualify as an Investment for the 
purpose of Article 1(6) of the ECT. As REISMAN sees it,  
“[m]odern investment law, with which the ECT is consistent, does not require 
the ownership of majority of the shares, but allows minority and non–
controlling shareholders to bring a claim to an international tribunal.”527 
 
The practice of the ECT tribunals is settled on the issue as to whether shareholding 
gives legal standing to Investors under the ECT.528 In Amto v. Ukraine, the ECT 
tribunal saw no impediment in upholding the standing of the claimant as the owner of 
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 While the earlier drafts of the ECT referred to “owned or controlled, directly or indirectly”, the final 
version of the ECT provided for “owned or controlled directly or indirectly”. The absence of the 
punctuation might create confusions as to whether it is only the control that can be direct or indirect or 
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“including minority forms”. See, Basic Agreement of 19 March 1992, 17/92 BA 10. This proposal was 
included in the subsequent drafts, but later eliminated. Interesting to note is that the representative of 
Japan requested the clarification and examples of “minority forms”. See, Basic Agreement of 24 June 
1992, 32/92 BA 14. 
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 Witness’ Testimony of W. Michael REISMAN, Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 241. 
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 Apparently, the issue whether investors may claim indirect damages is also settled in the ECT case 
law. Even so, the language of the ECT seems to implicitly confirm the admissibility of indirect claims. 
Art. 13(3) of the ECT provides that  
“For the avoidance of doubt, Expropriation shall include situations where a Contracting Party expropriates 
the assets of a company or enterprise in its Area in which an Investor of any other Contracting Party has an 
Investment, including through the ownership of shares.” 
For similar opinion and detailed analysis of indirect claims in investment law, see, Perkams, M.; supra at 
FN 293, p. 110 et seq. 
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67.2% of the shares in EYUM–10,529 a company incorporated in Ukraine. The tribunal 
briefly noted that it 
“[…] accepts that the Claimant owns 204,165 shares in EYUM–10. These 
shares constitute a kind of asset owned by the Claimant within the definition 
of the first part of Article 1(6) ЕСТ, and in particular constitute 'shares ...in a 
company or business enterprise' identified in Article 1(6)(b).”530 
 
In Nykomb v. Latvia, the claimant owned 100% of the shares of Windau, a company 
incorporated in Latvia.531 The tribunal concluded that Nykomb’s “acquisition of shares 
in and its giving of credits to Windau constitute investments within the meaning of the 
Treaty.”532 The tribunal in the Yukos Cases, while observing the breadth of the 
definition of ‘Investment’ in the ECT, held that 
“[…] an “Investment” includes “every kind of asset” owned or controlled, 
directly or indirectly, and extends not only to shares of a company but to its 
debt (Article 1(6)(b) of the ECT) […] The Tribunal reads Article 1(6)(b) of 
the ECT as containing the widest possible definition of an interest in a 
company, including shares (as in the case at hand), with no indication 
whatsoever that the drafters of the Treaty intended to limit ownership to 
“beneficial” ownership.”533 
 
In Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, claimant based his claims on both the ECT and Greece–
Georgia BIT.534 While the definition of ‘Investment’ under the ECT covers “asset, 
owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an Investor”, the Greece–Georgia BIT is 
silent whether the indirect ownership of shares may qualify as an investment.535 Relying 
on the decision of the tribunal in Siemens v. Argentina,536 the tribunal in 
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Kardassopoulos v. Georgia held that indirect ownership of shares constitutes an 
Investment under both Greece–Georgia BIT and the ECT.537  
 
2.1.4 State–Owned Companies and the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
Article 1(7) of the ECT is silent on whether companies that are wholly or partially 
owned or controlled by a Contracting Party may qualify as ECT investors.538  
 
International investment instruments sometimes expressly include state owned or 
controlled companies in the definition of ‘investor’. The 2004 United States Model BIT 
provides for “governmentally owned or controlled” enterprises in the definition of 
‘enterprise’, as an investor under the BIT.539 Article 1139 of the NAFTA also covers 
“privately–owned or governmentally–owned” enterprises in the notion of ‘investor’.540 
The Commentary to the Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention stated the following 
with reference to the definition of ‘national of a Contracting State’: 
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 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, para. 124: 
“The Tribunal is of the view that, in the present case, the indirect ownership of shares by Claimant constitutes 
an “investment” under the BIT and the ECT.” 
Also, as concluded by the tribunal, 
“[…] Claimant was, at all relevant times (and remains now), the beneficial holder of 50% of the share capital 
in Tramex Panama and indirectly owned a 25% interest in the joint venture vehicle GTI which carried out an 
investment in Georgia.” (Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, para. 141) 
538
 States have various reasons for setting up companies. As one author explains, 
“[i]t may do so for simple reasons of accounting, […] or to facilitate participation in international trade.” 
(Seidl–Hohenveldern, Ignaz; Corporations in and under International Law, Llandysul: Cambridge/Grotius 
Publications Limited, 1987, p. 55) 
On the other hand, it is clear that Contracting Parties are excluded from the definition of ‘Investor’ under 
Art. 1(7) of the ECT. 
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 Art. 1 of the 2004 United States Model BIT: 
“[…] any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or not for profit, and whether 
privately or governmentally owned or controlled, including a corporation, trust, sole partnership, joint 
venture, association, or similar organization; and a branch of an enterprise.” 
See also, Art. I(1)(a) of the United States–Nicaragua BIT:  
“[…] “company” means any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or not for profit, 
and whether privately or governmentally owned or controlled […]” (Treaty between the Government of the 
United States of America and the Government of the Republic of Nicaragua concerning the Encouragement 
and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, signed on 1 July 1995, not in force) 
540
 See, Art. 1139 of NAFTA, with reference to Art. 201, which provides for the following: 
“[…] enterprise means any entity constituted or organized under applicable law, whether or not for profit, 
and whether privately-owned or governmentally-owned, including any corporation, trust, partnership, sole 
proprietorship, joint venture or other association” 
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“It will be noted that the term “national” is not restricted to privately–owned 
companies, thus permitting a wholly or partially government–owned company 
to be a party to proceedings brought by or against a foreign State.”541 
 
Under the ICSID Convention, which does not explicitly cover or exclude state owned or 
controlled companies, the matter is somehow settled. Authors and tribunals agree that 
state companies are allowed to ICSID’s jurisdiction as long as they act in their 
commercial capacity and not in the governmental one.542 BROCHES summarized this as 
follows: 
“[…] the classical distinction between private and public investment, based on 
the source of the capital, is no longer meaningful, if not outdated. There are 
many companies which combine capital from private and governmental 
sources and corporations all of whose shares are owned by the government, 
but who are practically indistinguishable from the completely privately owned 
enterprise both in their legal characteristics and in their activities. It would 
seem, therefore, that for purposes of the [ICSID] Convention a mixed 
economy company or government–owned corporation should not be 
disqualified as a "national of another Contracting State" unless it is acting as 
an agent for the government or is discharging an essentially governmental 
function.”543 
 
As long as state owned or controlled companies do not act as “agent for the 
government” or are not fulfilling “an essential governmental function”, as BROCHES 
explains, tribunals have jurisdiction ratione personae where such companies claim the 
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control and supervision by governmental bodies over the current activities of the corporation.” (Hirsch, M.; 
supra at FN 324, p. 65) 
543
 Broches, A.; supra at FN 429, pp. 354–355. It is not less true that at the time when the ICSID 
Convention was drafted, a large number of enterprises were stated owned or controlled due to political 
reasons. For example, the monopolistic industries or the communist prototype, where the international 
trade transactions were carried out through state companies only. See also, Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C.; supra 
at FN 258, p. 46. 
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status of investor. In CSOB v. Slovakia, Slovakia contested jurisdiction on the basis that 
the claimant, Československa obchodní banka (CSOB), was “merely an agent of the 
Czech Republic”.544 The tribunal, relying on the drafting history of the ICSID 
Convention and, in agreement with the scholarly writings, found that 
“[…] the concept of “national,” was not intended to be limited to privately–
owned companies, but to embrace also wholly or partially government–owned 
companies.”545  
 
The tribunal in CSOB v. Slovakia rested its decision on the fact that the decisive test was 
whether the claimant was discharging an essential governmental function, as suggested 
by BROCHES,546 rather than the ownership or control exercised by the state.547 In this 
respect, the tribunal relied on the nature of the claimant’s activities, as opposed to their 
purpose,548 and concluded that CSOB’s activities in the context of the dispute were 
commercial, rather than governmental.549 
 
                                                
544
 Československa obchodní banka, a.s. v. Slovak Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction of 24 May 1999, 
para. 10. 
545
 Ibid., para. 16. 
546
 Ibid., para, 17. 
547
 Ibid., para. 18: 
“[…] such ownership or control alone will not disqualify a company under the here relevant test from filing a 
claim with the Centre as “a national of a another (sic!) Contracting State”.” 
548
 CSOB v. Slovakia; supra at FN 544, para. 20: 
“But in determining whether CSOB, in discharging these functions, exercised governmental functions, the 
focus must be on the nature of these activities and not their purpose. While it cannot be doubted that in 
performing the above-mentioned activities, CSOB was promoting the governmental policies or purposes of 
the State, the activities themselves were essentially commercial rather than governmental in nature.” 
549
 Ibid., paras 21–26. In Rumeli v. Kazakhstan, the respondent contended that the Turkish Savings 
Deposit Insurance Fund, an agency of the Turkish state, was in fact the proper claimant in the dispute 
(Rumeli Telekom A.S. and Telsim Mobil Telekomunikasyon Hizmetleri A.S. v. Republic of Kazakhstan, 
Award of 29 July 2008, para. 241), as this agency seized control over the claimants before the 
commencement of the arbitration. (ibid., para. 241) The tribunal rejected respondent’s allegations and 
noted that although the companies were managed by the Turkish agency, the role of this agency was 
comparable to the role of a liquidator or receiver and any amounts awarded subsequent to this arbitration 
would not be kept by the Turkish agency, but distributed to claimants’ creditors. (ibid., para. 327) The 
extent of control by the Turkish state over the claimants did not affect the legal standing of the claimants 
in the ICSID proceedings. (ibid., paras 327–331) See also, Telenor Mobile Communications AS v. 
Republic of Hungary, Award of 13 September 2006, para. 16, where Norway held 75% of the shares of 
Telenor, but no objection was raised as to the legal standing of the claimant. 
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The permissive language of Article 1(7) of the ECT,550 and the absence of an explicit 
exclusion of state owned or controlled companies from the definition of investor 
suggest that such entities may benefit from the protection of the ECT.551 It is to be seen 
whether the test adopted by the ECT tribunals will follow the criteria suggested by 
BROCHES and retained by the ICSID tribunals.  
 
2.2 ‘Other Organization’ as Investor under the Energy Charter Treaty 
 
Article 1(7) of the ECT refers to companies or other organizations organized in 
accordance with the law of a Contracting Party. The ECT drafters did not include a 
definition of ‘company’, as they did not explain the meaning of ‘organization’. The term 
‘organization’ refers to “an organized body of people with a particular purpose, […] a 
                                                
550
 See, VANDEVELDE who, referring to BITs in general, concludes that where the language of a BIT does 
not explicitly include governmentally owned entities,  
“[…] the definition nevertheless may be phrased in terms broad enough to include implicitly both 
governmental and private entities. Some BITs, rather than listing types of entities included, adopt a different 
approach. They use a generic term, such as “legal person” or “juridical person”.” (Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at 
FN 271, p. 158, footnote omitted) 
551
 Art. 22 of the ECT refers to state and privileged enterprises of a Contracting Party, but in relation to 
their conduct in compliance with the obligations of the Contracting Party under the ECT: 
 “(1) Each Contracting Party shall ensure that any state enterprise which it maintains or establishes shall 
conduct its activities in relation to the sale or provision of goods and services in its Area in a manner 
consistent with the Contracting Party’s obligations under Part III of this Treaty. 
(2) No Contracting Party shall encourage or require such a state enterprise to conduct its activities in its Area 
in a manner inconsistent with the Contracting Party’s obligations under other provisions of this Treaty. 
(3) Each Contracting Party shall ensure that if it establishes or maintains an entity and entrusts the entity with 
regulatory, administrative or other governmental authority, such entity shall exercise that authority in a 
manner consistent with the Contracting Party’s obligations under this Treaty. 35 
(4) No Contracting Party shall encourage or require any entity to which it grants exclusive or special 
privileges to conduct its activities in its Area in a manner inconsistent with the Contracting Party’s 
obligations under this Treaty. 
(5) For the purposes of this Article, “entity” includes any enterprise, agency or other organization or 
individual.” 
The early draft Art. 22 required Contracting Parties to ensure that government–controlled Investors, with 
or without exclusive or special privileges, conduct their activities in a manner consistent with the 
provisions of the ECT. See, Art. 15 of the Basic Protocol of 21 September 1991, 8/91 BP2. The chapeau 
of this provision referred to “Government Controlled Entities”. See for example, Art. 15 of the Basic 
Agreement of 31 October 1991, 21/91 BA 4. A proposal from the delegation of Norway suggested 
adding to the text of Art. 22 a provision according to which any Contracting Party would have been “free 
to participate in energy activities through direct participation by the Government or through government–
controlled investors.” See, Basic Agreement. Article 25, Room Document 8, 13 November 1992. The 
proposal also appears in a subsequent document and reads as follows: 
“Any Contracting Party shall be free to participate in energy activities through, inter alia, direct participation 
by the government or through State Enterprises.” (Art. 25(5), Article 25 – State and Privileged Enterprises, 
Room Document 11, 16 December 1993) 
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business, society, association etc.”552 At first glance, the freedom given to the 
Contracting Parties to determine the organizations protected by the ECT is limited by 
the provisions of their internal laws. Any organization established in accordance with 
the laws of a Contracting Party can be, at least in theory, covered by the provisions of 
the ECT. The open ended definition of ‘Investor’ ensures that new types of 
organizations, unknown at the time of the drafting of the ECT, but now recognized by 
the laws of the Contracting Parties, are protected by the ECT.553 
 
The first issue deriving from the broad definition of ‘Investor’ concerns the question of 
legal personality. The ECT, as most of the investment instruments, is silent with respect 
to the requirement of legal personality of organizations.554 Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT 
broadly refers to “a company or other organization organized in accordance with the 
law”.555 While it is inherent for a company to have legal personality, an organization 
may or may not have legal personality. Consortiums, joint ventures and other types of 
associations without legal personality would be included in the broad definition of 
‘Investor’ under the ECT.556 
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 The New Oxford American Dictionary; supra at FN 136, p. 1199. 
553
 See also, Vandevelde, K. J.; supra at FN 271, p. 158. 
554
 On the other hand, the jurisdiction of the ICSID covers “any juridical person which had the nationality 
of a Contracting State”. See, Art. 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, emphasis added. 
555
 Art. 1(f) of the Basic Protocol of 11 September 1991, 8/91 BP 2, refers to “corporations, companies, 
firms, enterprises, organisations or associations […] competent, in accordance with the laws of that 
Contracting Party” to “make investments in the Territory of another Contracting Party”. The United 
States delegation suggested amending this provision and replacing the term ‘competent’ with the wording 
“is not prohibited by the laws of that Contracting party from making investments.” In the opinion of the 
United States representatives, the wording of the provision implied “a need to be governmentally licensed 
in order to make investments.” See, U.S. Proposal of 19 March 1992 and Art. 1(6) of the Basic 
Agreement of 9 April 1992, 22/92 BA 12. 
556
 In the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal jurisprudence, the question raised by these partnerships 
concerned the cases where one or more holder in the partnership had an ineligible nationality. Apparently, 
a compromise solution was adopted and allowed partners to submit pro rata claims, in accordance with 
their participation in the joint venture. This was the approach in various cases, including in Housing and 
Urban Services International Inc. v. Iran that concerned the claims of an American corporation, Housing 
and Urban Services International Inc (HAUS) against the Iranian government, related to a partnership 
formed between HAUS, Teheran Redevelopment Corporation, an Iranian company, and Meaplan A.G., a 
German company The tribunal allowed claimant to claim only 85% of the amounts owed by the Iranian 
government and excluded the share of the German corporation. See, Housing and Urban Services 
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The requirement for legal personality is not essential for qualifying a legal entity to the 
protection of an investment instrument.557 Some BITs expressly include in the definition 
of ‘investor’ organizations without legal personality. The Germany–Chile BIT refers to 
associations with or without legal personality.558 The Romania–Hungary BIT demands 
legal personality for Romanian investors, while it includes investors without legal 
personality with respect to Hungary.559 
 
However, when an ECT dispute is brought under the provisions of the ICSID 
Convention, entities without legal personality, although supposedly covered by the 
broad definition of Article 1(7)(a)(ii), might not have access to the dispute resolution 
mechanism of the ICSID. The ICSID literature and case law is constant in affirming that 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention does not cover associations without legal 
personality.560 As SCHREUER explains, “legal personality is a requirement for the 
application of Art. 25(2)(b) and […] a mere association of individuals or of juridical 
persons would not qualify.”561 In Impregilo v. Pakistan, the claimant, together with two 
Pakistani companies and a German company, set up an unincorporated joint venture 
                                                                                                                                          
International Inc. v. Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Tehran Redevelopment Corporation, 
Award No. 201–174–1 of 1985. 
557
 DOLZER and SCHREUER conclude that “[n]ationality normally presupposes legal personality.” See, 
Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C.; supra at FN 258, p. 49. 
558
 Art. 1(4)(a) of the Germany–Chile BIT reads as follows: 
“[...] con referencia a la República Federal de Alemania: todas las personas jurídicas, así como sociedades 
comerciales y demás sociedades o asociaciones con o sin personalidad jurídica [...]” (Agreement between the 
Government of Chile and the Federal Republic of Germany concerning Mutual Promotion and Protection of 
Investments, 8 May 1999) 
Similar provision can be found in Art. 1(3)(b) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic 
of Bulgaria and the Government of Romania on Mutual Promotion and Protection of Investments, 23 
May 1995. 
559
 Art. 1(2)(b) of the Romania–Hungary BIT provides that: 
“[t]he term "legal person" shall mean with respect to either Contracting Party, any entity incorporated or 
constituted in accordance with, and recognized as legal person by its laws, having their seat together with real 
economic activities in the territory of that Contracting Party. In the case of the Republic of Hungary, this term 
also includes any body of persons having no legal personality but considered as a company by its laws.” 
(Agreement between the Republic of Hungary and Romania for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of 
Investments, 6 May 1996) 
560
 See, the wording of Art. 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention, supra FN 554. 
561
 Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 278, para. 690, 
also cited in Impregilo v. Pakistan, infra at FN 562, para. 133. 
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called Ghazi–Barotha Contractors (GBC),562 and claimed, on behalf of the joint venture 
and the other partners, compensation for the entirety of the damages suffered by the 
joint venture.563 The tribunal found that the joint venture had no legal personality under 
the law applicable to it,564 and did not fall under the definition on ‘investor’ provided by 
the ICSID Convention because it was not a juridical person.565 Consequently, the 
tribunal held that the consent given by Pakistan in the BIT may not cover this particular 
case: 
“In so far as this is a claim in respect of GBC’s alleged losses, it remains a 
claim by an unincorporated grouping that fails to meet the requirements of the 
BIT and the ICSID Convention, and lies beyond the scope of Pakistan’s 
consent to arbitration.”566 
 
In LESI–DIPENTA v. Algeria, the tribunal rejected a claim brought by a consortium of 
companies. Two Italian corporations formed the consortium LESI–DIPENTA under the 
Italian law, which was granted a concession for the construction of the Koudiat 
Acerdoun dam in Algeria.567 The tribunal held that the consortium could not qualify as 
an investor within the meaning of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention and suggested 
that a new request for arbitration be submitted by the two Italian companies in their own 
names.568 
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 Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction of 22 April 2005, paras 8, 
10 and 115. The initial structure of the joint venture included a French company. See, Impregilo v. 
Pakistan; supra, para. 10.  
563
 Impregilo v. Pakistan; supra at FN 562, para. 35. 
564
 Ibid., para. 119: 
“Swiss law does not provide for a specific legal regime for joint ventures. Such joint ventures must therefore 
follow the rules applicable to corporations (“sociétés”). According to Article 530(2) of the Swiss “Code des 
Obligations”, GBC is classified as a “société simple”. As such, it is common ground that GBC has no legal 
personality under Swiss law. It does not constitute a partnership or other form of permanent or corporate 
body, and it has no capacity to act in legal proceedings in its own right.” (emphasis original) 
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 Impregilo v. Pakistan; supra at FN 562, para. 134. 
566
 Ibid., para. 137, emphasis original. 
567
 Consortium Groupement L.E.S.I. – DIPENTA v. People's Democratic Republic of Algeria , Award of 
10 January 2005, part I.A, paras 3–4, pp. 427–428. 
568
 Ibid., part 3.2, para. 40, p. 481. For the reasoning behind this conclusion, see, LESI–DIPENTA v. 
Algeria; supra at FN 567, part 3.2, para 37, pp. 477–480. The case was resubmitted in March 2005 by the 
two companies that formed the LESI–DIPENTA consortium. See, LESI, S.p.A. and Astaldi, S.p.A. v. 
People's Democratic Republic of Algeria. 
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The second issue refers to the types of organizations covered by the ECT. As mentioned 
before, it appears that there is no limitation imposed on the types of organizations 
allowed under the ECT. The wording of Article 1(7) of the ECT reinforces this 
conclusion, as it refers to “company or other organization”. The term ‘other’ suggests 
the inclusion of any organization, besides companies, and that no similarity test is put 
forward.569 While other organizations may include joint ventures, partnerships and other 
associations engaged in business activities, a pertinent question concerns the legal 
standing of non–profit organizations, also known as non–governmental organizations 
(NGOs). NGOs play an important role in the host states, acting at different levels of the 
economic and social development: 
“They may rent offices, build facilities (for example, clinics, schools, 
community centres, food relief centres), purchase or import vehicles and other 
supplies and enter into contracts with local actors.”570 
 
Although the purpose of NGOs is not the making of profit, they do have an economic 
component of their activities. Besides this, NGOs, probably more often than companies, 
are subject to discriminatory measures or expropriations from the host state.571 
 
A review of the investment instruments shows that some treaties explicitly include 
NGOs in the definition of ‘investor’, while others require investors to carry out 
economic activities. The 2004 United States Model BIT refers to “any entity constituted 
                                                
569
 See, for example, Art. 1 of the 2004 United States Model BIT, which includes in the definition of 
‘enterprise’ “a corporation, trust, sole partnership, joint venture, association, or similar organization”. The 
term ‘similar’ suggests here that similar organizations to the ones listed in the definition are covered by 
the BIT. For further comments, see, Vandevelde, Kenneth J.; U.S. International Investment Agreements, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 2009, p. 156. 
570
 Gallus, Nick; Peterson, Luke Eric; International Investment Treaty Protection and NGOs, 22(4) Arb. 
Int’l 527(2006), pp. 529–530. 
571
 See for example, the harassment of Sudanese NGOs in Amnesty International, Continued harassment 
of Sudanese NGO and curtailment to freedom of expression and association in Sudan, AFR 54/009/2006, 
16 March 2006; or the repressive measures adopted in 2009 by Ethiopia, in Amnesty International, 
Ethiopian parliament adopts repressive new NGO law. 
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or organized under applicable law, whether or not for profit”.572 Similarly, the United 
States–Morocco BIT speaks about companies, “regardless of whether or not […] 
organized for pecuniary gain”,573 while the Chile–Denmark BIT covers “[a]ny entity 
[…] such as corporations, firms, associations, development finance institutions, 
foundations or similar entities whether or not their activities are directed at profit.”574 
Article 1139 of the NAFTA refers to “any entity constituted or organized under 
applicable law, whether or not for profit”.575 On the other hand, there are BITs imposing 
an economic requirement on legal entities. The Romania–China BIT defines Chinese 
investors as “economic entities established in accordance with the laws of the People's 
Republic of China”.576 Likewise, the Peru–Romania BIT refers to Peruvian juridical 
persons engaged in economic activities.577 Where BITs impose no requirement of 
profit–making and, at the same time, contain a wide definition of ‘investor’ so as to 
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 See, for example, Art. 1 of the 2004 United States Model BIT. Besides investment instruments, 
international conventions extend the protection to NGO’s. Art. 44 of the American Convention on Human 
Rights recognizes the right of the NGOs to complain to the Inter–American Commission on Human 
Rights of violations of the Convention: 
“Any person or group of persons, or any nongovernmental entity legally recognized in one or more member 
states of the Organization, may lodge petitions with the Commission containing denunciations or complaints 
of violation of this Convention by a State Party.” (Art. 44 of the American Convention on Human Rights, 18 
July 1978) 
See also, the European Convention on the Recognition of the Legal Personality of International Non–
Governmental Organisations of 24 April 1986. Although the scope of this Convention is important in the 
context of the recognition of legal personality to NGOs, only eleven European Countries have ratified it. 
The central provisions of the Convention are found in Art. 2(1), which provides that 
“[t]he legal personality and capacity, as acquired by an NGO in the Party in which it has its statutory office, 
shall be recognised as of right in the other Parties.” 
573
 Art. I.2 of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Kingdom of Morocco concerning 
the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 29 May 1991. 
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 Art. 1(3)(b) of the Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Chile and the Government of 
the Kingdom of Denmark concerning the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 3 
November 1995. 
575
 Art. 1139 of the NAFTA makes reference to Art. 201. See, supra at FN 540. 
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 Art. 1(2) of the Agreement between the Government of the People’s Republic of China and the 
Government of Romania concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 1 
September 1995. 
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 Art. 1(2)(i)(b) of the Peru–Romania BIT provides as follows: 
“Todas la personas jurídicas, incluidas las sociedades civiles y comerciales y demás asociaciones con o sin 
personería jurídica que ejerzan una actividad económica comprendida en el ámbito del presente convenio 
[…]” (Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Peru and the Government of Romania for the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investments,1 January 1995) 
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encompass any association or organization, scholars argue in favour of the inclusion of 
NGOs.578 
 
While the definition of ‘Investor’ under the ECT appears to be broad enough to support 
the inclusion of NGOs,579 this is not sufficient. To have jurisdiction over a claim 
submitted by NGOs, ECT tribunals must also confirm their jurisdiction ratione 
materiae. This means that NGOs must have an Investment within the meaning of the 
ECT. This is probably the hurdle likely to defeat the claims of NGOs at the 
jurisdictional stage. However, NGOs may engage in activities that  
“[…] may produce desirable forms of investment, such as a research facility. 
Further, non–profit entities often acquire portfolio investment in commercial 
enterprises in order to earn revenue to support their charitable or educational 
activities. In that capacity, non–profit entities are likely to act in the same way 
as any other portfolio investor and their distinct status as non–profit entities 
would seem of little significance.”580 
 
The definition of ‘Investment’ under Article 1(6) of the ECT is wide enough to 
encompass any property and property rights, shares and claims to money, but which are 
restricted to investments in the energy sector. As long as, for example, an NGO owns or 
controls shares in an electricity company, arguably, there is an Investment and the NGO 
may benefit from the substantive protection of the ECT.581 Nevertheless, for the 
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 See, Gallus, N.; Peterson, L.E.; supra at FN 570, p. 535 et seq. 
579
 Several proposals to include non–profit organizations have been made during the negotiation of the 
ECT. See for example, the United States proposal in respect to the Basic Agreement of 20 January 1992, 
4/92 BA 6, to include legal entities “whether or not organised for pecuniary gain”. See also, the Proposal 
of the Romanian Delegation, 18 December 1992. This proposal made its way into the Basic Agreement, 
but was removed from the final draft of the ECT with no explanation. See for example, Art. 1(6)(b) of the 
Basic Agreement of 9 April 1992, 22/92 BA 12. 
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 UNCTAD; Scope and Definition, UNCTAD Series on issues in international investment agreements, 
1999, p. 34. 
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 In general about definition of ‘investment’ in investment instruments and NGOs, see Gallus, N.; 
Peterson, L.E.; supra at FN 570, pp. 537–538. While the definition of ‘Investor’ under Article 1(7) of the 
ECT may not impose the requirement of profit–making for organizations, the making of profit is part of 
the ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’. See, Joy Mining v. Egypt, where the ICSID tribunal stated 
that in order to qualify as an investment, an activity must have “regularity of profit and return” (Joy 
Mining Machinery Limited v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Award of 6 August 2004, para. 53); CME v. Czech 
Republic, where the dissenting arbitrator affirmed that an investment is “a form of expenditure or transfer 
of funds for the precise purpose of obtaining return” (CME Czech Republic B.V. v. Czech Republic, 
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procedural protection of the NGOs, Article 26(1) of the ECT provides that the dispute 
with a Contracting Party must be related to an Investment. However, as suggested by 
scholars, few NGOs would actually see an advantage in submitting their claims under 
investment treaties: 
“[…] they could not accept the damage to their relationship with the host 
country that suing the country is likely to bring. NGOs exist to help the 
countries in which they operate.”582 
 
2.3 Dual Nationality of Legal Entities 
 
Legal entities may have dual or multiple nationalities when states adopt different 
standards of nationality.583 A classical example is of a company incorporated in state A 
and having its seat of business in state B. The company may be considered to have both 
nationality of state A and state B, if state A adopts the incorporation test, while state B 
the seat test for determining the nationality of the company.584 In a globalized society 
where corporations expand in various forms, in the furthest corners of the world, the 
case of multinational corporations is no longer atypical. 
 
Under the provisions of the ECT, legal entities claiming the status of Investor must be 
organized in accordance with the laws of a Contracting Party.585 Article 26(1) of the 
ECT refers to disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another 
Contracting Party relating to an Investment. The case of legal entities is not different 
than the ones of individuals possessing more than one nationality, and it can be argued 
                                                                                                                                          
Separate Opinion of Ian Brownlie on the Final Award of 14 March 2003, para. 34); also, Chapter III.1 
below. 
582
 Gallus, N.; Peterson, L.E.; supra at FN 570, p. 547. 
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 See, Hirsch, M.; supra at FN 324, p. 92. 
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 And the example can be extended with the case where states adopt the control test for the nationality 
of a corporation. See also, Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 
293, p. 292, para. 742. 
585
 Art. 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT. 
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that those principles would apply mutatis mutandis to legal entities. Nevertheless, 
perhaps dissimilarity still exists when looking at the degree to which international law 
sources deal with multiple nationalities of individuals in contrast with legal entities. 
Except for the particular case when a treaty, including the ECT, allows a legal entity 
that has the nationality of a Contracting Party party to the dispute and it is controlled by 
investors of another Contracting Party to be considered as having the nationality of the 
controlling investors,586 treaties are rather silent on this matter.  
 
The practice of investment law concerning cases of multiple nationalities of legal 
entities is scarce and, at the maximum, tribunals had to deal with tangential situations 
concerning multiple interests in a corporation.587 Referring to the ICSID Convention, 
scholars generally agree that the multiple nationalities of a juridical person should not 
pose difficulties, as the ICSID Convention only requires juridical persons to  
“[…] have the nationality of a Contracting State other than the host State; or, 
if it initially has the nationality of the host State, that it be agreed because of 
foreign control that it has the nationality of another Contracting State.”588  
 
Where possible nationalities belong to Contracting States of the ICSID Convention, 
except for the host state, scholars see no jurisdictional obstacle.589 However, when one 
of the nationalities is of the Contracting State party to the dispute, the commentators of 
the ICSID Convention have different views. AMERASINGHE, for example, suggests that 
where one of the nationalities of the juridical person belongs to the host state, tribunals 
                                                
586
 Art. 26(7) of the ECT. The ECT adopted this provision in consideration of Art. 25(2)(b) of the ICSID 
Convention.  
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 See, for example, Aucoven v. Venezuela; supra at FN 445. 
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 Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra at FN 297, p. 259. 
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 Hirsch, M.; supra at FN 324, p. 92; Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra at FN 297, p. 259. 
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might search for the effective nationality.590 Others reject this interpretation, as being 
incompatible with the provisions of the ICSID Convention.591 
 
2.4 Implied Requirements for Legal Entities 
 
The plain wording of Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT suggests that the sole requirement 
for a company or other organization to be deemed as an ECT Investor is the 
organization in accordance with the law of a Contracting Party. Since the place of 
incorporation is the only criteria adopted by the ECT, tribunals are precluded from 
looking past the first layer of shareholders or owners in order to determine the real 
nationality of a legal entity, except when applying the rule under Article 26(7) of the 
ECT or where the ‘denial of benefits’ clause is invoked. This approach is often 
challenged as it is suggested to allow foreign investors to choose the protection of a 
particular investment treaty – also known as ‘treaty shopping’.592 
 
ECT tribunals were faced with the question whether any other additional condition to be 
fulfilled by Investors can be read in Article 1(7). The issue was extensively discussed in 
the Yukos Cases, as the Russian Federation contended that it is not sufficient for an 
alleged Investor to be organized in accordance with the laws of a Contracting Party, but 
also that the beneficial owners of the Investor should not be nationals of the respondent 
Contracting Party.  
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 Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra at FN 297, p. 260. AMERASINGHE suggests that “[i]t is not necessary to 
establish an hierarchy within the applicable tests for this purpose.” See, Amerasinghe, C.F.; supra, p. 260. 
Oppenheim’s International Law reasonably concludes that 
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 See, for example, Hirsch, M.; supra at FN 324, pp. 93–94. With respect to the application of the 
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“[…] a broad principle of interpretation under which the arbitration tribunal ought to be given jurisdiction 
wherever reasonably possible should not be adopted.” (Hirsch, M.; supra at FN 324, p. 93) 
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 The issue is further discussed in the ‘Conclusions’ to this Thesis. 
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This discussion in not strange to cases brought under investment law. Examples of 
companies incorporated in a state and having the majority of their shares owned by 
nationals of the same state are ideal, but this is not always the case. Any other situation 
is likely to raise difficulties for determining the jurisdiction ratione personae of 
tribunals. Tribunals dealing with the issue of piercing the corporate veil have been 
generally reluctant to do so when the relevant treaty provided for incorporation as the 
single requirement for the nationality of a company.593 In Saluka v. Czech Republic, the 
respondent argued that Saluka Investments BV was a shell company controlled by its 
Japanese owners.594 The tribunal found that 
“[it] cannot in effect impose upon the parties a definition of “investor” other 
than that which they themselves agreed. That agreed definition required only 
that the claimant–investor should be constituted under the laws of (in the 
present case) The Netherlands, and it is not open to the Tribunal to add other 
requirements which the parties could themselves have added but which they 
omitted to add.”595 
 
In Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, the Respondent argued that although the Claimant was 
legally established under the laws of Lithuania, it was in fact owned and controlled by 
nationals of the Respondent, making it an “a Ukrainian investor in Lithuania, not a 
Lithuanian investor in Ukraine”.596 The majority of the tribunal held that the Claimant 
                                                
593
 As pointed out by scholars, 
“[…] ICSID practice repeatedly confirms that in the absence of a definition of nationality in a treaty or law 
imposing further, more substantial connections than mere incorporation or seat, it is both permissible and to 
be expected that investors will structure their investments in order to avail themselves of treaty protection 
[…].” (Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 292, para. 740).  
Tribunals pierce the corporate veil when the investment instrument gives effect to the control test. See, 
for example, Article 26(7) of the ECT and 25(2)(b) of the ICSID Convention. 
594
 Saluka Investments BV v. Czech Republic, Partial Award of 17 March 2006, paras 183(c) and 184(c). 
595
 Ibid., para. 241. The tribunal, however, considered the argument of the Respondent for lifting the 
corporate veil in the present case and concluded the following: 
“The Tribunal has some sympathy for the argument that a company which has no real connection with a State 
party to a BIT, and which is in reality a mere shell company controlled by another company which is not 
constituted under the laws of that State, should not be entitled to invoke the provisions of that treaty. Such a 
possibility lends itself to abuses of the arbitral procedure, and to practices of “treaty shopping” which can 
share many of the disadvantages of the widely criticised practice of “forum shopping.” (Saluka v. Czech 
Republic, para. 240) 
596
 Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, Decision on Jurisdiction of 29 April 200, para 21. The Decision is 
accompanied by the Dissenting Opinion of the president of the tribunal, PROSPER WEIL. 
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is a Lithuanian company based on the provisions of Article 1(2)(b) of the Lithuania–
Ukraine BIT, which defines the term ‘investor’ as “any entity established in the territory 
of the Republic of Lithuania”.597 The tribunal found that the relevant criterion for 
determining if the Claimant qualifies as a Lithuanian investor is whether the Claimant is 
established under the laws of Lithuania.598 
 
The tribunal in Rompetrol v. Romania had to deal with Romania’s objection to the 
nationality of the Claimant. The Respondent argued that, while the Claimant satisfied 
the formal requirements of the ICSID Convention and the Netherlands–Romania BIT,599 
the “ownership and control, effective seat, or source of the funds used for the relevant 
investment” showed “that the Claimant’s ‘real and effective’ nationality is that of the 
Respondent”.600 The tribunal rejected the Respondent’s objections and held that the 
valid test for Claimant’s nationality is the incorporation test, as set forth in the 
Netherlands–Romania BIT.601 The tribunal rejected Respondent’s arguments that there 
is, in international law, a general rule of “’real and effective nationality’ for determining 
the status of corporate entities”.602  
                                                
597
 Ibid., para. 28, emphasis original. 
598
 Ibid., para. 38. In deciding so, the majority considered that 
“[…] Contracting Parties are free to define their consent to jurisdiction in terms that are broad or narrow; they 
may employ a control–test or reserve the right to deny treaty protection to claimants who otherwise would 
have recourse under the BIT. Once that consent is defined, however, tribunals should give effect to it, unless 
doing so would allow the Convention to be used for purposes for which it clearly was not intended.” (Tokios 
Tokelès v. Ukraine, supra at 596, para. 39) 
599
 The Rompetrol Group N.V. v. Romania, Decision on Jurisdiction of 18 April 2008, para. 78. Art. 1(8) 
of the Netherlands–Romania BIT provides that 
“[…] the term ‘investors’ shall comprise with regard to either Contracting Party: 
i. natural persons having the citizenship or the nationality of that Contracting Party in accordance with its 
laws; 
ii. legal persons constituted under the law of that Contracting Party; 
iii. legal persons owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by natural persons as defined in i. or by legal 
persons as defined in ii. above.” (Rompetrol v. Romania; supra, para. 98) 
600
 Rompetrol v. Romania; supra at FN 599, para. 78. 
601
 Ibid., paras 83, 99 and 110. 
602
 Ibid., para. 92. The tribunal further added that the definition of investor under the Netherlands–
Romania BIT 
“[…] contains a straightforward, one might say lapidary, criterion for the case of legal persons, including 
companies; the criterion refers simply and exclusively to the place of incorporation – or, to be more exact, to 




In ADC v. Hungary, the tribunal found that states are free to insert in their investment 
treaties other requirements in addition to the incorporation test. Where they chose not to 
do so, tribunals cannot read into the treaties requisites, such as a ‘genuine link’ test, 
which have not been agreed to by the states: 
“The Tribunal cannot find a “genuine link” requirement in the Cyprus–Hungary 
BIT either. While the Tribunal acknowledges that such requirement has been 
applied to some preceding international law cases, it concludes that such a 
requirement does not exist in the current case. When negotiating the BIT, the 
Government of Hungary could have inserted this requirement as it did in other 
BITs concluded both before and after the conclusion of the BIT in this case. 
However, it did not do so. Thus such a requirement is absent in this case. The 
Tribunal cannot read more into the BIT than one can discern from its plain 
text.”603 
 
The Yukos tribunal saw Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT as only requiring legal entities to 
be organized in accordance with the laws of a Contracting Party. To consider otherwise, 
the tribunal noted, would mean to interpret the terms of Article 1(7) not as they are, but 
“as they might have been written”.604 Even accepting an ambiguous meaning of the 
                                                                                                                                          
The tribunal also held that the Contracting States of the ICSID are the ones having 
“[…] the sole power to determine national status under their own law, who decide by mutual and reciprocal 
agreement which persons or entities will be treated as their ‘nationals’ for the purposes of enjoying the 
benefits the BIT is intended to confer.” (Rompetrol v. Romania; supra at FN 599, para. 81) 
603
 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v. Republic of Hungary, Award of 2 
October 2006, para. 359, emphasis original. The tribunal in the ADC v. Hungary also concluded that “the 
origin of capital is not a relevant factor” in determining the nationality of the claimant (ADC v. Hungary; 
supra, para. 360) and that the principle of ‘piercing the corporate veil’ does exist, but it “only applies to 
situations where the real beneficiary of the business misused corporate formalities in order to disguise its 
true identity and therefore to avoid liability” (ADC v. Hungary, supra, para. 358). 
604
 The Yukos tribunal stressed that it 
“[…] is bound to interpret the terms of the ECT not as they might have been written so as exclusively to 
apply to foreign investment but as they were actually written. […]” (Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 435 
Similarly, in the opinion of CRAWFORD, 
“[t]he Treaty [ECT] imposes no further requirements with respect to shareholding, management, siège social, 
or location of its business activities (…). Companies incorporated in Contracting Parties are embraced by the 
definition, regardless of the nationality of shareholders, the origin of investment capital or the nationality of 
directors or management.” (Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 411, emphasis original, footnote omitted) 
In a review of several investment cases, WEINIGER reaches the following conclusions regarding the 
interpretation of the BITs’ provisions by arbitral tribunals: 
“• Far-reaching effects arising out of the text of BITs must be confirmed by clear and convincing evidence of 
the State parties’ intent; 
• BIT terms should be read in such a way to enhance mutuality and balance of benefits; […] 
• A tribunal cannot read into a BIT words of limitation that are not found in the text; […] 
• Tribunals should not read into BITs limitations not found in the text nor evident from the negotiating 
history sources […]” (Weiniger, Matthew; Jurisdictional Challenges in BIT Arbitrations – Do You Read a 
BIT by Reading a BIT or by Reading Into a BIT?, pp. 254–255, footnote omitted, in Mistelis, Loukas A.; 
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terms of Article 1(7) and relying on the rules of interpretation of the Vienna 
Convention, the Yukos tribunal held that it is not aware of 
“[…] general principles of international law that would require investigating 
how a company or another organization operates when the applicable treaty 
simply requires it to be organized in accordance with the laws of a Contracting 
Party. The principles of international law […] do not allow an arbitral tribunal 
to write new, additional requirements–which the drafters did not include–into 
a treaty, no matter how auspicious or appropriate they may appear.”605  
 
The ECT provides for the incorporation test as the sole relevant requirement for the 
nationality of legal entities.606 Accordingly, tribunals are prevented from looking 
                                                                                                                                          
Lew, Julian D.M. (eds.); Pervasive Problems in International Arbitration, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law 
International, 2006) 
605
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 415, footnote omitted. In the Acquisition of Polish Nationality 
Case, the PCIJ came to the conclusion that 
“[t]he Minorities Treaty (Article 4, paragraph I) admits and declares to be Polish nationals, ipso facto, 
persons who were born in the territory of the new State “of parents habitually resident there”. […] It is 
necessary, but on the other hand sufficient, that on the date of birth the parents should have been habitually 
resident, that is to say should have been established in a permanent manner, with the intention of remaining, 
in the territory which subsequently became incorporated in Poland. To impose an additional condition for the 
acquisition of Polish nationality, a condition not provided in the Treaty of June 28th, 1919, would be 
equivalent; not interpreting the Treaty, but to reconstructing it.” (The Acquisition of Polish Nationality, 
Advisory Opinion no. 7 of 15 September 1923, p. 20, emphasis original)  
See, in comparison, the provisions of the Algiers Declaration referring to the Iranian nationality of a legal 
entity: 
“[…] a corporation or other legal entity which is organized under the laws of Iran or the United States […], 
if, collectively, natural persons who are citizens of such country hold, directly or indirectly, an interest in 
such corporation or entity equivalent to fifty per cent or more of its capital stock.” (Art. VII.1 of the 
Declaration of the Government of the Democratic and Popular Republic of Algeria concerning the Settlement 
of Claims by the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, p. 232–233) 
Nevertheless, the Iran–United States Claims Tribunal held sufficient the 49.8% of the shares owned by a 
United States company in a corporation organized in Iran. See SEDCO, Inc., for itself and on behalf of 
SEDCO INTERNATIONAL, S.A., and SEDIRAN DRILLING COMPANY v. National Iranian Oil Co. and 
the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. ITL 55–129–3 of 24 October 1985. 
As DOUGLAS points out, 
“[i]nvestment treaties do not […] reveal a fundamental preoccupation with the origin of that capital. It would 
not, therefore, be consistent with the object and purpose of investment treaties for tribunals to develop 
stringent requirements for the quality of the link of nationality between the claimant investor and the relevant 
contracting state party.” (Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 290, para. 541) 
606
 During the negotiations of the ECT, the Canadian delegation suggested that Investors “should have a 
more substantive connection to a Contracting Party than required by the current definition”, since legal 
entities that are “controlled directly or indirectly by nationals of states not signatory to the Basic 
Agreement” should be excluded from the definition of Investor. See, Comments of the Canadian 
delegation regarding the Basic Agreement of 19 June 1992; supra at FN 346. Norway also suggested 
strengthening the link between Investors and the Contracting Parties: 
“This Agreement shall apply to: 
[…] (b) companies or other organisations under the law and regulations applicable in a Contracting Party and 
whose ultimate parent company is located in the area of a Contracting Party or which are controlled directly 
or indirectly by such natural persons or legal entities.” (Proposal of the Delegation of Norway, Room 
Document 11, Plenary Session, 25–28 May 1993) 
None of these proposals were retained for the final draft of the ECT. In fact, in a Note from the Chairman 
of the Working Group II, it is pointed out that “[t]here is no requirement as to the origin of the company”, 
but that the sole requirement for a company to be considered Investor under Art. 1(7) of the ECT is to be 
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beyond what is required and give effect to other criteria that are not foreseen in the 
ECT, such as the nationality of the owners, the seat of business, or the origin of the 
invested capital.607 
 
Tribunals and scholars, however, argue the necessity of lifting the corporate veil when 
juridical persons misuse the privileges in a treaty.608 Usually, this can be prevented by 
inserting in the treaty a ‘denial of benefits’ clause, which excludes investors from taking 
advantage of the provisions of a treaty. For counteracting these situations, Article 17 of 
the ECT provides for the denial of benefits to certain legal entities and Investments. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                          
“registered in a country being a Contracting Party”. See, Note from the Chairman of the Working Group 
II, BUR 14, 24 February 1992. As explained in this Note, 
“[…] a company originating from a country not being a party to the Basic Agreement and related documents, 
could, by registering a daughter company in a country being a Contracting Party in this respect, get access to 
the energy resources of all the Contracting Parties on the same conditions as companies originating from a 
Contracting Party […].” (Note from the Chairman of the Working Group II; supra) 
607
 For the origin of the invested capital, see, infra Chapter III.5. Oppenheim’s International Law admits 
that while “it is permissible to look behind the formal nationality of a company, as evidence primarily by 
its place of incorporation and registered office, so as to determine the reality of its relationship to a state”, 
“such inquiries usually have as their purpose the need to support a claim to nationality based on 
incorporation, rather than to elevate some alternative criterion”. See, Jennings, R.; Watts, A.; supra at FN 
278, pp. 861–862. 
In international law, piercing the corporate veil attained its recognition in cases of flags of convenience. 
In the much debated case of the I’m Alone, the Commissioners pierced the veil of the ship’s Canadian 
registration and of the Canadian company owning the ship I’m Alone and exposed the United States 
beneficial ownership (S.S. “I’m Alone” (Canada, United States), Award of 30 June 1933 and 5 January 
1935). See further, Goldie, L.F.E.; Recognition and Dual Nationality – A Problem of Flags of 
Convenience, 39 British Yearbook of International Law 220 (1963); Fitzmaurice, Gerald G.; The Case of 
the I’m Alone, 17 Brit. Y.B. Int’l L. 82 (1936). 
608
 In the Barcelona Traction Case, the ICJ held: 
“The wealth of practice already accumulated on the subject in municipal law indicates that the veil is lifted, 
for instance, to prevent the misuse of the privileges of legal personality, as in certain cases of fraud or 
malfeasance, to protect third persons such as a creditor or purchaser, or to prevent the evasion of legal 
requirements or of obligations.” (Barcelona Traction Case; supra at FN, para. 56) 
In the same line, see, Art. 9 of the ILC Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection; supra at FN 360, p. 52. In 
the context of the ICSID Convention, AMERASINGHE is the opinion that a tribunal must go beyond the 
test of incorporation and look into other criteria, such as control or place of administration, until it finds 
that jurisdiction can be uphold. See, Amerasinghe, C.F.; Interpretation of Article 25(2)(B) of the ICSID 
Convention, p. 241, in Lillich, Richard B.; Brower, Charles N. (eds.); International Arbitration in the 21st 
Century: Towards “Judicialization” and Uniformity?, Irvington, New York: Transnational Publishers, 
Inc., 1994.  
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3. INVESTORS AND THE ‘DENIAL OF BENEFITS’ CLAUSE UNDER THE ENERGY 
CHARTER TREATY 
 
The broad definition of ‘Investor’ in Article 1(7) of the ECT is balanced by the 
provisions of Article 17 of the ECT, which restricts the benefits of the provisions 
concerning the promotion and protection of Investments to certain categories of legal 
entities or Investments of Investors under the so–called denial of benefits clause. Article 
17 of the ECT provides for the following 
“Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of this Part 
to: 
(1) a legal entity if citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such 
entity and if that entity has no substantial business activities in the Area of the 
Contracting Party in which it is organized; or 
(2) an Investment, if the denying Contracting Party establishes that such 
Investment is an Investment of an Investor of a third state with or as to which 
the denying Contracting Party: 
   (a) does not maintain a diplomatic relationship; or 
   (b) adopts or maintains measures that: 
         (i) prohibit transactions with Investors of that state; or 
      (ii) would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Part were 
accorded to Investors of that state or to their Investments.”609 
 
The denial of benefits clause is often seen as a safeguard against free riders,610 or as a 
method to counteract nationality planning,611 or to preserve reciprocity in the 
                                                
609
 The denial of benefits clause was inserted in the ECT following the proposal from the United States 
delegation, which read as follows: 
“Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of this agreement to a company, firm, 
enterprise, organization or association if nationals of non–signatories control such entity and if that entity has 
no substantial business activities in the territory of the Contracting Party in which it is organized.” (U.S. 
Proposal of 19 March 1992) 
The ECT Draft of 15 March 1993, first version, records the denial of benefits clause: 
“Each Contracting Party reserves the right to deny the advantages of this Part to a legal entity if citizens or 
nationals of a non–signatory control such entity and if that entity has no substantive business activities in the 
Domain of the Contracting Party in which it is organised or the denying Contracting Party does not maintain 
diplomatic relationship with the non–signatory that prohibit transactions with the investor of that non–
signatory or that would be violated or circumvented if the advantages in this Part were accorded to the 
investor of that non–signatory or to its investments.” (Art. 19 of the ECT Draft of 15 March 1993, first 
version, 23/93 CONF 50) 
There was also a proposal to include the denial of benefits clause in Art. 46, dealing with the reservations 
to the ECT. 
610
 In 1956, WALKER JR., while discussing the provision on companies in the United States treaties, 
explained the ‘denial of benefits’ provision as a safeguard against “free riders” – nationals of third 
countries – who would gain rights or interests despite the fact that the contracting parties to the treaty did 
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relationship between two states.612 Irrespective of what it is called, the purpose of the 
clause is to exclude from the protection offered by treaties investors or investments that, 
under normal circumstances, would not benefit from host state’s protection.613 As 
explained by the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine, 
“[a]s the purpose of the ЕСТ is to establish a legal framework 'in order to 
promote long–term cooperation in the energy field, based on 
complementarities and mutual benefits...' then the potential exclusion of 
foreign owned entities from ЕСТ investment protection under Article 17 is 
readily comprehensible. 'Long term economic cooperation', 
'complementarities' or 'mutual benefits' are unlikely to materialise for the host 
State with a State that serves as a nationality of convenience devoid of 
economic substance for an investment vehicle, or a State with which it does 
not enjoy normal diplomatic or economic relations.”614 
 
The right conferred on Contracting Parties by Article 17 of the ECT is in line with 
clauses found in modern bilateral and multilateral investment and trade treaties.615 For 
example, Article 1113(1) of the NAFTA provides for the following: 
                                                                                                                                          
not whish to accord them. See, Walker Jr., H; Provisions on Companies in United States Commercial 
Treaties, 50(2) Am. J. Int’l L. 373 (1956), p. 388.  
611
 DOLZER and SCHREUER consider the denial of benefits right as a “method to counteract nationality 
planning” and explain the ‘denial of benefits’ clause as follows: 
“Under such a clause the states reserve the right to deny the benefits of the treaty to a company that does not 
have an economic connection to the state on whose nationality it relies. The economic connection would 
consist in control by nationals of the state of nationality or in substantial business activities in that state.” 
(Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C.; supra at FN 258, p. 55) 
VANDEVELDE sees the denial of benefits clause as a tool for limiting the practice of treaty shopping. See, 
Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at FN 271, p. 163. 
612
 According to SALACUSE, allowing the benefits of the BITs to nationals of thirds countries or who are 
“primarily associated” with these countries and with which the denying country has no relationship, 
would be “to abandon […] right to negotiate corresponding privileges and obligations from those 
countries.” See, Salacuse, J.W.; BIT by BIT: The Growth of Bilateral Investment Treaties and Their 
Impact of Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 24(3) International Lawyer 665 (1990). 
613
 The denial of benefits clause under Article 1113 of the NAFTA was seen by the tribunal in Waste 
Management v. Mexico II as addressing 
“[…] situations where the investor is simply an intermediary for interests substantially foreign, and it allows 
NAFTA protections to be withdrawn in such cases […].” (Waste Management, Inc. v. United Mexican States, 
Award of 30 April 2004, para. 80) 
614
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 61. 
615
 Article 17 of the 2004 United States Model BIT provides that 
“1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the other Party that is an enterprise of such 
other Party and to investments of that investor if persons of a non-Party own or control the enterprise and 
the denying Party: 
a) does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non-Party; or 
b) adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non-Party or a person of the non-Party that prohibit 
transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Treaty 
were accorded to the enterprise or to its investments. 
2. A Party may deny the benefits of this Treaty to an investor of the other Party that is an enterprise of such 
other Party and to investments of that investor if the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the 
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“A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party 
that is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investor if 
investors of a non–Party own or control the enterprise and the denying Party:  
(a) does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non–Party; or  
(b) adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non–Party that prohibit 
transactions with the enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if 
the benefits of this Chapter were accorded to the enterprise or to its 
investments.” 
 
The denial of benefits clause raised several controversial issues in some of the 
arbitrations submitted under the ECT and, most recently, in the Yukos Cases.616 
 
3.1 Nature of the ‘Denial of Benefits’ Clause  
 
Article 17 of the ECT denies legal entities and Investments the right to benefit from the 
provisions on the promotion and protection of Investments.617 However, as the denial of 
benefits clause limits the benefits of investment protection to a class of Investors and 
Investments, the analysis of this provision is relevant in the context of the notion of 
‘Investor’.618 The tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine took the following approach in examining 
the denial of benefits clause: 
“Article 17 can be read together with the definition of 'Investor' in Article 1(7) 
as establishing two classes of Investors of a Contracting Party for the purposes 
of the ЕСТ. The first class comprises Investors with an indefeasible right to 
investment protection under the ЕСТ. […] 
                                                                                                                                          
territory of the other Party and persons of a non-Party, or of the denying Party, own or control the 
enterprise.” 
616
 Besides the cases discussed here below, the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan also touched upon the 
denial of benefits clause under Art. 17 of the ECT, but rejected its applicability. In doing so, the tribunal 
held that the information about the claimant 
“[…] contradicts the view that Petrobart is a company owned or controlled by citizens or nationals of a state 
other than the United Kingdom and that Petrobart has no substantial business in the United Kingdom.” 
(Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 63) 
617
 The denial of benefits clause is seen as an objection of admissibility of claims, rather than an objection 
to the jurisdiction ratione personae of an ECT tribunal. See, Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 468 et seq., 
para. 874 et seq. See also, the explanation of the ICSID tribunal in Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine: 
“[…] This is not, as the Respondent appears to have assumed, a jurisdictional hurdle for the Claimant to 
overcome in the presentation of its case; instead it is a potential filter on the admissibility of claims which can 
be invoked by the respondent State.” (Generation Ukraine, Inc. v. Ukraine, Award of 16 September 2003, 
para. 15.7, p. 433) 
But see, for the contrary, Legum, B.; supra at FN 289, p. 524. 
618
 See also, Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 292, pp. 378–387. 
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The second class comprises Investors that have a defeasible right to 
investment protection under the ЕСТ, because the host State of the investment 
has the power to divest the Investor of this right.”619 
 
Article 17 denies the benefits included in Part III of the ECT, which refers to the 
protection and promotion of Investments. Additionally, the title of Article 17 is 
restricted to “Non–application of Part III in certain circumstances”. The wording of the 
denial of benefits clause suggests that other rights provided to Investors and not covered 
in Part III of the ECT, for example the dispute resolution rights under Article 26 of Part 
V of the ECT, are not excluded by the application of the denial of benefits clause.620 In 
Plama v. Bulgaria,621 the tribunal considered the wording of Article 17 and its exclusive 
reference to the provisions of Part III on the promotion and protection of Investments: 
“The express terms of Article 17 refer to a denial of the advantages "of this 
Part", thereby referring to the substantive advantages conferred upon an 
investor by Part III of the ECT. The language is unambiguous; but it is 
confirmed by the title to Article 17: "Non–Application of Part III in Certain 
Circumstances" (emphasis supplied). All authentic texts in the other five 
languages are to the same effect. From these terms, interpreted in good faith in 
accordance with their ordinary contextual meaning, the denial applies only to 
advantages under Part III. It would therefore require a gross manipulation of 
the language to make it refer to Article 26 in Part V of the ECT.”622 
 
                                                
619
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 61. 
620
 The documents of the ECT’s negotiation record a proposal from the Chairman of the Legal Sub–Group 
to exclude the disputes related to the denial of benefits under Art. 17(2), from the dispute resolution 
mechanism under Articles 26 and 27 of the ECT: 
“Disputes between a Contracting Party and another Contracting Party or Investor thereof arising out of the 
denial by the first Contracting Party of the advantages of this Part to citizens or nationals of a state that is not 
a Contracting Party and with which the first Contracting Party does not maintain diplomatic relations shall 
not be subject to dispute settlement under Article 30 or 31.” (Letter from C. Bamberger to Lise Weis and Leif 
Ervik, 21 March 1994) 
621
 In Plama v. Bulgaria, the dispute related to a refinery owned by Nova Plama AD, a company 
controlled by the claimant, a Cypriot company. Respondent contended that Article 17(1) of the ECT 
applies in this case since claimant had no substantial activities in Cyprus and it was controlled by 
nationals of a third state. (Plama v Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, paras 31, 55 et seq.). While claimant 
conceded during the hearings that it had no substantial business in Cyprus (Plama v Bulgaria; supra, 
para. 74 et seq.), it maintained that at all time it was controlled by a French national (ibid., para. 168). The 
tribunal accepted the ownership and control of the claimant by the French national (Plama Consortium 
Limited v. Republic of Bulgaria, Award of 27 August 2008, para. 95), but it found that the claimant’s 
investment was not made in accordance with the laws of Bulgaria (Plama v. Bulgaria, Award, para. 140 
et seq.). 
622
 Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, para. 147, emphasis original. 
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The tribunal made it clear that Article 17 of the ECT restricts the application of the 
protection of Investors and their Investments under Part III, but the procedural remedies 
under Article 26 of the ECT remain unaffected: 
“Article 26 provides a procedural remedy for a covered investor’s claims; and 
it is not physically or juridically part of the ECT’s substantive advantages 
enjoyed by that investor under Part III. […] This limited exclusion from Part 
III for a covered investor, dependent on certain specific criteria, requires a 
procedure to resolve a dispute as to whether that exclusion applies in any 
particular case; and the object and purpose of the ECT, in the Tribunal’s view, 
clearly requires Article 26 to be unaffected by the operation of Article 
17(1).”623  
 
The Yukos tribunal accepted the view taken in Plama v. Bulgaria: 
“[…] Article 17 specifies–as does the title of the Article–that it concerns 
denial of the advantages of “this Part,” i.e., Part III of the ECT. Provision for 
dispute settlement under the ECT is not found in “this Part” but in Part V of 
the Treaty. Whether or not Claimant is entitled to the advantages of Part III is 
a question not of jurisdiction but of the merits. Since Article 17 relates not to 
the ECT as a whole, or to Part V, but exclusively to Part III, its interpretation 
for that reason cannot determine whether the Tribunal has jurisdiction to 
entertain the claims of Claimant.”624 
 
Nevertheless, Article 17 of the ECT must be read in the light of the provisions of Article 
26(1) of the ECT that is restricted to disputes “which concern an alleged breach of an 
obligation […] under Part III”. The substantive protection of Investors cannot be 
                                                
623
 Ibid., para. 148. Bulgaria argued that the intention of the ECT’s drafters was to confer on Contracting 
State “a direct and unconditional right of denial which may be exercised at any time and in any manner”. 
See, Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, para. 144. The tribunal rejected this view considering that it is 
crucial for the investor to be able to address to a forum that would be able to determine whether Article 
17(1) of the ECT is applicable. The tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria noted that 
“[i]n the absence of Article 26 as a remedy available to the covered investor (as the Respondent contends), 
how are such disputes to be determined between the host state and the covered investor, given that such 
determination is crucial to both? […] Towards the covered investor, under the Respondent’s case, the 
Contracting State invoking the application of Article 17(1) is the judge in its own cause. That is a license for 
injustice; and it treats a covered investor as if it were not covered under the ECT at all.” (Plama v. Bulgaria; 
supra at FN 93, para. 149) 
See also, supra at FN 620, the proposal of the Chairman of the Legal Sub–Group to exclude the disputes 
arising out of the denial of benefits clause from the Investor–Contracting Party dispute resolution 
mechanism, which was not retained in the text of the ECT. 
624
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 441. See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine: 
“A dispute regarding an obligation includes a dispute relating to the existence of an obligation. […] The State 
might assert 'rights', 'powers,' 'privileges' or 'immunities' to deny, annul or evade an obligation, but the legal 
description of the objection does not detach it from the Claimant's assertion of the existence and breach of an 
obligation. The Respondent's exercise of its 'right' to deny advantages is an aspect of the dispute submitted to 
arbitration by the Claimant, and within the jurisdiction of this Arbitral Tribunal.” (Amto v. Ukraine; supra at 
FN 529, para. 60, emphasis original) 
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effective without the remedies contained in the dispute resolution mechanism under 
Article 26 of the ECT: 
“[…] the Tribunal finds that the Treaty itself, together with so many other 
treaties of investment protection, has as a distinctive feature special dispute 
settlement mechanisms not normally open to investors. Access to these 
mechanisms is part of the protection offered under the Treaty. It is part of the 
treatment of foreign investors and investments […].”625 
 
Thus, Article 17 of the ECT denies not only the benefits of Part III, but also the 
procedural remedies under Part V of the ECT. As one author observes, 
“[h]iding behind Article 31 (1) VCLT, the [Plama v. Bulgaria] tribunal never 
answered the basic question of how there can be Article 26 ECT jurisdiction, 
which it recognizes as limited to Part III, if a respondent properly invokes 
Article 17 (1), which denies to the investor any Part III protections.”626 
 
The exclusion of Article 26 of the ECT from the benefits denied by Article 17 has little 
practical consequences to the outcome of a dispute. By considering that Article 17 does 
not deny the right to resort to the dispute resolution mechanism under Article 26, 
tribunals are called to decide on the denial of benefits at the merits stage; alternatively, 
by interpreting the provisions of Article 17 with a view of the ECT as a whole and, thus, 
excluding the benefits of Part III and Article 26, tribunals would still have to decide 
whether they have jurisdiction hear the case, based on the principle of competence–
competence, and, therefore, ensure the access of Investors to the procedural protection 
of the ECT.627 
 
                                                
625
 Siemens v. Argentina, supra at FN 493, para. 102. 
626
 Chalker, James; Making the Energy Charter Treaty Too Investor Friendly: Plama Consortium 
Limited v. the Republic of Bulgaria, 3(5) TDM (2006), p. 7. SHORE concludes that 
“[i]t is undeniable that Art.17 appears in Pt III and only refers to Pt III. […] It is a perfectly plausible reading 
of ECT Arts 1(7), 17 and 26, pursuant to Art.31 of the Vienna Convention, to find that as Art.17(1) relates so 
centrally to the Art.26(1) requirements of investor status ("Investor of another Contracting Party") and a 
breach of a Pt III obligation, that it constitutes a jurisdictional consideration for an arbitral tribunal.” (Shore, 
Laurence; The jurisdiction problem in Energy Charter Treaty claims, 10(3) International Arbitration Law 
Review 58 (2007), p. 63) 
627
 On the competence-competence doctrine, see in general, Carbonneau, Thomas E.; The Law and 
Practice of Arbitration, 3rd edition, Huntington: JurisNet, LLC, 2009, pp. 48-49. 
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3.2 Application and Effects of the ‘Denial of Benefits’ Clause 
 
Because of the way Investments are structured nowadays, Contracting Parties usually 
become aware of the circumstances justifying the application of Article 17 of the ECT 
only after Investor files the claim.628 As noted by SINCLAIR and JAGUSCH, 
“[t]he host State may not even be aware of the establishment of a new 
investment in its territory, let alone the nationality of that investor, the extent 
of its business activities in its home State, and the nationality of its underlying 
owners or controllers. […] The host State may only learn of the conditions 
that would justify invoking its right to deny at such time as an investor notifies 
it that a dispute under the ECT has arisen and possibly not even then”629 
 
Article 17 provides that each Contracting Party “reserves the right to deny the 
advantages” of Part III of the ECT. Several questions in connection with this 
introductory part of the denial of benefits clause have been raised in practice. They 
mainly concern the moment when a Contracting Party may invoke the denial of benefits 
right; whether there are special requirements for the exercise of this right; and what are 
the effects of the denial of benefits clause. 
 
The wording of Article 17 suggests that the right to deny the benefits of Part III of the 
ECT to certain Investors or Investments must be exercised by a Contracting Party. A 
Contracting Party may choose to exercise this right or not. The tribunal in Plama v. 
Bulgaria explained this as follows: 
                                                
628
 For example, in the application of Art. 17(1) of the ECT, denying Contracting Parties must be aware 
not only of the ownership and control of the Investor, but also whether it conducts substantial business 
activities in the Contracting Party where it is organized. While the ownership or control could be exposed 
prior to arbitration, Contracting Parties will most probably not engage in finding out whether or not 
Investor has substantial business activities in another Contracting Party. 
629
 Jagusch, Stephen; Sinclair, Anthony; The Limits of Protection for Investments and Investors under the 
Energy Charter Treaty, p. 101, in Ribeiro, C. (ed.); supra at FN 89. LEGUM supports this opinion by 
referring to the obligations under a bilateral investment treaty as being de facto obligations erga omnes : 
“[…] although each investment treaty is drafted as a bilateral set of obligations, to comply with those 
obligations the host state must treat them as obligations erga omnes: obligations owed to every state and 
every company. 
This conclusion flows from the fact that, under normal circumstances, host state officials will never know at 
the time they must take action whether a given company is covered by a given treaty.” (Legum, B.; supra at 
FN 289, pp. 524–525, emphasis original, footnote omitted) 
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“In the Tribunal’s view, the existence of a "right" is distinct from the exercise 
of that right. For example, a party may have a contractual right to refer a claim 
to arbitration; but there can be no arbitration unless and until that right is 
exercised. In the same way, a Contracting Party has a right under Article 17(1) 
ECT to deny a covered investor the advantages under Part III; but it is not 
required to exercise that right; and it may never do so. The language of Article 
17(1) is unambiguous; and that meaning is consistent with the different state 
practices of the ECT’s Contracting States under different bilateral investment 
treaties […].”630 
 
The same argument was noted by the Yukos tribunal: 
“Article 17(1) does not deny simpliciter the advantages of Part III of the ECT–
as it easily could have been worded to do […]. It rather “reserves the right” of 
each Contracting Party to deny the advantages of that Part to such entity. This 
imports that, to effect denial, the Contracting Party must exercise the right.”631 
 
ECT tribunals were confronted with practical issues of the exercise of the denial of 
benefits right.632 The main question concerned the manner in which the Contracting 
                                                
630
 Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, para. 155. The tribunal further stated that 
“[…] the interpretation of Article 17(1) ECT under Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention requires the right 
of denial to be exercised by the Contracting State.” (ibid., para. 158) 
631
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 456, emphasis original. In the Yukos Cases, the claimants’ 
argument relied on the wording of Art. 17(1) of the ECT: 
“Article 17(1) could have been otherwise drafted, as is Article VI of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on 
Services, to state that the advantages of Part III “shall be denied” to “a juridical person owned or controlled 
by persons of a non-Member State constituted under the laws of a Member State, but not engaged in 
substantive business operations in the territory of Member States. But the drafters of the ECT […] 
deliberately chose to provide for a reserved, optional right in Article 17(1), a right that must be exercised to 
take effect, and only prospectively.” (Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 454) 
632
 Also controversial is whether investor or the denying Contracting Party has the burden of proof under 
Art. 17(1) of the ECT. While Art. 17(2) of the ECT, which provides that “the denying Contracting Party 
establishes”, appears to suggest that the burden of proof is upon the denying Contracting Party, Art. 17(1) 
is silent on this issue. Although procedural aspects are not covered by this Thesis, it is, however, useful to 
summarize here the main conclusions of the jurisprudence. 
In Amto v. Ukraine, the tribunal held that the burden to prove that the Investor falls under Art. 17(1) of 
the ECT lies on the respondent Contracting Party: 
“The burden of proof of an allegation in international arbitration rests on the party advancing the allegation, 
in accordance with the maxim onus probandi actori incumbit. In application of this principle, a claimant has 
the burden to prove that it satisfies the definition of an Investor so as to be entitled to the Part III protections 
and the right to arbitrate disputes in Article 26. On the same basis, the claimant would be expected to have 
the burden of proof that it controls, directly or indirectly, an Investment for which protection is sought, and 
this is a fact explicitly stated in Understanding 3 to the Final Act. However, when a respondent alleges that 
the claimant is of the class of Investors only entitled to defeasible protection, so that the respondent can 
exercise its power to deny, then the burden passes to the respondent to prove the factual prerequisites of 
Article 17 on which it relies. Article 17(2) adopts exactly this approach but, as already mentioned, Article 
17(1) is neutral on the question of burden of proof.” (Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 64) 
In Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal held that “[…] the burden of proof to establish ownership and control is 
on Claimant.” See, Plama v. Bulgaria, Award; supra at FN 621, para. 89. The ICSID tribunal in 
Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine held that the burden of proof that a legal entity is denied the benefits of 
the BIT’s protection falls upon the denying state: 
“[…] the burden of proof to establish the factual basis of the “third country control”, together with the other 
conditions, falls upon the State as the party invoking the “right to deny” conferred by Article 1(2).” 
(Generation Ukraine v. Ukraine; supra at FN 617, para. 15.7, p. 433) 
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Parties should carry out such right. In Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal concluded that the 
denying Contracting Party must exercise the denial of benefits right in a public manner 
that must be reasonably made available to Investors: 
“The exercise would necessarily be associated with publicity or other notice so 
as to become reasonably available to investors and their advisers. To this end, 
a general declaration in a Contracting State’s official gazette could suffice; or 
a statutory provision in a Contracting State’s investment or other laws; or even 
an exchange of letters with a particular investor or class of investors.”633 
 
The Plama v. Bulgaria tribunal further explained that 
“[b]y itself, Article 17(1) ECT is at best only half a notice; without further 
reasonable notice of its exercise by the host state, its terms tell the investor 
little; and for all practical purposes, something more is needed.”634 
 
However, the conclusion of the Plama v. Bulgaria tribunal regarding the notice to be 
given to Investors is not based on the ordinary meaning of the terms of Article 17. 
Article 17 of the ECT does not provide for any requisites which should be complied 
with by the Contracting Party in denying the benefits of Part III to an ECT Investor.635 
Unlike Article 17 of the ECT, Article 1113 of the NAFTA expressly provides that the 
application of the denial of benefits clause is subject to prior notification and 
                                                                                                                                          
In CCL v. Kazakhstan, the tribunal concluded that 
“[…] a Claimant party, requesting arbitration on the basis of the Treaty, provides the necessary information 
and evidence concerning the circumstances of ownership and control, directly or indirectly, over [Claimant-
investor] at all times. This is especially the case when reasonable doubt has been raised as to the actual 
ownership of and control over the company seeking protection.” (CCL Oil v. Kazakhstan, Decision on 
Jurisdiction of 2003, p. 152) 
For further comments on the burden of proof and Art. 17(1) of the ECT, see, Essig, H.; Balancing 
Investors’ Interests and State Sovereignty: The ICSID–Decision on Jurisdiction Plama Consortium Ltd. v. 
Republic of Bulgaria, 5(2) OGEL 2007; Chalker, J.; supra at FN 626, pp. 11–15; Shore, L; supra at FN 
626, pp. 60–62. 
633




 Article 1113 of the NAFTA provides the following: 
“1. A Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of another Party that is an enterprise of such 
Party and to investments of such investor if investors of a non–Party own or control the enterprise and the 
denying Party: 
a. does not maintain diplomatic relations with the non–Party; or  
b. adopts or maintains measures with respect to the non–Party that prohibit transactions with the 
enterprise or that would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of this Chapter were accorded to the 
enterprise or to its investments. 
2. Subject to prior notification and consultation in accordance with Articles 1803 (Notification and Provision 
of Information) and 2006 (Consultations), a Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of 
another Party that is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investors if investors of a non–
Party own or control the enterprise and the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of 
the Party under whose law it is constituted or organized.” 
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consultation where the legal entity is owned or controlled by nationals of a third state 
and has no substantial business in the Contracting Party where it is organized. The state 
denying the benefits of Chapter XI of the NAFTA must give prior notice to the state 
which the entity in question is asserting to be a national of, and consultations must be 
conducted in accordance with Article 2006 of the NAFTA. The commentators of the 
NAFTA see the consultation requirement as “a safeguard preventing a too–hasty 
decision on the real nationality of an enterprise by permitting the other Party to provide 
information about the alleged “sham” corporation […].”636 Similarly, the 2004 
Canadian Model BIT allows the denial of benefits to companies with no substantial 
business activity subject to prior notification and consultation.637 However, the Plama v. 
Bulgaria tribunal saw in Article 1113 of the NAFTA the justification for an implied 
prior notice in the application of the denial of benefits clause under the ECT: 
“The Tribunal was referred to Article 1113(2) NAFTA as an example of a 
term providing for the denial of benefits which provides for a form of prior 
notification and consultation; and whilst the wording is materially different 
                                                
636
 Kinnear, Meg; Bjorklund, Andrea; Hannaford, John F.G.; Investment Disputes under NAFTA: An 
Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11, Alphen aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International, 2006, para. 
1113–6. Nevertheless, the commentators acknowledge that the requirement of such prior notification is 
“somehow unclear” and it “most likely means that, before asserting Article 1113 as a defense before a 
tribunal, the respondent Party must notify, and commence consultations with, the Party in which the 
claimant is located”. (id.) 
637
 Art. 18 of the 2004 Canadian Model BIT. Art. 18 makes reference to “notification and consultation in 
accordance with Art. 19 of the Canadian Model BIT, which does not provide per se for such procedure, as 
it mainly regulates transparency issues. Nevertheless, Art. 19(2) reads as follows: 
“To the extent possible, each Party shall: 
(a) publish in advance any such measure that it proposes to adopt; and 
(b) provide interested persons and the other Party a reasonable opportunity to comment on such proposed 
measures.” 
See also, Art. 18(2) of the Canada–Peru BIT, which refers to the following: 
“Subject to Article 19(3), a Party may deny the benefits of this Agreement to an investor of the other Party 
that is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investors if investors of a non–Party own or 
control the enterprise and the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the territory of the Party 
under whose law it is constituted or organized.” (Agreement between Canada and the Republic of Peru for 
the Promotion and Protection of Investments, signed on 14 November 2006, not in force) 
Art. 19(3) of the Canada–Peru BIT provides that 
“[u]pon request by a Party, information shall be exchanged on the measures of the other Party that may have 
an impact on covered investments.” 
Art. 70(2) of the Mexico–Japan Free Trade Agreement reads as follows: 
“Subject to prior notification and consultation, a Party may deny the benefits of this Chapter to an investor of 
the other Party that is an enterprise of such Party and to investments of such investor if investors of a non-
Party own or control the enterprise and the enterprise has no substantial business activities in the Area of the 
Party under whose law it is constituted or organized.” (Agreement between Japan and the United Mexican 
States for the Strengthening of the Economic Partnership, 1 April 1995) 
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from Article 17(1) ECT, this term does suggest that the Tribunal’s 
interpretation is not unreasonable as a practical matter.”638 
 
Such an implied requirement conflicts with the provisions of Article 31 of the Vienna 
Convention. The ordinary meaning of the terms used by Article 17 does not validate an 
implied requirement for a prior notification of investors by the Contracting Parties 
before exercising the denial of benefits right.639 Scholars agree with this: 
“A natural and ordinary reading of the words in Article 17(1) yields no 
express or necessary condition that the denying State must first give prior 
notification for the denial of advantages to be effective.”640 
 
The plain wording of the introductory part of Article 17 of the ECT justifies the right of 
a Contracting Party to deny, at any time and without any formality, the advantages of 
Part III of the ECT.641 
 
In Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal also found that when a Contracting Party exercises 
the right to deny the benefits of the promotion and protection of Investments, it can only 
do so with prospective effect. The tribunal rejected the retrospective effects of Article 
17 of the ECT, relying on the legitimate expectations of Investors and on the purpose of 
the ECT: 
                                                
638
 Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, para. 157. As noted by CHALKER, 
“[t]he tribunal did not address why the absence of a prior-notification provision, like NAFTA’s, in Article 
17(1)ECT did not indicate that such notification was not required to deny an investor the Treaty’s investment 
protections.” (Chalker, J.; supra at FN 626, p. 9) 
639
 See, Morocco Case; supra at FN 304, p. 199. 
640
 Jagusch, Stephen; Sinclair, Anthony; Part II–Denial of advantages under Article 17(1), p. 35, footnote 
omitted, in Coop, G; Ribeiro, C. (eds.); supra at FN 90. Other authors, however, suggested that states 
should enact “a law containing an abstract and general denial of benefits provision” (Essig, H.; supra at 
FN 632, p. 10), or that prudent states will make a declaration in its official gazette regarding the exercise 
of the rights under Article 17 of the ECT (Shore, L.; supra at FN 626, p. 63). 
641
 See also, JAGUSCH and SINCLAIR who refer to the negotiations of the ECT and the rejection of the 
proposal to include a notification procedure for bringing into effect the denial of benefits clause under 
Art. 17. (Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 640, p. 38). The authors are of the opinion that 
“[…] the Plama decision also appears to engender in States a perverse incentive to publish blanket denials or 
attempt to screen inward investment, neither of which would seem to be in accord with one of the overall 
purposes of the ECT to promote foreign investments in the energy sector.” (Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at 
FN 640, p. 40, emphasis original) 
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“The ECT’s express "purpose" under Article 2 ECT is the establishment of "... 
a legal framework in order to promote long–term co–operation in the energy 
field ... in accordance with the objectives and principles of the Charter" 
(emphasis supplied). It is not easy to see how any retrospective effect is 
consistent with this "long–term" purpose.”642 
 
The tribunal in the Yukos Cases concluded, in line with the decision of the Plama v. 
Bulgaria tribunal, that the application of the Article 17 of the ECT may only have 
prospective effects: 
“To treat denial as retrospective, would, in the light of the ECT’s “Purpose,” 
as set out in Article 2 of the Treaty […] be incompatible “with the objectives 
and principles of the Charter.” Paramount among those objectives and 
principles is “Promotion, Protection and Treatment of Investments” as 
specified by the terms of Article 10 of the Treaty. Retrospective application of 
a denial of rights would be inconsistent with such promotion and protection 
and constitute treatment at odds with those terms.643 
 
Article 2 provides that the purpose of the ECT is to develop a legal framework for the 
promotion of “long–term cooperation in the energy field”, which should be based on 
“complementarities and mutual benefits”. As the Amto v. Ukraine tribunal suggested, 
the denial of benefits clause is intended to strengthen long–term cooperation based on 
mutual benefits: 
“As the purpose of the ЕСТ is to establish a legal framework 'in order to 
promote long–term cooperation in the energy field, based on 
complementarities and mutual benefits...' then the potential exclusion of 
foreign owned entities from ЕСТ investment protection under Article 17 is 
readily comprehensible. 'Long term economic cooperation', 
'complementarities' or 'mutual benefits' are unlikely to materialise for the host 
State with a State that serves as a nationality of convenience devoid of 
                                                
642
 Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, para. 161, emphasis original. The tribunal also noted that 
“[t]he covered investor enjoys the advantages of Part III unless the host state exercises its right under Article 
17(1) ECT; and a putative covered investor has legitimate expectations of such advantages until that right’s 
exercise. A putative investor therefore requires reasonable notice before making any investment in the host 
state whether or not that host state has exercised its right under Article 17(1) ECT. At that stage, the putative 
investor can so plan its business affairs to come within or without the criteria there specified, as it chooses. It 
can also plan not to make any investment at all or to make it elsewhere. After an investment is made in the 
host state, the "hostage-factor" is introduced; the covered investor’s choices are accordingly more limited; 
and the investor is correspondingly more vulnerable to the host state’s exercise of its right under Article 17(1) 
ECT. At this time, therefore, the covered investor needs at least the same protection as it enjoyed as a 
putative investor able to plan its investment.” (Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, para. 161) 
643
 See, Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 458. 
 193
economic substance for an investment vehicle, or a State with which it does 
not enjoy normal diplomatic or economic relations.”644 
 
However, the tribunals in Plama v. Bulgaria and the Yukos Cases considered that to 
give retrospective effect to the denial of benefits clause would breach Investor’s 
legitimate expectations and would contradict the object and purpose of the ECT. 
Nevertheless, the purpose of the ECT for the long–term cooperation in the energy field, 
based on mutual benefits, does not automatically exclude a retrospective refusal of 
benefits for Investors and Investments which under normal circumstances would not be 
protected by the provisions of the ECT. Access to the protection granted by the ECT 
may only be based on reciprocal privileges and, as suggested by one author, 
“[o]ne could argue that the retrospective effect of Article 17(1) would benefit 
“long–term cooperation” by encouraging investors to be upfront about 
ownership, nationality and citizenship”.645  
 
Article 17 of the ECT provides for the circumstances under which the benefits of Part 
III on the promotion and protection of Investments may be denied to legal entities and 
Investments. The clause is not, therefore, excluding Investors from the ECT’s coverage, 
but it denies their access to some of the ECT’s provisions. The right to deny the 
advantages offered by Part III of the ECT must be exercised by the denying Contracting 
Party. The issue of whether there is an implied requirement under Article 17 of the ECT 
to exercise the denial of benefits right by way of prior notification,646 or whether the 
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 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 61. 
645
 Chalker, J.; supra at FN 626, p. 17. 
646
 As DOUGLAS explains, 
“[…] the Contracting Party need not exercise [the denial of benefits] right in relation to a specific legal entity 
until it is expedient to do so; viz. when the Contracting Party is on notice of the existence of the specific 
foreign investor and its particular circumstances. Unless the Contracting State be under an obligation to seek 
out foreign investors in its territory and conduct a full investigation of their ultimate owners or controllers 
and the extent of their business activities in various states, then the Contracting Party is on notice when 
arbitration proceedings are commenced.” (Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 472, para. 882) 
See also, VANDEVELDE who considers that 
“[h]ost states are not necessarily in a position to know whether third country nationals own or control an 
investment. Further, the fact may be of no significance until a dispute arises and an investor suddenly claims 
the benefit of a treaty […].” (Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at FN 271, p. 171) 
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denial right has prospective or retrospective effect are issues still controversial in the 
practice of the ECT tribunals.  
 
3.3 Denial of Benefits and Legal Entities 
 
The first situation dealt with by Article 17 of the ECT refers to the denial of benefits of 
Part III to a legal entity, if citizens or nationals of a third state own or control such entity 
and if that entity has no substantial business activities in the Area of the Contracting 
Party in which it is organized. The denial of benefits concerns legal entities and not 
individuals. Article 17(1) of the ECT refers to legal entities owned or controlled by 
nationals or citizens of third states, and, thus, it does not apply when legal entities are 
owned or controlled by permanent residents of third states. 
 
Article 17(1) of the ECT sets forth two cumulative conditions for a Contracting Party to 
exercise its right to deny the benefits to promotion and protection of Investments. Only 
legal entities controlled or owned by citizens or nationals of a third state and that have 
no substantial business activity in the Contracting Party where they are organized may 
be denied the benefit of Part III of the ECT. If one of the requisites provided by Article 
17(1) of the ECT is not met, the denial of the benefits clause is inapplicable.647 
 
a. Legal entities owned or controlled by nationals or citizens of a third state 
Article 17(1) of the ECT excludes the benefits of Part III to legal entities when owned 
or controlled by “citizens or nationals of a third state”. Article 17(1) limits the 
ownership and control to nationals and citizens, and does not include permanent 
                                                
647
 The tribunal in the Yukos Cases pointed out that 
“[i]t is apparent from the wording of Article 17(1) that two additional cumulative substantive conditions must 
be met before the “denial-of-benefits” clause can be exercised in respect of any particular entity.” (Yukos 
Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 460) 
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residents of third states. Further, the meaning of ‘third state’ in this context refers to a 
non–Contracting Party.648  
 
In the Yukos Cases, the tribunal had to interpret the reference to ‘third state’ under the 
first paragraph of the denial of benefits clause of the ECT. In doing so, the tribunal 
looked at several provision of the ECT that employ the wording ‘third state’ and 
reached the conclusion that the drafters of the ECT intended to refer to non–Contracting 
Parties: 
“[…] several provisions distinguish between a Contracting Party and third 
State (for example, Articles (1)(7), 10(3) and 10(7), and 17) and that there is 
no equation in the ECT between a Contracting Party and a third State. This 
conclusion is further supported by the travaux préparatoires, which 
demonstrate that the term “third state” was substituted for the term “non–
Contracting Party.”649 
 
The tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine concluded that ‘third state’ 
“[…] is used in Article 1(7) in contradistinction to ‘Contracting Party’, which 
suggests that a third state is any state that is not a Contracting Party to the 
ECT.”650 
 
                                                
648
 JAGUSCH and SINCLAIR conclude that “the “third state” in the first limb of the Article 17(1) is simply a 
non-Contracting Party.” See, Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 640, p. 19, emphasis original. The 
authors also consider that ‘third state’ may also include the host Contracting Party, when a legal entity is 
owned or controlled by nationals or citizens of the host Contracting Party, since they are not entitled to 
receive the protection of the ECT: 
“The interpretation of “third state” […] catches not only entities or nationals of States that are not 
Contracting Parties to the ECT, but might also apply in respect of entities or nationals of the host State to 
whom the ECT was never intended to confer international protection.” (Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A; supra at FN 
640, p. 19, emphasis original) 
649
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 544, emphasis original. In this context, the tribunal made the 
distinction between the meaning of ‘third state’ under Articles 7 and 17 of the ECT: 
“The transit provision of Article 7(10)(a)(i) is clearly distinguishable. That provision defines “transit” as 
(i) the carriage through the Area of a Contracting Party, or to or from port facilities in its Area for 
loading or unloading, of Energy Materials and Products originating in the Area of another state and 
destined for the Area of a third state, so long as either the other state or the third state is a Contracting 
Party;  
In this particular context, the term “third state” is used simply to designate the third of the three States 
necessarily involved in the transit relationship, and not a category of States distinct from Contracting Parties. 
The French version of the Treaty uses the term “troisième Etat” in Article 7(10)(a)(i), but “Etat tiers” 
elsewhere in the Treaty, clearly supporting the distinct meaning of the term in the different contexts.” (Yukos 
Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 545) 
See also, the ECT Draft of 15 March 1993, first version; supra at FN 609, which refers to “non-
signatory” instead of “third state”. For more comments on the meaning of ‘third state’ under Art. 17, see, 
Pinsolle, P., in Fernández–Ballesteros, M.Á.; Arias, D. (eds.); supra at FN 320, pp. 970–974. 
650
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 62. 
 196
While ownership of a legal entity appears to be a straightforward notion, the term 
‘control’ used by Article 17(1) of the ECT seems to be more complex. The only 
explanation of the notion of ‘control’ can be found in Understanding no. 3 of the Final 
Act.651 As mentioned before, the wording of Understanding no. 3 restricts its purpose to 
the definition of investment under Article 1(6) of the ECT,652 but, nevertheless, it offers 
guidance as to the understanding of the drafters with respect to the notion of 
‘control’.653 In establishing the meaning of ‘control’ for the purpose of Article 17, ECT 
tribunals looked behind the first layer of ownership or control,654 and discarded minority 
beneficiaries or ownership in assessing control.655 
 
b. Legal entities with no substantial business activity in the area of the Contracting 
Party where it is organized 
The second requirement for the application of Article 17(1) of the ECT refers to the 
absence of ‘substantial business activities’ of the legal entities in the Area of the 
Contracting Party where it is organized. The expression ‘substantial business activities’ 
is not defined by the ECT. In AMTO v. Ukraine, the tribunal discussed the meaning of 
the term ‘substantial’ and reached the conclusion that  
                                                
651
 See, supra at FN 524. 
652
 In Plama v. Bulgaria, the tribunal did not pay much attention to Understanding no. 3. It only did so 
when discussing the burden of proof under Article 17(1) of the ECT. See, Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 
93, para. 166. Similarly, the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine referred to Understanding no. 3 when discussing 
the burden of proof. See, Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 64. 
653
 For the notion of ‘control’ and the ECT, see, Chapter II.2.1.2 above. Whether tribunals consider that 
Understanding no. 3 is applicable in the case of Article 17(1) of the ECT, this brings in another 
consequence besides the explanation of the meaning of ‘control’. Understanding no. 3 places the burden 
of proof on Investor, should there be doubts as to such control. See, supra at FN 524. But see also, ESSIG: 
“Understanding 3 cannot be generalized as containing a rule that for all questions concerning the control over 
an investment the burden of proof is borne by the investor.” (Essig, H.; supra at FN 632, p. 13) 
654
 See, Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, paras 66–67; Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 536; Plama 
v. Bulgaria, Award; supra at FN 621, para. 88. 
Where the legal entity is controlled by nationals of a non–Contracting Party, but at the next layer it is 
controlled by nationals of a Contracting Party to the ECT, arguably, the denial of benefits would not 
apply. See also, JAGUSCH and SINCLAIR: 
“[…] it would follow that immediate ownership of a company by a national of a non-ECT Contracting Party 
would presumably not justify the application of Article 17 if the company’s ultimate beneficial owner were a 
national of an ECT Contracting Party.” (Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 629, p. 95) 
655
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 536. 
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“[…] in this context means 'of substance, and not merely of form'. It does not 
mean 'large', and the materiality not the magnitude of the business activity is 
the decisive question.”656 
 
The plain meaning of the terms ‘substantial business activities’ suggests that a legal 
entity should be more than a mere façade incorporated in the Contracting Party for other 
purposes than doing business there. As the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine put forward, it is 
not the size of the business that counts, but the existence of the business activities. As 
explained by some authors,  
“[…] one would expect that, at a minimum, [a company] will be engaged in 
buying, selling, and contracting in that territory beyond the normal activities 
or functions required merely by the fact of its corporate existence (such as 
corporate registration and administration, including holding requisite board or 
shareholders’ meetings and the payment of associated taxes and corporate 
registration fees).”657 
 
The term ‘substantial’ used by Article 17(1) of the ECT appears to have a qualitative 
rather than a quantitative meaning, and, therefore, intended to exclude the so–called 
‘mailbox companies’ from the protection of the ECT, since their activities either occur 
elsewhere or they are temporary or restricted to the existence of the legal entity in the 
area of a Contracting Party. The term ‘substantial’ also indicates that temporary 
activities would not be considered for the purpose of Article 17(1) of the ECT.658 The 
ECT does not provide for a list of criteria for determining whether legal entities have 
substantial business activity. However, tribunals should seek to determine this question 
based on the facts of each case, taking into consideration the nature and duration of their 
activities, whether or not they pay taxes and make profit or have permanent 
                                                
656
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 69. 
657
 Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 640, p. 20. The authors also suggest that 
“[o]ne would also expect such a company: (1) to have employees in the territory of the Contracting Party in 
which it is organised carrying out assignments in furtherance of the business; (2) to have resident managers 
involved in a hands-on manner in the actual decision-making of the business; (3) to be a party to substantial 
transactions in the Area of the Contracting Party associated with the furtherance of the business; (4) to pay 
taxes to the treasury of that Contracting Party in relation to profits earned from these transactions; and (5) to 
engage in procurement locally of inputs for the business.” (Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 640, p. 20) 
658
 See also, Jagusch, S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 640, p. 20. 
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employees.659 For instance, the tribunal in AMTO v. Ukraine held that claimant had 
substantial business activities in Latvia, based on the activities conducted there, which 
involved permanent staff.660 
 
3.4 Denial of Benefits to an Investment 
 
Article 17(2) of the ECT allows Contracting Parties to deny the benefits of Part III 
to Investments of an Investor of a third state if the denying Contracting Party (i) 
does not maintain diplomatic relation with this third state, or (ii) adopts or maintains 
measures that prohibit transactions with investors of the third state or such measures 
would be violated or circumvented if the benefits of Part III of the ECT were 
accorded to such investors or their investments. The denial of benefits clause to an 
Investment of an Investor of a third state on diplomatic or economic grounds is seen 
as a “means of furthering certain foreign policy goals of the host state by denying 
treaty benefits to investors of certain specific states.”661 
 
The denial of benefits to Investments is applicable if the prerequisites under Article 
17(2) of the ECT are met. First, the denying Contracting Party must establish that 
                                                
659
 JAGUSCH and SINCLAIR consider that these entities should also have resident managers and be party to 
substantial transactions in the Areas of the Contracting Parties in which they are organized. See, Jagusch, 
S.; Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 640, p. 20. 
660
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 69: 
“In the present case, the Tribunal is satisfied that the Claimant has substantial business activity in Latvia, on 
the basis of its investment related activities conducted from premises in Latvia, and involving the 
employment of a small but permanent staff.” 
See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Yaung Chi Oo Trading PTE Ltd. v. Government of the Union of 
Myanmar, Award of 31 March 2003, para. 52 regarding the “effective management” of Yaung Chi Oo 
Trading PTE Ltd., as required by Art. I.2 of the Agreement among the Government of Brunei 
Darussalam, the Republic of Indonesia, Malaysia, the Republic of the Philippines, the Republic of 
Singapore, and the Kingdom of Thailand for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 15 December 
1987. 
661
 Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at FN 271, p. 163. 
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such Investment is an Investment of an Investor of a third state.662 Secondly, there 
has to be a case where the Contracting Party either does not maintain diplomatic 
relations with the third state or adopts or maintains measures that would be 
incompatible with the benefits offered by Part III of the ECT. ECT tribunals have 
not yet been faced with situations where the respondent Contracting Party relied on 




The core Chapter of this Thesis analysed the notion of ‘Investor’ in the light of the 
definition of Article 1(7)(a) and the relevant provisions of the ECT. The interplay 
between the ECT and the ICSID Convention, in particular, showed that outside the 
ECT’s framework, the notion of ‘Investor’ suffers important restrictions that are 
relevant for the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals in the context of Investor–Contracting 
Party dispute resolution mechanism. The analysis also revealed that there are distinct 
limitations placed on the notion of ‘Investor’ in the context of the substantial and 
procedural protection of the ECT. The notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT generously 
encompasses natural persons – nationals, citizens and permanent residents of the 
Contracting Parties, and legal entities – companies and any other organizations 
organized in accordance with the laws of the Contracting Parties. Thus, the link between 
                                                
662
 Thus, the burden of proof is on the denying Contracting Party. See also, Mistelis, Loukas; Baltag, 
Crina; Denial of Benefits and Article 17 of the Energy Charter Treaty, p. 315, in Carbonneau, Thomas E.; 
Sinopole, Angelica M. (eds.); Building Civilization of Arbitration, London: Wildy, Simmonds & Hill 
Publishing, 2010. 
For the notion of ‘Investor of a third state’, see Art. 1(7)(b) of the ECT, which provides for the following: 
““Investor” means: 
[…] (b) with respect to a “third state”, a natural person, company or other organization which fulfils, mutatis 
mutandis, the conditions specified in subparagraph (a) for a Contracting Party.” 
The definition of an Investor of a third state was introduced following the proposal of the Legal Sub–
Group because there was “a need to define “Investor” not only in relation to a “Contracting Party” but 
also in respect to “third states”, since a “third state” standard is employed”. See, Memorandum of C. 
Bamberger, Chairman of the Legal Sub–Group, 27 May 1993.  
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Investor and the Contracting Parties can take various forms and it is not restricted to the 
bond of nationality.  
 
Natural persons qualify as ECT Investors if they possess the nationality or citizenship of 
or are permanent residents of the Contracting Parties, in accordance with their 
municipal laws. The ECT does not provide for definitions of nationality, citizenship or 
permanent residence, but it refers this matter to the laws of the Contracting Parties. The 
terms ‘nationality’ and ‘citizenship’, as revealed in this Chapter, may not have the same 
meaning for all the Contracting Parties. Relevant for the notion of ‘Investor’ is the 
quality of an individual to be “subject of a certain state”,663 irrespective of whether this 
link is called nationality or citizenship. In this context, the nature and legal effects of the 
EU citizenship have been considered. The EU citizenship cannot be construed as 
nationality for the purpose of international and investment law, mainly because it is a 
subsidiary ‘citizenship’ that attests the link between nationals of states and a regional 
organization, and which cannot exist in the absence of the nationality of an EU Member 
State. The ECT also extends its protection to permanent residents of Contracting 
Parties. Permanent residence only and not any type of residence, in accordance with the 
laws of the Contracting Parties, allows individuals to claim the protection of the ECT. 
 
A controversial issue related to Investor natural person, likely to arise in practice, refers 
to the dual nationality lato sensu. Article 26(1) of the ECT refers to disputes “between a 
Contracting Party and an Investor of another Contracting Party”. Although the terms of 
the ECT do not expressly exclude Investors of dual nationality lato sensu, it is argued 
that Article 26(1) suggests two possible interpretations: the consent under Article 26(1) 
of the ECT covers (a) disputes between a Contracting Party and an Investor of another 
                                                
663
 Jennings, R.; Watts, A.; supra at FN 278, p. 851. 
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Contracting Party, except for the respondent Contracting Party; or (b) disputes between 
a Contracting Party and an Investor of any other Contracting Party, including the 
respondent Contracting Party. The practice of states, and in particular that related to the 
exercise of diplomatic protection, is divided between the principle of non–
responsibility, which prevents a state from espousing a claim of its national who holds, 
at the same time, the nationality of the respondent state; and the principle of dominant 
nationality, which allows claims of individuals against one of their own states, as long 
as the dominant nationality is not of the respondent state. The documents of the ECT’s 
negotiation do not record any substantial discussion between the negotiating parties on 
the issue of dual nationality; some of the negotiating parties understood, however, that 
dual nationals are not excluded from the ECT’s coverage. Nevertheless, Article 25(2)(a) 
of the ICSID Convention contains an absolute prohibition for individuals who possess 
the nationality of a Contracting State and of the respondent Contracting State, although 
the drafting history of the ICSID Convention shows that the drafters of the ICSID 
Convention considered allowing these individuals to resort to the ICSID mechanism. 
The review of the dual nationality in the jurisprudence of international tribunals 
revealed that the principle of non–responsibility lost ground against the dominant 
nationality rule. Nonetheless, the application of the dominant nationality principle in 
investment law is not yet settled. These conclusions of the research are also valid when 
the individual is a national of a Contracting Party to the ECT and a permanent resident 
of the respondent Contracting Party or the opposite. When natural persons hold the 
nationality of or are permanent residents of a Contracting Party and of a non–disputing 
Contracting Party or third state, such situation would apparently not create problems for 
the jurisdiction of arbitral tribunals. 
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Companies and other organizations are probably the types of Investors that are more 
visible in claiming the protection of investment treaties. The ECT covers companies and 
any organization organized in accordance with the laws of the Contracting Parties. 
Article 1(7)(a)(ii) of the ECT retains the incorporation test for determining the link 
between legal entities and Contracting Parties. The analysis of the Societas Europaea 
revealed that this is not a company of EU nationality, but a company that has the 
nationality of the state of incorporation. The ECT does not approach the issue of state–
owned or controlled companies as Investors under the ECT, although the drafting 
history of the ECT reveals that earlier drafts included references to such companies as 
Investors under the ECT. As the ECT does not expressly exclude these companies, it is 
possible that ECT tribunals would follow the criteria adopted by the ICSID tribunals: 
state–owned or controlled companies will benefit from the ECT’s protection if they do 
not act as agents of the state and are not fulfilling essential governmental functions. 
 
Disputes against states are most often brought under investment treaties by shareholders 
of companies. Shareholders rely on the interest they hold in companies to ask for direct 
damages or for indirect damages caused by measures taken by the states that affect the 
companies and, indirectly, the value of their interest. The access of shareholders under 
the ECT is granted under Article 1(6) of the ECT, which provides that Investments may 
take the form of a company or business enterprise or shares, stock or other form of 
participation in a company. Article 26(7) of the ECT also allows legal entities that have 
the nationality of the host Contracting Party and are controlled by Investors of another 
Contracting Party to bring a dispute against the host Contracting Party. This provision, 
however, is restricted to disputes brought to the ICSID. Dual nationality of legal entities 
may occur when different states adopt varied criteria for considering these legal entities 
their nationals. The issue has been scarcely present in the scholarly debates and the 
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practice of international tribunals. If applying mutatis mutandis the analysis of the dual 
nationality of natural persons to legal entities, it can be deemed that the ECT does not 
restrict the access of legal entities possessing dual nationality. However, scholars have 
been reluctant in endorsing the rule of dominant nationality where legal entities also 
have the nationality of the host state. 
 
Not only companies, but any other organization organized in accordance with the laws 
of a Contracting Party may claim the status of Investor and the benefits of the ECT. The 
terms ‘other organization’ are broad enough to cover any type of association, with or 
without legal personality, from joint ventures to partnerships and non–profit association. 
However, particularly for NGOs, the extensive wording of Article 1(7) of the ECT is 
shaped by the notion of ‘Investment’. Also, for benefiting from the procedural 
protection of the ECT, NGOs must have an Investment within the meaning of the ECT 
and the dispute with a Contracting Party must relate to this Investment. 
 
The sole requirement imposed by the ECT on legal entities is their organization in 
accordance with the laws of the Contracting Parties. ECT tribunals discussed whether 
any other prerequisites can be inferred from the language of the ECT, such as the 
nationality of the ultimate beneficiaries of a legal entity. In the Yukos Cases, the tribunal 
forcefully rejected the existence of such requirements, relying on the text of the ECT 
and the principles of international law. Moreover, the Yukos tribunal concluded that it is 
bound to interpret the terms of the ECT as they are, and not “as they might have been 
written”.664 
 
                                                
664
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 413. 
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The final part of this Chapter discussed the limitations imposed on the notions of 
‘Investor’ and ‘Investment’ by the denial of benefits clause under Article 17 of the ECT. 
The denial of benefits clause, when exercised by the denying Contracting Party, restricts 
the benefits of the provisions for the protection and promotion of Investments to legal 
entities and Investments. For legal entities, the denial of benefits clause may be 
exercised where the legal entity is owned or controlled by nationals of a third state, and 
the legal entity does not have substantial business activity in the Contracting Party in 
which it is organized. For Investments, Article 17(2) of the ECT allows Contracting 
Parties to rely on the denial of benefits clause against Investments of Investors of third 





CHAPTER III – INVESTOR AND THE NOTION OF INVESTMENT UNDER 
THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY  
 
For an Investment–related claim to succeed to the merits phase, an ECT arbitral tribunal 
must also be satisfied that the Investor has an Investment within the meaning of the 
ECT.665 The fact that natural persons or legal entities fulfil the requirements imposed by 
the ECT in respect of the notion of ‘Investor’ is not sufficient. The consent of the 
Contracting Parties on the types of disputes that can be submitted to the Contracting 
Party–Investor dispute resolution mechanism extends to disputes between an Investor 
and a Contracting Party relating to an Investment.666 Apart from this, the substantive 
protection undertaken by the Contracting Parties is mostly directed towards Investments 
of Investors. For example, Article 10(1) of the ECT provides that Contracting Parties 
shall accord at all time fair and equitable treatment to Investments of Investors, and that 
Investments shall enjoy the most constant protection and security. The notion of 
‘Investment’ is, thus, indissolubly connected to the notion of ‘Investor’. 
 
The notion of ‘investment’ is controversial: it is much used by investment treaties, 
scholars and tribunals, but, as in the case of the notion of ‘nationality’, there is no 
universal definition of the concept. Referring to the notion of ‘investment’ in a 
conference paper of 1961, LAUTERPACHT summarized the hurdles encountered by the 
drafters of investment instruments in trying to find the proper definition of the notion of 
‘investment’:  
                                                
665
 When an ECT dispute is brought for resolution under the provisions of the ICSID Convention, 
investors must observe a two–fold test, both jurisdictional requirements of the ECT and of the ICSID 
Convention must be satisfied. Similar test must be considered for the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. 
666
 Art. 26(1) of the ECT. 
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“But what is “an investment” for these purposes? The word is not a term of art 
in international law and there is room for a variety of interpretations and 
approaches. […] For example, is “investment” the same as “property”? To this 
the answer is No. The word “investment” carries with it some additional 
connotation representing the idea of development, growth or return. Not all 
property possesses these characteristics.”667 
 
The concept of ‘investment’ does not have the same meaning for lawyers and 
economists.668 For investment treaties, investments are seen as “subset of assets”,669 
while economists portray investment as “a phenomenon, a process, or an action.”670 
Investments, unlike ordinary commercial transactions, require more than a simple 
exchange of performances. SORNARAJAH defines investments as involving the transfer 
of tangible or intangible assets from one country into another “for the purpose of their 
use in that country to generate wealth under the total or partial control of the owner of 
                                                
667
 Lauterpacht, E.; supra  at FN 67, p. 28. LAUTERPACHT further reflects upon the test for determining 
what constitutes an investment: 
“It is, of course, possible to enumerate the categories of property which the Parties are prepared to regard as 
constituting an investment. Alternatively, one can introduce a subjective test–for example, that an investment 
for the purposes of convention is made with the consent of the recipient State and acknowledged by it to be 
an investment.” (Lauterpacht, E.; supra  at FN 67, p. 28) 
668
 As metaphorically explained by a scholar, “[t]he notion of investment is a notion in motion.” See, 
Nathan, K. V. S. K.; ICSID Convention. The Law of the International Centre for Settlement of Investment 
Disputes, New York: JurisNet, LLC, 2000, p. 111. See also, Dugan, C.; Wallace jr., D.; Rubins, N. D.; 
Sabahi, B.; supra at FN 198, p. 247. 
669
 It is argued that these treaties “set forth definitions of investment that are quite broad and unhelpful”. 
See, Dugan, C.; Wallace Jr., D.; Rubins, N. D.; Sabahi, B.; supra at FN 198, p. 247.  
670
 Rubins, Noah; The Notion of ‘Investment’ in International Investment Arbitration, p. 284, footnote 
omitted, in Horn, Norbert; Kröll, Stefan (eds.); Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, The Hague: 
Kluwer Law International, 2004. For the dual nature of the notion of ‘investment’, see also, Salacuse, 
Jeswald W.; The Law of Investment Treaties, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010, pp. 18–19. See 
also, the distinction between direct investments – the traditional notion of ‘investment’ – and portfolio 
investments. The OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment refers to foreign direct 
investments as follows: 
“Foreign direct investment reflects the objective of obtaining a lasting interest by a resident entity in one 
economy (‘‘direct investor’’) in an entity resident in an economy other than that of the investor (‘‘direct 
investment enterprise’’). The lasting interest implies the existence of a long-term relationship between the 
direct investor and the enterprise and a significant degree of influence on the management of the enterprise. 
Direct investment involves both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent capital 
transactions between them and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated.” (OECD; 
OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment, 3rd edition, 1999, pp. 7–8) 
The IMF distinguishes portfolio investment from other investments as it “provides a direct way to access 
financial markets, and thus it can provide liquidity and flexibility”, while it “is associated with financial 
markets and with their specialized service providers, such as exchanges, dealers, and regulators.” See, 
International Monetary Fund; Balance of Payments and International Investment Position Manual, 6th 
edition, Washington D.C.: International Monetary Fund, 2009 p. 99. Usually, the difference between 
portfolio investment and direct investment is the absence of management and control rights of the 
investor under portfolio investments. See, Sornarajah, M.; supra at FN 439, p. 8. 
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the assets”.671 BROWNLIE, in his Separate Opinion in the CME v. Czech Republic, noted 
that the application of the provisions of an investment treaty “necessarily involves 
recognition” of some elements out of which one refers to “the nature of investment as a 
form of expenditure or transfer of funds for the precise purpose of obtaining a 
return.”672 
 
1. INVESTMENT AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 
 
Article 1(6) of the ECT provides for the definition of the notion of ‘Investment’, as 
follows: 
““Investment” means every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or 
indirectly by an Investor and includes: 
(a) tangible and intangible, and movable and immovable, property, and any 
property rights such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges; 
(b) a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other forms of equity 
participation in a company or business enterprise, and bonds and other debt of 
a company or business enterprise; 
(c) claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to contract having an 
economic value and associated with an Investment; 
(d) Intellectual Property;673 
(e) Returns;674 
(f) any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licences and 
permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any Economic Activity in the 
Energy Sector.”675 
                                                
671
 Sornarajah, M.; supra at FN 439, p. 7.  
672
 CME v. Czech Republic, Separate Opinion of Ian Brownlie; supra at FN 581, para. 34. 
673
 Pursuant to Art. 1(12) of the ECT, Intellectual Property “includes copyrights and related rights, 
trademarks, geographical indications, industrial designs, patents, layout designs of integrated circuits and 
the protection of undisclosed information.” 
674
 The term ‘Returns’ is defined by Art. 1(9) of the ECT as: 
“[…] amounts derived from or associated with an Investment, irrespective of the form in which they are paid, 
including profits, dividends, interest, capital gains, royalty payments, management, technical assistance or 
other fees and payments in kind.” 
675
 The documents of the negotiation of the ECT show that Art. 1(6) of the ECT was one of the most 
debated provisions of the ECT, after the provisions of Art. 10 on the Promotion, Protection and Treatment 
of Investments. 
The Basic Protocol of 11 September 1991 defined Investment as follows: 
““Investment” means every kind of asset, including changes in the form in which assets are invested and in 
particular, though not exclusively, includes any of the following: 
(i) movable and immovable property and any other related property rights such as mortgages liens or pledges; 
(ii) shares in, and stock, bonds and debentures of, and any other form of participation in, a company or 
business enterprise; 
(iii) claims to money, and claims to performance under contract having a financial value; 
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Paragraph three of Article 1(6) of the ECT specifies that 
““Investment” refers to any investment associated with an Economic Activity 
in the Energy Sector and to investments or classes of investments designated 
by a Contracting Party in its Area as “Charter efficiency projects” and so 
notified to the Secretariat.” 
 
The provisions of Article 1(6) of the ECT offer a broad approach to the notion of 
‘Investment’, as it virtually covers any kind of asset, whether owned or controlled 
directly or indirectly by an Investor. It also offers a non–exhaustive enumeration of the 
kinds of assets that could be covered by the notion of ‘Investment’. Nevertheless, the 
notion of ‘Investment’ is particularized to investments that are associated with an 
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector, a concept explained in Article 1(5) of the 
ECT: 
““Economic Activity in the Energy Sector” means an economic activity 
concerning the exploration, extraction, refining, production, storage, land 
transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing, or sale of Energy 
Materials and Products except those included in Annex NI, or concerning the 
distribution of heat to multiple premises.” 
 
The ECT refers to the notion of ‘Investment’ as “any kind of asset” and provides for an 
open list of assets that may constitute an Investment.676 It is common for BITs to offer a 
                                                                                                                                          
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical processes, know-how and any other benefit or advantage 
attached to a business; 
(v) rights, conferred by law or under contract, to undertake any commercial activity, including the search for, 
or the cultivation, extraction or exploitation of natural resources; 
which is used in connection with the implementation of the principles of the Charter and in accordance with 
the provisions of this Agreement.” (Art. 1(e) of the Basic Protocol of 11 September 1991, 8/91 BP 2) 
Art. 1(4)(f) of the Basic Agreement of 20 January 1992, 4/92 BA 6, also included 
“[…] goods which under a leasing agreement are placed at the disposal of a lessee in the Territory of a 
Contracting Party in conformity with its laws and regulations”. 
The same draft defined Investment as 
“[…] every kind of asset, which are used in connection with the implementation of the principles of the 
Charter and in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement” (Art. 1(4)) 
The version of 19 March 1992 of the Basic Agreement added to the definition of Investment “every kind 
of asset, which has been used or is used”. See, Art. 1(4) of the Basic Agreement of 19 March 1992, 17/92 
BA 10. 
676
 The tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine summarized the definition of ‘Investment’ under Article 1(6) of the 
ECT as follows: 
“This definition of Investment has three parts: a wide definition ('every kind of asset') illustrated by a list of 
six types of rights; a clarification (covering changes in form, and a temporal qualification of the investment), 
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non–exhaustive list of assets or activities that may be regarded as covered 
investments.677 There are, however, other treaties providing for an exhaustive list of 
covered assets and transactions that may qualify as an investment. Article 1139 of the 
NAFTA, for example, contains two lists of assets: assets that may be considered 
investments,678 and assets that are excluded from the notion of ‘investment’.679 Some 
                                                                                                                                          
and a restriction as to the types of economic activity included in the definition of investment. The definition 
part reflects a standard formula of investment treaties; the clarifications are also routine; and the restriction 
reflects the purpose of the Energy Charter Treaty to promote long term cooperation in a particular sector, 
namely the energy sector.” (Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 36) 
As explained by WAELDE, the ECT “assigns the widest possible meaning to the term “investment”, 
basically encompassing any legal right of financial value.” See, Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 270–
271. 
677
 The United Kingdom-Armenia BIT refers to investment as 
“[…] every kind of asset and in particular, though not exclusively, includes: 
(i) movable and immovable property and any other property rights such as mortgages, liens or pledges; 
(ii) shares in and stock and debentures of a company and any other form of participation in a company; 
(iii) claims of money or to any performance under a contract having a financial value; 
(iv) intellectual property rights, goodwill, technical process and know-how; 
(v) business concessions conferred by law or under contract, including concessions to search for, cultivate, 
extract or exploit natural resources.” (Art. 1(a) of the Agreement between the Government of the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Republic of Armenia for the 
Promotion and Protection of Investments, 11 July 1996) 
As explained by DOLZER and STEVENS,  
“[…] BITs have adopted a more elaborate formula, illustrated by a list of five groups of specific rights which 
usually include traditional property rights, rights in companies, monetary claims and titles to performance, 
copyrights and industrial property rights as well as concessions and similar rights. It is frequently stated that 
these illustrations are not exhaustive.” (Dolzer, R.; Stevens, M.; supra at FN 424, p. 26) 
678
 Art. 1139 of the NAFTA provides that 
“[…] investment means:  
(a) an enterprise;  
(b) an equity security of an enterprise;  
(c) a debt security of an enterprise  
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or  
(ii) where the original maturity of the debt security is at least three years,  
but does not include a debt security, regardless of original maturity, of a state enterprise;  
(d) a loan to an enterprise  
(i) where the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or  
(ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years,  
but does not include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise;  
(e) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of the enterprise;  
(f) an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that enterprise on dissolution, 
other than a debt security or a loan excluded from subparagraph (c) or (d);  
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of 
economic benefit or other business purposes; and  
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to economic 
activity in such territory, such as under  
(i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of the Party, including turnkey or 
construction contracts, or concessions, or  
(ii) contracts where remuneration depends substantially on the production, revenues or profits of an 
enterprise” 
679
 These refer to: 
“[…] (i) claims to money that arise solely from  
(i) commercial contracts for the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party 
to an enterprise in the territory of another Party, or  
(ii) the extension of credit in connection with a commercial transaction, such as trade financing, 
other than a loan covered by subparagraph (d); or  
(j) any other claims to money,  
that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in subparagraphs (a) through (h)”. 
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treaties are more explicit as to the characteristics an asset must have in order to be 
regarded as an investment. Article 1 of the United States Model BIT refers to 
investment as 
“[…] every asset that an investor owns or controls, directly or indirectly, that 
has the characteristics of an investment, including such characteristics as the 
commitment of capital or other resources, the expectation of gain or profit, or 
the assumption of risk.”680 
 
However, as observed by the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan, 
“[t]here is no uniform definition of the term investment, but the meaning of 
this term varies […]. While in ordinary language investment is often 
understood as being capital or property used as a financial basis for a company 
or a business activity with the aim to produce revenue or income, wider 
definitions are frequently found in treaties on the protection of investments, 
whether bilateral (BITs) or multilateral (MITs). 
The term investment must therefore be interpreted in the context of each 
particular treaty in which the term is used.”681 
 
A definition, by essence, requires certain criteria against which potential concepts, 
activities, assets etc. should be tested. As noted by MANCIAUX, 
“[…] if a definition is necessary, it could not result from an enumerative 
method retained in the near totality of international treaties, if not because an 
enumeration, no matter how long, has never constituted a definition.”682 
 
                                                
680
 Art. 1 of the 2004 United States Model BIT. The definition continues with a non–exhaustive 
enumeration of the forms that an investment may take: 
“[…] (a) an enterprise; 
(b) shares, stock, and other forms of equity participation in an enterprise; 
(c) bonds, debentures, other debt instruments, and loans; 
(d) futures, options, and other derivatives; 
(e) turnkey, construction, management, production, concession, revenue-sharing, and other similar contracts; 
(f) intellectual property rights; 
(g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to domestic law; and 
(h) other tangible or intangible, movable or immovable property, and related property rights, such as leases, 
mortgages, liens, and pledges.” 
681Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 69, emphasis original. 
682
 Manciaux, Sébastien; The Notion of Investment: New Controversies, 9(6) Journal of World Investment 
and Trade (2008), p. 6. See also, Robert Azinian and others v. United Mexican States, Award of 1 
November 1999, para. 90: “Labelling is, however, no substitute for analysis.” Also, the Cour D’Appel de 
Paris in the Decision of 25 September 2008 in the case of Czech Republic v. Pren Nreka, for the 
annulment of the Arbitral Award of 15 March 2007, p. 5: “[…] les dispositions du TBI [BIT] qui viennent 
d'être rappelées ne fournissent pas de critère pour caractériser ce qu'est un investissement mais donnent 
seulement une énumération, et encore de manière non limitative, des cas considérés comme des 
investissements […].” 
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The understanding of the definition of ‘Investment’ under Article 1(6) of the ECT must 
rely on the ordinary meaning of the terms used therein, in their context and in 
accordance with the object and purpose of the ECT.683 Article 1(6) refers to any asset 
and provides for a non–exhaustive list of such assets that may qualify as an Investment. 
However, there may be assets that, although not listed, could be considered 
Investments. The question, therefore, refers to what kind of test should be applied in 
assessing whether such assets are Investments. 
 
While the terms of a treaty must be interpreted within their ordinary meaning,684 this 
must not result in a simple grammatical or literal interpretation of the text, thus ignoring 
the context and the object and purpose of the treaty.685 The principle of integration calls 
for the interpretation of the provisions of a treaty in the context in which they occur.686 
In the Advisory Opinion No. 2, the PCIJ stated the principle as follows: 
“[…] it is obvious that the Treaty must be read as a whole, and that its 
meaning should not be determined merely upon particular phrases which, if 
detached from the context, may be interpreted in more than one sense.”687 
 
The term ‘context’ includes “the remaining terms of the sentence and of the paragraph; 
the entire article at issue; and the remainder of the treaty”.688 It is therefore required for 
the terms of a treaty to be given a contextual interpretation, starting with the actual 
sentence in which they emerge. This, in turn, means that the drafters intended to give a 
meaning to each term in the treaty. In accordance with the rule of non–surplus, the 
                                                
683
 Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention. 
684
 Which is the “current and normal (regular, usual) meaning”. See, Villiger, Mark E.; Commentary on 
the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Leiden and Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishes, 
2009, p. 426. 
685
 Iranian Oil Case; supra at FN 156, p. 104 
686
 See, Fitzmaurice, G.G.; supra at FN 194, p. 9; Vattel, E.; supra at FN 155, pp. 254–255; Publius 
Celsus: Incivile est, nisi tota lege perspecta, una aliqua particula eius proposita iudicare vel respondere 
(unofficial translation: “It is improper to judge or to counsel based on a fragment of the law, without 
taking into consideration the law in its entirety”). 
687
 Advisory Opinion No. 2 of 12 August 1922 (Competence of the ILO in regard to International 
Regulation of the Conditions of the Labour of Persons Employed in Agriculture), p. 23. 
688
 Villiger, M. E.; supra at FN 684, p. 427. 
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parties to a treaty “must be presumed to have used the particular word or words 
intending that they should have some significance.”689 As explained by FITZMAURICE, 
the rule of non–surplus is a consequence of the principle of effectiveness, which refers 
to the interpretation of the provisions of a treaty so as to “give them their fullest weight 
and effect consistent with the normal sense of words and with other parts of the text, in 
such a way that a reason and a meaning can be attributed to every part of the text.”690 
 
The rules of interpretation as presented above must be applied to the provisions of 
Article 1(6) of the ECT in order to shed light on the meaning of the notion of 
‘Investment’. Paragraph 3 of the Article specifies that “”Investment” refers to any 
investment associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector and to 
investments or classes of investments designated by a Contracting Party”. The term 
‘Investment’ appears in this text four times: once with capital ‘I’, “Investment”, and 
quotation marks and three times in lower case, ‘investment’ or ‘investments’. The 
provision employs the wording ““Investment” refers to any investment”. Similarly, 
paragraph 2 of the Article 1(6) refers to “[a] change in the form in which assets are 
invested does not affect their character as investments and the term “Investment” 
includes all investments, whether existing at or made after the later of the date of entry 
into force”. The term ‘investment’ also appears in this provision as ‘Investment’ and 
‘investment’. The provision also refers to ““Investment” [that] includes all 
investments”. While it is clear that the term “Investment” has the meaning designated 
by Article 1(6) – Article 1 of the ECT referring to “Definitions”, the issue to be 
                                                
689
 Hogg, James H.; The International Court: Rules of Treaty Interpretation II, 44 Minn. L.Rev. 5 (1959–
1960), p. 11. See also, the Separate Opinion of Judge Anzilotti in the Lighthouse Case Between France 
and Greece, Judgment of 17 March 1943, p. 31: 
“[…] it is a fundamental rule in interpreting legal texts that one should not lightly admit that they contain 
superfluous words: the right course, whenever possible, is to seek for an interpretation which allows a reason 
and a meaning to every word in the text.” 
690
 Fitzmaurice, G.; supra at FN 156, p. 211. See also, VILLIGER who, relying on Art. 31(1) of the Vienna 
Convention, concludes that there is “the presumption that the treaty terms were intended to mean 
something, rather than nothing.” See, Villiger, M. E.; supra at FN 684, p. 425, footnote omitted. 
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clarified is the meaning of the term ‘investment’ in lower case. The principles of 
integration and effectiveness, together with the rule of non–surplus, suggest that the 
Contracting Parties intended to give a different meaning to the two terms.691 As 
suggested by VATTEL, 
“[i]f any one of those expressions which are susceptible of different 
significations occurs more than once in the same piece, we cannot make it a 
rule to take it every–where in the same signification. For we must […] take 
such expression, in each article, according as the subject requires […].” 692 
 
It appears that the Contracting Parties to the ECT ascribed an objective meaning to the 
term ‘investment’ in lower case, according to which the notion of “Investment”, as 
established by Article 1(6), should be tested against.693 Otherwise, the expressions 
under paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 1(6) would be rendered meaningless: 
“It ought to be interpreted in such a manner, as that it may have its effect, and 
not prove vain and nugatory […].”694 
 
If such objective meaning would be ignored, than the wording ““Investment” refers to 
any investment” would be stripped of its proper meaning.695 This would go against the 
rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention. Moreover, such objective meaning, as 
supported by the wording of Article 1(6), allows for assets not listed under the 
definition to be considered Investments if they fall under this meaning of the term 
                                                
691
 Other provisions of the ECT refer to the notion of ‘investment’ in lower case, but as adjectives and not 
as nouns: trade-related investment measure (e.g. Article 10(11)), investment agreements and investment 
authorizations (e.g. Article 10(12)), inward investments (e.g., Article 14(3)), energy investment projects 
(e.g. Article 19(1)(i)). 
692
 Vattel, E.; supra at FN 155, p. 252, emphasis original. 
693
 As suggested by the drafting documents of the ECT, 
“[…] the practice in the ECT [is] of using initial capital letters to identify defined terms. […] we could find 
no persuasive rationale that would justify departing from the ECT’s existing usage […].” (Message No. 269L, 
Subject: Legal Sub–Group Meeting – Report, 10 October 1994) 
See also, Art. 1(4) of the Basic Agreement of 12 August 1992, 37/92 BA 15, which refers to Investment 
as “every kind of energy investment”. 
694
 Vattel, E.; supra at FN 155, p. 253, emphasis original. 
695
 Further, if the drafters of the ECT would have intended to give the same meaning to ‘Investment’ and 
‘investment’, they could have simply used one of the terms or a different wording of the provisions in 
which these terms appear. For example, paragraph 3 of Art. 1(6) could have been: ““Investment” must be 
associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector”, rather than ““Investment refers to any 
investment associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector”. 
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‘investment’. Likewise, since Article 1(6) of the ECT virtually covers “every asset”, not 
all assets will constitute an Investment, but only those assets that, pursuant to paragraph 
3, represent an “investment associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy 
Sector”.696 
 
A similar conclusion was reached by the tribunal in Romak v. Uzbekistan, a non–ECT 
arbitration under the UNCITRAL Rules, where the tribunal had to interpret the meaning 
of the notion of ‘investment’ under the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT.697 The dispute 
arose between Romak S.A., a Swiss company, and Uzbekistan in connection with a set 
of contracts of supply of wheat between Romak S.A. and three Uzbek entities.698 In 
interpreting the notion of ‘investment’, the tribunal relied on the ordinary meaning of 
                                                
696
 See also, the comments of CABROL with respect to the non–exhaustive list of assets in the definition of 
‘investment’ in BITs: 
“[…] it will not suffice for the tribunal to check that the operation matches one of the items listed in the 
article. This only checks that the form of investment in question falls under the BIT. However, it will also 
have to consider whether the operation itself qualifies as an investment.” (Cabrol, Emmanuelle; Pren Nreka 
v. Czech Republic and the Notion of Investment under Bilateral Investment Treaties. Does “Investment” 
Really Mean “Every Kind of Asset”?, p. 229, in Sauvant, Karl P.; Yearbook on International Investment Law 
& Policy 2009–2010, New York: Oxford University Press, 2010) 
697
 Agreement between the Swiss Confederation and the Republic of Uzbekistan concerning the 
Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 5 November 1993. See, Romak S.A. v. Republic of 
Uzbekistan, Award of 26 November 2009, para. 7. 
698
 Uzkhleboproduct (or Uzdonmakhsulot), Uzdon and Odil. See, Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, 
para. 14 et seq. The UNCITRAL arbitration was preceded by another arbitration under the auspices of the 
Grain and Feed Trade Association (GAFTA), where the tribunal ruled that Romak S.A. was entitled to 
receive the payment for the delivered wheat and awarded damages in the amount of USD 10,510,629 plus 
interest. See, Romak v. Uzbekistan, supra, para. 52 et seq. After unsuccessful attempts to enforce the 
GAFTA award, Romak S.A. commenced the arbitration against Uzbekistan relying on the Uzbekistan–
Switzerland BIT. To this extent, Uzbekistan objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal by arguing, among 
others, that the underlying transaction does not qualify as an investment within the meaning of Article 
1(2) of the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT. Art. 1(2) of the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT provides that 
“[t]he term “investments” shall include every kind of assets and particularly: 
a. movable and immovable property as well as any other rights in rem, such as servitudes, mortgages, liens, 
pledges; 
b. shares, parts or any other kind of participation in companies; 
c. claims to money or to any performance having an economic value; 
d. copyrights, industrial property rights (such as patents, utility models, industrial designs or models, trade or 
service marks, trade names, indications of origin), technical processes, know-how and goodwill; 
e. concessions under public law, including concession to search for, extract or exploit natural resources as 
well as all other rights given by law, by contract or by decision of the authority in accordance with the law.” 
(para. 97) 
According to Uzbekistan, the sale of goods, which was the transaction envisaged by the agreements 
between the Claimant and the Uzbek entities, does not constitute an investment under the Uzbekistan–
Switzerland BIT. See, Romak v. Uzbekistan, supra at FN 697, para. 98. This argument was supported, 
claimed the respondent, by the fact that Uzbekistan and Switzerland negotiated and concluded at the same 
time with the BIT, a separate agreement regulating the relations between these two states with respect to 
sales of goods. See, Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation (ATEC), Romak v. Uzbekistan, 
supra at FN 697, para. 100. 
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the terms of the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT, in their context and in the light of its 
object and purpose. The tribunal rejected Romak S.A.’s request to “simply confirm that 
the Claimant’s assets fall within one or more of the categories listed in Article 1(2) of 
the BIT, thus sponsoring a construction of the BIT that puts special emphasis on the 
literal words in the list”.699 The Romak v. Uzbekistan tribunal considered the list of 
assets under Article 1(2) of the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT a non–exhaustive 
enumeration that “do not constitute an all–encompassing definition of “investment”.”700 
Assets that are not explicitly listed must be assessed against a “benchmark”, which, in 
the tribunal’s opinion, is the meaning of the notion of ‘investment’ itself.701 The 
interpretation of the notion of ‘investment’, therefore, cannot rely on the literal meaning 
of the terms only, but also on the context and object and purpose of the Uzbekistan–
Switzerland BIT, as required by Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention.702 A 
“mechanical” application of Article 1(2) of the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT, without 
considering the rules of interpretation of the Vienna Convention, would produce a 
manifestly absurd and unreasonable result and “would eliminate any practical limitation 
to the scope of the concept of “investment””.703  
 
                                                
699
 Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 178, footnote omitted. 
700
 Ibid., para. 180. 
701
 Id. The language of the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT differs essentially from one used in Art. 1(6) of 
the ECT, as the ‘benchmark’ referred to by the tribunal – the notion of ‘investment’ itself – is not 
expressly mentioned therein.  
702
 Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 181. The tribunal relied on the Preamble of the 
Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT to find the object and purpose of the BIT: “by referring to “economic 
cooperation to the mutual benefit of both States” and to the “aim to foster the economic prosperity of both 
States”, suggests an intent to protect a particular kind of assets, distinguishing them from mere ordinary 
commercial transactions.” See, Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 189, emphasis original. 
Art. 31(1) of the Vienna Convention refers to the “the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the 
treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose”. However, “object and purpose functions 
as a means of shedding light on the ordinary meaning rather than merely as an indicator of a general 
approach to be taken to treaty interpretation.” See, Gardiner, R.; supra at FN 101, p. 190. See also, infra, 
Chapter III.7, for the controversy surrounding the requirement built on the Preamble of the ICSID 
Convention that refers to the contribution to the economic development of the host state. 
703
 Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, paras 184–185.  
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The ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’ includes “the action or process of 
investing money for profit or material result”, “the thing that is worth buying because it 
may be profitable or useful in the future”, “an act of devoting time, effort, or energy to 
a particular undertaking with the expectation of a worthwhile result”.704 The tribunal in 
Romak v. Kazakhstan referred to the ordinary meaning of ‘investments’ as “the 
commitment of funds or other assets with the purpose to receive a profit, or “return,” 
from that commitment of capital”,705 while the term ‘asset’ “means property of any 
kind”.706 In Saba Fakes v. Turkey, the tribunal considered the criteria of contribution, 
certain duration and risk as “necessary and sufficient” for the definition of investment 
within the meaning of the ICSID Convention.707 The tribunal went on and explained 
that 
“[t]hese three criteria derive from the ordinary meaning of the word 
‘investment’, be it in the context of a complex international transaction or that 
of the education of one’s child: in both instances, one is required to contribute 
a certain amount of funds or know–how, one cannot harvest the benefits of 
such contribution instantaneously, and one runs the risk that no benefits would 
be reaped at all, as the project might never be completed or a child might not 
be up to his parents’ hopes or expectations.”708 
 
The ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’ must effectively encompass at least two 
elements, contribution and returns, while the third one, the risk, may, nevertheless, be 
deemed inherent to any investment, given the contribution and returns criteria.709 As for 
                                                
704
 The New Oxford American Dictionary; supra at FN 136, p. 887. GARDINER refers to dictionaries as 
allowing “the basic discovery of ordinary meaning of a term” (Gardiner, R.; supra at FN 101, p. 166) 
705
 Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 177, footnote omitted. The tribunal cites the definition of 
‘investment’ of the Black’s Law Dictionary: 
“Investment. (16c) 1. An expenditure to acquire property or assets to produce revenue; a capital outlay. 2. 
The asset acquired or the sum investment. 3. Investiture. 4. Livery of Saisin.” (Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at 
FN 697, note 152, emphasis original) 
706
 Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 177, footnote omitted. The tribunal refers to the Black’s 
Law Dictionary for the definition of ‘asset’: 
“Asset. (16c) 1. An item that is owned and has value. 2. (pl.) The entries on a balance sheet showing the 
items of property owned, including cash, inventory, equipment, real estate, accounts receivable, and 
goodwill. 3. (pl.) All the property of a person (esp. a bankrupt or deceased person) available for paying debts 
or for distribution.” (Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, note 153, emphasis original) 
707




 See, the conclusion of the tribunal in Alpha v. Ukraine: 
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the element of ‘duration’ retained by the tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Turkey, it appears 
that the ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’ does not discriminate between 
investments of one hour and investments of three years. Portfolio investments, for 
example, may vary between a few minutes and few years.  
 
The interpretation of Article 1(6) of the ECT suggests that the while the definition of 
‘Investment’ is broad enough to encompass “every kind of asset, owned or controlled 
directly of indirectly by an Investor”, it is not boundless. Paragraph 3 of Article 1(6) 
restricts the notion of ‘Investment’ to “investment associated with an Economic 
Activity in the Energy Sector”. Besides the required association between the 
Investment and the Economic Activity in the Energy Sector, the Investment must be an 
investment within the ordinary meaning of the term. Consequently, not “every asset” is 
an Investment under the ECT, but only those assets that are investments. For example, 
sale of goods and other one–off transaction, although associated with an Economic 
Activity in the Energy Sector, may not be construed as Investments, as they do not 
satisfy the requirement to be investments within the ordinary meaning of the term. 
 
Investors may only submit a dispute under Article 26 of the ECT if there is a dispute 
relating to an Investment that concerns an alleged breach of the obligations under Part 
                                                                                                                                          
“Should a tribunal find it necessary to check whether a transaction falls outside any reasonable understanding 
of “investment,” the criteria of resources, duration, and risk would seem fully to serve that objective.” (Alpha 
Projektholding GmbH v. Ukraine, Award of 8 November 2010, para. 312) 
See also, Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 189: 
“Rule 23. The Economic materialisation of an investment requires the commitment of resources to the 
economy of the host state by the claimant entailing the assumption of risk in expectation of a 
commercial return.” (emphasis original, footnote omitted) 
DOUGLAS’ conclusion was retained by the tribunal in Pantechniki S.A. Contractors & Engineers v. 
Republic of Albania, Award of 30 July 2009, paras 36–47. See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Toto 
Costruzioni v. Lebanon: 
“In the absence of specific criteria or definitions in the ICSID Convention, the underlying concept of 
investment, which is economical in nature, becomes relevant: it implies an economical operation initiated and 
conducted by an entrepreneur using its own financial means and at its own financial risk, with the objective 
of making a profit within a given period of time.” (Toto Costruzioni Generali S.p.A. v. Republic of Lebanon, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 11 September 2009, para. 84) 
For further comments on the ‘risk’ criterion, see Baltag, Crina; The Risk of Investment under the ICSID 
Convention, 3(5) TDM (2006). 
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III of the ECT.710 The ECT does not define the terms “disputes […] relating to an 
Investment”,711 but the words “relating to” suggest that a dispute should be connected 
or associated with an Investment, terms that are broader than the wording ‘dispute 
arising out of an Investment’.712  
 
The notion of ‘Investment’ under the ECT is not settled in the practice and literature of 
the ECT. While the ECT case law is not yet abundant, it raises interesting debates 
concerning the notion of ‘Investment’.713 The provision under Article 1(6)(b) of the 
ECT – “a company or business enterprise, or shares, stock, or other forms of equity 
participation in a company or business enterprise, and bonds and other debt of a 
company or business enterprise” – was discussed by several ECT tribunals. In the 
Yukos Cases, the tribunal rejected the argument of the Russian Federation that the 
drafters of the ECT meant beneficial rather than legal ownership. Referring to the 
wording of Article 1(6)(b) of the ECT, the Yukos tribunal found that it contains 
“[…] the widest possible definition of an interest in a company […], with no 
indication whatsoever that the drafters of the Treaty intended to limit 
ownership to “beneficial” ownership.”714 
 
The tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia held that indirect ownership of shares 
constitutes an investment under the ECT.715 Similar conclusion was reached by the 
tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine: 
                                                
710
 Art. 26(1) of the ECT. 
711
 See also, Waelde, Thomas W.; Ben Hamida, Walid; The Energy Charter Treaty and corporate 
acquisition, p. 187, in Coop, G.; Ribeiro, C. (eds.); supra at FN 90. 
712
 See also, on this wording, Lew, Julian D.M.; Mistelis, Loukas A.; Kröll, Stefan M.; Comparative 
International Commercial Arbitration, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003, p. 169. 
Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention extends the jurisdiction of the ICSID to “any legal dispute arising 
directly out of an investment”. The wording of this provision reduces significantly the types of disputes 
covered by the ICSID mechanism. 
713
 See, the OGEMID discussion on the notion of Investment under Art. 1(6) of the ECT and the ICSID 
Convention, were Kaj HOBÉR concludes that 
“[…] we have discussed numerous critical and thorny issues that arbitral tribunals may struggle with when 
interpreting fundamental concepts of investment instruments [and] these discussions will continue […] in 
front of arbitral tribunals.” (OGEMID; Guest Kaj Hobér: The Investor as the Initiator of Emerging Trends in 
Investment Treaty Interpretation, 8(1) TDM (2011)) 
714
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 430. 
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“The Arbitral Tribunal accepts that the Claimant owns 204,165 shares in 
EYUM–10. These shares constitute a kind of asset owned by the Claimant 
within the definition of the first part of Article 1(6) ЕСТ, and in particular 
constitute 'shares ...in a company or business enterprise' identified in Article 
1(6)(b).”716 
 
The issue whether contracts of sale and other one–off transactions could be covered by 
the definition of Investment under Article 1(6) of the ECT was debated in Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan.717 The tribunal concluded that, although the dispute in this case related to a 
contract for the sale of gas condensate, it constituted an investment within the meaning 
of the ECT.718 While taking into account the provision of Article 1(6)(c) of the ECT 
                                                                                                                                          
715
 Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, para. 124: 
“The Tribunal is of the view that, in the present case, the indirect ownership of shares by Claimant constitutes 
an “investment” under the BIT and the ECT”. 
716
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 39, emphasis original. Also, Mohammad Ammar Al–Bahloul 
v. Republic of Tajikistan, Partial Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 2 September 2009, para 142: 
“[…] the Energy Charter Treaty protects not only directly, but also indirectly, owned or controlled 
investments. It applies to assets held through an intermediary company in a non-ECT State. Here, Claimant 
alleges he owns and controls 100% of the shares in Vivalo […], and thus indirectly owns shares in the 
Baldjuvon and Petroleum SUGD joint ventures companies.” 
See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in AES v. Hungary: 
“Both actions (purchasing the company and carrying out the Retrofit of the power station) qualify as 
investments in accordance with Article 1(6) of the ECT […].” (AES v. Hungary; supra at FN 240, para. 
6.2.5) 
717
 Under the ICSID Convention, the issue was recently discussed by the tribunal in Globex v. Ukraine. 
The claimants, Global Trading Resource Corp. and Globex International Inc., alleged that Ukraine 
breached its obligations under the US–Ukraine BIT by failure to pay and take most of the poultry shipped 
by the claimants under several sale and purchase contracts. (Globex Trading Resource Corp. and Globex 
International, Inc. v. Ukraine, Award of 1 December 2010, para. 39) The tribunal concluded that sale–
purchase contracts are pure commercial transactions and cannot qualify as an investment under Art. 25 of 
the ICSID Convention. Although the claimants argued that they were induced to conclude the contracts 
by the Ukrainian Prime–Minister, the tribunal in Globex v. Ukraine held that this particularity does not 
change the nature of the transactions. The tribunal concluded that 
these are individual contracts, of limited duration, for the purchase and sale of goods, on a commercial basis 
and under normal CIF trading terms, and which provide for delivery, the transfer of title, and final payment, 
before the goods are cleared for import into the recipient territory; and that neither contracts of that kind, nor 
the money expended by the supplier in financing its part in their performance, can by any reasonable process 
of interpretation be construed to be ‘investments’ for the purposes of the ICSID Convention. (Globex v. 
Ukraine, para. 56) 
See also the conclusion of the Annulment Committee in MHS v. Malaysia 
It appears to have been assumed by the [ICSID] Convention’s drafters that use of the term “investment” 
excluded a simple sale and like transient commercial transactions from the jurisdiction of the Centre. 
(Malaysian Historical Salvors SDN BHD v. Malaysia, Decision on the Application for Annulment of 16 
April 2009, para. 69) 
718
 Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, pp. 69 and 72. Claimant’s claim also referred to the 
judgements of the Bishkek Court, which recognized the rights of the claimant deriving from the sale 
contract. The tribunal dismissed Petrobart’s argument on this issue and concluded that 
“[…] a correct legal analysis leads to the conclusion that the Contract and the judgment are not in themselves 
assets but merely legal documents or instruments which are bearers of legal rights, and these legal rights, 
depending on their character, may or may not be considered as assets. The relevant question which requires 
consideration is therefore whether the rights provided for in the Contract and confirmed in the judgment 
constituted assets and were therefore an investment in the meaning of the Treaty. In other words, the question 
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providing for “claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to contract having 
an economic value and associated with an Investment”, the tribunal in Petrobart v. 
Kyrgyzstan held that this provision is not unusual for investment treaties, as the 
definition of ‘investment’ “is often a wide concept in connection with investment 
protection and […] claims to money may constitute investments even if they are not 
part of a long–term business engagement in another country.”719 However, the tribunal 
rejected this argument in determining whether claimant had an Investment within the 
meaning of the ECT since the provision under Article 1(6)(c) “presents certain 
ambiguities”. As the tribunal suggested,  
“[…] it is not entirely clear whether the words “pursuant to contract having an 
economic value and associated with an Investment” or parts of these words – 
“having an economic value and associated with an Investment” or “associated 
with an Investment” – relate only to “claims to performance” or also to 
“claims for money”. If we assume that at least the terms “associated with an 
Investment” also relate to “claims for money”, we are faced with the logical 
problem that the term “Investment” is not only the term to be defined but is 
also used as one of the terms by which “Investment” is defined. This means 
that the definition is in reality a circular one which raises a logical problem 
and creates some doubt about the correct interpretation.”720 
 
Considering that the Article 1(6)(c) is a circular provision, the tribunal decided to 
pursue a different line of reasoning and referred to the provisions of Article 1(6)(f), 
which encompasses “any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licenses 
and permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any Economic Activity in the Energy 
Sector.” The conclusion of the tribunal was that “a right conferred by contract to 
                                                                                                                                          
is whether Petrobart’s right under the Contract to payment for goods delivered under the Contract was an 
asset and constituted an investment under the Treaty.” (Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN, p. 71) 
719
 Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 71. In Al–Bahloul v. Tajikistan, the claimant entered into 
six oil and gas exploration agreements with the State Committee for Oil & Gas of Tajikistan. See, Al–
Bahloul v. Tajikistan, supra at FN 716, para. 136. The tribunal held that 
“[s]ince the exercise of the exploration and exploitation rights pursuant to these agreements requires the 
issuance of a license, they cannot be considered to constitute “rights conferred by law…to undertake any 
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector” […]. However, they do give Claimant a contractual right […] to the 
issuance of necessary licenses to start these activities […]. As such, they may be considered as “claims to 
performance pursuant to contract having an economic value and associated with an Investment” […]. It is 
clear that they relate to an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector, and therefore satisfy that requirement as 
well.” (Al–Bahloul v. Tajikistan, supra at FN 716, para. 139, emphasis original) 
720
 Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan; supra at FN 124, p. 72.  
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undertake an economic activity concerning the sale of gas condensate is an investment 
according to the Treaty”721  
 
As shown above, the ECT envisaged an objective notion of ‘Investment’. Although the 
list provided by Article 1(6) is generous and could virtually encompass any asset, 
paragraph 3 of Article 1(6) calls for the Investment to be an “investment associated 
with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector”. As explained by the tribunal in 
Romak v. Uzbekistan, pure commercial transactions, such as one–off sales of goods, 
may constitute an investment if included by the states in the covered investments under 
a BIT.722 However, “in such cases, the wording of the instrument in question must leave 
no room for doubt that the intention of the contracting States was to accord to the term 
“investment” an extraordinary and counterintuitive meaning.”723 The tribunal in 
Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan disregarded the objective meaning of the notion of 
‘investment’, as stated in paragraph 3 of Article 1(6) and misinterpreted the provisions 
of Article 1(6)(c). Article 1(6)(c) refers to “claims to money and claims to performance 
pursuant to contract having an economic value and associated with an Investment”. 
There is no circular or unclear meaning of this provision, as suggested by the tribunal. 
                                                
721
 Id. The Svea Court of Appeal upheld the conclusion of the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan, stating 
that 
“[…] the term investment can have different meaning in different international contexts. The meaning of the 
term as defined in the ECT has a wide scope of application. […] 
The Court of Appeal finds, as well as the Arbitral Tribunal, that the definitions in Article 1 (6) and 1 (5) in 
the ECT must be interpreted as including the investment made by Petrobart. Thus, it can not be claimed that 
the arbitration award is not covered by a valid arbitration agreement between the parties.” (Republic of 
Kyrgyzstan v. Petrobart Ltd., Svea Court of Appeal; supra at FN 204, p. 8) 
722
 Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 205. 
723
 Id. The tribunal gave considerable weight to the ATEC concluded at the same time with the BIT by 
Uzbekistan and Switzerland. See, supra at FN 698. 
The tribunal in Romak v. Uzbekistan also relied on the object and purpose of the BIT, which refers to 
“economic cooperation to the mutual benefit of both States” and to the “aim to foster the economic 
prosperity of both States”. In the opinion of the tribunal, the object and purpose of the BIT suggests “an 
intent to protect a particular kind of assets, distinguishing them from mere ordinary commercial 
transactions”. See, Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 189. See also, the Draft OECD 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment refers to claims of money, which may also arise from sales of 
goods or services, and concludes that “[t]hese claims are not generally considered as investments.” 
(OECD; OECD Draft Multilateral Agreement on Investment, DAFFE/MAI(98)8/REV1, 22 April 1998, p. 
7, pt. 11) 
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The textual interpretation of the terms of Article 1(6)(c) suggest that ‘claims to money’ 
and ‘claims to performance’, arising from a ‘contract’ which has ‘an economic value’ 
and it is ‘associated with an Investment’ are to be considered potential Investments.724 
It is not claims to money, as possible Investments, that must be associated with an 
Investment – the interpretation which lead the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan to 
conclude that Article 1(6)(c) is a circular provision, but the contract from which the 
claims to money arise.725 These contracts – the contract for sale of gas condensate in 
Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan – must be associated with an Investment,726 which was not the 
case in this dispute.727 Similarly, Article 1(6)(f) of the ECT refers to “any right 
conferred by law or contract or by virtue of any licenses and permits granted pursuant 
to law to undertake any Economic Activity in the Energy Sector.” The provision refers 
to “any right […] to undertake any Economic Activity in the Energy Sector”, while this 
right can be granted pursuant to ‘law’, ‘contract’, ‘licenses’ and ‘permits’. While the 
notion of ‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’ is broad enough to cover 
                                                
724
 The requirement for the contracts to be associated with an Investment was suggested by the United 
States delegation. See, Basic Agreement of 24 June 1992, 32/92 BA 14. 
725
 This suggests that there is an indirect association between the claims to money and the claims to 
performance and the Investment. This provision is, thus, correlated with Art. 26(1) of the ECT that refers 
to “[d]isputes […] relating to an Investment”. 
The tribunal in Al–Bahloul v. Tajikistan, supra at FN 716, para. 136, had the opportunity to discuss this 
provision and to revisit the conclusions of the Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan, but it simply concluded that 
claimant’s Investment falls under the provisions of Art. 1(6)(c) of the ECT. 
726
 See also, Poulain, B.; Energy Charter Treaty – Petrobart vs. The Kyrgyz Republic – a few reservations 
regarding the Tribunal’s constructions of the material, temporal and spatial application of the Treaty, 
3(3) OGEL (2005): 
“[…] this position appears to dismiss a little too quickly the very last part of this definition, which requires a 
link – or an association – with an «Investment».” (Poulain, B.; supra, p. 3) 
For a similar opinion, see, Zukova, Galina; The Award in Petrobart Limited v. Kyrgyz Republic, pp. 337–
338, in Alvarez Aguilar, Guillermo; Reisman, Michael W. (eds); The Reasons Requirement in 
International Investment Arbitration; Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2008. See also, Douglas, Z.; 
supra at FN 292, pp. 184–185, paras 385–389. 
727
 Similar provision can be found in Article 1(c)(iii) of the 1983 United States Model BIT, which refers 
to “a claim of money or a claim to performance having economic value, and associated with an 
investment”. See, Art. 1(c)(iii) of the 1983 United States Model BIT, in Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at 569, p. 
780. As VANDEVELDE points out with reference to the 1983 United States Model BIT, “[t]he phrase 
“associated with an investment” is intended to exclude claims associated with a current commercial 
transaction, such as the sale of goods.” See, Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at 569, p. 117. 
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“marketing, or sale of Energy Materials and Products”,728 paragraph 3 of Article 1(6) 
still requires for an Investment to be an investment within the ordinary meaning of the 
term. The two provisions discussed by the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan are not 
sufficient to justify the inclusion of one–off transactions, such as sale of gas, under the 
notion of ‘Investment’.729 
 
2 INVESTMENT ASSOCIATED WITH AN ECONOMIC ACTIVITY IN THE ENERGY 
SECTOR 
 
The definition of ‘Investment’ under Article 1(6) extends only to “investments 
associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector”. Economic Activity in the 
Energy Sector is defined by Art. 1(5) of the ECT as 
“[…] an economic activity concerning exploration, extraction, refining, 
production, storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, 
                                                
728
 Art. 1(5) of the ECT. But see, PETROCHILOS and RUBINS, who suggest that one–off transactions are 
covered by both Articles 1(6)(c) and 1(6)(f): 
“[i]t would have been relatively simple for the ECT’s drafters to indicate, either in the treaty text or in 
supporting documentation, that trade contracts were not intended to fall within the scope of treaty protection. 
This could have been done by removing the words “marketing” and “sale” from Article 1(6)(f) and narrowly 
defining the types of “investment” to which contract rights must be related to qualify under the Treaty.” 
(Petrochilos, Georgios; Rubins, Noah; Final Arbitral Award Rendered in 2005 in SCC Case 126/2003 
Petrobart Ltd v. The Kyrgyz Republic, SIAR 2005:3, para. 26) 
However, contrary to what the authors assert, paragraph 3 of Art. 1(6) of the ECT requires that 
Investments must constitute an investment. While the authors consider that it is possible that “the phrase 
“and associated with an Investment” in Article 1(6)(c) was intended to limit ECT’s coverage to contract 
related to more traditional investment projects”, they suggest that the literal interpretation of this 
provision allowed the tribunal to conclude that Petrobart made an Investment. See, Petrochilos, G; 
Rubins, N; supra, para. 26. The textual interpretation of Art. 1(6)(c), though, suggests the opposite 
conclusion.  
729
 As POULAIN explains,  
“[i]f today, it is accepted that bilateral and multilateral instruments adopt a broad definition of the concept of 
«investment», transactions in the international sale of goods traditionally stay on the fringe of this 
characterization.” (Poulain, B.; supra at FN 726, p. 5) 
WAELDE, in a paper published in 1996, considered that the expansion of the notion of ’investment’ “has 
not yet reached merely contractual claims against government or private entities, arising out of short–
term commercial transactions without relation to a more lasting, more substantial, “investment” project.” 
See, Waelde, T.W; supra at FN 66, p. 271, footnote omitted. In a paper published after the award in 
Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan was rendered, WAELDE reconsidered his earlier opinion and concluded that 
“[…] the ECT covers not only contractual claims to performance when the contract is part of a foreign direct 
investment scheme–the traditional notion, but also simple contract claims, e.g. non-payment on a sales 
contract or embodied in a judgment based on a sales contract.” (Waelde, Thomas W.; Investment Arbitration 
under the Energy Charter Treaty: An Overview of Selected Key Issues based on Recent Litigation 
Experience, p. 232, in Horn, N.; Kröll, S. (eds.); supra at FN 670) 
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marketing, or sale of Energy Materials and Products except those included in 
Annex NI, or concerning the distribution of heat to multiple premises.”730 
 
Understanding no. 2 of the Final Act clarifies the notion of “Economic Activity in the 
Energy Sector” by providing an illustrative list of such Activity: 
“[…] (i) prospecting and exploration for, and extraction of, e.g., oil, gas, coal 
and uranium; 
(ii) construction and operation of power generation facilities, including those 
powered by wind and other renewable energy sources; 
(iii) land transportation, distribution, storage and supply of Energy Materials 
and Products, e.g., by way of transmission and distribution grids and pipelines 
or dedicated rail lines, and construction of facilities for such, including the 
laying of oil, gas, and coal–slurry pipelines; 
                                                
730
 Annex NI of the ECT reads as follows: 
“27.07 Oils and other products of the distillation of high temperature coal tar; similar products in which the 
weight of the aromatic constituents exceeds that of the non-aromatic constituents (e.g., benzole, toluole, 
xylole, naphtalene, other aromatic hydrocarbon mixtures, phenols, creosote oils and others). 
44.01.10 Fuel wood, in logs, in billets, in twigs, in faggots or in similar forms. 
44.02 Charcoal (including charcoal from shells or nuts), whether or not agglomerated.” 
The concept of “Energy Materials and Products” is defined by Art. 1(4) of the ECT: 
““Energy Materials and Products”, based on the Harmonized System of the Customs Co-operation Council 
and the Combined Nomenclature of the European Communities, means the items included in Annex EM.” 
Annex EM to the ECT provides for the following Energy Materials and Products: Nuclear energy 26.12 
Uranium or thorium ores and concentrates; 26.12.10 Uranium ores and concentrates; 26.12.20 Thorium 
ores and concentrates; 28.44 Radioactive chemical elements and radioactive isotopes (including the 
fissile or fertile chemical elements and isotopes) and their compounds; mixtures and residues containing 
these products; 28.44.10 Natural uranium and its compounds; 28.44.20 Uranium enriched in U235 and its 
compounds; plutonium and its compounds; 28.44.30 Uranium depleted in U235 and its compounds; 
thorium and its compounds; 28.44.40 Radioactive elements and isotopes and radioactive compounds 
other than 28.44.10, 28.44.20 or 28.44.30; 28.44.50 Spent (irradiated) fuel elements (cartridges) of 
nuclear reactors; 28.45.10 Heavy water (deuterium oxide); Coal, Natural Gas, Petroleum and 
Petroleum Products, Electrical Energy 27.01 Coal, briquettes, ovoids and similar solid fuels 
manufactured from coal; 27.02 Lignite, whether or not agglomerated excluding jet; 27.03 Peat (including 
peat litter), whether or not agglomerated; 27.04 Coke and semi-coke of coal, of lignite or of peat, whether 
or not agglomerated; retort carbon; 27.05 Coal gas, water gas, producer gas and similar gases, other than 
petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons; 27.06 Tar distilled from coal, from lignite or from peat, 
and other mineral tars, whether or not dehydrated or partially distilled, including reconstituted tars; 27.07 
Oils and other products of the distillation of high temperature coal tar; similar products in which the 
weight of the aromatic constituents exceeds that of the non-aromatic constituents (e.g., benzole, toluole, 
xylole, naphtalene, other aromatic hydrocarbon mixtures, phenols, creosote oils and others); 27.08 Pitch 
and pitch coke, obtained from coal tar or from other mineral tars; 27.09 Petroleum oils and oils obtained 
from bituminous minerals, crude; 27.10 Petroleum oils and oils obtained from bituminous minerals, other 
than crude; 27.11 Liquified petroleum gases and other gaseous hydrocarbons - natural gas, - propane, - 
butanes, - ethylene, propylene, butylene and butadiene (27.11.14), - other. In gaseous state: - natural gas, 
- other; 27.13 Petroleum coke, petroleum bitumen and other residues of petroleum oils or of oils obtained 
from bituminous minerals; 27.14 Bitumen and asphalt, natural; bituminous or oil shale and tar sands; 
asphaltites and asphaltic rocks; 27.15 Bituminous mixtures based on natural asphalt, on natural bitumen, 
on petroleum bitumen, on mineral tar or on mineral tar pitch (e.g., bituminous mastics, cut-backs); 27.16 
Electrical energy; Other Energy 44.01.10 Fuel wood, in logs, in billets, in twigs, in faggots or in similar 
forms; 44.02 Charcoal (including charcoal from shells or nuts), whether or not agglomerated. 
For the Harmonized System of the Customs Co–operation Council and the Combined Nomenclature of 
the European Communities, see Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 of 23 July 1987 on the tariff and 
statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff; Commission Regulation (EC) No 948/2009 
of 30 September 2009 amending Annex I to Council Regulation (EEC) No 2658/87 on the tariff and 
statistical nomenclature and on the Common Customs Tariff.  
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(iv) removal and disposal of wastes from energy related facilities such as 
power stations, including radioactive wastes from nuclear power stations; 
(v) decommissioning of energy related facilities, including oil rigs, oil 
refineries and power generating plants; 
(vi) marketing and sale of, and trade in Energy Materials and Products, e.g., 
retail sales of gasoline; and 
(vii) research, consulting, planning, management and design activities related 
to the activities mentioned above, including those aimed at Improving Energy 
Efficiency.” 
 
The documents of the ECT’s negotiation show that there were various proposals on the 
relationship between Investments and the Economic Activities in the Energy Sector 
until the final version was approved. The proposal to restrict the definition of 
Investment to the energy field was suggested by the United States delegation in March 
1992.731 The Basic Agreement of 12 August 1992 referred to “every kind of energy 
investment”,732 while the Basic Agreement of 21 October 1992 defined the notion of 
‘Investment’ as “every kind of energy asset”.733 Later on, it was suggested to replace 
the reference to “energy asset” with “every kind of asset employed in the activities of 
exploration, production, conversion, storage, transport, distribution and supply of 
Energy Materials and Products […] and, in related services”.734 The Basic Agreement 
of 9 February 1993 inserted a new paragraph in the definition of the notion of 
‘Investment’ according to which, “[f]or the purposes of this Agreement, “Investment” 
refers to any investment associated with an economic activity in the Energy Sector.”735 
 
                                                
731
 Basic Agreement of 19 March 1992, 17/92 BA 10. 
732
 Art. 1(4) of the Basic Agreement of 12 August 1992, 37/92 BA 15. 
733
 Art. 1(4) of the Basic Agreement of 21 October 1992, 53/92 BA 22. 
734
 Note from the Chairman of Working Group II, 8 December 1992. The proposal was inserted in the 
Basic Agreement of 21 December 1992, 76/92 BA 31. 
735
 Art. 1(5) paragraph 3 of the Basic Agreement of 9 February 1993, 15/93 BA 35. The “Energy Sector” 
was defined as “the exploration, extraction, production, conversion, storage, transmission, distribution 
and trade in, marketing and sales of Energy Materials and Products […]”, while the illustrative list of 
economic activities in the Energy Sector included the activities currently included in Understanding no. 2. 
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The definition under Article 1(5) excludes maritime and air transportation,736 and 
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector concerning the Energy Materials and Products 
listed in Annex NI.737 The term ‘Economic Activity’ suggests that only activities having 
economic character are considered for the purpose of the ECT.738 Given this economic 
nature of the activity, it is suggested that “purely scientific activities, e.g. by foreign 
scientific organizations, are not covered” by the definition under Article 1(5) of the 
ECT.739 
 
While many of the activities listed in Understanding no. 2 “are traditional activities 
associated with the energy industry and should not, in practice, raise particular 
difficulty”,740 the critical point of paragraph 3 of Article 1(6) of the ECT is the wording 
“associated with”.741 The issue raised by the terms ‘associated with’ refers to the degree 
of association between investment and an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector in 
order to recognize an Investment. The tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine explained that  
                                                
736
 Art. 1(5) refers to “land transportation” only. The early definition of Economic Activity in the Energy 
Sector generally referred to “transport”. See, for example, ECT Draft of 1 June 1993, third version, 46/93 
CONF 60. The proposal to exclude maritime and air transportation came with the seventh version of the 
ECT Draft and it was suggested by the United States and Japan. According to this proposal, the following 
provision should have been inserted in the ECT: 
“Nothing in the Treaty shall apply to maritime transport (including inland waterways) and related activities, 
and to air transport (including specially air services).” (ECT Draft of 17 March 1994, seventh version, 17/94 
CONF 96) 
However, 
“[…] the extension of the definition of ‘Investment’ to investments (i.e. assets) ‘associated with’ an 
‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector” attenuates the sectoral restriction of the Treaty’s protections and 
dispute resolution mechanisms; it can provide a basis for claiming coverage, for example, with respect to 
otherwise uncovered petrochemical facilities within an oil refinery complex, or maritime transportation that is 
‘associated with’ a covered on-land investment.” (Bamberger, Craig; Linehan, Jan; Waelde, Thomas; The 
Energy Charter Treaty, para. 4.16, in Roggenkamp, Martha; Redgwell, Catherine; Rønne, Anita; Del Guayo, 
Iñigo (eds.); Energy Law in Europe. National, EU and International Law and Institutions, New York: Oxford 
University Press, 2001) 
737
 See, supra at FN 730. 
738
 The New Oxford American Dictionary defines the term ‘economic’ as “relating to economics or the 
economy”, while the notion of ‘economics’ means “the branch of knowledge concerned with the 
production, consumption, and transfer of wealth” and the term ‘economy’ refers to “the wealth and 
resources of a country or region”. See, The New Oxford American Dictionary; supra at FN 136, p. 536. 
739
 Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 273. 
740
 Gaillard, E.; supra at FN 420, p. 66. 
741
 WAELDE referred to it as an “open–ended term”. See, Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, pp. 273–274. 
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“[t]he drafters of the Energy Charter Treaty did not require an Investment to 
be an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector, but only to be 'associated with' 
such an activity.”742 
 
The Energy Charter Secretariat, referring to the terms ‘investment associated with an 
economic Activity in the Energy Sector’, emphasises that 
“[t]he term “associated with” implies that it includes not only the 
establishment of an energy company as such (e.g. a refinery), but also 
investments indirectly linked to economic activity in the energy sector (e.g. 
office space associated with a refinery)”.743 
 
The ordinary meaning of the terms ‘associated with’ refers to something that is 
“connected with something else”,744 while the term ‘connected’ is understood as to 
“have a link or relationship with” or to “associate or relate in some respect”.745 This 
suggests, as noted by the tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine, that while there must be a link or 
a relationship between an investment and an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector, 
there is no identity requirement between an investment and an Economic Activity in the 
Energy Sector to identify an Investment within the meaning of the ECT. Or, as clarified 
by the Amto v. Ukraine tribunal, 
“[t]he associated activity of any alleged investment must be energy related, 
without itself needing to satisfy the definition in Article 1(5) of an Economic 
Activity in the Energy Sector.”746 
 
Nevertheless, the terms ‘associated with’ do not exclude the identity between an 
investment and an Economic Activity, which suggests that an Investment may be any 
investment identified as an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector.747  
 
                                                
742
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 42. 
743
 The Energy Charter Treaty. A Reader’s Guide; supra  at FN 52, p. 21. 
744
 The New Oxford American Dictionary; supra at FN 136, p. 95. 
745
 Ibid., p. 361. 
746
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 42. 
747
 “Cui licet quod est plus, licet utique quod est minus”, Regulae Iuris in VI Decretalium Bonifacii VIII, 
1298 (unofficial translation: Who may do more, may do less). 
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The tribunal in Amto v. Ukraine explained that the association between an Investment 
and an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector should be based on “factual rather than 
legal” association. 748 In the tribunal’s opinion,  
“[a] mere contractual relationship with an energy producer is insufficient to 
attract ЕСТ protection where the subject matter of the contract has no 
functional relationship with the energy sector.”749 
 
WAELDE separated potential Investments associated with an Economic Activity in the 
Energy Sector into two categories: “clearly covered core zones of related activities”,750 
and “mixed (energy/non–energy) investments”.751 For the first category, he gave the 
example of a company having “an energy label […] in the firm’s name and […] 
predominantly engaged in energy services”,752 while for the second, he referred to “a 
department of a larger organization [that] provides energy–focused services”,753 and to 
“a company [that] is only occasionally engaged, with an energy company, in 
commercial transactions of a type that has no energy–specificity”.754 In the case of 
mixed investments, WAELDE noted that the situation of a company occasionally 
engaged in commercial transactions having no energy–specificity would not qualify for 
the ECT’s coverage since “there must be a substantial, and lasting, energy–industry 
specificity written clearly on the face of a covered activity.”755 However, Article 1(6) 
and Understanding no. 2 of the ECT do not refer to a “substantial” and “lasting” 
                                                
748
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 42. 
749
 Ibid., para. 42. 
750








 Id. WAELDE referred here to “selling non-energy-specific products and services to, or purchasing 
energy products from, an energy project.” See, Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 274. 
755
 Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 274. For the mixed (energy/non–energy) investments, WAELDE 
suggested two approaches: “either to make a separation (for application of the Treaty’s standards and 
Article 26 arbitration), which is very difficult in practice; or to establish if the energy character or the 
non–energy activity predominates.” See, Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 274. 
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association between an investment and an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector.756 
The ordinary meaning of the terms ‘associated with’ suggests that a link between an 
Investment and an Economic Activity is sufficient to qualify an Investment under the 
ECT.757 Nonetheless, Article 1(6) of the ECT requires that such association is 
established between an “investment” and an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector, 
which leads to the conclusion that one–off transactions, even substantially associated 
with an Economic Activity, will not qualify as an Investment for the purpose of the 
ECT. 
 
The requirement in paragraph 3 of Article 1(6) of the ECT was extensively discussed in 
Amto v. Ukraine. The claimant, a Latvian investment company,758 purchased 67.2% of 
the shares in EYUM–10,759 a Ukrainian company, having as main activity the 
“'installation of electric wiring and reinforcement', 'installation of fire and security 
alarm systems' and 'painting works'”.760 EYUM–10 provided services to ZAES, the 
largest nuclear power plant in Ukraine and a division of the National Nuclear Power 
                                                
756
 The documents of the negotiation of the ECT record a proposal from the Japanese delegation, which 
suggested to particularize Investments as “any investment associated with an economic activity whose 
principal purpose is the exploration, extraction, production, conversion, storage, transmission, distribution 
and trade in, marketing and sales of Energy Materials and Products […]”, because, as explained by the 
Japanese representatives, there are investments included in the definition of Investment in industries that 
are not energy industries, for example, “power generators […] for the production of computer 
soft/hardwares in an IBM plant in Japan.” See, Letter from Shinya Wakimoto, Japan, to the European 
Energy Charter Conference Secretariat, 18 February 1993. The proposal was not retained for the final 
draft of the ECT. The Chairman of the Legal Sub–Group, though, expressed its concern regarding the 
coverage of non–energy activities by the ECT given the wording “associated with”: 
“[…] Article 1(6) reference to investment “associated with” and “Economic Activity in the Energy Sector” 
leaves ambiguity as to whether the non-energy aspects of an energy investment are intended to be covered by 
the Treaty.” (Memorandum of C. Bamberger, Chairman of the Legal Sub–Group; supra at FN 662) 
757
 Apparently, the drafters of the ECT did not intend to include every investment associated with an 
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector in the notion of ‘Investment’. A document in connection with the 
drafting of the ECT suggests that one of the original wordings of Understanding No. 2 of the ECT 
contained a paragraph that excluded insurance and financial services from the ECT’s coverage: 
“The establishment or operation of banks, insurance companies and other institutions providing financial 
services shall not be considered Economic Activities in the Energy Sector.” (European Energy Charter 
Conference Secretariat, Annex III, 23 August 1994) 
The proposal was later removed from the final version of Understanding No. 2. 
758
 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 16. 
759
 Ibid., para. 19. 
760
 Ibid, para. 17. 
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Generating Company ‘Energoatom’.761 ZAES described the relationship with EYUM–
10 as follows: 
“«[…] CJSC EYUM–10 has been being [sic] the strategic partner of SD ZAES 
for 20 years executing important works on reconstruction and technical 
rearmament repair. […] CJSC EYUM–10 works [are] strategically important 
and directed on the reliable and safe exploitation of power units of our 
nuclear power plant. […] The continuation of the contractual relations is 
vitally an important stage not only for SD ZAES but also for atomic energy on 
the whole.»”762 
 
Ukraine objected to the jurisdiction of the tribunal based on the fact that “AMTO's 
shares in EYUM–10 do not constitute a qualified 'Investment' under the ЕСТ, since 
they are not 'associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector', as required by 
Article 1(6) of the ЕСТ”.763 Ukraine further contended that “EYUM–10's activities, 
which consist of electric installation works, repair, reconstruction and technical re–
equipment works and services to ZAES”, are not covered by Article 1(5) and 
Understanding no. 2 of the ECT and are “not sufficiently closely "associated with" an 
economic activity of ZAES/Energoatom in the energy sector, such as the production (or 
sale) of Energy Materials and Products.”764 The tribunal rejected Ukraine’s objection 
and rightfully concluded that AMTO’s shareholding in EYUM–10 constitutes an 
Investment for the purpose of the ECT and satisfies the requirement under paragraph 3 
of Article 1(6) of the ECT to be associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy 
Sector.765 The tribunal relied on the fact that “ZAES/Energoatom is engaged in an 
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector as its activity concerns the production of 
Energy Material and Products, namely electrical energy”, while “EYUM–10 provides 
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 Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 43. 
 231
technical services –installation, repair and upgrades– directly related to the production 
of electrical energy”.766 
 
3. INVESTMENT IN THE AREA OF A CONTRACTING PARTY 
 
Article 26(1) of the ECT specifies that the consent to submit disputes between an 
Investor and a Contracting Party arising out of alleged breaches of Part III of the ECT 
covers only Investments “in the Area” of the respondent Contracting Party.767 Article 
1(10) of the ECT defines the notion of ‘Area’, as follows: 
““Area” means with respect to a state that is a Contracting Party: 
(a) the territory under its sovereignty, it being understood that territory 
includes land, internal waters and the territorial sea; and 
(b) subject to and in accordance with the international law of the sea: the sea, 
sea–bed and its subsoil with regard to which that Contracting Party exercises 
sovereign rights and jurisdiction. 
With respect to a Regional Economic Integration Organization which is a 
Contracting Party, Area means the Areas of the member states of such 
Organization, under the provisions contained in the agreement establishing 
that Organization.”768 
 
For states that are Contracting Parties to the ECT, Article 1(10) defines the notion of 
‘Area’ as including the territory of the state with its land, internal waters and territorial 
                                                
766
 Besides this, the tribunal retained as relevant the long–lasting relationship between EYUM–10 and 
ZAES, as EYUM–10 “has provided these services through multiple contracts over a substantial period of 
time.” See, Amto v. Ukraine; supra at FN 529, para. 43. 
767
 The earlier drafts of the ECT included the requirement for Investments to be in the Area of another 
Contracting Party in the definition of Investment under Art. 1(6): 
““Investment” means every kind of asset owned or controlled, directly or indirectly, by Investors of one or 
more Contracting Parties in the Domain of another Contracting Party […].” (Art. 1(5) of the Basic Agreement 
of 9 February 1993, 15/93 BA 35) 
The requirement was soon afterwards excluded from the wording of Art. 1(6) of the ECT. 
768
 Territories that are not excluded by a Contracting Party from the application of the ECT, in accordance 
with Art. 40 of the ECT, are included in the Area of that Contracting Party. See, Chapter I.1.4 above. 
The first draft of this provision referred to the notion of “Territory” and was defined, in respect of each 
Contracting Party, as 
“[…] its land territory as well as those maritime areas adjacent to the outer limit of its territorial sea of any of 
its territories, over which the state concerned exercises, in accordance with international law, sovereign rights 
for the purpose of exploration and exploitation of the natural resources of such areas.” (Art. 1(i) of the Basic 
Protocol of 11 September 1991, 8/91 BP 2) 
The later drafts referred to the notion of ‘Domain’, before settling on the term ‘Area’, and included 
references to the Area of REIOs. 
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sea,769 and, in accordance with the international law of the sea, the sea, the seabed and 
its subsoil over which the Contracting Party exercises sovereign rights and 
jurisdiction.770 For energy investments, Article 1(10)(b) is probably of utmost 
importance, as relevant energy–related natural resources are found in the continental 
margins of coastal states. Unlike BITs,771 the ECT provides for a definition of the term 
‘Area’, which is clear enough to extend the protection of Investments to those made in 
the continental shelf area.772 For REIOs, Article 1(10) explains that Area consists of the 
                                                
769
 Internal waters are those which are situated landward of the baseline from which the territorial sea is 
measured (Art. 8 (1) of the UNCLOS; supra at FN 129, and Art. 5(1) of the Convention on the Territorial 
Sea and the Contiguous Zone (Convention on the Territorial Sea), 10 September 1964) and over which 
the coastal state exercises full territorial sovereignty (Art. 2(1) of the UNCLOS and Art. 1(1) of the 
Convention on the Territorial Sea). 
The territorial sea is set up by the UNCLOS to maximum 12 nautical miles measured from the normal 
baseline, which is the low–water line along the coast as marked on large–scale charts officially 
recognized by the coastal State. See, Articles 3 and 5 of the UNCLOS. Costal states exercise their 
sovereignty over the territorial sea, including the air space over the territorial sea, its bed and subsoil (Art. 
2 of the UNCLOS). 
770
 The UNCLOS regulates the contiguous zone and the sea bed of the sea. In accordance with Art. 33(2) 
of the UNCLOS, the contiguous zone is the zone of the sea seaward of the territorial sea, which may not 
exceed 24 nautical miles from the baseline (for the notion of ‘baseline’, see, supra at FN 769). In the 
contiguous zone, states may only exercise enforcement jurisdiction (Art. 33(1) of the UNCLOS; see also, 
Churchill R.R.; Lowe, A.V.; The Law of the Sea, 3rd edition, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 
1999, p. 137). The UNCLOS provides for two distinct legal bases for the sovereign rights of states over 
the sea bed: the exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and the continental shelf (see also, the Convention on the 
Continental Shelf, 10 June 1964). While these two areas may coincide, this is not always the case. As 
explained by CHURCHILL and LOWE, the EEZ “may be greater or less than the breadth of the ‘physical’ 
continental shelf under the classical doctrine [i.e. Convention on the Continental Shelf].” (Churchill R.R.; 
Lowe, A.V.; supra, p. 145) The EEZ is the zone of the sea extending up to 200 nautical miles from the 
baseline (Art. 57 of the UNCLOS) where states enjoy sovereign and jurisdictional rights. Art. 56(1) of the 
UNCLOS refers to rights “for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and managing the 
natural resources, whether living or non–living, of the waters superjacent to the seabed and of the seabed 
and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the 
zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and winds”. The EEZ must be claimed by 
the states, while the continental shelf exists ipso facto (see Art. 77(3) of the UNCLOS). Pursuant to Art. 
76(1) of the UNCLOS, the continental shelf “comprises the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas 
that extend beyond its territorial sea throughout the natural prolongation of its land territory to the outer 
edge of the continental margin, or to a distance of 200 nautical miles from the baselines from which the 
breadth of the territorial sea is measured where the outer edge of the continental margin does not extend 
up to that distance”. In the continental shelf area, states exercise sovereign rights for the purpose of 
exploring it and exploiting its natural resources (Art. 77(1) of the UNCLOS). 
771
 See for example, Egypt–Thailand BIT providing that ““Territory” means territory over which 
Contracting Party has sovereignty and/or jurisdiction” (Agreement between the Government of the 
Kingdom of Thailand and the Government of the Arab Republic of Egypt for the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, 27 February 2002), or the Italy–China BIT which provides no definition of the 
term ‘territory’ (Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Italy and the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China for the Promotion and Reciprocal Protection of Investments, 28 August 
1987). 
772
 It is estimated that “around 70 per cent of the world’s undiscovered [gas and oil] reserves lie offshore”. 
See, Churchill R.R.; Lowe, A.V.; supra at FN 770, p. 141. For energy disputes related to concessions 
extending to the continental shelf, see, Petroleum Development (Qatar) Ltd. v. Ruler of Qatar, Award of 
 233
Areas of the member states, in accordance with the agreement establishing the REIO. 
The territorial scope of the treaties establishing the EU and EURATOM is provided for 
by Article 355 of the TFEU,773 and by Article 198 of the EURATOM Treaty, 
respectively.774 
 
The requirement that an Investment must be in the Area of the respondent Contracting 
Party in order to trigger the dispute resolution mechanism under Article 26 of the ECT 
brings up the issue as to whether this must be understood as demanding a physical 
presence of such Investment in the Area of the Contracting Party. The terms of Article 
26(1) of the ECT providing for this prerequisite must be read within their ordinary 
                                                                                                                                          
April 1950, and Petroleum Development Ltd. v. Sheikh of Abu Dhabi, Award of September 1951. 
According to an explanatory memorandum from the EU regarding the safety of offshore activities, out of 
the “900 offshore installations operating in the EU, 486 are in the UK, 181 in the Netherlands, 61 in 
Denmark, 2 in Germany, 2 in Ireland, 123 in Italy, 4 in Spain, 2 in Greece, 7 in Romania, 1 in Bulgaria 
and 3 in Poland.” See, EU; Safety of Offshore Oil and Gas Exploration and Production: Questions and 
Answers, MEMO/10/486, 13 October 2010. 
The definition of the notion of ‘Area’ and its reference to sea, sea bed and subsoil suffered important 
amendments throughout the negotiation process and raised debates as to the appropriate wording of the 
definition. The Australian delegation, for example, suggested in its first comments to the early Basic 
Protocol to “review the definition of “territory” with the generally accepted concept of territory in 
international law”. See, Basic Protocol of 11 September 1991, 8/91 BP 2. 
773
 Art. 355 of the TFEU reads as follows: 
“1. The provisions of the Treaties shall apply to Guadeloupe, French Guiana, Martinique, Réunion, Saint-
Barthélemy, Saint-Martin, the Azores, Madeira and the Canary Islands in accordance with Article 349.  
2. The special arrangements for association set out in Part Four shall apply to the overseas countries and 
territories listed in Annex II. 
The Treaties shall not apply to those overseas countries and territories having special relations with the 
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland which are not included in the aforementioned list.  
3. The provisions of the Treaties shall apply to the European territories for whose external relations a 
Member State is responsible.  
4. The provisions of the Treaties shall apply to the Åland Islands in accordance with the provisions set out in 
Protocol 2 to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Republic of Austria, the Republic of 
Finland and the Kingdom of Sweden.  
5. Notwithstanding Article 52 of the Treaty on European Union and paragraphs 1 to 4 of this Article:  
(a) the Treaties shall not apply to the Faeroe Islands;  
(b) the Treaties shall not apply to the United Kingdom Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia in 
Cyprus except to the extent necessary to ensure the implementation of the arrangements set out in the 
Protocol on the Sovereign Base Areas of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in 
Cyprus annexed to the Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of 
Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, 
the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic to the 
European Union and in accordance with the terms of that Protocol;  
(c) the Treaties shall apply to the Channel Islands and the Isle of Man only to the extent necessary to ensure 
the implementation of the arrangements for those islands set out in the Treaty concerning the accession of 
new Member States to the European Economic Community and to the European Atomic Energy Community 
signed on 22 January 1972. […]” 
See also, Article 52 of the TEU. 
774
 Art. 198 of the EURATOM Treaty provides for a provision similar to the one under Art. 355 of the 
TFEU. 
 234
meaning and in their context, in accordance with the rules of treaty interpretation of the 
Vienna Convention. The wording of Article 26 of the ECT does not refer to 
Investments ‘made in the Area’, but to “Investment […] in the Area”, which would 
suggest that Investments need not be physically located in the host Contracting Party. 
Article 26(1) of the ECT must, however, be examined in conjunction with Article 1(6) 
of the ECT, which defines the notion of ‘Investment’. Among the assets listed under 
Article 1(6) as potential Investments, there are some that, by definition, cannot by 
physically located in the host Contracting Party. For example, while tangible property 
(Article 1(6)(a)) and companies (Article 1(6)(b)) have physical materialization in the 
Area of the host Contracting Party, bonds (Article 1(6)(b)), claims to money (Article 
1(6)(c)) or intellectual property (Article 1(6)(d)) would not be a tangible presence in the 
Contracting Party.775 Therefore, the meaning of the terms ‘Investments […] in the 
Area’ should not be restricted to physical manifestations of Investments in the host 
Contracting Party. There should be “a certain degree of flexibility”,776 as some forms of 
Investments cannot physically materialize in the host Contracting Party. The 
requirement of Investment to be in the Area of the respondent Contracting Party can be 
satisfied when the Investment is directed or originated in this Contracting Party. As 
suggested by scholars, 
“[…] the interpretation of a territorial requirement will to a large extent 
depend on the type of investment. Investment in movable and particularly 
immovable property will require a territorial nexus. In cases involving 
financial obligations the locus of the investment can often be determined by 
reference to the debtor and its location. In this way financial instruments 
issued by Sates have their situs in that State. Investment through shareholding 
may be seen to take place at the company’s place of registration or main place 
of activity. Services may be seen to be located in a State if their chief impact is 
in that State.”777 
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 See, Baltag, Crina; Territoriality under the ICSID Convention: Two Issues, 4(5) TDM (2007), p. 4; 
Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L., Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 139, para. 197. 
776
 Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L., Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, p. 139, para. 197. 
777
 Ibid., p. 140, para. 198, emphasis original. 
See also, Douglas, who suggests that 
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ICSID tribunals discussed the territoriality requirement of investments under the ICSID 
Convention and BITs and, by and large, they adopted the flexible approach suggested 
by scholars. The ICSID Convention, however, makes no reference to investments being 
located or made in the territory of a Contracting State.778 In Fedax v. Venezuela, where 
the claimant acquired promissory notes issued by Venezuela, respondent argued that the 
claimant failed to make an investment “in the territory” of Venezuela.779 In rejecting 
respondent’s contentions, the tribunal distinguished between investments that can take a 
physical form and investments that, by their nature, cannot materialize in the territory of 
the host state: 
“[w]hile it is true that in some kind of investments listed under Article 1(a) of 
the Agreement, such as the acquisition of interests in immovable property, 
companies and the like, a transfer of funds or value will be made into the 
territory of the host country, this does not necessarily happen in a number of 
other types of investments, particularly those of a financial nature. It is a 
standard feature of many international financial transactions that the funds 
involved are not physically transferred to the territory of the beneficiary, but 
put at its disposal elsewhere. In fact, many loans and credits do not leave the 
country of origin at all, but are made available to suppliers or other 
entities.”780 
 
                                                                                                                                          
“[r]esort must be had to the rules of private international law of the host state which, in respect of some forms 
of intangible property, may supply a fictitious situs. A debt may have its situs at the place of the debtor; 
shares – at the place where the company’s share register is maintained. In each case, if the host state’s rules 
of private international law locate the intangible property rights in the host state, then the territorial 
requirement is satisfied with respect to a putative investment in that form of intangible property.” (Douglas, 
Z; supra at FN 292, pp. 171–172, para. 351, emphasis original, footnotes omitted) 
For the rules of private international law, see in general, McClean, David; Beevers, Kisch; The Conflict of 
Laws by J.H.S. Morris; 7th edition, London: Sweet & Maxwell, 2009; Fawcett, James; Carruthers, Janeen 
M; Cheshire, North & Fawcett Private International Law; 14th edition, New York: Oxford University 
Press, 2008. 
778
 Nevertheless. the Report of the Executive Directors refers to the  
“[..] adherence to the Convention by a country [which] would provide additional inducement and stimulate a 
larger flow of private international investment into its territories, which is the primary purpose of the 
Convention.” (Report of the Executive Directors; supra at FN 541, para. 12) 
779
 Fedax N.V. v. Republic of Venezuela, Decision on Objections to Jurisdiction of 11 July 1997, para. 41. 
780
 Fedax v. Venezuela; supra at FN 779, para. 41. Art. 1(a) of the Netherlands–Venezuela BIT provides 
for the definition of investment: 
“[…] the term ‘investments’ shall comprise every kind of asset and more particularly though not exclusively: 
i. movable and immovable property, as well as any other rights in rem in respect of every kind of asset; 
ii. rights derived from shares, bonds, and other kinds of interests in companies and joint-ventures; 
iii. title to money, to other assets or to any performance having an economic value; 
iv. rights in the field of intellectual property, technical processes, goodwill and know-how; 
v. rights granted under public law, including rights to prospect, explore, extract, and win natural resources.” 
(Agreement on Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investments between the Kingdom of the 
Netherlands and the Republic of Venezuela, 1 November 1993) 
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In assessing whether claimant’s investment was made in the territory of Venezuela, the 
tribunal in Fedax v. Venezuela concluded that “[t]he important question is whether the 
funds made available are utilized by the beneficiary of the credit […] so as to finance 
its various governmental needs.”781 Similarly, in CSOB v. Slovakia, where the dispute 
involved a loan agreement, the tribunal held that “a transaction can qualify as an 
investment even in the absence of a physical transfer of funds”.782 In LESI–DIPENTA v. 
Algeria, the tribunal also emphasized that the physical presence of the investment in the 
territory of the host state is “not an absolute condition”.783 However, whether or not the 
Investment has a physical presence, it must be made, linked, or directed to the host 
Contracting Party, and not to the home state of the Investor.784 
 
4. LAWFULNESS, APPROVAL AND AUTHORIZATION OF INVESTMENT 
 
There are investment treaties that do not grant unconditional rights of admission and 
establishment in the host state. There are various reasons for limiting the access of 
foreign investments: economic policies, national security, the need to safeguard 
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 Fedax v. Venezuela; supra at FN 779, para. 41. 
782
 CSOB v. Slovakia; supra at FN 544, para. 78, footnote omitted. 
783
 LESI–DIPENTA v. Algeria; supra at FN 567, para. 14(1), p. 451. The identical conclusion reached the 
same tribunal in the LESI & Astaldi v. Algeria; supra at FN 568, Decision on Jurisdiction of 12 July 2006, 
para. 73(i): 
“De même est-il fréquent que ces investissements soient effectués dans le pays concerné, mais il ne s’agit pas 
non plus d’une condition absolue. Rien n’empêche en effet que des investissements soient en partie du moins 
engagés depuis le pays de résidence du contractant mais en vue et dans le cadre du projet à réaliser à 
l’étranger.” 
784
 In Bayview v. Mexico, the tribunal stated that 
“Chapter Eleven [of the NAFTA] applies to “investments of investors of another Party in the territory of the 
Party”: Article 1101(1)(b). It is clear that the words “territory of the Party” in that phrase do not refer to the 
territory of the Party of whom the investors are nationals. It requires investment in the territory of another 
NAFTA Party –the Party that has adopted or maintained the measures challenged. In short, in order to be an 
“investor” under Article 1139 one must make an investment in the territory of another NAFTA State, not in 
one’s own.” (Bayview Irrigation Distrct and others v. United Mexican States, Award of 19 June 2007, para. 
105) 
However, this was a case, as the tribunal concluded, where the claimants made the investment in the 
territory of their own state, rather than in the territory of the respondent state: 
“They [the claimants] have substantial investments in Texas, in the form of their businesses and, in the 
context of these proceedings, more particularly in the form of the infrastructure for the distribution of the 
water that they extract from the Rio Bravo / Rio Grande. They have investments in the form of the water 
rights granted by the State of Texas. They are certainly “investors”; but their investments are in Texas, and 
they are not investors in Mexico or vis-à-vis Mexico.” (Bayview v. Mexico; supra, para. 113) 
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imperative interests of host states in crucial industries or to have control over the entry 
and establishment of foreign investments in the national territory. Some authors 
consider these limitations as facilitating the identification of investments that are 
entitled to the protection granted by the investment treaties or as ensuring that 
investments are channelled into economic areas where they are needed.785 There are 
BITs that provide protection only to investments made in accordance with the laws of 
the host states,786 or that are authorized or approved by the host states.787 These 
provisions allow states to adopt national laws on admission of foreign investments in 
accordance with their economic or political interests or policies.  
 
The ECT does not contain explicit provisions requiring the conformity of an Investment 
with the laws of the host Contracting Party and for Investments to be approved or 
authorized by the host Contracting Party, as jurisdictional requirements. 788 The rules of 
interpretation of treaties do not allow reading in a treaty what is not there. As expressed 
                                                
785
 Perera, Rohan A.; The Role and Implications of Bilateral Investment Treaties, 26(1) Commonwealth 
Law Bulletin 607 (2000), p. 609. 
786
 Where an investment is unlawfully made, this does not mean that there is no investment within the 
ordinary meaning of the term, but that such investment is not protected under the specific BIT, and the 
jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunals does not extend to disputes related to this investment. See, Baltag, 
Crina; Admission of Investments and the ICSID Convention; 6(1) TDM (2009), p. 7. 
787
 See, Art. 4(a) of the ASEAN Comprehensive Investment Agreement, 26 February 2009, which covers 
only investments “admitted according to […] laws, regulations, and national policies, and, where 
applicable, specifically approved in writing.” (footnote omitted) See also, Annex 1 to the ASEAN 
Comprehensive Investment Agreement dealing with the approval in writing of investments. See also, Art. 
I.1.b.ii of the Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern 
Ireland and the Government of Malaysia for the Promotion and Protection of Investments, 21 October 
1988 which refers to investments made in projects classified as an “approved project” by the appropriate 
Ministry of Malaysia, in accordance with its legislation and administrative practice. 
788
 See also, Gaillard, E.; supra at FN 420, p. 62. The requirement for Investments to be made in 
accordance with the laws of the host Contracting Party cannot be implicitly understood in the context of 
the ECT. The wording of Art. 1(6)(f) of the ECT, “any right conferred by law or contract or by virtue of 
any licences and permits granted pursuant to law”, for example, cannot be construed as such implicit 
requirement. Nevertheless, the absence of these jurisdictional requisites in the ECT does not affect the 
requirements provided for in the national laws in respect to the admission or lawfulness of Investments. 
There was a proposal during the negotiation of the ECT to include in the definition of Investment the 
following wording: “admitted by one of the other Contracting Parties subject to its laws and investment 
policies.” See, the comments of the Australian delegation to the Basic Agreement of 31 October 1991, 
21/91 BA 4. See also, the comments at supra FN 555. 
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in various decisions of the ICJ and of the ICSID arbitral tribunals, the duty is “to 
interpret the Treaties, not to revise them”.789 
 
The lawfulness of Investment was discussed in Plama v. Bulgaria.790 Contrary to the 
text of the ECT, the tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria held that there is an implied 
requirement for Investments to be in accordance with the laws of the host Contracting 
Party. While the tribunal admitted that, “[u]nlike a number of Bilateral Investment 
Treaties, the ECT does not contain a provision requiring the conformity of the 
Investment with a particular law”,791 the absence of such express provision “does not 
mean, however, that the protections provided for by the ECT cover all kinds of 
investments, including those contrary to domestic or international law.”792 In reaching 
this conclusion, the tribunal relied on an introductory note to the ECT drafted by the 
Energy Charter Secretariat, which provides that “[t]he fundamental aim of the Energy 
Charter Treaty is to strengthen the rule of law on energy issues”.793 Relying of this 
statement, the tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria reasoned that 
“[…] the ECT should be interpreted in a manner consistent with the aim of 
encouraging the rule of law. The Arbitral Tribunal concludes that the 
substantive protections of the ECT cannot apply to investments that are made 
contrary to law.”794 
 
While the tribunal took into consideration the declaration made by the Energy Charter 
Secretariat, this statement, however, cannot have legal effects in the interpretation of 
                                                
789
 Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, second phase, Advisory 
Opinion of 18 July 1950, p. 229. See also, the conclusion of the ICJ in the Morocco Case: 
“The Court can not, by way of interpretation, derive from the Act a general rule as to full consular 
jurisdiction which it does not contain.” (Morocco Case; supra at FN 304, p. 199) 
790
 In Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, the tribunal analysed the lawfulness of claimant’s Investment based 
only on the provisions of the Greece–Georgia BIT under Art. 12, which provides that 
“[t]his Agreement shall also apply to investments made prior to its entry into force by Investors of either 
Contracting Party in the territory of the other Contracting Party, consistent with the latter’s legislation.” 
791
 Plama v. Bulgaria, Award; supra at FN 621, para. 138, footnote omitted. 
792
 Id., footnote omitted. 
793
 Energy Charter Secretariat, The Energy Charter Treaty and Related Documents. A Legal Framework 
for International Energy Cooperation, An Introduction to the Energy Charter Treaty, p. 14. 
794
 Plama v. Bulgaria, Award; supra at FN 621, para. 139. 
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the provisions of the ECT, although the Energy Charter Secretariat is a body established 
by the ECT itself. First, a declaration of this kind is not envisaged by Article 31(2) of 
the Vienna Convention, which refers to “any agreement relating to the treaty which was 
made between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty” and to 
“any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the 
treaty”, or by Article 31(3), which allows to be taken into account “any subsequent 
agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions” or “any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty 
which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation”. Nor can this 
statement gain legal effects based on the provisions of Article 32 of the Vienna 
Convention, which refers to “the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion”. Secondly, Article 35 of the ECT does not provide for any 
interpretative prerogative of the Energy Charter Secretariat, as its main function is to 
assist the Energy Charter Conference in the performance of its duties.795  
 
The provisions of the ECT suggest that there is no such jurisdictional requirement for 
Investments to be made in accordance with the laws of the host Contracting Party or 
authorized or approved by that Contracting Party.796 Nonetheless, these issues become 
relevant when tribunals decide the merits of the dispute.797 
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 Art. 35(4) of the ECT. Moreover, the Energy Charter Conference, which is the body of the ECT 
assembling the representatives of the Contracting Parties, does not have the prerogatives to interpret or 
amend the provisions of the ECT. See, Art. 34(3) of the ECT. 
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 See also, Blanch, J.; Moody, A.; Lawn, N.; supra at FN 254, p. 5. 
797
 See, Gaillard, E.; supra at FN 420, p. 62. For the opinion that there is a jurisdictional bar for 
Investments made in breach of the laws of the host Contracting Party, see, Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, 
p. 273: 
“[…] an invalid right or title, not issued by the competent authority, but issued under material breach of 
mandatory procedures or issued in contravention of peremptory law, does not constitute “investment”. A 
contractual right to explore and develop oil and gas issued by an incompetent local entity, or issued without 
complying with mandatory tender procedures, or issued with material breach of such procedures suggesting 




The ICSID Convention, like the ECT, does not contain the requirement for investment 
to be made in accordance with the laws of the host Contracting Party or to be 
authorized or approved in any way. As stated in Saba Fakes v. Turkey, the ICSID 
Convention “remains neutral” with respect to the lawfulness of investments; however, 
“bilateral investment treaties are at liberty to condition their application and the whole 
protection they afford […] to a legality requirement”.798 Consequently, an ECT dispute 
submitted under the ICSID Convention should not raise jurisdictional questions of 
unlawfulness or approval of the Investment, unless, as it was in the case of 
Kardassopoulos v. Georgia, the Investor also relies on a BIT that provides for such 
prerequisites.799 
 
5. ORIGIN OF INVESTMENT 
 
The tribunal in the Yukos Cases was called to decide on whether the ECT contains any 
requirement regarding the origin of Investment. The interpretation of the ECT’s 
provisions does not reveal the prerequisite that Investments should have a foreign 
source, nor does it require evidence of a real link between the Investor and its home 
Contracting Party.800 While Article 2 refers to the purpose of the ECT to “promote 
long–term cooperation in the energy field”, this is not sufficient to suggest an implied 
requirement of the foreign origin of Investment.801 As explained by the tribunal in the 
Yukos Cases, “the ECT is directed towards the promotion of foreign investments, 
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 Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 114. 
799
 See, supra FN 790. 
800
 See also, the Yukos Cases: 
“[…] the definition of investment in Article 1(6) of the ECT does not include any additional requirement with 
regard to the origin of capital or the necessity of an injection of foreign capital.” (Yukos Cases; supra at FN 
98, para. 432) 
801
 Furthermore, the ECT, unlike the ICSID Convention, as it will be seen below, is not using the term 
‘foreign’ or ‘international’ jointly with the notion of ‘Investment’. 
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especially of investment by Western sources in the energy resources of the Russian 
Federation and other successor States of the USSR.”802 However, “the Tribunal is 
bound to interpret the terms of the ECT not as they might have been written so as 
exclusively to apply to foreign investment but as they were actually written.”803 In the 
tribunal’s opinion, the provisions of the ECT do not require that Investments originate 
from the home Contracting Party of the Investor, even though the “ultimate source of 
the investments at issue in the instant cases may be Russian.”804 
 
The ECT does not impose a jurisdictional requirement regarding the foreign origin of 
Investments. If there is a foreign nature condition of Investment under the ECT, at the 
most, this must be presumed to be assimilated in the Investor requirement under Article 
1(7).805 This provision defines Investor as a natural person having the nationality, 
citizenship or permanent residence of a Contracting Party and as a legal entity organized 
in accordance with the laws of a Contracting Party. When Investor makes an Investment 
in a Contracting Party, other than his home Contracting Party, the foreign character of 
the invested capital becomes apparent. In effect, the provisions of the ECT are not 
dissociating the foreign character of the Investment from the Investor criteria under the 
ECT.806 
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 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 434. 
803
 Ibid., para. 435. Also, 
“[t]he Tribunal cannot in effect impose upon the parties a definition of “Investment” other than that which the 
parties to the ECT, including Respondent, have agreed.” (Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para.432) 
804
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 434. The tribunal, though, draw attention to the following: 
“If the States that took part in the drafting of the ECT had been asked in the course of that process whether 
the ECT was designed to protect—and should be interpreted and applied to protect—investments in a 
Contracting State by nationals of that same Contracting State whose capital derived from the energy 
resources of that State, it may well be that the answer would have been in the negative, not only from the 
representatives of the Russian Federation but from the generality of the delegates.” (Yukos Cases; supra at 
FN 98, para. 434) 
805
 SALACUSE refers to the international nature of an investment that comes from two attributes: “(1) the 
person or entity undertaking the investment is not a citizen, or at least not a resident, of the country in 
which the investment is made; and (2) the investment process includes the transfer of funds or capital 
from a foreign country to the country of investment”. Nevertheless, the author concludes that “a physical 
transfer of capital from one country to another may not necessarily be present in all international 
investment transactions.” See, Salacuse, J.W.; supra at FN 670, pp. 27–28. 
806
 See also, Castro de Figueiredo, R.; supra at FN 427, p. 3. 
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The origin of the invested capital was also debated by ICSID tribunals. In Tokios 
Tokelès v. Ukraine, where the claimant was a company incorporated in Lithuania, but 
owned and controlled by Ukrainian nationals, respondent objected to the jurisdiction of 
the tribunal based on the fact that the dispute did not arise out of an investment having 
international character, since the invested capital of the claimant originated in Ukraine 
and not in the home state, Lithuania. The majority of the tribunal rejected claimant’s 
contentions and stated that “[t]he origin of the capital used to acquire these assets is not 
relevant to the question of jurisdiction under the [ICSID] Convention”.807 The tribunal 
went on and concluded that “the ICSID Convention contains no inchoate requirement 
that the investment at issue in a dispute have an international character in which the 
origin of the capital is decisive.”808 The drafting history of the ICSID Convention 
shows that the proposal regarding the jurisdiction of the ICSID based on the nationality 
of the investment was rejected. BROCHES explained that he could not see “how the 
Convention could make a distinction based on the origin of funds once the host State 
had agreed with the investor to accept the jurisdiction of the Center.”809 However, it is 
argued by scholars that the context of the ICSID Convention and, in particular, its 
Preamble would suggest that the notion of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention demands a foreign character of investments. The Preamble of the 
ICSID Convention recognizes “the need for international cooperation for economic 
development, and the role of private international investment therein” as the major 
                                                
807
 Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine; supra at FN 596, para. 81. The tribunal recalled the conclusion of the 
tribunal in Tradex v. Albania: 
“The 1993 Law, in its definition of “Foreign investment” in Art. 1 (3), nowhere requires that the foreign 
investor has to finance the investment from his own resources. As seen above, quite to the contrary, the law 
provides for a broad interpretation of “investment”.” (Tradex Hellas S.A. v. Republic of Albania, Award of 29 
April 1999, para. 109) 
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 Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine; supra at FN 596, para. 82. 
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 History of the ICSID Convention; supra at FN 366, vol. II–1, p. 261. Broches also stated that 
“[…] if those funds were really not of foreign origin, the host State was entirely justified in treating the 
resident investor on the same footing as its own nationals.” 
This, for example, could be done by inserting the origin requirement of investments in the investment 
treaties that record the consent to the ICSID. 
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purpose of the ICSID Convention.810 The conclusion of the tribunal in Tokios Tokelès v. 
Ukraine was opposed by the chairman, PROSPER WEIL, who maintained in his 
Dissenting Opinion that “[t]he ICSID mechanism and remedy are not meant for 
investments made in a State by its own citizens with domestic capital through the 
channel of a foreign entity, whether preexistent or created for that purpose.”811 The 
Dissenting Opinion concludes that “when it comes to ascertaining the international 
character of an investment, the origin of the capital is relevant, and even decisive”,812 
and that the purpose of the ICSID Convention “is to protect foreign investment, [and] it 
should not be interpreted so as to allow domestic, national corporations to evade the 
application of their domestic, national law and the jurisdiction of their domestic, 
national tribunals.”813 
 
Scholarly writings are divided on whether the ICSID Convention requires indeed, as a 
jurisdictional prerequisite, that investments to be of foreign origin. Some authors are of 
the opinion that there is no requirement regarding the origin of the invested capital,814 
while others conclude that the interpretation of the provisions of the ICSID Convention 
in their context, including its Preamble, requires investments to have foreign source.815 
It is suggested that this foreign nature requirement is more justified when “a domestic 
investor channels the investment made in his own home State through a foreign entity, 
used as a mere investment vehicle, in order to be covered by rules of foreign investment 
protection set forth in an international investment treaty”.816 In this case, although the 
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 See also, the Report of the Executive Directors; supra at FN 541, which contains several references to 
‘international investment’: “encourage a larger flow of private international investment” (para. 13), 
“stimulate a larger flow of private international investment into its territories” (para. 12); ‘international 
capital’: “stimulating a larger flow of private international capital into those countries” (para. 9). 
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 Tokios Tokelès v. Ukraine, Dissenting Opinion; supra at FN 596, para. 19. 
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 Ibid., para. 20, emphasis original. 
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 Ibid., para. 23, emphasis original. 
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 See, Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 314 et seq., para. 583 et seq. 
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 Castro de Figueiredo, R.; supra at FN 427, pp. 31–37. 
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 Ibid., p. 4. 
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investment is formally foreign, because of the way it is structured, there should be an 
emphasis on the “economic reality in which the effective origin of the investment plays 
a crucial role”,817 and, thus, prevent investors to shop for convenient jurisdictions to 
channel their investments. The ICSID case law suggests, so far, that when submitting a 
dispute under the ICSID Convention, the claimant is not required to show that his 
investment is a foreign investment.818 
 
The ECT does not provide and its provisions do not suggest a foreign character of 
Investment, as a jurisdictional prerequisite. It can be the case that the invested capital of 
the Investor is of domestic origin. However, in the absence of a jurisdictional 
requirement of ‘foreign origin’ of Investment, ECT tribunals cannot dismiss a claim 
based on the fact that the source of Investor’s Investment is in the host Contracting 
Party. 
 
6. PRE–INVESTMENT AND THE ENERGY CHARTER TREATY 
 
The investment process is usually regarded as consisting of two phases: the admission 
or the establishment phase, often referred to as the ‘pre–investment’ stage, and the 
investment or the ‘post–investment’ phase.819 In the admission phase, potential 
investors evaluate the possibility to investment: they develop studies and discussions 
about the investment, gather information, develop contacts with the local market, and 
participate “in more or less formal and regulated tenders.”820 But while it is not disputed 
that expenses are made and intellectual effort is committed to establishing an 




 The tribunal in Rompetrol v. Romania rejected respondent’s objections based on the origin of the 
claimant’s funds, in the context of the nationality of investor. See, Rompetrol v. Romania; supra at FN 
599, para. 110. 
819
 See also, Waelde, T.W.; Ben Hamida, W.; supra at FN 711, p. 168. 
820
 Waelde, T.W.; Ben Hamida, W.; supra at FN 711, p. 175. 
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investment,821 host states rarely agree to offer their protection at this stage of the 
investment process. Investment treaties usually bestow their protection at the post–
investment stage, when the process of establishing the investment is completed. For 
example, Article 2(2) of the United Kingdom–Morocco BIT provides that 
“[e]ach Contracting Party shall in its territory ensure fair and equitable 
treatment and provide full protection and security for investments of nationals 
of the other Contracting Party. Neither Contracting Party shall impair by 
discriminatory measures the management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal of investments in its territory of nationals of the other Contracting 
Party. Each of the Contracting Parties shall observe any obligation it may have 
entered into with regard to investments of nationals of the Contracting 
Party.”822 
 
In contrast, there are some investment treaties that extend their protection to the pre–
investment stage of the investment process. Article II(1) of the United States–Croatia 
BIT states that  
“[w]ith respect to the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, 
conduct, operation and sale or other disposition of covered investments, each 
Party shall accord treatment no less favorable than that it accords, in like 
situations, to investments in its territory of its own nationals or companies 
(hereinafter "national treatment") or to investments in its territory of nationals 
or companies of a third country (hereinafter "most favored nation treatment"), 
whichever is most favorable (hereinafter "national and most favored nation 
treatment").”823 
 
                                                
821
 See also, the statement made by the tribunal in Mihaly v. Sri Lanka regarding the costs incurred by the 
claimant in the tender procedure: 
“The expression of interest itself was obviously the product of considerable work and expenditure of money 
on the part of the Claimant.” (Mihaly International Corporation v. Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri 
Lanka, Award of 15 March 2002, para. 38) 
822
 Agreement between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and 
the Government of the Kingdom of Morocco, signed on 30 October 1990, not in force. 
823
 Treaty between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Republic 
of Croatia concerning the Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 20 June 2001. See 
also, Article 2 of the Japan–Turkey BIT, which provides for the following: 
“1. Each Contracting Party shall, subject to its rights to exercise powers in accordance with the applicable 
laws and regulations, encourage and create favourable conditions for nationals and companies of the other 
Contracting Party to make investment in its territory, and, subject to the same rights, shall admit such 
investment. 
2. Nationals and companies of either Contracting Party shall within the territory of the other Contracting 
Party be accorded treatment no less favourable than that accorded to nationals and companies of any third 
country in respect of the matters relating to the admission of investment.” (Agreement concerning the 
Reciprocal Promotion and Protection of Investment between Turkey and Japan, 12 March 1993) 
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Authors explain that states express their consent to protect only investments – at the 
post–investment phase – because at this stage “the investor has made a serious 
commitment of capital exposed to government risk.”824 At this point, the investor, who 
does not have the choice of investing or not anymore, needs the substantive protection 
of the investment treaties. As soon as the investor has an investment, it is also natural 
“to subject the state to more stringent and internationally enforceable obligations to 
avoid the abuse of political power against acquired rights”.825 
 
However, the distinction made between pre–investment and post–investment stage of 
the investment process for the purpose of the substantive and procedural protection 
offered by investment treaties looks rather straightforward in academic discussions, but 
fairly complex applied to the actual investment process.826 Complex investments, like 
the ones made in the energy area, require an elaborate investment process that 
comprises various steps, from information–gathering and studies to gradual 
investments.827  
 
Under the provisions of the ICSID Convention, the tribunals denied the coverage of 
pre–investment expenditures. In Mihaly v. Sri Lanka, a case relying on the substantive 
protection of the United States–Sri Lanka BIT,828 the tribunal had to decide whether in 
                                                
824




 As explained by EWING, the term ‘pre–investment’ entails different meanings and in “its narrower 
sense it means the carrying out of all those specific studies required before seeking or committing finance 
for the execution of a project”. See, Ewing, A.F.; Pre–Investment, 8(3) Journal of World Trade Law 316 
(1974), p. 316. See also, the comment made by the representatives of the United States in the negotiation 
of the ECT in respect to the definition of the notion of ‘Make Investments’ or ‘Making of Investments’: 
“[…] the current definition may not be sufficiently precise in drawing the line between the Making of 
Investments and the post-establishment activity of managing, maintaining, etc. the investment […].” (U.S. 
Proposal – Art. 1(8) Make/Making of Investments, Room Document 6, 9 June 1994) 
827
 EWING identifies three steps in respect to the studies undertaken at the pre–investment stage: the 
preliminary study, also referred to as “prefeasibility study”; the feasibility study, both technical and 
economic; and the engineering study, for the major infrastructural or industrial projects. See, Ewing, A.F.; 
supra at FN 826, pp. 318–319. 
828
 Mihaly v. Sri Lanka; supra at FN 821, para. 1. 
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the absence of a contract signed by the parties, the expenditures incurred by the 
claimant could constitute an investment for the purpose of Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention. In reaching the decision, the tribunal emphasized that its decision rests on 
the particular facts of the case, and that it “cannot consider in a vacuum whether or not 
in other circumstances expenditure of moneys might constitute an “investment””.829 In 
deciding whether the costs incurred by the claimant could represent an investment for 
the purpose of ICSID Convention, the tribunal extensively relied on the particular 
wording of the documents between the parties which contained express provisions 
pursuant to which there were no contractual obligations on any party resulting from 
these Letters. The fact that Sri Lanka inserted these limitations in the documents 
negotiated with the claimant compelled the tribunal to conclude that the expenditures 
incurred by claimant cannot represent an investment. The tribunal admitted, however, 
that “in other circumstances, similar expenditure may perhaps be described as an 
investment”,830 and acknowledged that 
“[…] if the negotiations […] had come to fruition, it may well have been the 
case that the moneys expended during the period of negotiations might have 
been capitalised as part of the cost of the project and thereby become part of 
the investment”.831 
 
Zhinvali v. Georgia, an ICSID case brought under the provisions of the Georgian law, 
had similar underlying facts to the Mihaly v. Sri Lanka case. The case involved the 
rehabilitation of a Georgian power plant for which the claimant was granted exclusivity 
in signing the contract, without having a tender procedure.832 The claimant executed a 
Memorandum of Understanding and a Head of the Agreement, which dealt with the 
modalities of cooperation with the state–owned company operating the power plant, and 
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 Ibid., para. 48. 
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 Ibid., para. 49. 
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 Ibid., para. 50. 
832
 Zhinvali Development Ltd. v. Republic of Georgia, Award of 24 January 2003 and Separate Opinion of 
Andrew J. Jacovides., paras 89–94.  
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circulated a draft contract, 833 but the parties did not sign the concession contract. 
Georgia objected to the jurisdiction of the ICSID based on the fact that the claimant did 
not have an investment within the meaning of Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.834 
Zhinvali argued, on the other hand, that it did make an investment within the meaning 
of the 1996 Georgian Investment Law applicable in the dispute, although the concession 
contract was not signed, since it committed intellectual property in the form of “various 
agreements, drafts and studies”,835 while respondent gained “valuable “know–how” 
from its dealings with the Claimant and even went so far […] as to use the Claimant’s 
proposed draft transactional documents as a model for another deal with a third 
party”.836 The tribunal rejected these arguments and concluded that the claimant “failed 
to demonstrate any intellectual property contributions” capable of satisfying the 
definition of investment under the Georgian law. 
 
ICSID tribunals have been reluctant in accommodating disputes arising out of pre–
investment expenditures under the provisions of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. 
As pointed out by scholars, “[t]he sole question is whether the claimant has made an 
investment in the host state; the notion of a ‘pre–investment’ is meaningless.”837 
 
There is no arbitral decision and only few scholarly writings are dealing with pre–
Investments and the ECT. 838 Article 1(8) of the ECT refers to the establishment of 
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Zhinvali v. Georgia; supra at FN 832, para. 190. 
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 Ibid., para. 385. 
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 Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 187, para. 398. ICSID tribunals, however, failed to take into 
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 The distinction between pre–investment and post–investment stages, for the procedural protection 
offered by investment instruments, is an issue pertaining to the types of disputes covered by an 
investment treaty, rather than related to the notion of ‘investment’. See, Baltag, C.; supra at FN 786, p. 
19. Yet, for the analysis of the notion of ‘Investment’, it appears appropriate to discuss this matter here. 
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Investments and defines the term ‘Make Investments’ or ‘Making of Investments’ as 
“establishing new Investments, acquiring all or part of existing Investment or moving 
into different fields of Investment activity.”839 The ECT, thus, distinguishes between 
Investments and the Making of Investments, relevant in the context of the protection 
afforded by the ECT. Article 10(1) of the ECT provides only for an obligation on the 
Contracting Parties to “encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and 
transparent conditions” for the Making of Investments: 
“Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this 
Treaty, encourage and create stable, equitable, favourable and transparent 
conditions for Investors or other Contracting Parties to Make Investments in 
its Area.” 
 
This general obligation to encourage and create proper conditions for Investors who are 
Making Investments in a Contracting Party contrasts with the commitment of the 
Contracting Parties to accord Investments fair and equitable treatment, provide them 
with the most constant protection and security and abstain from unreasonable and 
discriminatory measures: 
“Such conditions shall include a commitment to accord at all times to 
Investments of Investors of other Contracting Parties fair and equitable 
treatment. Such Investments shall also enjoy the most constant protection and 
security and no Contracting Party shall in any way impair by unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures their management, maintenance, use, enjoyment or 
disposal. In no case shall such Investments be accorded treatment less 
favourable than that required by international law, including treaty obligations. 
Each Contracting Party shall observe any obligations it has entered into with 
an Investor or an Investment of an Investor of any other Contracting Party.”840 
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 According to VANDEVELDE, “the right to “establish” investment can refer to the right to acquire 
existing investment as well as the right to create new investment.” See, Vandevelde, K.J.; supra at 569, p. 
237. 
The first definition of the notion ‘Make Investments’ or ‘Making of Investments’ was inserted in the 
Basic Agreement of 19 March 1992 and read as follows: 
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Investment, and expanding an existing Investment.” (Art. 1(7) of the Basic Agreement of 19 March 1992, 
17/92 BA 10) 
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the objective of an existing Investment.” See, Art. 1(6) of the Basic Agreement of 12 August 1992, 37/92 
BA 15. 
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 Art. 10(1) of the ECT. The wording of this provision appears to be slightly confusing. The terms ‘such 
conditions’ refer to the first part of Art. 10(1), cited above: 
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In addition, Articles 10(2) and 10(3) of the ECT provide that Contracting Parties shall 
only “endeavour” to accord the national and most favoured nation treatment for Making 
of Investments: 
“Each Contracting Party shall endeavour to accord to Investors of other 
Contracting Parties, as regards the Making of Investments in its Area, the 
Treatment described in paragraph (3).841 
[…] “Treatment” means treatment accorded by a Contracting Party which is 
no less favourable than that which it accords to its own Investors or to 
Investors of any other Contracting Party or any third state, whichever is the 
most favourable.”842 
 
The obligation to accord the national and most favoured nation treatment is to be 
regulated by a supplementary treaty, as stated under Article 10(4) of the ECT. However, 
even though Contracting Parties have no obligation under the ECT to grant national 
treatment or the most favoured nation treatment with respect to the Making of 
Investments, Article 10(5) of the ECT provides that each Contracting Party shall 
endeavour to  
                                                                                                                                          
“Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with the provisions of this Treaty, encourage and create stable, 
equitable, favourable and transparent conditions for Investors or other Contracting Parties to Make 
Investments in its Area.” 
However, while the first phrase of Art. 10(1) refers to the Making of Investments, the second part of the 
provision deals only with the obligations of the Contracting Parties concerning Investments. This 
misleading wording was spotted during the negotiations of the ECT. In a document of the Legal Sub–
Group, it is stated the following: 
“It was suggested in the Sub-Group that the terms “such Investment” and “such Investments” which appear in 
the third and fourth sentences of paragraph (1) could be read as referring, inter alia, to the obligation in the 
paragraph’s first sentence concerning conditions for investors to “Make Investments”. If such an 
interpretation were to prevail, the obligations contained in the third and fourth sentences could apply to the 
making of investments.” (LSG/notes/Report 2, 6 October 1994) 
In order to avoid this confusion, it was suggested to either insert an Understanding clarifying that the 
terms ‘such Investment’ and ‘such Investments’ do not refer to the Making of Investments, either to 
restructure the first paragraph and create a distinction between the pre– and post–Investment obligations. 
See, LSG/notes/Report 2, 6 October 1994. The representatives of Canada also showed their concern in 
this respect. As mentioned in a letter to the Chairman of the Legal Sub–Group, 
“[…] the present construction of para (1) could lead both to the conclusion that pre-establishment matters are 
subject to binding obligations under this paragraph […], and that such obligations could become the subject 
of ECT dispute settlement.” (Fax from David Ehinger, Canadian Economic Law Division, to C. Bamberger, 
13 October 1994, emphasis original) 
However, it was recommended that “no change should be made”. See, Fax from Sydney Fremantle to 
Clive Jones, 20 October 1994. 
841
 Art. 10(2) of the ECT. 
842
 Art. 10(3) of the ECT. 
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“[…] (a) limit to the minimum the exceptions to the Treatment described in 
paragraph (3); 
(b) progressively remove existing restrictions affecting Investors of other 
Contracting Parties.” 
 
The obligations of the Contracting Parties at the pre–Investment stage are obligations of 
best efforts – “shall endeavour”, “shall … encourage”, in contrast with the obligations 
towards Investments, which are obligations of result – “commitment to accord”, “shall 
… enjoy”, “shall observe”.843 The obligations of the Contracting Parties at the Making 
of Investments stage are often referred to as “softer” obligations.844 Even though the 
obligations of the Contracting Parties at the Making of Investment phase are softer than 
the ones towards Investments, it does not make them not binding commitments or 
“merely hortatory”.845 
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organisations (“non-legal soft law”), to statements prepared by individuals in a non-governmental capacity, 
but which purport to lay down international principles.” (Chinkin, C.M.; supra, p. 851, footnotes omitted) 
See also, Pronto, Arnold N.; Some Thoughts on the Making of International Law, 19 EJIL 601 (2008); 
Klabbers, Jan; The Redundancy of Soft Law; 65 Nordic J. Int’l L. 167 (1996); Fitzmaurice, Malgosia; 
Elias, Olufemi; Contemporary Issues in the Law of the Treaties, Utrecht: Eleven International Publishing, 
2005, pp. 26–48; Gruchalla–Wesierski, Tadeusz; A Framework for Understanding “Soft Law”, 30 
McGill L. J. 37 (1984–1985): 
“[…] the term soft law is used as a convenient shorthand to include vague legal norms. Examples of such 
norms include: the duty to cooperate found in the Framework Agreement between Canada and the E.E.C.; the 
duty to consult found in G.A.T.T.; the precise non-legal norms such as those found in the O.E.C.D. 
Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises […].” (Gruchalla–Wesierski, T.; supra, p. 44, footnotes omitted) 
845
 Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 281. See also on the Making of Investments, Elshihabi, Saamir; The 
Difficulty Behind Securing Sector–Specific Investment Establishment Rights: The Case of the Energy 
Charter Treaty; 35 Int’l L. 137 (2001). 
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Scholars are of the opinion that obligations of Contracting Parties towards the Making 
of Investments are contained in Part III of the ECT and “[t]here is, therefore, no reason 
why they can not be justiciable under the investor–state arbitration regime”.846 The 
moderate character of the obligations of the Contracting Parties at the pre–Investment 
stage “does not mean that they are not susceptible of being “enforced” by an investor–
initiated arbitration under Article 26.”847 While this is apparent, one must not ignore the 
wording of Article 26(1) of the ECT. Tribunals will have to be satisfied that there is a 
dispute relating to an Investment and that this dispute concerns alleged breaches of Part 
III of the ECT by a Contracting Party. Although it is uncontested that the protection of 
the Making of Investments is included in Part III, the distinction made by the ECT 
between Investments and Making of Investments cannot suggest that, in the absence of 
an Investment, tribunals will have jurisdiction to hear a dispute related to the Making of 
Investments. Similar to the ICSID Convention, the ECT registers the consent of the 
Contracting Parties with respect to Investments. Nevertheless, if the Investor satisfies 
the tribunal that there is an Investment, then, claims concerning the Making of 
Investments and which are related to the Investment could be covered by Article 26(1) 




                                                
846
 Waelde, T.W.; Ben Hamida, W.; supra at FN 711, p. 178. 
847
 Ibid., p. 180. 
848
 Although scholars suggest that Art. 26(1) of the ECT does not “explicitly exclude the “making of 
investment”” and since “the usual approach in the Treaty is to specifically mention exclusions from the 
scope provided for direct investor-state arbitration”, “[i]t is, therefore, not possible to imply an exclusion 
of the pre-investment obligations – binding obligations although with a soft and flexible content”. See, 
Waelde, T.W.; Ben Hamida, W.; supra at FN 711, p. 187. Consequently, “[t]he term “relating to an 
investment” in Article 26(1) should, therefore, be understood as relating to an investment that is being 
made, i.e. pre–investment, or relating to an investment that has been made, i.e., post–investment.” See, 
Waelde, T.W.; Ben Hamida, W.; supra at FN 711, p. 187, emphasis original. 
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7. INVESTMENT AND THE ICSID CONVENTION 
 
When an ECT dispute is submitted for resolution under the provision of the ICSID 
Convention, Investors must observe the provisions of Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention providing for the jurisdictional requirements laid down therein.849 
Accordingly, arbitral tribunals must be satisfied that they have jurisdiction under both 
Article 26 of the ECT and Article 25 of the ICSID Convention.850 
 
Article 25 of the ICSID Convention refers to the jurisdiction of the ICSID over “any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment […] which the parties to the dispute 
consent in writing to submit to the Centre.”851 Even though it is the cornerstone of the 
ICSID Convention, the notion of ‘investment’ employed by Article 25 is not defined. 
This generated extensive debate in the practice of the ICSID tribunals and scholarly 
writings.852 
 
                                                
849
 It is relatively rare nowadays that the parties in dispute submit a dispute to the ICSID based on an 
arbitration clause contained in a contract between them. Investors tend to rely on the offer of consent 
made by the states in investment treaties or national investment legislation, a situation characterized by 
PAULSSON as “arbitration without privity”. See, Paulsson, Jan; Arbitration without Privity, 10 ICSID Rev. 
– FILJ 232 (1995). The treaty based on which the investor submits a dispute against a state, including the 
definitions of ‘investor’ and ‘investment’ therein, constitute the agreement of the parties to arbitrate. 
850
 See, Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, para. 113: 
“In order for the Tribunal to have jurisdiction ratione materiae over the present dispute, it must be found to 
have jurisdiction under the ICSID Convention, and under the ECT or the BIT.” (emphasis original, footnote 
omitted) 
851
 When an ECT dispute is brought under the ICSID Additional Facility Rules, the investment 
requirement under the ICSID Convention must be satisfied only with respect to Art. 2(1)(a); Art. 2(1)(b) 
of the ICSID Additional Facility Rules allows the submissions of disputes that do not arise directly out of 
an investment. See also, Chapter I.2.2.1 above. 
852
 For the notion of ‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention, see, Schreuer, Christoph H.; Commentary 
to the ICSID Convention: Article 25, 11 ICSID Rev.–FILJ 320 (1996); Dolzer, R.; Schreuer, C.; supra at 
FN 258, pp. 60–71; Schreuer, C.; with Malintoppi, L.; Reinisch, A. and Sinclair, A.; supra at FN 293, pp. 
pp. 114–143, paras 113–210; McLachlan, Campbell; Shore, Laurence; Weiniger, Matthew; International 
Investment Arbitration. Substantive Principles, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 163–196; 
Ben Hamida, Walid; Two Nebulous ICSID features: The notion of Investment and the Scope of Annulment 
Control: Ad Hoc Committee’s Decision in Patrick Mitchell v. Democratic Republic of Congo, 24 J. Int’l 
Arb. 287 (2007); Broches, A.; supra at FN 429, pp. 361–364; Krishan, Devanish; A Notion of ICSID 
Investment, p. 61, in Grierson Weiler, T.J. (ed.); supra at FN 371; Manciaux, S.; supra at FN 682; Rubins, 
N.; supra at FN 670; Yala, Farouk; The Notion of “Investment” in ICSID Case Law: A Drifting 
Jurisdictional Requirement? Some “Unconventional” Thoughts on Salini, SGS and Mihaly, 22 J. Int’l 
Arb. 105 (2005) etc. 
 254
Although the Report of the Executive Directors states that “[n]o attempt was made to 
define the term “investment””,853 the drafting history of the ICSID Convention shows 
that there were some attempts to define this notion, but the Contracting States 
deliberately left out the definition of the notion of ‘investment’ from the text of the 
ICSID Convention.854 As noted by MANCIAUX,  
“[t]the absence of a definition of the notion of investment in the Washington 
Convention is thus presented as the result of a choice, just as the presence in 
the near totality of international treaties on investment of these long non 
exhaustive lists […] of transactions considered as investments […].”855 
 
The lack of a definition of ‘investment’ in the ICSID Convention generated two 
approaches in ICSID practice and literature: the subjectivist and objectivist theories.856 
                                                
853
 Report of the Executive Directors; supra at FN 541, para. 27. 
854
 The Working Paper of 5 June 1962, which is the first draft of the ICSID Convention based on which 
the discussions begun (History of the ICSID Convention; supra at FN 366, vol. II–1, pp. 19–46), did not 
contain any mention of the term ‘investment’. BROCHES explained the absence of the limitation in the 
nature of the disputes submitted to the ICSID with reference to the difficulty in defining the term 
‘investment dispute’ “with the precision required to avoid disagreements arising as to the applicability of 
the Convention to a given undertaking” (ibid., p. 22)  The reference to ‘investment’ was introduced in the 
First Preliminary Draft of the ICSID Convention of 9 August 1963, which provided in Article II, Section 
1 that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Center shall be limited to proceedings for conciliation and arbitration with 
respect to any existing or future investment dispute”. (ibid., p. 148) The commentary to this provision 
indicates that no definition of the term ‘investment’ was inserted in the First Preliminary Draft because 
“Contracting States would be free to determine in advance in each particular case what disputes they 
would submit to the Center” and due to the fact that “a more precise definition would tend to open the 
door for frequent disagreements as to the applicability of the Convention to a particular undertaking”. 
(ibid., p. 149) The First Draft of the ICSID Convention of 11 September 1964 provided in Article 26(1) 
that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Center shall extend to all legal disputes […] arising out of or in connection 
with any investment” (ibid., pp. 621–622) and contained a definition of the notion of ‘investment’: 
““investment” means any contribution of money or other asset of economic value for an indefinite period or, 
if the period be defined, for not less than five years”. (Art. 30(1), History of the ICSID Convention; supra, p. 
623) 
The Revised Draft of the ICSID Convention of 11 December 1964 contained a different wording of the 
provision on the jurisdiction of the ICSID and no definition of the notion of ‘investment’. See, History of 
the ICSID Convention; supra at FN 366, vol. II–2, pp. 918–919. Article 25(1) of the Revised Draft, which 
after some minor changes in the wording became the Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, provided 
that “[t]he jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any dispute of a legal character, arising directly out of 
an investment”. (ibid., p. 918) 
855
 Manciaux, S.; supra at FN 682, p. 4. 
856
 There are scholars who advocate a hybrid theory based on which the consent of the parties, as well as 
the objective meaning of the investment are relevant for the jurisdiction of the ICSID. See, Ben Hamida, 
Walid; The Mihaly v. Sri Lanka case: Some Thoughts Relating to the Status of Pre–Investment 
Expenditures, pp. 55–56, in Weiler, Todd (ed.); International Investment Law and Arbitration: Leading 
Cases from the ICSID, NAFTA, Bilateral Treaties and Customary International Law, London: Cameron 
May, 2005. The author refers to the theory as using “a subjective consent criterion, in addition to 
objective elements, to qualify the meaning of “investment”” and refers to the cases of Alcoa Minerals of 
Jamaica, Inc. v. Jamaica, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence of 6 July 1975, Kaiser Bauxite 
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The subjectivist theory argues that the lack of a definition of ‘investment’ was the result 
of the intention of the drafters to give full effect to the consent of the parties concerning 
the investment disputes to be submitted to the ICSID. The subjectivist theory relies on 
the statement of the Report of the Executive Directors, which refers to the fact that 
“[n]o attempt was made to define the term “investment” given the essential 
requirements of consent by the parties”.857 Accordingly, the consent of the parties on 
the term ‘investment’ is necessary and sufficient for the purpose of Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention. According to this theory, the notion of ‘Investment’ under the ECT 
would represent the consent of the parties for the purpose of the ICSID’s jurisdiction, 
and thus, the jurisdiction requirement of investment under the ICSID Convention would 
be satisfied. 
 
In MCI Power v. Ecuador, a dispute referred to the ICSID based on the Ecuador–
United States BIT,858 the respondent objected to the ICSID’s jurisdiction based on the 
fact that the definition of ‘investment’ under the BIT could not alter the objective 
requirement of investment under the ICSID Convention.859 The tribunal rejected 
respondent’s contentions and concluded that the definition of investment in the BIT 
complements the ICSID Convention, given that the absence of a definition in the ICSID 
Convention suggests the freedom of the parties to determine the meaning of this notion: 
“The Tribunal notes that numerous arbitral precedents confirm the statement 
in the Report of the Executive Directors of the World Bank that the 
Convention does not define the term “investments” because it wants to leave 
                                                                                                                                          
Company v. Jamaica, Decision on Jurisdiction and Competence of 6 July 1975, and Aucoven v. 
Venezuela; supra at FN 445. 
857
 Report of the Executive Directors; supra at FN 541, para. 27. 
858
 Treaty between the United States of America and the Republic of Ecuador concerning the 
Encouragement and Reciprocal Protection of Investment, 11 May 1997; M.C.I. Power Group, L.C. and 
New Turbine, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Award of 31 July 2007, para. 27. 
859
 MCI Power v. Ecuador; supra at FN 858, para. 141. See also, Lanco. v. Argentina; supra at FN 429, 
para. 48; Mihaly v. Sri Lanka; supra at FN 821, para. 33; Fraport AG Frankfurt Airport Services 
Worldwide v. Republic of the Philippines, Award of 16 August 2007, para. 305. 
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the parties free to decide what class of disputes they would submit to the 
ICSID. 
The BIT indicates in its Article 1 which investments are to be protected under 
it. Thus, the BIT complements Article 25 of the ICSID Convention, for 
purposes of defining the Competence of the Tribunal with respect to any legal 
dispute arising directly out of an investment.”860 
 
The subjectivist theory, which gives preference to the consent of the parties expressed in 
an investment treaty or other instrument, while relying on the paragraph 27 of the 
Report of the Executive Directors, ignores the statement made under paragraph 25 of 
the same Report, which provides that “[w]hile consent of the parties is an essential 
prerequisite for the jurisdiction of the Centre, consent alone will not suffice to bring a 
dispute within its jurisdiction.”861 
 
The objectivist theory is based on the idea, also advocated in paragraph 25 of the Report 
of the Executive Directors, that consent alone is not enough to establish the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID under Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. The notion of ‘investment’ 
under Article 25(1) has an objective meaning that cannot be overridden by the consent 
of the parties. In CSOB v. Slovakia, the tribunal acknowledged that the agreement of the 
parties describing their transaction as an investment is not sufficient for the jurisdiction 
of the ICSID.862 The tribunal concluded that 
“[t]he concept of an investment as spelled out in that provision is objective in 
nature in that the parties may agree on a more precise or restrictive definition 
of their acceptance of the Centre’s jurisdiction, but they may not choose to 
submit disputes to the Centre that are not related to an investment. A two–fold 
test must therefore be applied in determining whether this Tribunal has the 
competence to consider the merits of the claim: whether the dispute arises out 
of an investment within the meaning of the Convention and, if so, whether the 
dispute relates to an investment as defined in the Parties’ consent to ICSID 
arbitration, in their reference to the BIT and the pertinent definitions contained 
in Article 1 of the BIT.”863 
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 MCI Power v. Ecuador; supra at FN 858, paras 159–160, footnote omitted. 
861
 Report of the Executive Directors; supra at FN 541, para. 25. 
862




In Fedax v. Venezuela, the tribunal considered that apart from the consent of the parties, 
there is an objective meaning of the notion of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1) of the 
ICSID Convention.864 Although it did not expressly identify them as characteristics of 
ICSID investments, the tribunal referred to the 
“[…] basic features of an investment [which] have been described as 
involving a certain duration, a certain regularity of profit and return, 
assumption of risk, a substantial commitment and a significance for the host 
State’s development.”865 
 
Probably the most notorious case advocating the objectivist theory is Salini v. Morocco, 
where the tribunal, acknowledging the objective meaning of the notion of 
‘investment’,866 recognized the elements of investment within the meaning of the ICSID 
Convention: 
“The doctrine generally considers that investment infers: contributions, a 
certain duration of performance of the contract and a participation in the risks 
of the transaction […]. In reading the Convention’s preamble, one may add 
the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the 
investment as an additional condition. 
In reality, these various elements may be interdependent. […] As a result, 
these criteria should be assessed globally […].”867 
 
The ‘Salini test’, as it is referred to, provides that the investment must bear a 
contribution, a certain duration, be subject to risk and contribute to the economic 
development of the host state. The ‘Salini test’ was followed by several ICSID 
tribunals,868 including by the tribunal in Kardassopoulos v. Georgia. In Kardassopoulos 
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 Fedax v. Venezuela; supra at FN 779, para. 22. 
865
 Ibid., para. 43, footnote omitted. The tribunal referred here to the features of investment as explained 
by SCHREUER in Schreuer, C.H.; supra at FN 852, p. 372. 
866
 Salini Costruttori S.p.A. and Italstrade S.p.A. v. Kingdom of Morocco, Decision on Jurisdiction of 23 




 See also, Joy Mining v. Egypt; supra at FN 581; Bayindir Insaat Turizm Ticaret Ve Sanayi A.S. v. 
Islamic Republic of Pakistan, Decision on Jurisdiction of 14 November 2005; Jan de Nul v. Egypt; supra 
at FN 102; Helnan International Hotels A/S v. Arab Republic of Egypt, Decision on Jurisdiction of 17 
October 2006; Malaysian Historical Salvors, SDN, BHD v. Malaysia, Award of 28 May 2007; Noble 
Energy Inc. and MachalaPower Cía. Ltd. v. Republic of Ecuador and Consejo Nacional de Electricidad, 
Decision on Jurisdiction of 5 March 2008; Víctor Pey Casado v. Chile; supra at FN 373; Phoenix Action 
Ltd v. Czech Republic, Award of 15 April 2009, where the tribunal held that an operation made in 
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v. Georgia, a case brought under the ECT and the Greece–Georgia BIT, the tribunal 
concluded that, although the ICSID Convention does not provide for the definition of 
‘investment’, 
“ICSID tribunals have, however, developed a set of conjunctive criteria to 
determine whether an investment was made within the meaning of the 
Convention. There must be: (i) a contribution, (ii) a “certain duration of 
performance of the contract”, (iii) a “participation in the risks of the 
transaction”, and (iv) a contribution to the host State’s economic 
development.”869 
 
The diversity of opinions expressed by the ICSID tribunals shows that there is no 
consensus on what the notion of ‘investment’ is. The drafting history of the ICSID 
Convention and the rules of treaty interpretation suggest that there is an objective 
meaning of the term ‘investment’ and consent alone will not suffice to bring a dispute 
under the ICSID. The elements proposed by the ‘Salini test’ were developed based on 
the scholarly writings, and, in particular, on a paper written by SCHREUER in 1996, in 
which he concluded that: 
“[…] it seems possible to identify certain features that are typical to most of 
the operations in question. The first such feature is that the projects have a 
certain duration. […] The second feature is a certain regularity of profit and 
return. […] The third feature is the assumption of risk usually by both sides. 
[…] The fourth typical feature is that the commitment is substantial. […] The 
fifth feature is the operation’s significance for the host State’s development. 
This is not necessarily characteristic of investments in general. But the 
wording of the Preamble and the Executive Directors’ Report […] suggest that 
development is part of the Convention’s object and purpose. These features 
should not necessarily be understood as jurisdictional requirements but merely 
as typical characteristics of investments under the Convention.”870 
 
                                                                                                                                          
violation of the principle of good faith cannot constitute an investment (para. 100); Patrick Mitchell v. 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Decision on Annulment of 1 November 2006 etc. 
To the elements of investment under the ‘Salini test’, tribunals added a fifth one, the regularity of profit 
and return. See, Joy Mining v. Egypt; supra at FN 581, para. 53. See also, Schreuer, C.H.; supra at FN 
852, p. 372. 
869
 Ibid., para. 116, footnote omitted. The tribunal then turned to analyse the provisions of the ECT and 
the BIT, based on respondent objection that claimant has no interest in the investment made in Georgia. 
The tribunal found, however, that claimant had sufficient interest in the investment and rejected Georgia’s 
contentions. See, Kardassopoulos v. Georgia; supra at FN 83, para. 141. 
870
 Schreuer, C.H.; supra at FN 852, p. 372, emphasis original, footnotes omitted. 
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As suggested by SCHREUER, these elements of the investment should be considered 
typical characteristics and not jurisdictional requirements under Article 25 of the ICSID 
Convention. However, the jurisprudence of the ICSID Convention is not settled on this 
issue. The ‘Salini test’ does not explain whether the elements of investment are typical 
characteristics or jurisdictional requirements, while subsequent tribunals that followed 
the ‘Salini test’ have not reached an agreement on the nature of these requirements. For 
example, in Joy Mining v. Egypt, the tribunal considered them as jurisdictional 
prerequisites,871 while in Noble Energy v. Ecuador, the tribunal saw the elements 
proposed by the ‘Salini test’ as typical features.872 The consequence for this 
qualification may result in the lack of jurisdiction of the ICSID in the absence of one 
element of the term ‘investment’.  
 
In spite of the numerous decisions advocating the ‘Salini test’,873 the absence of a 
definition of ‘investment’ in the ICSID Convention suggests that the notion should be 
understood within its ordinary meaning and in the context in which the term is used, and 
not merely assessed based on criteria developed by the ICSID tribunals and scholars.874 
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 Joy Mining v. Egypt; supra at FN 581, para. 53: “the elements that an activity must have in order to 
qualify as an investment”. 
872
 Noble Energy v. Ecuador; supra at FN 868, para. 128: 
“The Tribunal concurs with earlier ICSID decisions which, subject to minor variations, have relied on the so-
called “Salini test”. Such test identifies the following elements as indicative of an "investment" for purposes 
of the ICSID Convention […]” (emphasis original) 
873
 See also, the idea of unity of investment advocated in CSOB v. Slovakia supra at FN 544, para. 72: 
“[…] a dispute that is brought before the Centre must be deemed to arise directly out of an investment even 
when it is based on a transaction which, standing alone, would not qualify as an investment under the 
Convention, provided that the particular transaction forms an integral part of an overall operation that 
qualifies as an investment.” (footnote omitted) 
The unity of investment was also considered by the tribunal in Alpha v. Ukraine: 
“The Tribunal concludes that it is the character of the project in toto which determines the nature of the 
commercial arrangements and not the individual agreements in isolation. (Alpha v. Ukraine; supra at FN 709, 
para. 272, emphasis original) 
874
 See, Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 164, para. 343. See also, the conclusion of the tribunal in Alpha 
v. Ukraine: 
“[…] the elements of the so-called Salini test, which some tribunals have applied mandatorily and 
cumulatively […] are not found in Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention. In applying the criteria in this 
manner, these tribunals have sought to apply a universal definition of “investment” under the ICSID 
Convention, despite the fact that the drafters and signatories of the Convention decided that it should not have 
one.” (Alpha v. Ukraine; supra at FN 709, para. 311, emphasis original, footnotes omitted) 
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This was the conclusion of the tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Turkey, where the respondent 
objected to the jurisdiction of the ICSID arguing that claimant’s alleged investment is 
not covered by the meaning of Article 25(1) of the ICSID, 875 and asked the tribunal to 
follow the ‘Salini test’ when deciding on this issue.876 The tribunal held that consent of 
the parties is not sufficient for satisfying the ICSID’s jurisdiction,877 and reasoned that 
“[…] an objective definition of the notion of investment was contemplated 
within the framework of the ICSID Convention, since certain terms of Article 
25 would otherwise be devoid of any meaning.”878 
 
The tribunal in Saba Fakes v. Turkey concluded that 
“[…] the criteria of (i) contribution, (ii) a certain duration, and (iii) an element 
of risk, are both necessary and sufficient to define an investment within the 
framework of the ICSID Convention.”879 
 
These criteria, the tribunal added, reflect “an objective definition of ‘investment’, 
without doing violence either to the text or the object and purpose of the ICSID 
Convention”,880 and “derive from the ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’”.881 
 
When Investors submit their ECT disputes under the ICSID option, they must consider 
the jurisdictional requirement of ‘investment’ under Article 25(1) of the ICSID 
Convention. ICSID tribunals have developed controversial approaches on the notion of 
‘investment’ given the absence of a definition of this term in the ICSID Convention. It 
                                                                                                                                          
Nevertheless, some of the elements of the ‘Salini test’ are reflected in the ordinary meaning of the notion 
of ‘investment’. See, Chapter III.1 above. 
875
 Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 82. 
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 Ibid., para. 83. 
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 Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 110. The tribunal held that the ‘contribution to the 
economic development of the host state’ requirement is “an expected consequence, not a separate 
requirement”. See, Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 111. Also, the tribunal concluded that 
the principle of good faith advocated in the Phoenix v. Czech Republic; supra at FN 868, “cannot be 
incorporated into the definition of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention without doing violence to the 
language of the ICSID Convention”. See, Saba Fakes v. Turkey; supra at FN 302, para. 112. 
 261
is possible for a tribunal sitting in a dispute based on the ECT’s provisions to adopt the 
subjectivist approach on the notion of ‘investment’ or the ‘Salini test’.882 It might also 
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 The ‘Salini test’ was also applied to disputes that had not been submitted under the ICSID Convention. 
In Romak v. Uzbekistan tribunal concluded that “the term “investments” under the BIT has an inherent 
meaning […] entailing a contribution that extends over a certain period of time and involves some risk.” 
(Romak v. Uzbekistan; supra at FN 697, para. 207, emphasis original) The tribunal reached the definition 
of investment by relying on the meaning of the notion of ‘investment’ under the ICSID Convention, as 
developed by the ICSID arbitral tribunals, although the dispute was brought under the UNCITRAL Rules. 
Uzbekistan argued that the tribunal should observe the ‘Salini test’, where a transaction, in order to be 
considered investment, must have the following characteristics: regularity of profits and returns, certain 
duration, risk, significant contribution to the development of the host state. (ibid., paras 104–105) Romak 
S.A. argued, in turn, that the definition of the notion of ‘investment’ “may vary depending on the 
investor’s choice between UNCITRAL or ICSID Arbitration” and suggested that the definition under the 
UNCITRAL proceedings is wider that in ICSID arbitration. (ibid., para. 193) The Romak v. Uzbekistan 
tribunal rejected claimant’s argument and relied on the fact that the Uzbekistan–Switzerland BIT provides 
for ICSID arbitration, besides the UNCITRAL option. In the tribunal’s opinion, claimant’s argument 
referring to the fact that a dispute brought under the UNCITRAL Rules or the ICSID Convention may 
narrow or widen the substantive protection offered by the BIT could lead to unreasonable results. (ibid., 
para. 194) The tribunal reasoned that there is no basis to suppose that the term ‘investment’ has different 
meaning in the context of the ICSID than it has in relation to the BIT (ibid., para. 194) and concluded that 
an investment, irrespective of whether investors resort to ICSID or UNCITRAL proceedings, entails a 
contribution, a certain duration and risk. 
In the related court proceedings regarding the enforcement of Romak S.A.’s GAFTA arbitral award (see, 
supra at FN 698), the Cour d’Appel de Paris concluded in its decision of 4 December 2008 that the 
definition of investment developed by ICSID case law cannot be applied in a non–ICSID case. See, 
Duprey, Pierre; Comments on the Paris Court of Appeal Decision on Czech Republic v. Pren Nreka, 
26(4) J. Int’l Arb. 591 (2009), at note 32. It was reported that in Nreka v. Czech Republic, a non–ICSID 
case, the tribunal applied the ‘Salini test’. See, the case report in Yannaca–Small, Katia; Definition of 
“Investment”: An Open–ended Search for a Balanced Approach, p. 257, in Yannaca–Small, K. (ed.); 
supra at FN 69. In the challenge procedures against the award brought by the Czech Republic (see, supra 
at FN 682), Cour d’Appel de Paris reverted the conclusion of the tribunal on the application of the ‘Salini 
test’, and gave full effect to the definition of ‘investment’ under the relevant BIT. See, supra at FN 682; 
also, Cabrol, E.; supra at FN 696, pp. 217–231. 
In AFT v. Slovakia, a non-ICSID and ad hoc arbitration, the tribunal reached the unusual conclusion that 
the elements of the ‘Salini test’ are to be applied by any tribunals dealing with disputes between investors 
and states, whether ICSID-based or not, and that in this sense, ICSID tribunals helped to elucidate the 
notion of 'investment' under customary international law having these elements: 
A more than abundant number of cases have contributed to elucidate the notion of investment under the 
ICSID Convention and, more general, international customary law. It is now common ground that the 
necessary conditions or characteristics to be satisfied for attributing the quality of 'investment' to a contractual 
relationship include: (a) a capital contribution to the host-State by the private contracting party, (b) a 
significant duration over which the project is implemented and (c) a sharing of operational risks inherent to 
the contribution together with long-term commitments. (AFT v. Slovakia, para. 241, emphasis original, 
footnotes omitted) 
Not only that the AFT v. Slovakia tribunal resorted in a non-ICSID arbitration to the ‘Salini test’ as 
applied by ICSID tribunals, but it reached the odd conclusion that the notion of 'investment' is part of 
customary international law (the tribunal referred to the notion of 'investment' as a 'general concept given 
by international law rules' – AFT v. Slovakia, para. 240), while considering that it is of its duty to follow 
the conclusions of ICSID tribunals (AFT v. Slovakia, para. 239). It is difficult, however, to imagine how 
the notion of ‘investment’, which is not a normative rule, may turn into a generally applicable concept. 
Moreover, it is difficult to substantiate the existence of customary rules in the context of investment law 
which is divided between different treaty and non-treaty regimes and settlement of disputes under various 
dispute resolution mechanisms, including arbitration under the auspices of different institutions or ad hoc 
tribunals, some of them with their particular substantive provisions. In spite of these peculiarities, there 
are voices – including, most recently, arbitral tribunals - advocating the formation of these rules in 
investment law. See, Schwebel, Stephen M.; The Influence of Bilateral Investment Treaties on Customary 
International Law, 98 Am. Soc’y Int’l L. Proc. 27 (2004); Schill, Stephan W.; The Multilateralization of 
International Investment Law, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009. 
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be that ICSID tribunals consider the ordinary meaning of the term ‘investment’, as 
suggested by the drafting history of the ICSID Convention and recent ICSID decisions. 
In this latter instance, the notion of ‘Investment’ under the ECT will identify itself with 
the meaning of the term under the ICSID Convention.883 However, it may be that ICSID 
tribunals will develop a new approach of the notion of ‘investment’. A diligent Investor 
will have to take into consideration all relevant criteria, including the chances for an 
ECT dispute to be dismissed by an ICSID tribunal because of the failure to fulfil the 




The notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT cannot be discussed outside the concept of 
‘Investment’. The consent of the Contracting Parties under Article 26 of the ECT is 
given in respect of disputes between Investors and Contracting Parties relating to an 
Investment. The substantive protection offered by the ECT is also confined, in most of 
its parts, to Investments of Investors. Similar to other treaties providing for protection 
and promotion of investments, the ECT has a broad definition of covered Investments. 
Article 1(6) encompasses any asset owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an 
Investor. The non–exhaustive list of assets comprises movable and immovable property, 
                                                
883
 See also, DOUGLAS, who is of the opinion that 
“[…] the open-textured nature of the standard formulation in investment treaties preserves the ordinary 
meaning of the term ‘investment’ and therefore its consistency with the characteristics that must be attributed 
to the same term as employed in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention. 
It is difficult to conceive of a hypothetical conflict between the conceptions of an investment in Article 25 of 
the ICSID Convention and an investment treaty because the use of the term ‘investment’ in both instruments 
imports the same basic economic attributes of an investment derived from the ordinary meaning of that term 
[…].” (Douglas, Z.; supra at FN 292, p. 164, paras 343–344) 
But see, authors who suggest that the notion of ‘Investment’ under the ECT is broader than the notion of 
‘investment’ under Art. 25(1) of the ICSID Convention: Waelde, T.W.; Ben Hamida, W.; supra at FN 
711, p. 203. 
884
 For an overview and statistics on the jurisdictional challenges related to the notion of ‘investment’ 
under the ICSID Convention, see, Commission, J.P.; An Analysis of a Developing Jurisprudence in 
International Investment Law – What Investment Treaty Tribunals Are Saying and Doing (Tables), 6(1) 
TDM (2009). 
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company or business enterprise, shares and debts in a company, intellectual property, 
returns, claims to money and claims to performance pursuant to a contract associated 
with an Investment, and any right to undertake an Economic Activity in the Energy 
Sector. The broad character of the definition of the notion of ‘Investment’ was captured 
by the tribunal in Plama v. Bulgaria: 
“[…] a broad, non–exhaustive list of different kinds of assets encompassing 
virtually any right, property or interest in money or money’s worth […]”.885 
 
However, this virtual boundless notion of ‘Investment’ is limited in paragraph 3 of 
Article 1(6) by two restrictive stipulations: the Investment must be an investment within 
the ordinary meaning of the term, and the Investment must be associated with an 
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector. Thus, the notion of ‘Investment’ under the 
ECT could not be extended as to encompass one–off transactions, such as sale of goods. 
The requirement that Investments must be associated with an Economic Activity in the 
Energy Sector gives expression to the purpose of the ECT to promote cooperation in the 
energy field. The notion of ‘Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’ is explained by 
Article 1(5) as being an economic activity concerning the exploration, extraction, 
refining, production, storage, land transport, transmission, distribution, trade, marketing, 
or sale of Energy Materials and Products. Investments must be associated with an 
Economic Activity, and not represent an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector per se. 
 
The consent of the Contracting Parties regarding the disputes between Investors and 
Contracting Parties covers Investments that are in the Area of the respondent 
Contracting Party. While the terms ‘in the Area’ would apparently suggest a physical 
materialization of Investments in the territory of the host Contracting Party, some of the 
potential Investments listed under Article 1(6) would not necessarily take a material 
                                                
885
 Plama v. Bulgaria; supra at FN 93, para. 125. 
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form. Therefore, it is not required for Investments to be physically located in the 
Contracting Party, but to be linked or directed to the host Contracting Party. Disputes 
related to the Making of Investments are excluded from the unconditional consent of the 
Contracting Parties to the ECT, as Article 26(1) refers to disputes “relating to an 
Investment”. The ECT does not provide for express provisions regarding the lawfulness 
or approval or Investments, nor does it discuss the origin of the Investment.  
 
The ECT is not a self–contained treaty. The Investor–Contracting Parties dispute may 
only be arbitrated under one of the options provided for by Article 26(4) of the ECT. 
While the UNCITRAL and SCC Rules do not contain provisions regarding the 
jurisdiction of the tribunals, the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility 
Rules place several limitations on the jurisdiction of the ICSID. Consequently, Investors 
must observe the requirements laid down in Article 25 of the ICSID Convention that 
include the prerequisite of having an ‘investment’. The notion of ‘investment’ is much 
debated in ICSID case law and scholarly writings, given the absence of the definition of 
this notion in the ICSID Convention. Tribunals are divided between a subjectivist 
approach, giving preference to the consent of the parties, and an objectivist position 
towards this concept, which adopts an objective meaning of the term. ICSID tribunals 
applying the objectivist theory consider either the so–called ‘Salini test’ or the ‘ordinary 
meaning’ approach. The ‘Salini test’ provides that an investment must bear a 
contribution, have a certain duration, be subject to risk and contribute to the economic 
development of the host state, while the ‘ordinary meaning’ approach suggests that the 
ordinary meaning of the term should be observed in the absence of the definition of the 
notion of ‘investment’ in the ICSID Convention. The review of ICSID case law is not 
just a useful academic research. It shows that Investors bringing their disputes to the 
ICSID relying on the ECT may face a lack of consistency in the approach of the ICSID 
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The last decades revealed a boom in the number of disputes between investors and 
states related to measures (or omissions) taken by states in respect to the promotion and 
protection of investors’ investments. The ICSID statistics show that more than one third 
of the disputes between investors and the Contracting States of the ICSID Convention 
are related to investments in the energy field. The over 2,600 BITs and the increasing 
number of trade agreements contributed to the implementation of standards of 
protection of investors and their investments, but also played an important part in the 
rapid raise of the number of cases brought under the investor–state dispute resolution 
mechanism, and, in particular, under the arbitration proceedings. 
 
The ECT came to life in the aftermath of the fall of the communist regimes across 
Europe and the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The political and economic interests of 
the Western European states, largely dependent on imports of energy resources, secured 
a framework agreement with the Eastern European and former Soviet states, with the 
purpose of developing an innovative multilateral treaty regulating the energy field. The 
European Charter, although no more than a political statement, laid down the 
foundation of the ECT. The ECT was negotiated in a short period, compared to the 
goals it intended to achieve, and received support not only from the European states, but 
also from the international community. The ECT is a unique treaty aiming at 
strengthening the rule of law in the energy field, by setting minimum standards of action 
in three main areas: trade, transit and investment protection. The provisions for the 
protection and promotion of Investments, reinforced by the dispute resolution 
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mechanism under Article 26 of the ECT, contribute to the predictability and stability of 
the investment environment and help improving Investors’ confidence in undertaking 
long–term and expensive investment opportunities. Although the protection and 
promotion of Investments and the mechanisms for the settlement of disputes related to 
these Investments brought notoriety to the ECT, all the provisions of the ECT 
contributed to its success.  
 
This Thesis aimed at clarifying the notion of ‘Investor’ within the ECT framework, 
while bringing up some of the key problems surrounding this notion. The notion of 
‘Investor’ is the keystone of the provisions for the promotion and protection of 
Investments and for the procedural remedies under Article 26 of the ECT. Although the 
ECT contains a definition of the term ‘Investor’ in Article 1(7), the notion of ‘Investor’ 
goes beyond this provision. The research showed that the notion of ‘Investor’ is shaped 
under the substantive protection provisions and under the procedural remedies. It also 
suffers limitations when Investors choose to arbitrate their disputes with the Contracting 
Parties under the ICSID Convention and the ICSID Additional Facility Rules. The 
analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ is not an easy task. The ECT is a web of provisions 
that are not always clear and interact with external provisions found in related treaties 
and rules. As explained by an author, the ECT is 
“[…] a tortuous legal instrument where great principles are announced and 
then taken back, excepted, mitigated and delayed – usually in the less–
conspicuous forms of annexes and annexed declarations and understandings. 
To understand the Treaty, it is necessary to appreciate the maze of textual 
compromises which paved the way to signature […].886” 
 
The research began from the definition of Investor under Article 1(7) and the consent 
expressed in Article 26(1) of the ECT on the types of disputes that can be brought under 
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 Waelde, T.W.; supra at FN 66, p. 269. 
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the Investor–Contracting Party dispute resolution mechanism. These two provisions 
revealed that a comprehensive analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ must necessarily refer 
to three concepts: the notion of ‘Contracting Parties to the ECT’, the notion of 
‘Investor’ and the links between natural persons and legal entities and the Contracting 
Parties, and the notion of ‘Investment’. The discussion considered both substantive and 
procedural protection of the ECT and constantly weighted the issues against the 
provisions of the related treaties and rules, with particular emphasis on the ICSID 
Convention. The network of – not always clear – provisions of the ECT and the 
interaction of the ECT with other provisions of related treaties and rules, turn the notion 
of ‘Investor’ into a nuanced and complex concept and, arguably, too generously 
defined.  
 
The analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ revealed several controversial issues, some of 
which have already been discussed by ECT arbitral tribunals. While the Chapters of this 
Thesis highlighted and discussed them in detail, it is the role of these ‘Conclusions’ to 
summarise and assess the most important ones and, where possible, suggest solutions. 
These issues do not concern only the ECT per se, but also the manner in which arbitral 
tribunals considered them and how they would influence Investor’s decision to submit a 
dispute to one or other arbitration fora under Article 26 of the ECT. 
 
a. Dual Nationality of Natural Persons. Rules of Diplomatic Protection and 
Investment Law 
Considerable space was devoted in Chapter II to the issue of dual nationality lato sensu 
of natural persons and the analysis concluded with the view that the ECT does not 
explicitly exclude dual nationals from its protection – opinion which was expressed by 
representatives of the negotiating parties on the working drafts of the ECT. To support 
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this conclusion, the research revealed that there is the tendency nowadays in 
international law, based on the realities of our globalized society, to eliminate the rule of 
non-responsibility of states - which under the rules of diplomatic protection prevented 
the state of one of the nationalities of an individual to take up a claim against the state 
of the other nationality -, and give preference to the rule of dominant nationality, thus 
recognizing that an individual with double or multiple nationality may have stronger 
ties with one state than with another, without making the other nationality(ies) 
ineffective. However, the analysis revealed not only a grey area of the notion of 
‘Investor’, which has potential to become highly debatable in the practice of arbitral 
tribunals, but also the relevance of the rules of diplomatic protection in investment law, 
which in itself is a controversy among scholars and arbitrators. Chapter II of the Thesis 
briefly referred to the relation between the rules of diplomatic protection and investment 
law and spotlighted that opinions are divided. Some voices argue that the very nature of 
investment law excludes the rules of diplomatic protection since under the protection 
regime offered by investment law investors no longer need their state of nationality to 
espouse their claims. Other scholars claim that in the absence of specific rules in 
investment treaties there is nothing to prevent the reliance on the rules of diplomatic 
protection. Whichever side is taken, the rules of diplomatic protection may become 
relevant when interpreting the provisions of a treaty to the extent that these rules are 
rules of international of law. 
 
b. Shareholders and Companies. Treaty Shopping and Parallel Proceedings 
Chapter II also analysed the quality of shareholder and its relation to companies and 
raised the issues of implied requirements for legal entities, such as the nationality of the 
real beneficiaries or controllers of a company – issue reiterated in Chapter III in respect 
of the origin of Investment. It was highlighted that problems of parallel proceedings and 
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‘treaty shopping’ may come up in connection with these aspects of the notion of 
‘Investor’. It is thus the place to reopen this discussion – although the Thesis is not 
intended to examine procedural issues in connection with the notion of ‘Investor’ – and 
analyse whether the notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT is too broad or the language of 
the provisions dealing with it must be revisited.  
 
In the Yukos Cases the tribunal took a literal approach to the terms of the definition of 
‘Investor’ under Article 1(7) of the ECT and rejected to read into this provision that the 
ECT requires more than the incorporation of a company in a Contracting Party. 
Respondent in these cases argued that the claimants were holding companies used by 
Russian nationals to bring claims against their home Contracting Party.887 Arguably, 
this translates into an abuse of the ECT’s provisions relying on the fact that the only 
express requirement for a company to be considered Investor under the ECT is the 
incorporation of that company in a Contracting Party of the ECT, irrespective of the 
nationalities of the shareholders or ultimate beneficiaries. This widening of the 
protection of a treaty is also referred to as ‘treaty shopping’ and it is seen as a misuse of 
a treaty, which normally would not protect those foreign investors, in violation of the 
principle of reciprocity between the parties to that treaty.888 Nevertheless, ‘treaty 
shopping’ is usually counteracted by the parties to a treaty by imposing further 
requirements on the nationality of controllers or shareholders of a company. Where 
these additional requirements are not expressly provided for in a treaty, tribunals – such 
as the one in the Yukos Cases - have been reluctant to read in a treaty something that 
was not expressly provided.889 The analysis of the provisions of the ECT in respect of 
these implied requirements for Investors legal entities and, implicitly, ‘treaty shopping’ 
                                                
887
 Yukos Cases; supra at FN 98, para. 407. 
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 See, Mistelis, Loukas; Baltag, Crina; supra at FN 662, p. 303. 
889
 See also, Saluka v. Czech Republic; supra at FN 595. 
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methods concluded that the rules of treaty interpretation do not allow to read in a treaty 
something that it is not there, opinion also expressed by the tribunal in the Yukos Cases. 
However, the economic realities and the purpose of the ECT – which is also based on 
the principle of reciprocity mentioned above – would suggest that tribunals should 
probably counteract the abuse of the ECT’s provisions and reject claims from shell 
companies set up by nationals of the respondent Contracting Party or of a third state in 
Contracting Parties in order to obtain – artificially - access to the protection of the ECT. 
However, one cannot disregard the fact that the Contracting Parties themselves had the 
opportunity, while negotiating the ECT, to prevent the misuse of the protection of the 
ECT and include adequate mechanisms for this purpose – one of which is the ‘denial of 
benefits’ clause which shall be revisited below. Would tribunals create less damage to 
the economic reality of the ECT by reading into the ECT something that it is not there? 
The tribunal in the Yukos Cases saw less injustice in following the plain wording of the 
provisions of the ECT than in condemning practices of ‘treaty shopping’, of which the 
Contracting Parties must have been aware of when agreeing on the provisions of the 
ECT. The broad definition of ‘Investor’ under Article 1(7) may not be restricted by 
interpretations of arbitral tribunals which would depart from the rules of treaty 
interpretation. Narrowing down the circle of Investors could, however, be done by other 
means provided by the ECT and referred to in the next pages. 
 
The ‘denial of benefits’ clause under the Article 17 of the ECT was introduced to 
balance the generous provisions of the ECT and prevent their abuse for the benefit of 
individuals or legal entities not protected by the ECT. However, as the analysis of 
Article 17 revealed, this clause proved to be controversial in the practice of ECT 
tribunals. The tribunals in Plama v. Bulgaria and the Yukos Cases expressed opinions 
which de facto leave the ‘denial of benefits’ clause with no practical consequences. 
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What would suppose to be a valid mechanism for counteracting manipulations of the 
protection of the ECT was turned by these tribunals into a beneficial provision for treaty 
shoppers. The arguments of the parties in these two cases raised questions regarding the 
exercise and effects of the ‘denial of benefits’ clause and the time when this clause may 
be reasonably invoked by a Contracting Party. Both tribunals held that the ‘denial of 
benefits’ clause does not function automatically, but that Contracting Parties must 
exercise this right in a timely manner and, when it is exercised, it can only have 
prospective effects. Without revisiting the arguments exposed in Chapter II of the 
Thesis, it is important to mention here that in reaching their decisions, the tribunals in 
Plama and Yukos Cases misinterpreted the provisions of the Article 17 of the ECT. For 
example, in respect of the prospective effect – which goes hand-in-hand with the issue 
of timing - one would wonder whether the purpose of the ‘denial of benefits’ clause 
would not be defeated since a purported Investor would still be able to claim the 
protection of the ECT although it was never entitled to it. The issues highlighted in 
connection with the ‘denial of benefits’ clause relate not only to the broad or unclear 
language of Article 17, but also to the manner in which tribunals apply the rules of 
treaty interpretation and/or follow the decisions of previous tribunals on similar issues. 
 
Chapter II extensively dealt with the quality of shareholders as Investors under the ECT 
and referred to another important problem arising out of the inclusion of shareholders in 
the broad circle of Investors, which relates to parallel proceedings arising from the same 
act of a Contracting Party. It were mentioned the CME and Lauder cases where both 
tribunals rejected claims of lis pendens and res judicata, as well as the abuse of process 
by the claimants. The tribunals reiterated that in the application of the two principles 
there must be identity of the cause of action, parties and subject-matter. In the CME and 
Lauder cases the parties also failed to agree on the consolidation of the related arbitral 
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proceedings and the appointment of the same tribunal to hear both claims. While the 
tribunals in these cases did not see an abuse of treaty provisions by allowing a company 
and its shareholders/beneficiaries to recover damages arising out of the same action or 
omission of a state, this is a situation which can turn into a problem, especially where it 
results in a double recovery of damages or in irreconcilable awards. The provisions of 
the ECT equally protect shareholders and companies and, thus, each of these Investors 
is entitled to rely on the ECT and seek compensation for the damages caused by a 
Contracting Party. It can also be the case, as in the CME and Lauder cases, that these 
claims appear not solely within the ECT system, but also outside it, for example when 
the shareholder relies on a BIT because it does not satisfy the Investor requirements of 
the ECT. Thus, taking a formalistic approach, these situations would not entitle the 
application of the principles of res judicata and lis pendens since in the first case there 
would not be a strict identity of parties, while in the second case, the parties and well as 
the cause of action would be different. The remedy for this problem could either be at 
the procedural level or within the treaty system. While the last solution will be 
discussed below, the procedural remedies within the ECT system – which were 
previously mentioned - are briefly discussed here. Tribunals and parties could manage 
parallel proceedings and duplication of claims by consolidating the proceedings. 
Although the ECT does not provide for this option, the parties may agree to consolidate 
new claims with the pending proceedings.890 Where consolidation is not possible or 
cannot be agreed by the parties, another option would be the appointment of the same 
tribunal to hear the claims, together or separately (seriatim). Another solution would be 
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 Only the SCC Arbitration Rules provide for consolidation (Art. 11). The other treaties and arbitration 
rules are silent on this. 
See also, Art. 1117 (3) of the NAFTA which provides for the possibility to consolidate a claim brought 
under Art. 1117 (by a controlling shareholder on behalf of the company) and a claim made under Art. 
1116 (by a shareholder on its own behalf). Also, Art. 1121(1)(b) of the NAFTA which provides for the 
condition precedent for shareholders submitting claims on their own behalf, i.e. the company waived the 
right to any dispute resolution mechanism with respect to the measure of the state giving rise to the 
alleged breach of Art. 1116.  
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for arbitral tribunals to take a wider approach on the res judicata and lis pendens 
doctrines because “from an economic point of view, such formalism prevents the law 
from addressing […] a true abuse of investment protection.”891 It is suggested that 
tribunals should retain the identity of parties when they bear the same interest – such as 
shareholders and companies, and assess the cause of action with reference to the nature 
of the rights asserted and not to their source.892 Arguably, such economic approach 
would give efficiency to the finality of arbitral awards and discourage parties to 
manoeuvre the provisions of investment treaties and resubmit claims arising from the 
same conduct of a state. Arbitral tribunals must also acknowledge that when dealing 
with claims brought by shareholders for damages caused to their Investment by conduct 
of Contracting Parties directed to their company the compensation awarded to 
shareholders may not be equivalent to the one which the company would be entitled to 
receive. This approach was adopted by the tribunal in Nykomb v. Latvia which noted 
that the reduced tariff did not cause Nykomb, as shareholder – albeit the sole 
shareholder of Windau - , the same damage as to Windau. The tribunal thus regarded 
the shares held by Nykomb as the Investment protected by the ECT and concluded that 
“[a]n assessment of the Claimant’s loss on or damage to its investment based directly on 
the reduced income flow into Windau is unfounded and must be rejected.”893 The 
NAFTA also provides for a solution to the potential problems raised by claims brought 
by shareholders arising out of the conduct of states towards companies. However, this 
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 Cremades, Bernardo M.; Parallel Arbitration Tribunals and Awards, p. 312, in Ribeiro, C. (ed.); supra 
at FN 89. 
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 McLachlan, C.; Shore, L.; Weiniger, M.; International Investment Arbitration. Substantive Principles; 
supra at FN 852, p. 130. See also, Schreuer, Christoph; Reinisch, August; Legal Opinion in CME Czech 
Republic B.V. (The Netherlands) v. The Czech Republic, 3 TDM (2005), where the authors suggest that 
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party in interest, which in the Lauder and CME cases was Mr Lauder as the ultimate controller of all 
companies involved. (ibid., p. 27) 
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 Nykomb v. Latvia, supra at FN 531, para. 5.2, p. 39. 
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solution concerns claims by shareholders on behalf of companies and not the case when 
shareholders submit the claims in their own name. Article 1117 of the NAFTA provides 
that any payment of damages in the case of claims brought by shareholder on behalf of 
the company has to be made directly to the company that suffered the damage.894 It 
must also be mentioned in this context the fact that Article 26(2) of the ECT allows 
Investors to choose between three mechanisms for the resolution of their disputes with 
Contracting Parties and this choice, when made, is not irrevocable and, accordingly, 
Investors may take the dispute to the other forums under Article 26.895 This means that 
in addition to the possibility that shareholders of a company and the company itself 
claim for damages arising out of the same conduct of the host Contracting Party, there 
also exists the possibility to reproduce the dispute resolution alternatives, even at the 
same time. 896 
 
c. Investor and Investment. Customary International Law and the Definition of 
Investment 
Chapter III of the Thesis analysed the notion of ‘Investment’ as an essential element 
which defines the notion of ‘Investor’ and highlighted - yet - other controversial issues. 
The main one concerns the apparently broad definition under Article 1(6) of the ECT as 
virtually encompassing any kind of asset owned or controlled by an Investor. The 
research revealed that this broadness is limited by two requirements set forth in 
paragraph 3 of Article 1(6), namely that the assets must constitute an investment within 
the ordinary meaning of the term and they must be associated with an Economic 
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 Under Art. 1117, the shareholder must own or control the company. See also, Art. 1117(3) for the 
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 See, Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan where the claimant, prior to the ECT arbitration, brought the dispute 
under the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules and the Kyrgz Foreign Investment Law.  
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Activity in the Energy Sector. Thus, the notion of ‘Investment’ within the meaning of 
the ECT excludes one-off transactions and, consequently, natural personas or legal 
entities engaged in these types of transactions cannot avail themselves of the quality of 
Investor. In spite of this, the tribunal in Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan held that a right 
conferred by contract to undertake an activity concerning the sale of gas condensate is 
an Investment. As it will be discussed below, arbitral tribunals have the duty to properly 
interpret the provisions of the ECT and, thus, not to expand the language of these 
provisions and widen the protection offered by the ECT. The analysis of the notion of 
‘Investment’ also revealed that there is currently a movement towards a standardization 
of investment law and its concepts. In AFT v. Slovakia the tribunal reached the unusual 
conclusion that the elements of the ‘Salini test’, as explained in Section 7 of Chapter III, 
are to be applied by any tribunals dealing with disputes between investors and states, 
whether ICSID-based or not, and, in this sense, they “contributed to elucidate the notion 
of investment under […] customary international law”.897 As mentioned before, it is 
difficult to substantiate this conclusion when, first, the notion of ‘investment’ is not a 
normative rule, and second, the traditional elements of custom – duration, consistency, 
generality and opinion juris -– are unlikely to be identified in investment law given the 
diversity of treaties and fora under which the rights of investors are granted and 
protected. However, this does not exclude the application of the existent customary 
international law rules by arbitral tribunals. 
 
d. Potential Solutions within the ECT System 
The problems identified throughout the Thesis and, in particular, the ones reiterated here 
above, raise distinct issues and solutions, some of which referred to in the previous 
pages. 
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First, there are decisions of arbitral tribunals constituted under Article 26 of the ECT 
which failed to correctly apply the rules of treaty interpretation codified by the Vienna 
Convention. This issue reveals not only a failure of behalf of distinguished arbitrators, 
but also the absence of a mechanism whereby questions of interpretation of the ECT’s 
provisions should be addressed. This discussion was also raised in the context of the 
ICSID Convention, in particular with regard to the jurisdiction of the ICSID.898 The 
Energy Charter Conference and the Energy Charter Secretariat, as mentioned in Chapter 
III, do not have interpretative powers. Each arbitral tribunal constituted under the 
dispute resolution mechanism of Article 26 has the competence to interpret the 
provisions of the ECT. It is true that this system, as it is the case with arbitral tribunals 
established under different structures, creates a fragmentation of the ECT since each 
tribunal may advocate its own view on the interpretation of the ECT. This situation can 
be solved by using the tools already present in the ECT to clarify or amend some of the 
ECT’s provisions. Examples of these provisions include the definition of ‘Investor’ 
under Article 1(7) which is silent on the inclusion or exclusion of dual nationals and 
state-owned or controlled legal entities, on the legal personality of legal entities etc., the 
application of the denial of benefits clause under Article 17, the issues of parallel 
proceedings and treaty shopping etc. 
 
The clarification of these provisions may be done through the mechanism of Article 
34(3)(b) of the ECT which authorizes the Energy Charter Conference to keep under 
review and facilitate the implementation of the provisions of the ECT, by way of 
protocols or declarations (Article 33(1) of the ECT). Contracting Parties may also resort 
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 See, ICSID Secretariat, Discussion Paper on Possible Improvements of the Framework for ICSID 
Arbitration, 
<http://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/FrontServlet?requestType=ICSIDPublicationsRH&actionVal=ViewA
nnouncePDF&AnnouncementType=archive&AnnounceNo=14_1.pdf>, (last visited 11 August 2011). 
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to the provisions of Article 42 of the ECT which provides for the amendment of the 
ECT. However, the shortcomings of the mechanisms under Article 34 and 42 concern 
the approval by all Contracting Parties of the protocols or amendments, in order to have 
the desired effects. 
 
Further, issues of misinterpretation of ECT’s provisions may also be prevented if a de 
facto stare decisis doctrine is not adopted by ECT tribunals – see for example the nearly 
identical decisions of the tribunals in the Plama v. Bulgaria and the Yukos Cases in 
respect of the ‘denial of benefits’ clause. As mentioned in the ‘Introduction’ to this 
Thesis, the ECT does not codify the stare decisis doctrine which would oblige tribunals 
to observe the decisions taken in previous cases. Arbitral awards and decisions under 
the ECT – and the same is valid in the context of the ICSID - are binding only on the 
parties to the dispute.899 While tribunals discuss previous decisions because they are 
either raised by the parties or because they seek to find support for their conclusions, 
this may not result in the application of the provisions of the ECT contrary to the rules 
of treaty interpretation.  
 
Last but not least, the issues raised by the interplay between the ECT and the related 
treaties and arbitration rules have significant consequences on the decision of Investor 
between the arbitration venues made available by Article 26 of the ECT. The same 
dispute may have different outcomes under the different options laid down in Article 26 
of the ECT. This sensible choice made by the Investor must take into consideration not 
                                                
899
 But see, Burlington Resources, Inc. v. Republic of Ecuador, Decision on Jurisdiction of 2 June 2010, 
para. 100, footnote omitted: 
“The Tribunal considers that it is not bound by previous decisions. At the same time, it is of the opinion that 
it must pay due consideration to earlier decisions of international tribunals. The majority believes that, 
subject to compelling contrary grounds, it has a duty to adopt solutions established in a series of consistent 
cases. It also believes that, subject to the specifics of a given treaty and of the circumstances of the actual 
case, it has a duty to seek to contribute to the harmonious development of investment law, and thereby to 
meet the legitimate expectations of the community of States and investors towards the certainty of the rule of 
law. […]” 
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only the supplementary requirements imposed by the related treaties and arbitration 
rules, but also other factors, such as the applicable procedure, the applicable law, the 
enforcement of the arbitral awards, the time and resources spent in the arbitration 
proceedings etc.900 
 
The aim of this Thesis was to attempt a comprehensive analysis of the notion of 
‘Investor’, as it is presented within the framework of the ECT and its related treaties and 
arbitration rules. While the inclusive approach of this research might have suffered from 
inherent limitations due the scope and nature of this Thesis, the intention was to present 
the concept of Investor not in isolation from other notions of the ECT, but as it interacts, 
naturally, with other concepts and provisions, within or outside the ECT. This research 
revealed that the notion of ‘Investor’ under the ECT has two important features: it is 
difficult to define and it is adaptable. A definition of the notion of ‘Investor’ may be put 
together, but there will always be limitations, caveats, statements, understandings, 
explanations etc. that come to clarify its meaning. It is adaptable because as soon as it 
leaves the frame of the ECT, it is shaped by the applicable provisions of related treaties 
or rules. 
 
The task of negotiating and bringing the ECT into force was a challenging endeavour 
for “breaking new ground in international treaties”,901 especially when the treaty covers 
“a very heterogeneous set of countries with a wide variety of existing international 
treaty commitments.”902 The speed of the ECT’s negotiation was the determining factor 
                                                
900
 For the different factors influencing the decision to arbitrate under particular rules or institutions, see, 
Mistelis, Loukas; International Arbitration: Corporate Attitudes and Practices; 12 Perceptions Tested: 
Myths, Data and Analysis, 15(3–4) Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 525 (2004); Blanch, J.; Moody, A.; Lawn, N.; 
supra at FN 254, p. 11; Bernardini, Piero; ICSID Versus Non–ICSID Investment Treaty Arbitration in 
Fernández–Ballesteros, M.Á.; Arias, D. (eds.); supra at FN 320. 
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that contributed to the entry into force of the ECT. However, as admitted by the 
Chairman of the Legal Sub–Group for the ECT’s negotiation, 
“[…] forcing the issues to a conclusion may have resulted in a scope of 
investment protection that is understood differently by different negotiating 
parties. The same probably can be said of various other provisions of the 
Treaty.”903 
 
The analysis of the notion of ‘Investor’ brought up controversial issues as a result of 
sometimes ambiguous or broad language of the ECT’s provisions. While some of these 
issues may be solved in practice through the rules of treaty interpretation, others might 
deserve further clarification form the Contracting Parties to the ECT. 
 
While the ECT might not be perfect, it has brought positive changes to the energy 
investment environment and laid down an enforceable legal framework for the 
development of Investments. At least from a historical perspective, the ECT has 
achieved what other treaties or projects are struggling to accomplish. Nevertheless, it is 
still to be seen whether the ECT served as precedent for other multilateral treaties. 
                                                
903
 Bamberger, Craig S.; The Negotiation of the Energy Charter Treaty, p. xlviii, in Coop, G.; Ribeiro, C. 
(eds.); supra at FN 90. 
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